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Abstract 
 
This dissertation analyses the biofuel debate in the UK, focusing on how the UK 
Government has deployed expectations to legitimise its biofuel policy. The 
analysis builds on the sociology of expectations, integrated with insights from 
the multi-level perspective (MLP) on socio-technical transitions.  
By the end of the 1990s, a sustainable paradigm permeated UK road transport 
policy opening a space for biofuel policy to emerge. In the second half of the 
2000s, disagreements among UK stakeholders over the translation of EU 
biofuel targets into UK biofuel policy prefigured later EU-wide discussions over 
limiting targets for first-generation biofuels. Biofuels critics disagreed with the 
UK Government and biofuels supporters over how to protect a space for future 
second-generation biofuels, which were expected to overcome the harm caused 
by currently available, but controversial, first-generation biofuels. The UK 
Government and biofuels supporters defended rising targets for available 
biofuels as a necessary stimulus for industry to help fulfil the UK’s EU 
obligations and eventually develop second-generation biofuels. By contrast, 
critics opposed biofuels targets on the grounds that these would instead lock-in 
first-generation biofuels, thus pre-empting second-generation biofuels.  
I argue that these disagreements can be explained in relation to the UK 
Government‘s responsibilities relating to “promise-requirement cycles”, whereby 
technological promises generate future requirements for the actors involved. 
Further, I claim that the UK Government’s stance reflects what I call a “policy-
promise lock-in” – i.e. a situation in which previous policy commitments towards 
technology innovators of incumbent technologies (currently controversial and 
potentially driven by several imperatives) are officially justified as necessary for 
the development of preferable emerging technologies. Finally, my analysis 
expands the focus of the sociology of expectations, which has hitherto mostly 
been used to investigate expectations from technology innovators – i.e. 
scientists or industrialists – by investigating how other types of actor mediate 
expectations among different parties, in particular, public authorities, industry 
associations, consultancies, and non-governmental organisations.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
The international debate on biofuel policy has degenerated into a heated 
controversy on the environmental and socio-economic sustainability of biofuels. 
Impressed by the complex network of expectations involved in that debate, I set 
out to research how the UK Government has come to endorse a specific set of 
expectations over others to justify its biofuel policy. To that end, in this 
dissertation I detail, through an analysis of their statements of expectations, 
how the UK Government and other participants in the debate have selected, 
combined, and diffused different visions of UK biofuel policy. Like other 
analyses grounded in the sociology of expectations, mine does not assess the 
validity of specific projections, rather it “shift[s] the discussion from looking into 
the future to looking at how the future as a temporal abstraction is constructed 
and managed, by whom and under what conditions” (Brown et al., 2000, p. 4). 
The future orientation of the debate on the environmental and socio-economic 
sustainability of biofuel policy takes the discussion into the realm of 
expectations on technologies and policies, where uncertainty is endemic, and 
multiple visions of the future compete to gain dominance. Take, for instance, the 
following two statements of expectations on biofuels: 
 
“… fuels made from biomass [i.e. biofuels] represent an important 
potential route for achieving the goal of zerocarbon transport, creating 
new opportunities for agriculture in the UK as well as globally.” 
(Department of Trade and Industry [DTI], 2003, p. 69) 
 
“It is a crime against humanity to convert agricultural productive soil into 
soil which produces food stuff that will be burned into biofuel.” (United 
Nations [UN], 2007, October 26) 
 
In the still ongoing controversy over biofuel policy, the UK Government has 
endorsed an official vision in which expectations for future technological 
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generations of biofuels justify the continued support of currently available, but 
controversial, biofuels. As shown in this dissertation, the UK Government has 
come to endorse this vision, despite all the uncertainties and disagreements 
surrounding it. 
 
In the European Union (EU), biofuel policy is led and enforced by the European 
Commission (EC) through EU Directives which require formal approval from the 
EU Council and Parliament. Current EU biofuel policy is set out by the 2009 EU 
Directives on Renewable Energy and Fuel Quality (EU, 2009FQ; 2009RED). 
These Directives introduced a “binding” target for all EU Member States 
requiring that renewable transport fuels – in practice, mostly biofuels – 
represent 10% of total transport fuel consumed by 2020. Before 2009, EU 
biofuel policy was set out by an EU Directive specifically dedicated to the 
promotion of biofuels (EU, 2003). Issued in 2003, the Directive initiated EU 
biofuel policy by introducing two EU-wide biofuel targets: 2.5% by 2005 and 
5.75% by 2010. Unlike the 2009 binding target, these were “reference” targets, 
granting EU Member States greater discretion in setting out their own 
“indicative” targets. The 2003 Directive also allowed Member States more 
freedom in deciding how to translate EU biofuel policy into national legislation.  
 
When the controversy over the environmental and socio-economic sustainability 
of biofuels gained momentum during 2007-2008, UK public authorities and 
stakeholders called the UK Government to account for its responsibilities for 
biofuel policy. Multiply constrained – upward by the EU, downward by UK 
stakeholders, and sideways by other UK public authorities – the UK 
Government attempted to mediate several parties’ diverging views on the future 
of biofuel policy. By the end of 2008, the UK Government decided to slow down 
support for biofuels. This decision reversed previous policy commitments made 
to the EU and the UK biofuel industry to increase support for biofuels over time. 
However, it effectively preserved support for biofuels despite calls for a biofuel 
policy moratorium from other UK public authorities and stakeholders. During this 
period, the UK Government adopted the vision on biofuel policy that it still holds 
today. 
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A key empirical contribution of my research is an explanation of how the UK 
Government’s responsibilities towards technology policies have affected the 
construction of its current vision on biofuel policy. This contribution stems from 
the investigation of a series of research questions: (1) How has the UK 
Government’s vision on biofuel policy evolved over time? (2) How have the UK 
Government’s responsibilities in technology policy affected that evolution? (3) 
Which visions on biofuel policy were competing at the time that the UK 
Government adopted its current vision on biofuel policy? (4) How have the UK 
Government’s responsibilities in technology policy affected its choice of which 
visions to select and marginalise within its current biofuel policy? 
 
To investigate this case of competing futures, I integrate the theoretical 
framework of the sociology of expectations with insights and terminology from 
the multi-level perspective (MLP). The sociology of expectations made 
expectations its main object of inquiry, while the MLP is well suited to cases of 
socio-technical transitions – such as that between generations of biofuel 
technologies. As a key theoretical contribution, my research extends the focus 
of the sociology of expectations to actors other than technology innovators. 
Technology innovators are the actors most closely related to technological 
development, such as scientists or industrialists or “‘innovations players’ whose 
hopes and efforts are invested in the success of new technologies” (Pollock & 
Williams, 2010, p. 2). The sociology of expectations in particular has typically 
been applied to analyse expectations from these types of actor. In this 
dissertation, I analyse and interpret the deployment of the expectations of the 
government in particular, but also of other public authorities as well as of private 
actors such as industry associations, consultancies, and non-governmental 
organisations. My analysis addresses a series of theoretical questions: (5) How 
do previous policy commitments towards technology innovators influence an 
executive public authority in the construction of its vision of the future? (6) How 
do public authorities, industry associations, consultancies, and non-
governmental organisations diffuse expectations? (7) How could these actors 
be interpreted through the lens of the sociology of expectations? 
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To tackle these research questions, I rely on an historical analysis and a cross-
sectional analysis, which I report in Part 1 and 2, respectively, of the 
dissertation.  
 
The historical analysis relies on analyses of a temporal series of official 
documents issued by several UK and EU public authorities during the period 
1994-2012. These official documents contain the “official voice” of public 
authorities, which assume responsibility for their content by signing them as 
their own. The analysis includes several official documents from the UK 
Government departments involved in sustainable road transport and biofuel 
policies, and issued them in the name of the UK Government. Complementing 
these documents are official documents from the European Commission and 
Council. A special focus is on the official correspondence that the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP), the Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs Committee (EFRAC), and the Environmental Audit Committee 
(EAC) exchanged with the UK Government within that period. This official 
correspondence is here treated as a time-series sample of documents for a 
comparative analysis of statements of expectations among public authorities 
over time. The historical analysis unveils how the UK Government’s official 
vision on biofuel policy evolved from its origins in the sustainable transport 
debate to the current biofuel controversy. It also shows how previous policy 
commitments towards technology innovators have distinctively influenced public 
authorities with executive roles in technology policy – compared with public 
authorities with other policy remits – in the construction of their visions of the 
future. The analysis shows that the UK Government disagreed with the RCEP, 
EFRAC and EAC on several occasions. I will argue that the previous policy 
commitments of the UK Government towards the biofuel industry have been a 
critical factor in the definition of its vision, partially explaining those 
disagreements.  
 
The cross-sectional analysis relies on document analyses of the responses and 
accompanying documents of a public consultation on biofuel policy. This 
consultation was launched on the 15th October 2008 by the Department for 
Transport (DfT) in the name of the UK Government. Around that time, the UK 
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Government adopted its current vision on biofuel policy. The consultation 
collected 89 responses, among which several from industry actors, but also 
from other types of actor, such as industry associations, consultancies, non-
governmental organisations, and public authorities among others. The 
consultation responses are here treated as a purposive and convenient cross-
sectional sample of documents for a comparative analysis of the statements of 
expectations of the UK Government and the consultation participants around 
the time when the former adopted its current vision on biofuel policy. The cross-
sectional analysis unveils the visions competing at that time and which of those 
visions were selected or marginalised in the current vision of the UK 
Government. It also shows how other types of actor besides technology 
innovators have deployed and diffused expectations in the consultation. The 
analysis indicates that the vision of the UK Government was very similar to that 
promoted by the biofuel industrialists, but strongly contested by supporters of 
other visions. I will argue that this finding reconfirms that the previous policy 
commitments of the UK Government towards the biofuel industry were a critical 
factor in its definition of future policy, again partially explaining those 
disagreements. 
 
This introductory chapter contains another four sections. Section 1 delineates 
the main features of the biofuel policy debate. Section 2 illustrates a 
conceptualisation of the UK Government as a public authority in a democratic 
society, which I use as a starting point for my research. Section 3 briefly 
introduces the theoretical framework adopted in the dissertation. Section 4 
outlines the dissertation. 
 
 
1. Case study: the UK Government’s vision on biofuel policy 
 
In the UK, the debate on biofuel policy is currently framed around a policy 
dilemma involving two opposing sets of expectations: whether to foresee 
incumbent biofuel technologies as a transitional requirement or as a threat for 
the future development of emerging biofuel technologies. Incumbent – or 
currently available – biofuels are generally referred to as “first generation” or 
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“conventional”, while emerging – or future – biofuels are generally referred to as 
“second generation” or “advanced” (United Nations Environment Programme 
[UNEP], 2009, p. 25; International Energy Agency [IEA], 2011, p. 8). This policy 
dilemma is at the centre of a highly contentious controversy involving a large 
and heterogeneous multitude of actors with different interests in biofuel 
technologies and their policies. Within this controversy, the UK Government has 
endorsed the view that current support for the incumbent industry of first-
generation biofuels is a transitional requirement to encourage investment in the 
development of emerging second-generation biofuels. In what follows, I outline 
the main features of the biofuel debate and detail the vision of the future that the 
UK Government has endorsed. 
 
1.1 The wider context 
 
The biofuel debate is grounded on the recognition that fossil fuels are a finite 
resource and are largely responsible for climate change. Liquid biofuel 
technologies can process a wide range of organic material (biomass) and 
convert it into fuels that can be used as substitutes for fossil fuels in road 
transport – i.e. petrol and diesel derived from crude oil. The value of these 
technologies is debated with respect to their potential to provide a sustainable 
solution for mitigating climate change by reducing the consumption of oil in the 
transport system. 
 
Oil is a fossil fuel, and therefore not a renewable energy source. It takes millions 
of years to form and oil reserves cannot reform or renew in time to match 
current and predicted future consumption rates. Oil is thus expected to become 
increasingly scarce and costly in the next few decades (Royal Society [RS], 
2008, pp. 1, 5). Within the last forty years, awareness about the serious 
negative consequences of oil supply crises has combined with expectations of a 
future depletion of the oil reserves. The exact point by which all currently 
available oil will have been extracted and its cost will start to rise permanently – 
a time referred to as “peak oil” – remains a contested issue however. This 
uncertainty is partly due to unreliable evidence on the state of oil reserves 
(Owen et al., 2010, pp. 4744-4745). Furthermore, expectations for new 
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technologies enabling the exploitation of currently inaccessible oil reserves, 
other types of fossil fuels, and alternative energies allay fears about an 
imminent exhaustion of the oil supply (Bardi, 2009, pp. 324-326; Chapman, 
2014, pp. 99-100). These concerns are particularly relevant for the transport 
sector, which is almost completely reliant on oil (Gasparatos et al., 2009, p. 
626). 
 
The consumption of fossil fuels has been identified as one of the major 
anthropogenic drivers of climate change. This liability is grounded in the 
recognition of the existence of climate change and of human activities as largely 
responsible for its worsening. According to the International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), increasing emissions of Green House Gases (GHGs) are 
among the causes of climate change:  
 
“Changes in the atmospheric concentrations of GHGs and aerosols, land 
cover and solar radiation alter the energy balance of the climate system 
and are drivers of climate change. They affect the absorption, scattering 
and emission of radiation within the atmosphere and at the Earth’s 
surface.” (Intergovernmental Pannel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2007, p. 
37) 
 
As for anthropogenic GHGs emissions, human activity is reckoned to have 
substantially increased the concentration in the global atmosphere of four long-
lived GHGs, namely: carbon dioxide CO2, methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), 
and halocarbons (a group of gases containing fluorine, chlorine, or bromine) 
(IPCC, 2007, p. 37). In particular: 
 
“Global atmospheric concentrations of CO2, CH4 and N2O have 
increased markedly as a result of human activities since 1750 and now 
far exceed pre-industrial values determined from ice cores spanning 
many thousands of years … The atmospheric concentrations of CO2 and 
CH4 in 2005 exceed by far the natural range over the last 650,000 years. 
Global increases in CO2 concentrations are due primarily to fossil fuel 
use, with land-use change providing another significant but smaller 
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contribution. It is very likely that the observed increase in CH4 
concentration is predominantly due to agriculture and fossil fuel use. The 
increase in N2O concentration is primarily due to agriculture.” (IPCC, 
2007, p. 37) 
 
In the period 1970-2004, energy supply, transport, and industry were 
responsible for the largest growth in GHG emissions, while emissions from the 
residential and commercial buildings, forestry (including deforestation), and 
agriculture sectors were growing at a lower rate (IPCC, 2007, p. 37). The 
transport sector in particular is reckoned to be responsible for a share of 13.1% 
of anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2004 in terms of CO2-eq (IPCC, 2007, p. 
36). 
 
These findings have moved policymakers to take action to reduce fossil fuel 
consumption and search for alternative and/or renewable energy sources for all 
sectors of human activity, including transport. Fossil fuels’ finite nature and the 
related risks of future shortages, as well as their negative impacts on the 
climate, are widely considered established facts that require solutions.1 Public 
authorities in the UK have attempted to shape policies accordingly. However, 
selecting specific solutions to promote through policy is not straightforward. A 
first issue is how to balance limited public finances when allocating investments 
in reducing fossil fuels consumption and developing alternative and/or 
renewable energy sources. Then there is the problem of selecting the right mix 
of technologies for these two aims. In road transport, the alternative and/or 
renewable technologies considered as substitutes for oil include hydrogen, 
electricity, and biofuels. In the following section, I provide a synthetic account of 
                                            
1
 As Oreskes and Conway pointed out, even today the existence of climate change and its link 
with human activity are still contested issues – the authors maintain that there should be no 
doubts about climate change being a real threat and human activities being partly responsible 
for it (Oreskes, 2004; Oreskes & Conway, 2010). The high degree of uncertainty that surrounds 
the science behind climate change provides grounds for controversy. Disputed issues concern, 
for instance, the causes of the observed increase in global average air temperature. Some 
question whether this upward trend in temperature is abnormal or simply following long-term 
climatic variations that we are unable to measure because of the missing data on past climates. 
Whether and how much humans contribute to it is also questioned. Furthermore, the complexity 
of the models used in forecasting, indirect measurements, and the missing data on global 
warming create additional disputes over the validity of predictions of future trends of global 
temperature and their consequences (BBC Weather Centre, 2009; Harvey, 2010). 
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the main features of the biofuel debate and the issues that have been 
considered when biofuels’ sustainability has been questioned.  
 
1.2 Biofuels: a solution or a problem? 
 
Electricity and hydrogen are not viable solutions for the short term, particularly 
as they would entail the replacement of all vehicles and the construction of new 
fuel distribution systems from scratch, as well as changes to current vehicle 
uses (e.g. adapting to shorter autonomies, longer refuelling times, different 
vehicle performances, etc.). By contrast, biofuels are readily available and 
require major changes to neither the distribution system nor current vehicle 
uses. Biofuels can be distributed in the existing transport fuel distribution 
system and can be blended up to 10% in transport fuels without requiring the 
replacement of the existing vehicle fleet. Thus, they currently represent the only 
short-term route to replacing oil and mitigating climate change in road transport. 
In addition, biofuels have been indicated as a solution to fostering rural 
development, through the economic opportunities created by the production of 
their feedstock (IEA, 2011, pp. 7, 10).  
 
Yet the production of biofuels is not risk free. Referred to as “first-generation” or 
“conventional” biofuels, currently used biofuels, if adopted at a large scale, 
would entail extensive use of agricultural land (IEA, 2008, p. 16; 2011, p. 8). 
Indeed, most biofuel technologies that are economically viable today employ 
agricultural crops such as sugar cane, wheat, maize and palm oil, which have 
traditionally been grown for food and animal feed purposes, as feedstock for 
their production (IEA, 2008, p. 16; 2011, pp. 12-13). This is a problem, because 
land is scarce and subject to many competing demands, such as food, animal 
feed, and wood production, conservation, urban development, and recreation to 
name but a few (RS, 2008, p. 40). Any increase in the demand for land thus 
inevitably increases competition and results in upward pressures on the price of 
land and its related outputs. Accordingly, a large-scale adoption of first-
generation biofuels would entail an increase in the demand for agricultural land 
and consequently raise the prices of agricultural land and its produce. This 
increased pressure on land is expected to generate, directly and indirectly, land 
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displacement effects potentially leading to increased carbon emissions – thus 
potentially contradicting a core aim of biofuel policy – as well as to related 
adverse phenomena such as deforestation, biodiversity losses, food price 
crises, and land grabbing in developing countries among others (see section 
1.3.1 for more details).  
 
The acknowledgement of the direct and indirect adverse effects of biofuel 
production led policymakers to promote the development of systems assuring 
sustainability standards, monitoring biofuel production to ensure the 
sustainability of biofuels (Lewandowski & Faaij, 2006, p. 87; Van Dam et al., 
2008, pp. 752-756; Van Dam et al., 2010, pp. 2446-2450; Chalmers & Archer, 
2011, pp. 5682-5683; IEA, 2011, pp. 19-20). Such assurance systems certify 
biofuels as sustainable if their production abides by certain standards aimed at 
preventing or containing the above-mentioned adverse effects. Still, it is a 
contentious matter whether these systems can effectively and efficiently tackle 
the problems they are meant to address (Nuffield Council [NC], 2011, pp. 32-33, 
93-96, 112). 
  
As opposed to first-generation biofuels, “second-generation” or “advanced” 
biofuels are technologies that can process non-food feedstock, which could be 
produced in marginal lands or derived from organic wastes. Assuming that their 
production is properly managed, second-generation biofuels could then avoid or 
reduce the competition for land with other land uses (IEA, 2008, p. 34; 2011, pp. 
12-13). Thus, if coupled with an effective and efficient assurance scheme of 
sustainability standards, these technologies are expected to soften the adverse 
effects imputed to first-generation biofuels (IEA, 2008, p. 33; 2011, p. 8). Yet, at 
the moment, the only technologies that have reached commercialisation are 
first-generation biofuels. Second-generation biofuel technologies are still 
confined to laboratories and have not yet translated into economically viable 
commercial facilities (IEA, 2008, p. 33; 2010, pp. 7, 21; 2011, pp. 12, 35). The 
following section describes in greater technical detail the issues concerning the 
environmental and socio-economic sustainability of biofuels. 
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1.3 Biofuels as sustainable? 
 
In principle, biofuels could be carbon neutral, i.e. the amount of carbon they 
release when combusted could be equal to the amount of carbon absorbed 
during the growth of the organic material used to produce them. Nevertheless, 
when looking at the Life Cycle Assessments (LCAs) of current biofuel supply 
chains, that neutrality is never achieved (UNEP, 2009, pp. 51-61; IEA, 2011, pp. 
16-18). LCAs are methodologies aimed at calculating the net amount of direct 
and indirect carbon emissions resulting from the entire supply chain of biofuels 
– i.e. “from-cradle-to-grave” or from the inputs to the final outputs of biofuel 
production (IEA Bioenergy, 2011, p. 5). When taking into account all these 
emissions, at their best, biofuels can realise some carbon savings compared to 
the use of an equivalent unit of fossil fuels (Renewable Fuels Agency [RFA], 
2008a, p. 23; UNEP, 2009, pp. 51-61; IEA, 2011, pp. 16-18). 
 
Biofuels’ life-cycle emissions depend on the carbon emissions directly and 
indirectly generated by the demand of inputs for biofuel production and by the 
direct or indirect carbon emissions saved by the possible parallel production of 
co-products from biofuel production. In particular, the net carbon saving of a 
specific biofuel depends on the specific organic material and technology used in 
production as the demand for inputs and possible production of co-products 
differ accordingly. Concerning the demand for inputs, the crucial issues concern 
whether, how much, and which kind of energy, land, pesticides, fertilisers, 
water, equipment, etc. are used to produce and process biofuel feedstock. With 
regards to the possible parallel production of co-products, the crucial issues are 
whether, how much, and which kind of inputs are saved by the use of these co-
products in biofuel production or in any other business. For instance, current 
biofuel production from wheat, maize, and rapeseed produces valuable organic 
co-products that are suitable as animal fodder because of their high protein 
content. The overall effect of these co-products is to reduce the land required to 
produce high-protein crops specifically for animal feed. By reducing the demand 
for land in the livestock farming business, these biofuel co-products generate 
emissions savings (RFA, 2008a, p. 33). 
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Direct carbon emissions refer to the operations directly imputable to biofuel 
production. More specifically, the emissions resulting from the use of energy in 
all operations to produce, process, and transport both feedstock and biofuels, 
as well as from the biochemical reactions following the clearing of land to make 
space for feedstock cultivation, the ploughing of the fields, the use of fertilisers, 
pesticides, water, equipment, and so on. Indirect carbon emissions are the 
reactions that biofuel production induces in other businesses. More specifically, 
they relate to the direct and indirect emissions generated (or saved) by other 
businesses reacting to the demand of inputs and to the production of co-
products of biofuel production.  
 
Summing up, all direct and indirect emissions generated or saved by the 
demand of inputs and the production of co-products of biofuel production would 
need to be factored in to estimate how much carbon is being released from a 
specific biofuel supply chain (UNEP, 2009, pp. 51-61). However, none of the 
existing LCA methodologies is universally considered as comprehensive of all 
carbon emissions attributable to biofuel supply chains, especially concerning 
their indirect effects. Several areas of scientific uncertainty persist, fuelling 
controversy over how to design such a comprehensive methodology. As a 
result, several LCA methodologies exist, which apply different approaches to 
analyse different ranges of factors, and which inevitably lead to different 
estimations of LCA emissions (Scarlat & Dallemand, 2011, p. 1645; Broch et al., 
2013, p. 155; Witcover et al., 2013, p. 64). Biofuel critics doubt that it is actually 
possible to construct such a comprehensive methodology and criticise the lack 
of consideration for impacts other than the environmental, such as the negative 
socio-economic impacts of biofuels on developing countries (NC, 2011, pp. 32-
33, 93-96, 112). The next subsection focuses in more detail on the implications 
of the use of land as an input in biofuel production. 
 
1.3.1 Direct and indirect land use changes 
 
Among all the inputs used in biofuel production, land is one of the most 
problematic (Searchinger et al., 2008). The majority of first-generation biofuels 
require organic feedstock that must be cultivated on agricultural land, giving rise 
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to the so-called Direct Land-Use-Changes (dLUC) and Indirect Land-Use-
Changes (iLUC) (Searchinger et al., 2008; UNEP, 2009, pp. 63-71; IEA, 2011, 
pp. 16-18). Direct land-use-changes refer to the land displacement effects 
directly caused by biofuel cultivation. Indirect land-use-changes refer to the land 
displacement effects indirectly caused by other businesses reacting to the 
demand for input or to the offer of co-products of biofuel production.  
 
Direct and indirect land-use-changes can potentially outweigh the carbon 
savings of biofuels by converting lands with high carbon stocks to other uses; 
for instance, by clearing forests or by reclaiming peatland to make space to 
cultivable land or livestock farming. The process would generate a “carbon 
debt” that could potentially annihilate biofuels’ carbon savings or even increase 
biofuels’ carbon emissions beyond those released by an equivalent amount of 
fossil fuels (UNEP, 2009, pp. 63-71). Beyond deforestation, land-use-changes 
could also generate other adverse phenomena, such as biodiversity losses, 
increases in food prices, as well as worsening social conditions in rural 
communities in developing countries. These phenomena are treated in greater 
detail below: 
 
- Deforestation and Biodiversity Losses – the demand for agricultural land 
for the cultivation of biofuel feedstock competes with other demands. That 
competition increases the price of cultivable land and creates an incentive 
to convert virgin lands to compensate for the lack of offer. In the worst-
case scenario, biofuel producers may convert carbon sinks, such as 
forests or peatlands, for their large-scale, monoculture plantations – i.e. 
direct land-use-changes. Meanwhile, in reaction to the scarcity of land 
caused by biofuel production, other businesses may divert further virgin 
land – i.e. indirect land-use-changes. In both cases, there would be 
negative implications in the form of biodiversity losses (Food and 
Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations [FAO], 2008, pp. 55-67; 
IEA, 2008, p. 30; UNEP, 2009, pp. 63-71). 
 
- Food and Animal Feed Prices Increases – the production of food and 
animal feed crops directly competes with the production of energy crops 
23 
 
for biofuel production. Attracted by the financial support given to biofuels, 
farmers may divert land from food and animal feed cultivation to biofuel 
feedstock cultivation. Such land diversion would eventually increase food 
and animal feed prices (FAO, 2008, pp. 72-79; FAO et al., 2011, pp. 10, 
26-27). The upward surges in prices would be particularly felt in 
developing countries, as the relative weight of food expenses in household 
budgets is higher than in richer developed countries (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2007, p. 15; FAO, 
2008, p. 72; IEA, 2008, p. 28; Mitchell, 2008). 
 
- Worsening of Social Conditions – seeking greater profits, multinationals 
would produce biofuels in developing countries to exploit their low-cost 
work force, greater availability of land, and more favourable climate. 
Eased by the weaker law enforcement and the more accommodating 
governments of developing countries, multinationals could eventually 
infringe human rights by imposing unfair conditions on workers and by 
depriving local farmers of their land, irremediably compromising their 
standard of life2 (FAO, 2008, pp. 79-85; RFA, 2008a, p. 68; UNEP, 2009, 
p. 76; FAO et al., 2011, p. 45). 
 
Using organic wastes as biofuel feedstock is considered a possible solution to 
reduce the competition between biofuels and other land uses. Organic wastes 
would marginally affect the demand for land. Furthermore, in this case, only the 
emissions generated by the collection and conversion of wastes would be 
attributed to biofuel production. Producing biofuel feedstock in marginal or idle 
land is considered another possible solution to minimise competition over land 
use. Nevertheless, this last solution would still require an efficient and effective 
system of sustainability standards capable of ensuring that feedstock production 
is actually directed into marginal or idle land and that no carbon sink is affected 
as a result. 
                                            
2
 In the UK, biofuels were initially supported as beneficial for the domestic agricultural sector. 
Nevertheless, it soon became evident that the UK would become a large net importer of biofuels 
from developing countries. UK biofuel policies then clashed with concerns over the potential 
negative impact of biofuel feedstock production in those countries. 
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A few incumbent first-generation technologies convert organic wastes into 
biofuels. Among these, biodiesel from used cooking oil (UCO) (e.g. vegetable 
oils used in the food and restoration industry) is considered among the most 
sustainable biofuels currently available. However, these first-generation 
technologies can only contribute a small share of the total biofuel requirements, 
as their capacity is constrained by the limited availability of these specific 
organic wastes.  
 
Newer generations of biofuels are expected to reduce the negative impacts of 
first-generation biofuels. In particular, second-generation biofuel technologies 
would use non-food feedstock, which could be produced in marginal or idle land 
or even extracted from a wide range of organic wastes. Meanwhile, biofuels 
produced from algae – referred to as “third-generation” (IEA, 2008, p. 83; 
UNEP, 2009, p. 25) – would minimise the impact on land even further (IEA 
Bioenergy, 2010, pp. i-vi; IEA, 2011, p. 8; Adenle et al., 2013, p. 184).  
 
The negative outcomes of future large-scale production of agricultural feedstock 
for first-generation biofuels are still, for the most, plausible future projections. As 
a result, current biofuel policies mostly rely on expectations for technologies and 
policies as major justifications, as the next section explains. 
 
1.4 The UK Government’s vision on biofuel policy 
 
The UK Government is currently justifying biofuel policy by means of three 
interrelated expectations. Firstly, second-generation biofuels will solve the 
problems and realise the benefits initially attributed to first-generation biofuels. 
Secondly, sustainability standards will soon become effective in tackling the 
problems created by the production of biofuels and be properly implemented in 
biofuel supply chains. Thirdly, preserving the current market of first-generation 
biofuels will be necessary to realise the first two expectations. Together, these 
three expectations support the view that the benefits of yet-to-be developed 
second-generation biofuels and sustainability standards constitute sufficient 
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reasons to continue supporting currently available, but environmentally and 
socio-economically risky, first-generation biofuels.  
 
As I will argue, behind the third expectation there is an implicit rationale. The 
rationale prescribes that, for public authorities in charge of technology policy, it 
is necessary to maintain the promises of support made by previous policies in 
order to maintain the trust of investors, and consequently to maintain effective 
technology policy in the future. In the specific case of UK biofuel policy, the 
rationale recommends that the UK Government maintain the policy-promises 
made to the first-generation biofuel industry. This would be necessary to avoid 
discouraging the industry from meeting EU commitments in biofuels as well as 
any current and prospective biofuel investors from undertaking investments in 
second-generation biofuels and in implementing sustainability standards. In 
short, this rationale justifies the preservation of the current market of first-
generation biofuels as instrumental to techno-scientific advancement in future 
biofuels. Yet, this rationale and the above expectations remain highly 
controversial. 
 
 
2. The UK Government and its democratic obligations 
 
The focal point of this dissertation is the UK Government as participant in the 
biofuel policy debate in the UK. This dissertation starts from an initial and broad 
conceptualisation of the UK Government as a public authority of a democratic 
society. A public authority is here generally defined as an institution funded by 
public revenue (e.g. taxes) and supposed to perform its roles in the public 
interest (i.e. common well-being or general welfare) – in principle at least. In a 
democratic society, a public authority ought to honour transparency and 
participatory requirements in policymaking, that is, allow “the public” to 
scrutinise its policies and to directly participate in the legislative process. 
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According to the Select Committee3 on the Modernisation of the House of 
Commons, 
 
“… an effective, democratic legislative process must be as open as 
possible. This means not only that the public should be able to observe 
every aspect of it, but that they should wherever possible have the 
opportunity to become involved as active participants. This is a 
fundamental point of democratic principle, but also a prudent strategy. 
Members of Parliament have no monopoly on wisdom; the Government 
has no monopoly on effective consultation. A system which allows the 
individual or organisation who has spotted a way in which a pending 
piece of legislation might affect them to bring this readily to the attention 
of the legislature is less likely to produce laws which are defective or 
redundant, or which lead to unintended (even unforeseen) consequences 
… By ‘the public’, we mean not only individuals, but also the non-
governmental organisations, lobby groups and interest groups who seek 
to influence the form and content of laws. It is an important matter of 
principle, in a democracy, that citizens should be able to make their 
views known to legislators, and an accessible legislative process 
provides access to the many thousands of smaller groups as well as to 
the larger, better-organised interests.” (Modernisation Committee, 2006, 
pp. 5, 11) 
 
In this dissertation, I prefer to use the term “taxpayers” when I refer to “the 
public” for two main reasons. Firstly, the UK Government often refers to “the 
taxpayer” when it comments on its own responsibilities in technology 
policymaking (e.g. Defra, 2004, p. 6). Secondly, the term taxpayers relates to 
the definition here given of public authorities as institutions funded by public 
revenue. This said, the term taxpayers is here intended in a broad sense and 
interpreted as an equivalent of “electorate”, and/or “citizens”.  
                                            
3
 The Select Committee on the Modernisation of the House of Commons was appointed on 13
th
 
July 2005 by the House of Commons to consider how the House operates and to make 
recommendations on how the practices and procedures of the House should be modernised 
(Modernisation Committee, n.d.). 
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As “an important matter of principle, in a democracy”, the UK Government ought 
then to allow taxpayers to scrutinise its policies and directly participate in the 
legislative process (Modernisation Committee, 2006, pp. 5, 11). The publication 
of official documents in which the UK Government justifies its policy 
interventions is aimed at ensuring transparency in the policymaking process, 
which is a precondition to allowing taxpayers to scrutinise policies. The launch 
of public consultations is aimed at opening up the legislative process, which is a 
precondition to allowing taxpayers to participate and have their say in 
policymaking. The UK Government ought to engage with taxpayers also for 
pragmatic considerations. By collecting valuable insights on policies from 
taxpayers, it would reduce the risk “to produce laws which are defective or 
redundant, or which lead to unintended (even unforeseen) consequences”, 
preserving in this way the positive judgement of taxpayers, and thus legitimacy 
of policy intervention (Modernisation Committee, 2006, pp. 5, 11). In this effort, 
it should consider all taxpayers – i.e. “individuals, but also the non-
governmental organisations, lobby groups and interest groups who seek to 
influence the form and content of laws” (Modernisation Committee, 2006, pp. 5, 
11). 
 
By extension, the UK Government ought to select expectations from and on 
behalf of all taxpayers when defining and justifying technology policies. This 
should be even more the case when the UK Government channels public 
resources into specific technology developments as it also becomes 
answerable as a manager of public resources. Yet, as I will show in my 
analysis, in the case of biofuel policy, the UK Government sought to content not 
just taxpayers as a whole, but particularly biofuel industrial stakeholders who 
had been involved with precious policies. Ever since the UK Government 
promised political and financial support to biofuel industrial stakeholders, its 
policymaking responsibilities expanded to include specific responsibilities 
towards these latter. These responsibilities turned out to be a critical factor in 
the definition of the UK Government’s vision of the future. 
 
A key empirical contribution of my dissertation is to reveal how the reputational 
stakes of the UK Government in the incumbent industry of first-generation 
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biofuels were linked to techno-scientific advancement in second-generation 
biofuels to justify current biofuel support (see also Berti & Levidow, 2014). This 
linkage complements insights from previous analyses of UK biofuel policy 
(Dunlop, 2010; Palmer, 2010; Boucher, 2012). My dissertation also sheds light 
on which voices have been given more weight in the policymaking process, with 
an analysis of the fourth public consultation on biofuel policy. This analysis 
builds upon and adds insights to previous analyses of the second and third 
consultations on UK biofuel policy (Upham & Tomei, 2010; Upham et al., 2011). 
 
To investigate this case of competing futures, I integrate the theoretical 
framework of the sociology of expectations with insights and terminology from 
the MLP. In the next section, I briefly summarise these two frameworks. 
 
 
3. Theoretical framework 
 
Expectations have been the objects of interest of many scholars studying 
technology policy and technological development. A common view is that 
expectations – as subjective beliefs about the future – may exert a strong 
influence in technology development, especially when widely shared. Another 
common view is that expectations may be used as instruments to influence the 
beliefs of other actors.  
 
In evolutionary economics, expectations – as “beliefs about what is feasible or 
at least worth attempting” – are considered to be potentially constraining to the 
boundaries of technological progress by narrowing the directions in which 
progress is possible (Nelson & Winter, 1977, p. 57). Once widely shared, such 
expectations could result in powerful exclusion effects: the community of actors 
behind a technology may be negatively limited in their imagination by these 
expectations and, consequently, become “blind” to other technological 
possibilities (Dosi, 1982, p. 153). In the literature on large technical systems, 
expectations have been observed to exert a relatively stronger influence in the 
early phases of their adoption (Hughes, 1994; 2001). Similarly, in the literature 
on strategic niche management, expectations have been acknowledged as 
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important elements in defining trajectories for technological developments 
(Kemp, 1994, p. 1033), especially for technologies at the niche level – i.e. in 
their early development stages (Schot & Geels, 2007, pp. 615-616; Schot & 
Geels, 2008, p. 540; Nil & Kemp, 2009, p. 674). In the technological innovation 
system literature, expectations play an important role within the “guidance of the 
search” function – i.e. in guiding future development trajectories (Hekkert et al., 
2007, p. 423; Bergek et al., 2008, p. 415; Hekkert & Negro, 2009, p. 586). 
 
Expectations for technologies and policies can also be strategically mobilised by 
actors that compete in securing advantages in the debates governing planning, 
purchasing, training, regulation, and capital investment in technology 
development. Within the science and technology policy literature, influential 
actors, such as governments, industrials, and other authoritative sources, have 
been observed trying to influence other actors’ beliefs to their own advantage by 
promoting their own expectations over others (Scrase & Ockwell, 2009, p. 41; 
Stirling, 2009, p. 254). Thus, seemingly neutral predictions from influential 
actors may actually hide vested interests in promoting and shaping favoured 
futures (Stirling, 2009, p. 254). The sociology of expectations has internalised 
and further extended the above views, prompting me to adopt it for my 
investigation of competing futures. 
 
3.1 The sociology of expectations 
 
The sociology of expectations assumes that the future is inherently uncertain 
and possible in multiple forms (Brown et al., 2000, pp. 4-5). A future emerges 
from the unstable fields of language, practice, and materiality in which 
heterogeneous actors compete for the right to represent favoured visions of the 
future (Brown et al., 2000, pp. 4-5). Extensively applied to investigations of 
contentious futures, this theoretical framework focuses on expectations as the 
main objects of inquiry. Within this framework, expectations are simultaneously 
viewed as elements “doing things” per se, as “promises” of future commitments, 
and as resources strategically “used to do things” (Van Lente, 1993, pp. 185, 
190).  
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Viewed as doing things, “expectations can be understood as performative” 
(Borup et al., 2006, p. 286). Performativity refers to expectations’ power in 
fostering cooperation and providing direction for decision-making, thus 
potentially shaping or facilitating future technological developments (Van Lente, 
1993; 2000; Brown et al., 2003; Borup et al., 2006). When widely shared, 
expectations can become a “depersonalized social construction” not attributable 
to specific individuals or groups of actors, and “part of a generalised and taken-
for-granted social repertoire” (Konrad, 2006, p. 431). For instance, 
“technologies presented as the next generation … are self-justifying because 
the notion of next generation is widely accepted” (Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, pp. 
222-223).  
 
Viewed as promises on future commitments, shared expectations can turn into 
requirements for the actors enunciating or endorsing them, and so generate 
“promise-requirement cycles” (Van Lente, 1993, pp. 167, 191-193; Van Lente & 
Rip, 1998a, pp. 216-217; Van Lente, 2000, p. 58). Expectations contain 
descriptions of future roles “for the self, others and artefacts” (Van Lente, 1993, 
p. 195). Enunciating or endorsing expectations means promising to fulfil those 
roles, which can eventually turn into requirements if those expectations become 
shared. Technology innovators – or “technologists” – are those expected to 
propose technological expectations to justify their existence, and later required 
to fulfil them in practice by the rest of society. By contrast, all other actors – or 
“government” and “others” – are expected to endorse technological 
expectations from technology innovators, and are later called to give political-
financial support (Van Lente, 1993, p. 167; Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, p. 216; Van 
Lente, 2000, p. 60). 
 
Viewed as resources to do things, expectations are generally used to legitimise 
actions, communicate intentions, and attract the attention of other actors (Van 
Lente, 1993, p. 185; Geels & Smit, 2000, p. 882). Aware of expectations’ power, 
actors strategically use expectations to influence other actors’ views on 
technological futures in order to favour their own interests. Promises and diffuse 
scenarios are used to convince funding organisations and attract other 
practitioners to join the development. Seeking “protected spaces” (Van Lente, 
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1993, p. 196) and “attention from (financial) sponsors”, technology innovators 
may exaggerate their promises, potentially leading to “the failure of some future 
speculations” (Geels & Smit, 2000, p. 881). Such inflated prospects may lead to 
disappointment when earlier statements fail to match actual outcomes (Borup et 
al., 2006, p. 289) and undermine the reputations of both individuals and entire 
fields of innovation (Brown, 2003, p. 6; Brown et al., 2003, p. 1). 
  
The sociology of expectations has mostly been applied to analysing 
expectations from a specific type of actor here referred to as technology 
innovators – i.e. the actors most closely related to technological development. A 
key theoretical contribution of my dissertation is the widening of the focus of the 
sociology of expectations to types of actor besides technology innovators. 
Within this dissertation, the framework of the sociology of expectations is 
applied to investigate the government in particular, but also other public 
authorities, as well as private actors such as industry associations, 
consultancies, and non-governmental organisations. All these types of actor 
have been largely overlooked in the sociology of expectations. Complementing 
previous analyses in the sociology of expectations, the present study analyses 
these types of actor through a distinctive analytical perspective that looks at 
their functional roles and interrelations when diffusing expectations among 
different parties. Thus, beyond looking at the content and dynamics of their 
expectations, I investigate how and on whose behalf these actors mediate 
expectations. As a minor adaptation of that framework in my analysis, I 
distinguish analytically “technological promises” from “policy-promises”, i.e. the 
promises public authorities make on their future policy commitments once they 
endorse technological expectations of technology innovators. 
 
3.2 Integrating the sociology of expectations with the multi-level 
perspective 
 
To address the case of biofuel technologies, I have integrated the above 
framework with insights from the MLP on socio-technical transitions. Widely 
applied to cases of socio-technical transition, the MLP framework provides 
interesting insights and terminology to interpret how different actors imagined a 
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socio-technical transition between different technological generations of biofuel 
technologies. It theorises hierarchical relations among three socio-technical 
levels – in ascending order: niche, regime, and landscape. A socio-technical 
regime denotes an established set of cognitive and normative rules as 
expressed in policy, science, users, markets, etc. A regime can provide space 
for niches in which radical innovations can take place; niches can eventually 
change a regime or generate a new one. The socio-technical landscape 
denotes aspects of the wider political-economic environment, especially 
policies, which lie beyond the direct influence of actors at the niche and regime 
levels (Geels, 2004, p. 913; Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 401). All three levels 
encompass expectations for future developments in inter-dependent ways. In 
this dissertation, the MLP’s framework is used to classify and interpret the 
visions of the future under analysis. 
 
 
4. Outline 
 
This dissertation reports the historical and cross-sectional analyses in two 
separate parts, respectively Part 1 and Part 2. In total, it consists of nine 
chapters, four appendices, and one glossary as outlined below.  
  
4.1 Chapter 1 – Expectations of technologies and policies 
 
Chapter 1 contains the literature review. The review illustrates in detail the 
integration of the theoretical framework of the sociology of expectations with 
selected insights and terminology from the MLP on socio-technical transitions. 
This integration is intended to improve the framework’s interpretative power in 
analysing expectations of socio-technical transitions – such as those between 
biofuel generations. 
 
4.2 Chapter 2 – Methods and evidence 
 
Chapter 2 details the research method and evidence used in the historical and 
cross-sectional analyses. In particular, it introduces the case study method, and 
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discusses its limits and merits in general and in relation to my research. It then 
justifies my choice not to integrate my document analyses with interviews. 
Finally, it provides a detailed explanation of the research design and how 
evidence has been presented in the following chapters. 
 
4.3 Part 1 – Historical analysis – chapters 3 and 4 
 
Chapter 3 is the empirical chapter of the historical analysis. It reports the 
evidence drawn from the document analyses of a temporal series of official 
documents issued by several UK and EU public authorities between 1994 and 
2012. During that time, the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
(RCEP), the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (EFRAC), and the 
Environmental Audit Committee (EAC) exchanged official correspondence with 
the UK Government. This chapter identifies and compares over time the vision 
of biofuel policy of the UK Government with those of the RCEP, EFRAC, and 
the EAC. By doing so, it reveals the evolution of the UK Government’s vision of 
biofuel policy during that period. 
 
Chapter 4 reinterprets the findings of the historical analysis through the lens of 
the sociology of expectations integrated with insights from the MLP of socio-
technical transitions. This chapter focuses on how the distinctive policymaking 
responsibilities of the UK Government – in comparison with the other public UK 
authorities selected for the analysis – have influenced the way it diffuses 
expectations for technologies and policies. It is argued that disagreements 
among UK public authorities can be partially explained by their different 
responsibilities towards “promise-requirement cycles” – whereby technological 
promises generate future requirements for the actors involved (Van Lente, 
1993, p. 167; Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, p. 216; Van Lente, 2000, p. 60). As for 
the UK Government’s specific deployment of expectations, it is related to a 
“policy-promise lock-in” – i.e. a situation in which previous policy-commitments 
towards technology innovators of incumbent technologies (currently 
controversial and potentially driven by several imperatives) are officially justified 
as necessary for the development of preferable, emerging technologies. 
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4.3 Part 2 – Cross-sectional analysis – chapters 5, 6, and 7 
 
Chapter 5 reports evidence from the document analyses of the responses and 
accompanying documents of the public consultation on UK biofuel policy of the 
15th October 2008. Around that time, the UK Government adopted its current 
vision on biofuel policy. This chapter identifies and compares the visions on UK 
biofuel policy that were voiced in the consultation and associates them with the 
specific groups of actor supporting them. In doing so, it uncovers the multitude 
of visions competing at the time when the UK Government adopted its current 
vision on UK biofuel policy.  
 
Chapter 6 investigates which voices the UK Government selected and 
marginalised when constructing its vision on biofuel policy. The UK Government 
sought views on three alternative policy options for biofuel support. In their 
responses, participants opted for the policy option more aligned with their own 
visions on UK biofuel policy. In the analysis, I subdivided participants according 
to the policy option they supported and synthesised, and reinterpreted their 
visions through the sociology of expectations framework integrated with the 
MLP on socio-technical transitions.  
 
Chapter 7 analyses how industry associations, consultancies, non-
governmental organisations, and public authorities mediate expectations of 
technologies and policies among different parties. Referring to the work of 
Pollock and Williams, it then compares those types of actor with “promissory 
organisations” (Pollock & Williams, 2010). Finally, it proposes the broader 
definitions of private and public “intermediaries of promise” as a starting point 
for a deeper analysis of the role played by the different types of intermediaries 
that populate technology policy arenas.  
 
4.4 Chapter 8 – A space for intermediaries of information on technologies: 
some insights from economics 
 
Chapter 8 follows Parts 1 and 2 of the dissertation. Within this chapter, I wish to 
explain how I eventually came to conceptualise the roles of specific actors, 
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which I define as “intermediaries of promise”, in mediating information on 
technologies among different parties. In order to do so, I firstly present some 
reflections on my own mind-set, which is greatly influenced by both the 
sociology of expectations as well as by my previous background in economics. 
Reflections and insights from these literatures are organised and presented as 
an analytical model, which helps illustrate the roles of specialisations of 
resources, expertise, and reputation in the diffusion of expectations and visions 
of technologies. The “intermediaries of promise” that I observed in my case 
studies are then reinterpreted through that analytical model.  
 
4.5 Chapter 9 – Conclusions 
 
Chapter 9 concludes the dissertation with some final comments on the 
phenomenon of technology innovators “hyping” their statements of 
expectations. While doing so, I emphasise the main conceptualisations that I 
have proposed in this dissertation. This chapter invites scholars to consider 
some of the findings and insights presented in this dissertation and to undertake 
further research on issues yet to be explored by the sociology of expectations. 
 
4.6 Appendices – 1, 2, 3, and 4 
 
Appendix 1 provides further details on how the UK Government publishes 
official documents and launches public consultations via its departments. It also 
provides details on how the RCEP, EFRAC, and the EAC exchange official 
correspondence with the UK Government. Appendix 2 compares the lists of 
organisations that the DfT used to invite participants to the consultation under 
analysis and to the previous three consultations on UK biofuel policy. Appendix 
3 reports the complete list of questions surveyed by the consultation under 
analysis. Appendix 4 provides a synthetic account of the biofuel industrial 
context at the time of the consultation under analysis. 
 
4.7 Glossary 
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The glossary lists and explains all acronyms and initialisms used throughout the 
dissertation.  
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Chapter 1 – Expectations of technologies and policies 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In my research, I investigate how the UK Government and other participants in 
the UK biofuel policy debate have selected, combined and diffused different 
visions of UK biofuel policy through an analysis of their statements of 
expectations. As an example of such statements: 
 
“In the longer term, second generation biofuel technologies have the 
potential to reduce pressure on land because they can use a wider range 
of feedstocks, including waste. However, the Government does not 
believe it is feasible to wait for technological improvements before 
utilising biofuels. It is through stimulating a market for biofuels that we will 
encourage investment and the development of advanced technology.” 
(DfT, 2008b, p. 11) 
  
The above statement contains expectations of second-generation biofuel 
technologies and UK biofuel policy. The sociology of expectations offers 
relevant insights for an investigation of these kinds of statement, as I illustrate in 
this chapter. 
 
The chapter is divided into five sections. Section 1 reviews the main insights 
from the sociology of expectations on how to conceptualise expectations. 
Section 2 illustrates insights on the temporal and spatial dynamics of 
expectations. Section 3 relates my research contributions to the sociology of 
expectations. Section 4 explains in detail the integration of the sociology of 
expectations with the multi-level perspective (MLP) on socio-technical 
transitions. Section 5 discusses how expectations are here intended in terms of 
agency and structure. 
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1. Expectations in the sociology of expectations 
 
Several disciplines have looked at expectations as important elements in 
technology development (Borup et al., 2006, p. 285). Within Science and 
Technology Studies (STS), the sociology of expectations has made the future 
its central object of enquiry, prompting me to consider its framework the most 
appropriate for an investigation of competing futures. This literature has 
variously investigated expectations, visions and promises related to 
technological developments. 
 
“While expectations in their general form can be defined as the state of 
looking forward (from Latin, exspectatio, looking, waiting for), 
technological expectations can more specifically be described as real-
time representations of future technological situations and capabilities. 
Similar terms, which are commonly used, like technological ‘promises’ 
and ‘visions’ are largely overlapping with ‘expectations’ but emphasize to 
a higher degree their enacting and subjectively normative character. 
They stress that expectations are wishful enactments of a desired future. 
By performing such futures, they are made real and in this sense 
expectations can be understood as performative. Along with positive 
promises and hopes of future capabilities, fears and concerns about 
future risks are parallel features of these kinds of dynamics. Both positive 
expectations and fears of risk – though different in character and having 
different dynamics – can be seen to have considerable influence on the 
discussion technological change.” (Borup et al., 2006, p. 286) 
 
The sociology of expectations views expectations as elements “doing things”, 
as “promises” of future commitments, and as resources strategically “used to do 
things” (Van Lente, 1993, pp. 185, 190).  
 
1.1 Expectations as performative 
 
By aligning beliefs on the future, expectations influence decision-making in the 
present, ultimately affecting the development of technologies in the future. In 
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this sense, expectations can be conceptualised as “performative or constitutive” 
of the future (Borup et al., 2006, pp. 286, 289). Widely shared expectations can 
become a “depersonalized social construction”, not attributable to specific 
individuals or groups of actors, and “part of a generalised and taken-for-granted 
social repertoire” (Konrad, 2006, p. 431). For instance, when technologies are 
presented as the “next” or “new” generation superseding the “old” generation, 
they become “self-justifying because the notion of next generation is widely 
accepted” (Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, pp. 222-223) and “the notion of an old 
generation suggests that it is natural to replace it by a new one” (Van Lente, 
2006, p. 215). Whenever they become societal assumptions or “collective”, 
such expectations can even guide or justify the actions of those who do not 
necessarily share them (Konrad, 2006, p. 431). Thus, statements of 
expectations do not simply represent futures that do not exist in the present, but 
also do something in the present (Van Lente, 1993, p. 190).  
 
Expectations operate from the macro level of national policymaking to the meso 
level of sectors and innovation networks, down to the micro level of scientists 
and engineers (Van Lente, 1993, pp. 181-182; Borup et al., 2006, p. 286). They 
rearrange resources in the present by shaping political “agendas” and by 
creating “protected spaces” for the development of technologies (Van Lente, 
1993). Such “future-oriented abstractions … guide activities, provide structure 
and legitimation, attract interest, and foster investment. They give definition of 
roles, clarify duties, offer some shared shape of what to expect and how to 
prepare for opportunities and risks” (Borup et al., 2006, pp. 285-286). 
Expectations may eventually evolve into a “reality that shapes the strategic 
actions of the actors” (Brown et al., 2001, p. 28) and lead to a general reduction 
of the perceived risk surrounding technology developments, which, by their 
nature, are extremely uncertain and risky (Van Lente, 1993, pp. 186-187). 
 
Expectations as “shared, though flexibly interpreted, cluster of visions” alter 
social reality by creating, reinforcing, or destroying social connections, or 
linkages (Van Lente, 1993, p. 190; Borup et al., 2006, p. 289). They model 
current society with the formation of “communities of promise” (Brown, 2003, p. 
6; Martin et al., 2008a, pp. 30-32; Martin et al., 2008b, p. 129), “niches” (Geels 
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& Smit, 2000, p. 880), or “worlds” of heterogeneous actors who share a 
common interest in promoting a technology and are connected by the mutual 
dependencies in their activities (Van Lente & Rip, 1998b, p. 234).  
 
As opposed to collective expectations, “specific” expectations should be 
identified instead as those attributable to and held by individual actors or 
specific groups of actors (Konrad, 2006, p. 431). Aware of their power, actors 
can choose to use their statements of expectations strategically in an attempt to 
influence collective expectations or other actors’ specific expectations. Thus, 
another analytical way of thinking about statements of expectations is as 
resources that actors use to do things (Van Lente, 1993, pp. 185-190).  
 
1.2 Expectations as strategic resources 
 
Viewed as resources to do things, expectations are generally stated to 
legitimise choices, reduce uncertainty, and attract the attention of other actors 
(Van Lente, 1993, p. 185; Geels & Smit, 2000, p. 882). For instance, actors 
such as researchers, firms, and governments routinely use statements about 
the development of technologies to legitimise claims about their strategies or 
polices (Brown et al., 2001, p. 28) or “legitimise, justify, back their arguments, 
give reasons in general” (Van Lente, 1993, p. 185). The release of statements 
of expectations can also be aimed to “allow decision-making and reduce the 
uncertainty inherent in technological developments” (Van Lente, 1993, p. 185). 
The strategic interaction of actors affects the evolution of technological 
developments. Actors are aware of the interdependence of their decisions and 
act accordingly. By communicating, agreeing, and working on a shared vision of 
the future, actors can foster coordination and collaboration, and thus reduce the 
“indeterminacy” resulting from the unknown outcomes of their interactions. In 
their effort to reduce future uncertainties, actors might then reveal their 
intentions in advance by publicly disclosing statements of expectations of 
technologies (Van Lente, 1993, pp. 186-189). In a way, expectations could be 
seen “as ‘bids’ about what the future might be like, that are offered by agents in 
the context of other expectation bids” (Berkhout, 2006, p. 301). 
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Actors may also disclose statements of expectations to “mobilize funds, [and 
the] attention of other actors” (Van Lente, 1993, p. 185). In their attempt to “get 
a hearing”, actors tend to “hype” their statements (Borup et al., 2006, p. 290). 
Hype as distortion towards over-optimism may be genuine and involuntary, but 
also strategic and voluntary: 
 
“The reason that initial promises and expectations are too optimistic is 
not that forecasters or futurists are ignorant or shortsighted … Initial 
promises are set high in order to attract attention from (financial) 
sponsors, to stimulate agenda-setting processes (both technical and 
political) and to build ‘protected spaces.’” (Geels & Smit, 2000, p. 881) 
 
Promises and expectations can then be voluntarily skewed towards optimism to 
convince funding organisations and other practitioners to join technological 
development.  
 
“Already at the very earliest stages of a field’s formation, actors use 
‘hypes’ and ‘hopes’ as a means to initiate movement, position 
themselves and others, build alliances and marginalise competing fields 
– this is how networks and industry structures emerge.” (Brown et al., 
2003, p. 5) 
 
Thus, within the sociology of expectations, expectations are not simply seen as 
descriptions of future realities, but also as performative elements and strategic 
resources. A third way to conceptualise technological expectations is as 
promises of future commitments made by the actors who enunciate or endorse 
them. This conceptualisation was originally proposed by Van Lente, and is 
detailed in the next section  
 
1.3 Expectations as promises on commitments: Van Lente 
 
Van Lente analytically subdivides actors into “technologists” and the “rest of 
society”. Technologists would be the actors who are “mandated” by the rest of 
society to bring about technical progress on behalf of the whole society (Van 
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Lente, 1993, p. 156). Their mandate would descend from a belief4 in “technical 
progress” that is shared by the whole society; a belief which would characterise 
Western society in particular (Van Lente, 2000, pp. 43-44).  
 
“… technical progress … contains an element of ongoing evolution, an 
unfolding logic that is captured in the notion of ‘next generation’. The 
notion is part of the rhetoric of a progress that should not be stopped.” 
(Van Lente, 1993, p. 153) 
 
Technologists would then be called on by the rest of society “not only to 
maintain existing technological systems”, but also and foremost to design new 
technological systems (Van Lente, 1993, p. 157; 2000, p. 50).  
 
Van Lente refers to this subdivision between technologists and the rest of 
society as “a question of social dynamics, a question of the division of labour at 
the societal level”, which is beyond the scope of his analysis (Van Lente, 1993, 
p. 153; 2000, p. 50). Van Lente only claims that this subdivision of labour has 
the character of a “mandate” and results from a shared belief in technical 
progress (Van Lente, 1993, p. 153; 2000, p. 50). In this subdivision of labour, 
technological promises are an “inherent part of technology”. Technologists are 
in charge of producing inventions, which by definition do not exist in the present. 
Thus, technologists have to rely not only on their “certainty of invention, but also 
on the promise of invention” (Van Lente, 1993, p. 158; 2000, p. 52). As Van 
Lente states: 
 
“The technologist is certain that he will make discoveries. He or she lives 
on the (modern) certainty that inventions will be done, that is, on the 
certainty that there will be something like technological progress. This is 
not just a personal conviction: the technologist can live this way because 
                                            
4
 Van Lente contends that, instead of conceptualising the promise of technology, as a belief in 
progress, a better notion is the “ideograph”. According to Van Lente, “taking the generic promise 
as a belief fails to make clear how it actually works in the dynamics of concrete developments” 
(Van Lente, 1993, p. 168). However, this is not a relevant concept for the other concepts I am 
interested in and that I want to discuss in these sections. Van Lente discusses the notion of 
ideograph in his PhD thesis (Van Lente, 1993, p. 149; see also Van Lente, 2000, pp. 44-50). 
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society expects this from him, and lends him the space to work at 
inventions.” (Van Lente, 1993, p. 157; 2000, p. 51) 
     
In other words, “the ‘raison d’être’ of technologists is the technological promise” 
(Van Lente, 1993, p. 158; 2000, p. 52). As a consequence, technologists 
inevitably depend on “audiences that have to be receptive to their promises” 
(Van Lente, 1993, p. 158; 2000, p. 52). 
 
Technologists seek and obtain a renewal of their mandate through technological 
promises. “Generic and specific technological promises are the currency in 
which the transactions in this social contract are concluded”. They are “defined 
by this implicit social contract, and their identity and self-image are related to it”. 
Through a mandate technologists can obtain “a space, a mandated territory, 
within which they count as experts”. In these spaces, “they are the ones who 
are allowed to speak first, they can in the first instance determine what is to 
happen” (Van Lente, 1993, p. 159; 2000, p. 53). Such “spaces” are a “macro 
analogy of a 'niche' within a firm that protects search processes … Here again, 
the 'niche' or 'space' is actively sought, created and maintained through actor-
strategies” (Van Lente, 1993, p. 168). Arguably, such “protected spaces … may 
be created and maintained thorough expectations” (Van Lente, 1993, p. 196). 
 
However, the “boundaries and the nature of a mandate are always debatable” 
(Van Lente, 1993, p. 159; 2000, p. 54). As Van Lente and Rip argue, especially 
when the boundaries of such a mandate are threatened, actors identified as 
“spokespersons” who “speak for a technology” as a field (Van Lente & Rip, 
1998b, p. 231) would come to the fore and speak in the name of the mandated 
territory (Van Lente, 1993, p. 160; 2000, p. 54). “They are not spokespersons in 
the sense that they represent an organisation, but are more like those who on 
their own initiative speak for an economic sector or an academic discipline” 
(Van Lente & Rip, 1998b, p. 231). Acting as “promise champions”, they promote 
the promise that represents their own technological field, rather than speaking 
directly in favour of their own interests, and are aware that “[their] fate is 
connected to the fate of that promise” (Van Lente & Rip, 1998b, pp. 231-232). 
Spokespersons or promise champions “need not be individuals … a plethora of 
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collective actors has emerged to carry and protect new developments … such 
collective actors are heterogeneous – combining, explicitly or implicitly, science, 
industry, government, and sometimes also social organizations” (Van Lente & 
Rip, 1998b, p. 232). They might be actors in universities, industries, and even 
“within the government, which becomes more and more involved in 
technological developments” (Van Lente, 1993, p. 160).  
 
To maintain a mandate from the rest of society, technologists and their 
spokespersons are required “to take care of the territory” and “to guard over 
‘technological progress’”. If these activities are neglected, “they can be 
confronted with this and called to account.” In the event of technological 
promises “in danger of not being pursued sufficiently”, technologists would then 
risk being “blamed” for it (Van Lente, 1993, p. 160; 2000, p. 54). As Van Lente 
states: 
 
“The interaction of technologists with their surroundings is regulated in 
terms of the general promise of technological progress. Their work, their 
opportunities and their obligations can be described as a mandate since 
they are relatively free to pursue their activities, but they must also be 
able to indicate that they do not neglect technological progress. If a 
promising technology becomes salient, they cannot really permit 
themselves to ignore it.” (Van Lente, 2000, p. 60) 
 
Thus, as soon as a technological promise becomes shared, the rest of society 
requires technologists to fulfil it, but are also required to support these latter in 
their effort. Once that promise is fulfilled, the rest of society will continue 
demanding technologists to renew their technological promise as a condition for 
its continued support. Technologists would be then required to constantly 
formulate and spread promises about new technologies in order to justify their 
existence. The implications of the belief in technological progress and of the 
mandate for technologists would be threefold:  
 
“First, when specific technologies take part in the generic promise of 
technology, they tend to become self-justifying, i.e. their legitimation will 
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get tautological. The legitimation, then, is: we need the new technology 
because it will be the future technology. Second, due to their mandate, 
technologists may interpret the development of a specific technology as 
a necessity: for themselves to work on, and for other[s] to support them. 
Third, the actual development of specific technologies will follow a 
pattern that can be characterized as a transition from promise to 
requirement.” (Van Lente, 1993, p. 161) 
 
This pattern creates an “unstoppable train”, a continuous motion towards 
technical progress, allowing one to think of technological development as driven 
by a “self-fulfilling prophecy” (Van Lente, 1993, p. 165; Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, 
p. 215; Van Lente, 2000, pp. 57-59). As Van Lente and Rip state: 
 
“Technological promises function as a yardstick for the present and as a 
signpost for the future. The implication for the dynamics of concrete 
developments is that what starts as an ‘option’ can be labelled a 
technical ‘promise’, and may subsequently function as a ‘requirement’ to 
be achieved, and a ‘necessity’ for technologists to work on, and for 
others to support.” (Van Lente, 1993, p. 167; Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, p. 
216; Van Lente, 2000, p. 60)  
 
Van Lente thinks that this phenomenon of promises being converted into 
requirements is general and ubiquitous in technological development (Van 
Lente, 1993, p. 194).  
 
1.3.1 Promise-requirement cycles 
 
Promise-requirement cycles imply that technological expectations “get accepted 
and become part of an agenda”. Presented as promises and generated within 
or even without a protected space, these technological expectations/promises 
are subsequently converted into requirements for the actors involved. At the 
same time, a protected space is created or maintained, forming a background 
for the conversion of other promises to requirements. Subsequent promise-
requirement cycles would then be superimposed upon each other, forming 
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spirals (Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, p. 223). Figure 1 presents a scheme 
describing the dynamics of the conversion of promises to requirements. 
 
Figure 1: conversion of promises to requirements 
(Source: Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, p. 223) 
 
 
 
 
The conversion option-promise-requirement-necessity should not “suggest 
inevitability … [because] many promises remain just that, or remain unheard” 
(Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, p. 222). One necessary condition for a promise to be 
converted into a requirement is its inclusion in what Van Lente and Rip call an 
“agenda” and the “presence (creation, or emergence) of a protected space” for 
technologists, which “is linked and adjusted to the agenda-building process” 
(Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, p. 222). “Protected spaces … may be created and 
maintained through expectations” (Van Lente, 1993, p. 196; Van Lente & Rip, 
1998a, p. 223). Within such protected spaces, “subsequent promises are 
accepted more easily” and give rise to spirals of promise-requirement cycles 
(Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, p. 223). Thus, a key element is the inclusion of the 
promise in the agenda and the presence of dedicated protected spaces (Van 
Lente, 1993, p. 195) that are collective entities. 
 
Not being an “autonomous and deterministic socio-technical process”, this 
conversion would then depend on the actions and interactions of “technologists, 
firms, and governments”. More specifically, such a conversion would be “a 
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consequence of actors assessing what is ‘feasible’, what is ‘obsolete’, and what 
is ‘necessary’, and of the efforts that follow these assessments” (Van Lente, 
1993, p. 167; Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, p. 216; Van Lente, 2000, p. 60). Thus, a 
promise-requirement cycle would ultimately depend on the promise being 
endorsed and becoming shared.  
 
In principle, this conversion may even be reversed and undone, but at 
“increasing costs and work” (Van Lente, 1993, p. 167; Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, 
p. 216; Van Lente, 2000, p. 60). As activities become “interlocked”, the 
“pressure to recoup suck investments” increases, and “the more is invested”, 
the more likely there will be “increasing resistance” to a cycle reversal or 
undoing (Van Lente, 1993, p. 167; Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, p. 217; Van Lente, 
2000, p. 60). 
 
Technological expectations describe a future scenario where specific actors are 
expected to play determinate roles5 (Van Lente, 1993, p. 191; 2006, pp. 216-
217; Van Merkerk & Van Lente, 2008, pp. 643-644). These “may be explicit (the 
statement includes a list of roles) or implicit (the statement assumes a list of 
roles)” (Van Lente, 1993, p. 191). In this regard, Van Lente maintains that:  
 
“… an option or new possibility [that] is presented as a promising new 
route … becomes accepted as such, thereby invoking new interactions, 
leading to new task divisions and specifications to be met. This, in short, 
is the conversion of a promise to requirement.” (Van Lente, 1993, p. 193) 
 
Through promise-requirement cycles, a technological expectation or promise 
may then become a required action – e.g. a technical specification to be fulfilled 
and/or political support or a protected space to be provided (Van Lente, 1993, p. 
167; Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, p. 216). As Van Lente and Rip point out: 
 
                                            
5
 Van Lente suggests conceptualising these roles as “scripts”, borrowing the concept from 
semiotic analysis. However, this is not relevant for the other concepts I am interested in and that 
I want to discuss in these sections. Van Lente discusses the use of this concept in his PhD 
thesis (Van Lente, 1993, pp. 190-192). 
48 
 
“Once technology promises are shared, they demand actions, and 
appear as a necessity for technologists to develop, and for others to 
support them. At the same time, the options which are considered 
feasible and promising are translated into requirements, guidelines and 
specifications.” (Van Lente, 1993, p. 165; Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, p. 
216; Van Lente, 2000, p. 58) 
 
Thus, when enunciating expectations or endorsing expectations enunciated by 
others, it is as if the actors are promising to fulfil the role allocated to them in 
those future scenarios. In this way, technological expectations can be seen as 
promises of future commitments by their proponents and by other actors who 
assess and endorse them. As seen above, when these promises become 
shared, they also turn into specific requirements for the actors involved (Van 
Lente, 1993, p. 167). At the very general level of society, those roles would 
imply “technologists” promising and fulfilling expectations of technologies, and 
“governments” and “others” supporting and monitoring the work of the former.  
 
Enunciating or endorsing expectations is then equivalent to promising to fulfil 
the specific roles that these expectations imply “for the self, others and 
artefacts” (Van Lente, 1993, p. 195). When these promises have become 
shared and endorsed, the actors involved are then obliged to fulfil them. As Van 
Lente and Rip state:  
 
“Behind the promise-requirement cycles lies the dynamic of expectations: 
as soon as expectations are shared they assume a life of their own. The 
basic point is that when expectations are shared they create a pattern 
into which the actors themselves may be locked.” (Van Lente & Rip, 
1998a, p. 217) 
 
Sociologists of expectations maintain that enunciating or endorsing 
technological expectations does not automatically generate accountability. 
However, it does prompt responses and generate the expectation that the 
actors involved with those expectations should provide further justifications 
(Borup et al., 2006, p. 289). A risk faced by proponents or endorsers of 
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technological expectations is then an excessive mismatch between past 
promises and actual developments. Such mismatches may entail dire 
consequences for the reputations of both single individuals and entire fields of 
innovation (Brown, 2003, p. 6; Brown et al., 2003, p. 9). As failed promises then, 
“expectations and the frequent disappointments to which they lead are 
accompanied by serious costs in terms of reputations, misallocated resources 
and investment” (Borup et al., 2006, p. 289). 
 
Expectations are inherently dynamic, changing shape over time and across the 
actors holding them. The following section highlights the main findings of 
previous analyses on the temporal and spatial dynamics of expectations.  
 
2. Dynamics of expectations: temporal and spatial 
 
Within the sociology of expectations, a number of analyses have attempted to 
shed light on how and why expectations change over time and across space, as 
briefly summarised in the following. 
 
2.1 Temporal dynamics of expectations 
 
Expectations tend to follow “alternating cycles of hype and disappointments” 
over time (Borup et al., 2006, p. 290). Surges of hype followed by 
disappointment appear to be a normal dynamic in the way expectations operate 
in science and technology development (Brown et al., 2003, p. 1; Borup et al., 
2006, p. 290). After a hype surge, expectations may undergo minor adjustments 
or complete switches from positive to negative; depending on the seriousness 
of the following disappointment. Disappointments may be then classified in 
relation to their severity and the consequential effects on the innovation process 
– e.g. “disillusionment”, when the innovation process continues; 
“disenchantment”, when public support decreases; “disappointment”, when 
innovation activities slow down; and “total disappointment”, when innovation 
activities are strongly reduced or abandoned (Ruef & Markard, 2010, pp. 333-
335). These dynamics are more pronounced in the early stages of technological 
development. Emerging technologies are characterised by high uncertainty and 
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unstable environment. At these early stages, roles among actors lack formal 
agreements, and quality controls and regulations on expectations are likely to 
be poorly defined. The high uncertainty of these moments may result in the 
release of visions that are likely to differ from future reality (Borup et al., 2006, 
p. 289; Bakker et al., 2011, pp. 153-154). Another possible reason explaining 
why initial expectations are often too optimistic relates to their use as strategic 
resources. Hype may not be the result of forecasters’ ignorance, but of the use 
of expectations as resources to catch attention (Geels & Smit, 2000, pp. 881-
882). Especially in the early stages of technology development, expectations 
are determinants to raise support and recruit stakeholders (Borup et al., 2006, 
p. 289; Bakker, 2010, p. 6540; Bakker et al., 2011, p. 159; Bakker et al., 2012a, 
p. 423; Konrad et al., 2012, p. 1096). This may prompt the actors involved in 
technology development to voluntarily create early surges of hype to catch 
attention and mobilise interest. This phenomenon can be conceptualised as a 
multiplayer prisoner dilemma where actors compete to get a hearing (Bakker, 
2011, p. 166; Bakker & Budde, 2012, pp. 557-558). The gains resulting from 
actors choosing to be “modest” – i.e. choosing not to voluntarily distort their 
statements towards optimism – would be perceived only at the collective level, 
only in the long term, and only if all other actors have also remained modest in 
the meantime. Such collective modesty and honesty would limit the ex-post 
misallocations of resources and damage to reputations following the 
disappointments caused by overoptimistic claims. However, if all other actors 
behave modestly and honestly, there is a strong incentive for any single actor to 
cheat and voluntarily hype statements. By hyping statements, any single actor 
can attract more attention than competitors who have instead behaved 
modestly and honestly, at least in the short term. If it is assumed that all actors 
are selfish, opportunistic, short-term minded, and do not trust each other, any 
single actor would then prefer to hype statements even when taking into 
account the superior gains at the collective level that would follow more modest 
and honest behaviour. Since hyping statements would provide gains only to the 
actor who hypes first, all actors have an incentive to be the first to hype and to 
outpace competitors in doing it. In other words, the short-term, individual gains 
in betraying the long-term, collective welfare would induce all actors to hype 
statements. Therefore, the observed frequent mismatch between early 
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expectations and real outcomes may be the result not only of genuine and 
involuntary over-optimism, but also of voluntarily created hype.  
 
2.2 Spatial dynamics of expectations 
 
Expectations tend to vary across the different social groups involved in 
technological development. Different actors “attach different levels of trust to 
expectations” (Borup et al., 2006, p. 292). A general correlation seems to exist 
between higher confidence in expectations and detachment from the research 
activity in the relevant field. The less influence a social group of actors feel they 
have on the realisation of expectations and the more distant they are from the 
uncertainties experienced in research, the higher their tendency to place high 
authority and confidence in expectations (Brown & Michael, 2003, p. 13; Brown 
et al., 2003, p. 6; Borup et al., 2006, p. 292). Furthermore, within the same 
social group of actors, individuals might show different levels of confidence in 
expectations, depending on the specific audiences addressed. For instance, it 
has been observed that researchers, when discussing with their colleagues, 
tend to express more contradictory expectations of the future of technologies. 
Whereas, when “wearing a public entrepreneurial hat” they show more 
confidence in the promises of their own research field (Brown & Michael, 2003, 
p. 13; Brown et al., 2003, p. 6; Borup et al., 2006, p. 292). As another example, 
it has been observed that staff members within R&D programmes may act as 
technology “selectors” towards technology innovators and then “emphatically 
act as technology enactors [or promoters] toward their leadership”, aiming 
primarily to ensure their job security (Bakker et al., 2012b, p. 1069). Different 
social groups of actors also differ in their sensitivity to disappointments following 
the failure of expectations. For instance, research communities may appear 
more cautious when dealing with emerging expectations and, at the same time, 
less concerned about possible disappointments following their failed realisations 
than the more competitive and exposed business communities (Borup et al., 
2006, p. 294). For these latter, at stake are their “position in the relevant 
agendas of research institutes, laboratories of firms and government schemes” 
in the short term, and their “market share” in the long term (Van Lente & Bakker, 
2010, p. 707). As another example, industrial actors have been observed 
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reacting more quickly to disappointments than research institutes. Within this 
context, hype-disappointment cycles appear to affect more actors “with a high 
sensitivity to external legitimacy (e.g. listed on a stock-exchange), research 
organizations with little base funding or actors with a weak strategic embedding 
of the new technology” (Konrad et al., 2012, p. 1096). Nevertheless, “in the 
context of large governmental programs and initiatives, while both public and 
private sectors have an obligation to justify decisions and investments, this is far 
more pressing for public sector legitimacy” (Borup et al., 2006, p. 295). In all 
cases, the “interpretative flexibility and the social patterning of expectations 
across communities often arises from asymmetries in access to the information 
on which expectations are based” (Brown & Michael, 2003, p. 13; Borup et al., 
2006, p. 292).  
 
 
3. Situating the UK Government’s current vision on biofuel policy 
 
The above insights into the temporal and spatial dynamics of expectations lead 
one to think that any investigation of the endorsement of a specific vision should 
inevitably take into account the dynamics of the expectations forming it. In the 
words of Brown, such an investigation would need to look at the “situatedness” 
of expectations (Brown, 2003, p. 10; Brown & Michael, 2003). Brown suggests 
looking at the actual contexts and conditions in which expectations are 
embedded – or the temporal and spatial situatedness of expectations – as a 
way to shed light on their disparities and volatilities (Brown, 2003, p. 10; Brown 
& Michael, 2003).  
 
Following Brown’s suggestion, in my research, I apply a “situated” approach to 
analyse the temporal evolution and spatial differences of the UK Government’s 
vision on biofuel policy. To investigate the temporal evolution, I narrow the focus 
to a number of public authorities and their contributions to the UK biofuel policy 
debate since its origins in the sustainable transport debate. To investigate the 
spatial differences, I identify and compare “who said what” about how to 
envision UK biofuel policy in a public consultation proposing changes to that 
policy. This consultation was launched around the time when the UK 
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Government adopted its current vision on UK biofuel policy (a detailed account 
of this analysis will be given in Chapter 2).  
 
3.1 Policy-promises and actors other than technology innovators 
 
One of the key empirical contributions of my research is to provide an 
explanation of how the UK Government’s responsibilities towards technology 
policies have affected the construction of its current vision on biofuel policy. To 
emphasise how those responsibilities have been related to that vision, I 
analytically distinguish “technological promises” from “policy-promises” – i.e. the 
promises that public authorities make regarding their future policy commitments, 
such as in the provision of political and financial support to a specific industry. 
Sociologists of expectations may criticise this distinction as deceptive, 
especially in relation to what I call “policy-promises of support”. These in 
particular may be objected to as simple conversions of technological promises 
into requirements for public authorities – or for “governments” and “others” in 
Van Lente’s terms. My contention is that public authorities often promise 
support for the future, but do not always deliver it. Thus, while the “actual 
delivery of support” may be interpreted as the “requirement that public 
authorities are called to execute in relation to the technology promises that they 
have endorsed from technology innovators”, their promises of future support 
remain nothing more than promises yet to be fulfilled. That said, “policy-
promise” is meant to be a general and practical term including all types of 
promises, not only those of support. As I defined them, policy-promises are 
objects of enquiry overlooked in the sociology of expectations, presumably 
because of the focus of this latter on the technology promises of technology 
innovators – i.e. the actors most closely related to technological development, 
such as technology scientists or industrialists or “‘innovations players’ whose 
hopes and efforts are invested in the success of new technologies” (Pollock & 
Williams, 2010, p. 2).  
 
My research fills this gap by shedding light on how executive public authorities 
endorse official visions in relation to their previous policy-promises to 
technology innovators. Another key theoretical contribution of my research is an 
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expansion of the focus of the sociology of expectations to types of actor other 
than technology innovators. Beyond industrial actors in biofuel and other 
industrial areas, my analysis investigates the UK Government in particular, as 
well as other public authorities, industry associations, consultancies, and non-
governmental organisations. My research adopts a distinctive analytical 
perspective with respect to that of the sociology of expectations. In analysing 
the types of actor above, the focus narrows down onto their functional roles and 
interrelations in diffusing expectations among different parties. Therefore, in 
addition to analysing the content and dynamics of their expectations, my 
research investigates how and on behalf of whom these actors mediate 
expectations. This investigation provides the basis for a reflection on how these 
functional roles may be conceptualised through the lens of the sociology of 
expectations. In later chapters, I will comment in detail and relate my work to 
two analyses which have looked at the UK Government in particular (Eames et 
al., 2006, pp. 367-368; Beynon-Jones & Brown, 2011, p. 647), and an analysis 
which theorised “promissory organisations” as specialised intermediaries of 
expectations (Pollock & Williams, 2010, p. 2). 
 
In my research, I deploy the sociology of expectations to investigate 
expectations belonging to different levels – e.g. technical performances of 
biofuel technologies, potential impacts of policies related to those technologies, 
and even exogenous phenomena somewhat related to the biofuel technological 
system. In the analysis, I classify expectations according to the three nested 
levels of the MLP on socio-technical transitions – i.e. niche, regime, and 
landscape. This integrated framework is well suited to interpreting the different 
visions proposed by the actors participating in the debate on UK biofuel policy.  
 
 
4. Classifying expectations: the multi-level perspective 
 
The integration of the sociology of expectations with the MLP has previously 
been proposed and successfully applied to investigate cases encompassing 
expectations belonging to different levels (Truffer et al., 2008, p. 1363; Budde et 
al., 2012, p. 1074). Furthermore, the applicability of the sociology of 
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expectations to the analysis of expectations of biofuel technologies has been 
considered before – e.g. Alkemade and Suurs studied expectation patterns in 
biofuels and other road transport renewable technologies in the Netherlands, 
drawing on the sociology of expectations among other theoretical frameworks 
(Alkemade & Suurs, 2012, pp. 449-450). Finally, the MLP has been successfully 
applied to the analysis of cases of socio-technical transitions between different 
technologies, including cases of biofuels – e.g. Hillman and Sanden used the 
MLP, in combination with other theoretical frameworks, to predict how current 
policy choices could determine the development of alternative transport fuels, 
among them biofuels, in Sweden to 2020 (Hillman & Sandén, 2008, p. 1281). 
These precedents strengthen my belief that an integrated framework, combining 
the sociology of expectations and a classification of expectations based on the 
MLP, is suitable for this case study on an expected socio-technical transition 
between different generations of biofuels. 
 
4.1 Expectations and the multi-level perspective on socio-technical 
transitions 
 
According to the MLP on socio-technical transitions:  
 
“The stability of established sociotechnical configurations results from the 
linkages between heterogeneous elements. The elements and the 
linkages are the result of activities of social groups which (re)produce 
them.” (Geels, 2002, p. 1259) 
 
For instance, within the road transport system as a socio-technical 
configuration: 
 
“Road infrastructures and car regulations … are built and maintained by 
transportation ministries. Cultural and symbolic meanings of cars are 
produced in the interaction between users, media and societal groups. 
User practices and mobility patterns emerge from the daily use of cars by 
user groups. Industry structures are the outcome of mutual positioning 
and strategies of car manufacturers and their suppliers. The 
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technological knowledge embodied in cars is created by car designers 
and engineers, while cars as artefacts are produced by car 
manufacturing firms. The activities of these different groups are aligned 
to each other and co-ordinated.” (Geels, 2002, p. 1259) 
 
To shed light on the dynamics behind this coordination of activities, the MLP 
theorises hierarchical relations among three nested socio-technical levels – in 
ascending order: niche, regime, and landscape (Geels, 2002, p. 1261). These 
levels are “not ontological descriptions of reality, but analytical and heuristic 
concepts to understand the complex dynamics of sociotechnical change” 
(Geels, 2002, p. 1259).  
 
Niches constitute the “micro” level and account “for the generation and 
development of radical innovations” (Geels, 2002, p. 1260; Geels & Kemp, 
2007, p. 443). Emerging innovations are initially unstable socio-technical 
configurations usually characterised by lower performances than established 
technologies. Serving as “incubation rooms”, niches protect emerging 
technologies “from ‘normal’ market selection in the regime” (Geels, 2002, p. 
1261). These protected spaces are carried and developed by small networks of 
dedicated actors who are usually outsiders and marginal to the larger networks 
behind regime technologies. 
 
Socio-technical regimes constitute the “meso” level and account for the “stability 
of existing technological development and the occurrence of trajectories” 
(Geels, 2002, p. 1261). Socio-technical regimes derive from the notion of 
“technological regimes” (Geels, 2002, p. 1259; 2004, p. 910; 2007, p. 642; 
Geels & Kemp, 2007, p. 443; Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 400). In technological 
regimes, the development of technologies follow specific “technological 
trajectories” due to shared cognitive routines in the engineering communities 
behind the technologies (Geels, 2004, p. 910; Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 400). 
The notion of socio-technical regime expands the notion of technological regime 
by including scientists, policymakers, users, and special interest groups as 
relevant players in shaping the patterning of technological development (Geels, 
2002, p. 1260; Geels & Kemp, 2007, p. 443; Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 400). A 
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socio-technical regime would result from the stabilisation of activities and the 
alignment of interests of that broader community of social groups into a specific 
technological trajectory (Geels, 2002, pp. 1259-1263; 2004, pp. 910-915; Geels 
& Schot, 2007, pp. 400-401). Regimes stabilise technological trajectories in 
many ways. For instance, by establishing cognitive routines that constrain the 
imagination of researchers and engineers, by enforcing regulation and 
standards, by adapting lifestyles to technological systems, and by locking into 
specific technological developments, investments in resources, and expertise 
(Geels, 2002, pp. 1259-1263; 2004, pp. 910-915; Geels & Schot, 2007, pp. 400-
401). 
 
Socio-technical landscapes constitute the “macro” level and consist of “slow 
changing external factors, providing gradients for the trajectories” (Geels, 2002, 
pp. 1259-1263; 2004, pp. 910-915; Geels & Schot, 2007, pp. 400-401) – i.e. 
macro-economic dynamics, cultural patterns, macro-political developments, and 
in general everything that forms “an external structure or context for interactions 
of actors” (Geels, 2002, p. 1260). This “exogenous environment” is “beyond the 
direct influence of niche and regime actors” (Geels & Kemp, 2007, p. 443; 
Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 400). 
 
Within this nested hierarchy (see Figure 2), a regime can provide space for 
niches to develop. Niches may eventually stabilise, thus changing the previous 
regime, or evolve into a new regime, replacing the old one. The landscape 
denotes aspects of the wider context, lying beyond the direct influence of actors 
at the niche and regime levels (Geels, 2002, pp. 1259-1263; 2004, pp. 910-915; 
2007, pp. 643-646; Geels & Kemp, 2007, pp. 443-444; Geels & Schot, 2007, 
pp. 400-401). 
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Figure 2: multiple levels as a nested hierarchy  
(Source: Geels, 2002, p. 1261) 
 
 
 
Within the MLP, “shared belief systems and expectations, which orient 
perceptions of the future and hence steer actions in the present”, are 
acknowledged as “important cognitive rules” for the stabilisation of socio-
technical systems (Geels, 2004, p. 910). Nevertheless, as Budde, Alkemade, 
and Weber have pointed out: “While studies using the MLP investigate the role 
of expectations these studies did not use the MLP as such to structure and 
classify the expectations” (Budde et al., 2012, p. 1075).  
 
The integration of the sociology of expectations with the MLP “builds on the 
assumption that there are not only activities and institutions, but also 
expectations and visions about future activities and institutions related to these 
levels” (Budde et al., 2012, p. 1075). Accordingly, the MLP can also be applied 
“as a framework to analyze expectations in addition to ‘real world’ developments 
and activities” (Budde et al., 2012, p. 1075). Within this integrated framework, 
the MLP levels – i.e. niche, regime, landscape –all encompass expectations for 
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future developments in interdependent ways. Expectations belonging to the 
niche level are those closely referring to the community of researchers and 
engineers constituting the niche, and to their work. Niche expectations are likely 
to be rather specific and to be of a highly technical nature. Expectations 
belonging to the socio-technical regime level refer to the interrelations between 
specific technological developments and the network of social groups forming 
their socio-technical regimes. Regime expectations are likely to be more 
general and to be of a more socio-economic nature. Expectations belonging to 
the socio-technical landscape level refer to long-term deep structural trends with 
broad socio-economic implications. Landscape expectations are likely to be 
very general and refer to broad environmental and socio-economic contexts.  
 
As Budde, Alkemade, and Weber observed in their study on hydrogen fuel cell 
vehicles: “different types of actors relate their strategies to different kind of 
expectations”, industrial actors being more focused on regime expectations and 
policy actors more concerned with landscape expectations (Budde et al., 2012, 
p. 1081). My analyses confirm this observation: in the UK biofuel policy debate, 
UK public authorities and industrial stakeholders mostly referred to expectations 
pertaining to the landscape and regime levels.  
 
 
5. A final comment on agency 
 
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is important to discuss how this 
dissertation views statements of expectations in relation to the debate on 
agency and structure in technological development. Agency-centred views tend 
to emphasise the social construction of technology and overlook how material 
and social structures enable or constrain actions. Conversely, structure-centred 
views tend to emphasise technological determinism and neglect how human 
and nonhuman agencies combine and affect technological development. 
Defining the boundaries of agency and structure in technological development 
always entails a risk of overestimating or underestimating one or the other 
(Smith, M. R. & Marx, 1994, pp. iv-xiv; Garud & Karnoe, 2001, pp. 1-12; Klein, 
H. K. & Kleinman, 2002, pp. 28-31; Bijker et al., 2012, pp. xix-xxi). 
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In the narrower focus of this dissertation, the discussion revolves around how 
strategic, individual statements of expectations shape performative, collective 
expectations and vice versa. When widely shared, expectations may become 
performative and, therefore, influence actors in their beliefs and use of 
statements – as ”structures to be realised”, shared expectations “do not exist 
yet, but nevertheless exert force” (Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, p. 225). Yet, widely 
shared expectations depend on actors who continuously contribute to their 
formation by diffusing statements of expectations. Therefore, one may wonder 
how much actors are influenced by performative expectations – as prospective 
structures – when releasing their statements of expectations (Van Lente, 1993, 
pp. 185, 190; Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, p. 225). 
 
My research is based upon the acknowledgement that actors diffusing 
expectations and expectations as prospective structures are indissolubly 
interconnected – or, in a similar vein to Giddens on social systems: “The 
constitution of agents and structures are not two independently given sets of 
phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality … [i.e.] the structural properties 
of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they 
recursively organize” (Giddens, 1986, p. 25). Within this dissertation, an actor’s 
release of statements of expectations is never considered a “one-way process”, 
but rather always dependent on a “process of continuous exchange of 
expectations”, where “individual or collective actors influence collective 
expectations, [and] … are themselves subject to the influence of collective 
expectations” (Konrad, 2006, p. 432). In other words, when analysing 
statements of expectations, I always assumed the existence of that dual 
relationship – i.e. sources were influenced by and, at the same time, potentially 
contributed to, the formation of collective expectations when releasing their 
statements. 
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Chapter 2 – Methods and evidence 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
My research started from the same “compelling feature[s]” from which “all case 
study research starts” – i.e. a “desire” to produce an invaluable and deep 
investigation leading to an “insightful appreciation of the ‘case(s)’”, and a belief 
“that examining the context and other complex conditions related to the case(s) 
being studied are integral to understanding the case(s)” (Yin, 2003, p. 4). This 
chapter explains how I designed my research from this initial desire and belief.  
 
This chapter consists of four main sections. Section 1 introduces the case study 
method. Section 2 discusses limits and merits of this method in general and in 
relation to my research. Section 3 explains my choice to focus on document 
analyses. Section 4 illustrates in detail the research design and explains how 
evidence has been presented in the empirical chapters. 
 
 
1. Research method: my choice to rely on the case study method 
 
The case study method can be and has been applied to interrogate a wide 
range of very diverse topics – e.g. decisions, individuals, organisations, 
institutions, programs, processes, events, and even phenomena (Stake, 1995, 
pp. 1-2; Hancock & Algozzine, 2006, p. 15; Swanborn, 2010, p. 5; Yin, 2013, p. 
17). Despite the established, widespread usage of this research method, the 
term “case study” remains a “definitional morass” (Gerring, 2004, pp. 341-342; 
2006, p. 17). Definitions in the literature differ in their breadth and/or in the 
importance given to specific defining features (Fidel, 1984, pp. 1-2; Gillham, 
2000, p. 1; Yin, 2003, p. 4; Gerring, 2004, pp. 341-342; Hartley, 2004, p. 26; 
Gerring, 2006, pp. 17-26; Hancock & Algozzine, 2006, pp. 15-16; Swanborn, 
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2010, p. 13; Woodside, 2010, pp. 1-2; Yin, 2013, pp. 17-19). There is even 
disagreement on whether to consider the case study a method or a “research 
strategy” (Hartley, 2004, p. 323). 
 
Nevertheless, there seems to be agreement on at least two, minimal defining 
features – i.e. a case study is (1) an in-depth, empirical inquiry into one or a few 
cases; (2) in which contextual conditions are crucial to understanding what is 
being studied.6 In case studies, what is being studied is “not isolated from its 
context … but is of interest precisely because the aim is to understand how 
behaviour and/or processes are influenced by, and influence context” (Hartley, 
2004, p. 323). Accordingly, the case study method is appropriate whenever the 
boundaries between what is being studied and its contextual conditions are not 
clear (Yin, 2003, p. 4; 2013, p. 11), and/or when several factors and 
relationships are involved, but there are no basic laws to predetermine which of 
these are relevant for the analysis (Fidel, 1984, p. 273; Swanborn, 2010, p. 15). 
 
Versatile and flexible, the case study method may serve different research 
purposes and interests. The primary research purpose of a case study may be 
as diverse as explorative (i.e. when the aim is to explore and find directions for 
further inquiry), descriptive (i.e. when the aim is to describe what is being 
studied, especially in relation to the relevant context), and/or explanatory (i.e. 
when the aim is to draw causal relationships and theoretical conclusions) (Yin, 
2003, pp. 5-6; 2013, pp. 7-8). Guiding a case study may be either intrinsic or 
instrumental interests (Stake, 1995, pp. 3-4, 77). An intrinsic interest refers to 
the situation in which a researcher’s main interest is gaining a better 
understanding of what is being studied, rather than generalising findings and/or 
refining theories. In other words, a researcher simply has a genuine interest in a 
specific case, not necessarily linked to the possibility of generalising findings to 
other cases and/or refining a theory. An instrumental interest refers to the 
situation in which a researcher’s main interest is in generalising findings and/or 
refining theories, rather than understanding in-depth and in particular what is 
                                            
6
 These two features in particular help distinguish case studies from other research methods, 
such as experiments, where what is studied is deliberately divorced from the context and 
surveys, with their limited ability to deal with the context (Yin, 2013, p. 18). 
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being studied. In other words, when a researcher selects a case for the 
possibility of generalising findings to other cases and/or to refine theories, and 
the interest in the case is secondary (Stake, 1995, pp. 3-4, 77). 
 
A main determinant in designing case study research is thus “the degree to 
which the aim of the case study is to analyse particular, unique circumstances 
or to focus on generalization” (Hartley, 2004, p. 326). Depending on that 
degree, the research may be designed either as a single case study or multiple7 
case study8 (Yin, 2003, pp. 7-9; 2013, p. 19). Multiple-case designs are 
generally believed to produce more “compelling” evidence, “powerful” 
conclusions, and consequently are considered to be more “robust” than single-
case designs9 (Yin, 2013, pp. 53, 61). That said, “the single-case design is 
eminently justifiable under certain conditions – where the case represents (a) a 
critical test of existing theory, (b) a rare or unique circumstance, or (c) a 
representative or typical case, or where the case serves a (d) revelatory or (e) 
longitudinal purpose” (Yin, 2013, p. 52). Last but not least, the choice of how 
many cases to focus on is also, inevitably affected by time and resource 
constraints (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 31; Yin, 2013, pp. 53, 60). 
 
My research stems from my initial, “intrinsic” interest in understanding how the 
UK Government came to endorse a specific set of expectations over others to 
justify its biofuel policy. Rather than finding and extending broad generalisations 
to other cases, the research interest is in deriving contingent and context-
specific generalisations to help explain a single, specific case – i.e. the UK 
Government’s endorsement of a specific vision. In such a case, “The detailed 
                                            
7
 Multiple case studies are also identified as collective (Stake, 1995, p. 4) 
8
 Either design may also be defined as holistic or embedded depending on whether the study 
investigates cases (single or each of the multiple) as whole units of analysis or rather pays 
attention also to subunits (Yin, 2013, pp. 50-52, 59-60). The analysis of subunits can be helpful 
to expand and deepen the investigation, and so produce insights that apply to the whole unit of 
analysis – i.e. the single or each of the multiple cases (Yin, 2013, pp. 50-52, 59-60). 
9
 As in multiple experiments, the underlining logic of multiple case studies is replication, either 
literal (i.e. selecting cases so that they predict similar results) or theoretical (i.e. selecting cases 
so that they predict contrasting results but for anticipatable reasons) (Yin, 2013, p. 54). The 
replication logic differs from the sampling logic, which requires statistical procedures to select 
large samples and aims at statistically inferring – i.e. generalising results – from samples to 
entire populations or universes (Yin, 2013, pp. 55-56). Therefore, multiple case studies do not 
produce generalisable results in statistical terms. Nevertheless, because of their underlying 
replication logic, multiple case studies are generally considered more robust than single case 
studies. 
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knowledge of the organization and especially the knowledge about the 
processes underlying the behaviour and its context can help to specify the 
conditions under which the behaviour can be expected to occur” (Hartley, 2004, 
p. 331). In my case study, moreover, the boundaries between what is being 
studied and contextual conditions are all but clear, while no obvious and 
unequivocal ways seem to exist to predetermine which factors and relationship 
are relevant for the analysis. Therefore, to shed light on the government’s 
endorsement, the investigation cannot neglect to analyse the contextual 
conditions in which it occurred – e.g. historical events, other competing visions 
on biofuels, other actors interacting with the UK Government, and so on. These 
considerations have convinced me that a case study is the appropriate research 
method for my research. 
 
My research started as a preliminary “exploratory” investigation, and 
progressively evolved into an in-depth, “descriptive” analysis of behaviours and 
related contextual conditions throughout a period spanning from the mid-1990s 
to the present. Drawing on this “longitudinal”, “single” case study, I reinterpreted 
evidence in an “explanatory” fashion to refine previous interpretations of UK 
biofuel policy as well as theoretical insights of the framework adopted in the 
analysis. 
 
 
2. Case study method: advantages and disadvantages 
 
My choice to adopt a single-case study as a research method entails both 
advantages and disadvantages. The merits and limits of the case study method 
are here discussed in general and in relation to my research in particular. 
 
An advantage of case studies is their flexibility in exploring new research 
avenues (Gerring, 2006, pp. 39-43). Within case studies, deductive approaches, 
which apply theory to data, can be integrated or even completely substituted 
with inductive approaches, which derive theory from data. This flexibility allows 
the researcher to analyse “deviant or outlier cases” that might potentially lead to 
the discovery of “new hypothes[e]s and variable[s] of interests” (George & 
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Bennett, 2005, pp. 20-21). Another advantage of case studies is that they “allow 
a researcher to achieve high levels of conceptual validity, or to identify and 
measure the indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts the 
researcher intends to measure” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 19). Theoretical 
concepts may refer to variables that are not measurable quantitatively, thus 
ruling out quantitative approaches in the analysis. By analytically comparing 
qualitative variables across different actors and/or contexts, “case studies allow 
for conceptual refinements with a higher level of validity over a smaller number 
of cases” (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 19-20). Another advantage of case 
studies is their holistic approach to the in-depth investigation of case-specific 
causal mechanisms: “Within a single case, we can look at a large number of 
intervening variables and inductively observe any unexpected aspects of the 
operation of a particular causal mechanism or help identify what conditions 
present in a case activate the causal mechanism” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 
21). The large number of intervening variables and contextual conditions, 
however, imposes constraints on the number of cases that can be included in 
the analysis. That is because it is “Often, though not invariably … easier to 
establish the veracity of a causal relationship pertaining to a single case (or a 
small number of cases) than for a larger set of cases” (Gerring, 2006, p. 43). 
Nevertheless, even “the investigation of a single case may allow one to test the 
causal implications of a theory, thus providing corroborating evidence for a 
causal argument” (Gerring, 2006, p. 45). 
 
Summing up, a case study is an appropriate method to explore, describe, and 
derive explanatory concepts or causal relationships pertaining to specific 
behaviours and contextual conditions within a limited number of cases. These 
concepts and causal relationship may be eventually generalised into theoretical 
propositions – i.e. it can be used to produce analytic generalisation (Yin, 2013, 
pp. 5-8, 15). Thanks to the flexibility of this research method, my research 
derived insights of the case, which refined previous explanations of UK biofuel 
policy, and the theoretical framework deployed in the analysis. 
 
An inherent limit of cast studies is that they “produce generalisations that are 
narrower or more contingent” to the specific cases under analysis (George & 
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Bennett, 2005, p. 22). All “Case study research suffers problems of 
representativeness because it includes, by definition, only a small number of 
cases of some more general phenomenon” (Gerring, 2006, p. 43). Therefore, a 
case study cannot be taken as a “sample” that can be used to formulate 
statistical generalisations on populations or universes (Yin, 2013, p. 15). A 
related limit of case studies is that they “remain much stronger at assessing 
whether and how a variable mattered to the outcome than at assessing how 
much it mattered” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 25). Appropriate for “identifying 
the scope conditions of theories and assessing arguments about causal 
necessity or sufficiency in particular cases”, case studies are generally not 
suited for “estimating the generalized causal effects or causal weight of 
variables across a range of cases” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 25). This is 
because, “it is difficult to arrive at a reliable estimate of causal effects across a 
population of cases by looking at only a single case or a small number of cases” 
(Gerring, 2006, p. 44). Another limit of case studies is their reliance on the 
subjective judgement of the investigator. In a case study, findings and 
conclusions can be negatively affected by biases induced by the investigator. 
Investigators “may fail to realize that by implicitly or explicitly limiting their 
sample of cases … they may bias their sample with regard to a wider set of 
cases about which they are trying to make inferences” (George & Bennett, 
2005, p. 25). “Cognitive biases” may lead to “selecting only cases whose 
independent and dependent variables vary as the favored hypothesis suggests, 
ignoring cases that appear to contradict the theory, and overgeneralizing from 
these cases to wider populations” (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 24-25). Other 
“selection biases” may relate to the “selection of a cases based on their 
“intrinsic” historical importance or on the accessibility of evidence” (George & 
Bennett, 2005, pp. 24-25). All these biases “understate or overstate” the 
relationships on which generalisations are drawn (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 
24). Therefore, “unless … [the investigators] carefully define and limit the scope 
of their findings to a well-specified population that shares the same key 
characteristics as the cases studied” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 25), the risk is 
to “ …“overgeneralizing” findings to types or subclasses of cases unlike those 
actually studied” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 32). Ways to prevent or, more 
realistically, to limit investigator-induced biases in case studies are to design 
67 
 
appropriate, rigorous, and systematic procedures for every step of the research, 
as well as to ensure transparency when reporting evidence (Fidel, 1984, p. 276; 
Yin, 2013, p. 14). Other limits of case studies are that they usually require a 
considerable amount of time and resources to be completed and that they often 
entail dealing with substantial volumes of evidence (Yin, 2013, p. 15). 
Depending on the topic studied, case studies may combine several techniques 
to collect evidence – e.g. document analyses, interviews, direct observations to 
name a few. All data-collecting techniques require time and resources, which 
means that there is a trade-off to solve between time and resources available 
and number and types of techniques that can be used to retrieve evidence. 
Depending on which requirements have been set in terms of rigorous 
procedures and transparency in reporting evidence, case studies may also 
result in sizable documents, which may be challenging to read. The volume of 
evidence collected in case studies is generally quite substantial, which means 
that there is a trade-off to solve between transparency in reporting evidence and 
readability of the resulting analysis. 
 
Summing up, a case study is not an appropriate method to produce statistical 
generalisations, measure frequencies and/or estimate causal relationships. It is 
also highly dependent on the skills of the researcher in avoiding understated or 
overstated generalisations as well as in finding an appropriate compromise 
between time and resource constraints, the amount and type of data retrievable, 
and transparency in presenting results. In my research, I did not aim to produce 
statistically generalisable conclusions. Rather, I attempted to find context-
contingent generalisations with a high degree of explanatory power in relation to 
the specific case under analysis. Transparency has been a major guiding 
principle in reporting evidence – i.e. I have tried to report sources as accurately 
as possible, and to reduce to a minimum any modification of the original text 
(e.g. by making extensive use of quotes), so as to provide the reader with direct 
(if mediated) access to the primary materials that I used as evidence for my 
arguments. This explains the lengthy empirical chapters in this dissertation. My 
research aims and some practical considerations led me to rely exclusively on 
document analyses, and not to include interviews, as the next section explains. 
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3. Evidence: my preference for document analyses over interviews 
 
The case study method is generally associated with the use of a variety of data 
sources (Fidel, 1984, p. 274; Gillham, 2000, pp. 1-2; Yin, 2003, p. 4; Hartley, 
2004, p. 324; Hancock & Algozzine, 2006, p. 16; Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 554; 
Swanborn, 2010, p. 15; Yin, 2013, p. 18). Widely used in qualitative research in 
general (Holstein & Gubrium, 2004, p. 140), interviews are often used either as 
a primary or supplementary data-collecting technique also in case study 
research. A main reason motivating my choice not to integrate interviews with 
my document analyses relates to my research requirements. Other practical 
reasons relate to the period and kinds of events and actors analysed as well as 
to time management issues.  
 
My research investigates how specific actors have released statements of 
expectations to specific audiences and within specific contextual conditions. For 
such an investigation, the statements for analysis need to be authentic – i.e. 
exactly those that their sources released to their intended audiences, and at the 
exact time and specific locus of their interaction with their audiences. Interviews 
may be used to interrogate the sources of those statements. However, 
statements collected in this way would be decontextualised, as well as 
unavoidably influenced by the interviewing process (Holstein & Gubrium, 2004, 
p. 142).  
 
My research analyses behaviours and contextual conditions that mostly took 
place in the recent past, and then looks at how they can be related to recent 
developments. With its analytical focus on a recent, but concluded, past, my 
research is thus mostly retrospective (De Vaus, 2006, pp. 268-269). 
Retrospective interviews – i.e. questioning about the past – can be used to 
interrogate a recent past. Interviews asking about past events, even recent 
ones, and especially about past, subjective beliefs, or opinions are, however, 
affected by several problems that undermine their reliability. A first major 
problem relates to the limits of human memory. Interviewees may simply 
misremember events. A second major problem is the tendency of interviewees 
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to reconstruct and reinterpret the past in light of present circumstances. This is 
especially the case for interviews about subjective states – e.g. beliefs or 
personal opinions. A third problem is selective recall, that is, some details are 
likely to have been forgotten, leaving only those that the interviewees 
subjectively experienced as more significant. Beyond these problems, there is 
always the possibility that interviewees may deliberately set out to mislead, 
distort, and/or falsify their accounts (Richards, 1996, pp. 200-201; De Vaus, 
2006, pp. 268-269).  
 
My research also investigates how several diverse types of actor have 
differently deployed statements of expectations. Such an investigation requires 
samples of actors as large and heterogeneous as possible. The specific 
analytical focus is on large organisations, such as public authorities, industry 
associations, non-governmental organisations, and consultancies. The 
members of the majority of the organisations analysed in my research may be 
generally classified as belonging to an “elite”: 
 
“… the whole notion of an elite, implies a group of individuals, who hoId, 
or have held, a privileged position in society and, as such … are likely to 
have had more influence on political outcomes than general members of 
the public.” (Richards, 1996, p. 199) 
 
Interviews of influential members of society are generally referred to as elite 
interviews (Richards, 1996; Gillham, 2000; Berry, 2002; Moyser, 2006). 
Notoriously, elite “interviewees especially weigh the pluses and the minuses of 
the exchange” (Moyser, 2006, pp. 85-86), raising problems in terms of access:  
 
“… by definition, elites are less accessible and are more conscious of 
their own importance; so problems of access are particularly important … 
and inevitably, elite interview samples tend to be a lot smaller.” 
(Richards, 1996, p. 200) 
 
Factors affecting access may include “the image of the potential interviewer, the 
research project or even the host institution or social science in general … 
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Perceived ideological, social or even sartorial or gender similarities [or 
dissimilarities] … [as well as] the research agenda, [as this can be] … very 
sensitive in particular circumstances or to particular elites” (Moyser, 2006, pp. 
85-86). These factors directly affect the risk of interviewees’ outright rejection of 
the interview, and consequently the sample size and the reliability of the data 
retrieved. 
 
Despite these drawbacks, interviews, by lending themselves to different types of 
research question, are still “one of the most flexible methods available” in 
qualitative research (King, 2004, pp. 20-21).Therefore, it may be argued that, 
even as a secondary source of data, my research would have benefited from 
interviews designed as supplements to the document analyses. Such interviews 
could have been helpful in interpreting relevant documents, and confirming 
findings, and, perhaps, even in providing access to relevant, unpublished, or not 
yet available information or first-hand information on the personal backgrounds, 
outlooks, and motivations of the people involved (Richards, 1996, p. 200; 
Moyser, 2006, pp. 85-86). Nevertheless, interviews remain extremely time 
consuming, and, in my specific case, also particularly risky in terms of the 
reliability and authenticity of the data produced.  
 
All that considered, I have given priority to expanding my document analyses, 
and focus on original, written documents, which, as primary sources of data, 
“hold the greatest value in the validity and reliability of historical analysis” 
(Lundy, 2008, p. 396). This preference relates to conceptual, methodological, 
and practical reasons: 
 
“A document can be defined as any symbolic representation that can be 
recorded or retrieved for analysis. Document analysis refers to an 
integrated and conceptually informed method, procedure, and technique 
for locating, identifying, retrieving, and analyzing documents for their 
relevance, significance, and meaning.” (Altheide, 1996, p. 3) 
 
In conceptual terms, documents can be seen as “resources that are employed 
to create versions of reality and self-representations” (Atkinson & Coffey, 2004, 
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p. 57). My research tracks and compares over time the visions and self-
definitions of several actors. For this kind of investigation, documents are 
valuable data sources. Comparing documents published throughout the 
historical period by the sources of interest enables the tracking and comparison 
over time of visions and self-definitions.  
 
In methodological terms, documents are an appropriate data source for 
retrieving authentic statements – i.e. representative in relation to their sources, 
as well as to the exact contextual conditions under, and purposes for, which 
they were produced. My research questions require the analysis of statements 
of expectations produced at the exact time and locus of the interaction between 
their sources and audiences. Analysing documents issued at the exact time of 
the events by the actors of interest ensures the authenticity of their statements.  
 
In practical terms, documents can be very efficient and reliable data sources 
(Bowen, 2009, p. 31). Documents are unaffected by the research process – or 
“non-reactive” (Bowen, 2009, p. 31). This means that the same documents can 
be analysed several times, thus making their analysis rather practical and 
flexible, as well as by different investigators, thus making their analysis 
verifiable in terms of reliability. Documents are unrelated to the research 
process – i.e. produced for purposes other than those underlying the research 
process. This means that they may not be appropriate sources of information to 
answer all types of research question. However, it also means that they only 
need to be sought and collected, not elicited and produced by the researcher in 
interaction with specific individuals, and/or within specific spatial and temporal 
settings. Documents may be relatively easy to access – e.g. published 
documents do not require authors’ permissions and/or ethical consent, thus 
saving time and resources. Finally, documents may be extremely rich, detailed, 
and cross-referenced sources of information, thus reducing the need to search 
for additional data sources to verify information.  
 
Ultimately, whether document analyses may be considered appropriate and 
sufficient, or instead require additional collection of evidence via other data 
sources, primarily depends on whether the documents analysed fully address 
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the research questions. In my research, I analysed a substantial number of 
documents that proved to be extremely rich sources of information for the 
research questions. The amount of available documents and their richness of 
content convinced me to focus exclusively on document analyses. These 
analyses turned out to be rather time-consuming, but also satisfying and 
appropriate to answering my research questions, and thus did not require 
additional sources of evidence. The suitability of the selection of documents 
analysed here in relation to my research questions will become evident in the 
next sections, in which I explain the research design that I followed in my 
research. 
 
 
4. Research design and presentation of case study evidence 
 
A research design may be generally defined as: “the logical sequence that 
connects the empirical data to a study’s initial research questions and, 
ultimately, to its conclusions” (Yin, 2013, p. 26). In other words, it is a “logical 
plan” that guides the research from the initial set of questions to be answered, 
through the processes of collecting, analysing and interpreting empirical data, to 
some set of answers (Yin, 2013, p. 26). The main purposes of a research 
design are to enable the “full investigation” of specific research questions 
(Hancock & Algozzine, 2006, p. 31), and “to avoid the situation in which the 
evidence does not address the initial research questions” (Yin, 2013, pp. 26-
27). One of the ultimate purposes of a research design is to justify any inference 
and/or conclusion drawn from the analysis. A research design should then 
effectively deal with a series of related issues – i.e. (1) how to find evidence for 
answers to the research questions, and (2) how to analyse that evidence. 
 
Besides adopting a logically consistent research design, it is also important “to 
present the evidence in your case study with sufficient clarity (e.g., in separate 
texts, tables, and exhibits) to allow readers to judge independently your later 
interpretation of the data” (Yin, 2003, p. 15). As a general principle, it is 
advisable to clearly demarcate evidence from interpretation (Yin, 2003, p. 15). 
Thus, a final issue to deal with is (3) how to report the evidence. 
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4.1 Research questions and evidence 
 
What drove me to embark upon this dissertation was my intrinsic interest in 
finding out how the UK Government came to endorse a specific set of 
expectations over others to justify its biofuel policy. From that initial interest, I 
set out to pursue a related empirical research aim – i.e. to show how the UK 
Government’s responsibilities towards technology policies have affected the 
construction of its vision on biofuel policy. My choice to deploy the sociology of 
expectations as the main framework for the analysis then offered me the 
opportunity to pursue another theoretical aim – that of expanding its focus on 
technology innovators with an analysis of other types of actor. For each 
research aim, I developed and investigated a series of related research 
questions that defined the boundaries of the research. 
 
To address my research questions, I used a “situated approach”, which 
recommends considering both temporal and spatial dimensions when 
investigating expectations (see Chapter 1). In adopting that approach, I 
designed my research as a combination of what I call a “historical analysis” and 
a “cross-sectional analysis”. The historical analysis looks at the temporal 
dimension of the case by focusing on a temporal series of policy documents 
issued from the mid-1990s to present. One of the main purposes of this 
longitudinal study is to observe and describe the evolution of the UK 
Government’s vision on biofuel policy within that period. The cross-sectional 
analysis looks at the spatial dimension of the case by focusing on the 
responses to a public consultation10 that was launched around the time when 
the UK Government adopted its current vision on biofuel policy. One of the main 
purposes of this cross-sectional study is to identify and compare the visions that 
were voiced at the time the UK Government adopted that vision. The two types 
of analysis complement each other, share the same analytical focus – i.e. the 
UK Government’s current vision on biofuel policy – and deploy the same data 
                                            
10
 The consultation here analysed is the fourth of the DfT on biofuel policy (DfT, 2008a). Insights 
into the second (DfT, 2007b) and third (DfT, 2007a) DfT consultations on biofuel policy are 
retrieved from previous academic analyses (Upham & Tomei, 2010; Upham et al., 2011) – see 
Chapter 6. 
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collection technique – i.e. document analysis. However, each analysis 
addresses different – though related – research questions. As a result, the two 
analyses also differ in the range of actors and types of document considered. 
These differences motivated my choice to report the analyses in two separate 
parts. 
 
4.1.1 The historical analysis: research questions and evidence 
 
The historical analysis firstly addresses the following empirical research 
question: 
 
(1) How has the UK Government’s vision on biofuel policy evolved from its 
origins in sustainable road transport policy to the current controversy on 
biofuel policy? 
 
To answer this question, the historical analysis narrows the focus to a temporal 
series of policy documents issued by a selection of UK Government 
departments. The departments included in the analysis are: the Department for 
Transport (DfT) – formerly Department of the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions (DETR); the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(Defra); the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI); and the Department of 
Energy and Climate Change (DECC). These departments have been selected 
because of their policymaking responsibilities for sustainable road transport and 
biofuel policies in the UK. Also included in the analysis are the European 
Commission and Council, because of their overarching policymaking 
responsibilities in both sustainable transport and biofuel policies across the 
European Union. 
 
Sustainable road transport and biofuel policies overlap in policy areas as 
diverse as transport, energy, environment, and agriculture. Such overlapping 
has muddled the distribution of policy responsibilities among the several 
government departments leading on these policy areas. These departments 
participated in the debates on sustainable transport and biofuel polices as 
representatives of the UK Government. Despite the muddled delegation of 
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policy responsibilities, UK departments merged their fragmented, multiple 
voices by issuing official documents in the name of “the Government”. 
Investigating the implications of the multiple nature of the UK Government’s 
“official voice” is beyond the scope of this dissertation. To reflect how UK 
departments have enacted that voice, I treat and report their statements as 
those of the UK Government – i.e. in the way UK departments wanted those 
statements to be read (as statements of “the Government”). At any rate, all 
statements are referenced to the respective UK department authoring them. 
The distribution of policy responsibilities among the UK Government 
departments involved in sustainable transport and biofuel polices is explained in 
detail in the empirical chapter (Chapter 3).  
 
To track the evolution of the UK Government’s vision on biofuel policy, the 
historical analysis reconstructs the official voice of “the Government” by 
following over time the interventions of its departments in the debates on 
sustainable transport and biofuel polices. The documents analysed span from 
the mid-1990s to present – i.e. from the origins of the biofuel policy debate in 
sustainable transport policy debate to the current biofuel controversy. This 
makes them a suitable temporal sample of documents for a longitudinal 
analysis of the evolution of the UK Government’s vision. 
 
The historical analysis ultimately addresses the following empirical research 
question:  
 
(2) How have the UK Government’s responsibilities towards technology 
policy affected the evolution of its vision on biofuel policy? 
 
To answer this question, the historical analysis narrows the focus to a temporal 
series of correspondence undertaken between the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution (RCEP), the Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs 
Committee (EFRAC), and the Environmental Audit Committee (EAC) and the 
UK Government throughout the historical period under analysis. In this 
correspondence, the RCEP, EFRAC, and the EAC strongly disagreed with the 
UK Government on how to envision the future of sustainable road transport and 
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biofuel policies, and questioned its policy responsibilities. To investigate these 
disagreements, the analysis compares over time the vision on biofuel policy of 
the UK Government with those of the RCEP, EFRAC, and the EAC. This 
comparison reveals how the former related its policy responsibilities to the 
construction of its vision on biofuel policy differently from the latter, thus partially 
explaining their disagreements. 
 
The RCEP, EFRAC, and the EAC had limited influence11 in the legislative 
process (see Appendix 1). Nevertheless, they could initiate a formal 
correspondence by publishing formal reports addressed to the UK Government, 
which was then called to reply through formal publications (House of Commons 
Information Office [HoC IO], 2009). The RCEP, EFRAC, and the EAC 
exchanged official correspondence with the UK Government at relatively regular 
intervals throughout the historical period analysed. The RCEP was among the 
first UK public authorities to engage in the debate on sustainable road transport 
policy, and addressed the UK Government with two reports on the issue, in 
1994 and 1997. In the related debate on biofuel policy, EFRAC addressed the 
UK Government with two reports on the issue, in 2003 and 2006. The EAC 
followed EFRAC addressing the UK Government with a report on biofuel policy 
in 2008. Their relatively regular distribution over time makes this 
correspondence a suitable temporal sample of documents for a comparative 
analysis of the different ways in which public authorities in the UK construct 
their visions in relation to their policymaking responsibilities.  
 
With specific regards to public authorities with executive roles in technology 
policy – e.g. the UK Government in this case – the sociology of expectations 
literature has overlooked the analysis of their policy-promises. This is 
presumably because of its focus on technology innovators and their 
expectations and promises on technological advancements. The term policy-
promise here refers to the promises of public authorities on their future policy 
                                            
11
 The RCEP’s remit was limited to policy advice, without any executive role in policymaking and 
in the administration of public resources for technology development. EFRAC and the EAC are 
institutions appointed to scrutinise and call to account the UK Government on its policies 
towards Parliament, but their remits exclude executive roles in policymaking and in the 
administration of public resources for technology development. The current UK Government 
closed down the RCEP in March 2011. 
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commitments, such as, for instance, the provision of political and financial 
support to a specific industry. To address this gap, the historical analysis 
addresses the following theoretical research question:  
 
(3) How do previous policy-promises of support for technology innovators 
influence an executive public authority in the construction of its vision of 
the future? 
 
The historical analysis provides an empirical basis for analysing and 
theoretically reinterpreting how previous policy commitments of executive public 
authorities towards an industry may turn out to be a critical factor in their 
definition of the future.  
 
The historical analysis processed exclusively official documents. UK public 
authorities use the general label “official documents” when referring to key 
Departmental Papers, Command Papers, and House of Commons Papers (The 
Stationery Office [TSO], ). Public authorities issue these documents in their 
name and assume responsibility for their content – in a way, these documents 
may be said to contain public authorities’ “official voice”. Within these 
documents, public authorities support their positions on specific policy 
proposals or statements of policy before the whole audience of taxpayers.12 All 
official documents here analysed were rich sources of statements of 
expectations on technologies and policies, and, implicitly or explicitly, also 
contained views on what the governmental responsibilities in policymaking 
ought to be. Publicly available by definition, these documents were relatively 
easy to find and collect. They proved to be extremely valuable data sources for 
the analysis of the different ways in which the UK Government, the RCEP, 
EFRAC, and the EAC have constructed their own official visions of the future, 
and publicly endorsed them to the whole audience of taxpayers. 
 
                                            
12
 Although the UK Government and the RCEP, EFRAC, and EAC were the direct 
correspondents in the official correspondence, these were official documents meant to be 
published online – i.e. meant to address the wider audience of taxpayers. 
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To reconstruct the temporal sequence of the official documents to include in the 
analysis, I started by searching the most recent documents in the websites of 
the above-mentioned public authorities. From the references listed in those 
documents and websites, I tracked the sequence of previous official documents 
back to the origins of the UK biofuel policy debate in the sustainable transport 
policy debate. Particularly useful for this retrospective search was the UK 
Government Web Archive, in the website of the National Archives, which stores 
all official documents and previous versions of the institutional websites of all 
UK Governmental departments (National Archives, n.d.). 
 
4.1.2 The cross-sectional analysis: research questions and evidence 
 
The cross-sectional analysis firstly addresses the following empirical research 
question:  
 
(4) Which visions on biofuel policy were competing at the time when the UK 
Government adopted its current vision on biofuel policy? 
 
To answer this question, the cross-sectional analysis processes the responses 
and accompanying documents of the fourth public consultation on biofuel policy, 
launched on the 15th October 2008 by the DfT in the name of the UK 
Government. Around that time, the UK Government adopted its current vision 
on biofuel policy. To identify the visions that were competing at that time, the 
cross-sectional analysis reconstructs the visions of the consultation participants. 
As argued below, this consultation can be considered a purposive and 
convenient cross-sectional sample of documents for a comparative analysis of 
the visions that were competing at the time when the UK Government endorsed 
its current vision.  
 
An issue that needs to be addressed in designing a public consultation is how to 
recruit those who supposedly represent the public (Fishkin, 2006, p. 57). This 
issue is just one among the many to consider for a comprehensive evaluation of 
a public consultation as a public engagement mechanism (Rowe & Frewer, 
2000; OECD, 2001; Rowe & Frewer, 2004; OECD, 2005; Rowe & Frewer, 2005; 
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Rowe et al., 2005; Rowe et al., 2008). Such an evaluation of the consultation 
under analysis is beyond the scope of this research. In the following, I evaluate 
only the recruitment process of the fourth public consultation on biofuel policy 
as it helps to understand who the respondents were and, therefore, what can be 
inferred from their responses. 
 
Public consultations may recruit respondents in different ways: self-selection; 
selection by sampling techniques that attempt to be representative with non-
probability sampling, or that specifically aim to ensure representativeness with 
probability sampling13 (i.e. random samplings); they may even be selected in 
their totality (i.e. virtually all members of the population or universe are 
consulted) (Fishkin, 2006, p. 59). In the consultation under analysis, as in the 
previous three on UK biofuel policy, the DfT omitted to explain in detail which 
sampling techniques it used to recruit participants, and only provided 
instructions on how to participate. Analysis of these instructions reveals that the 
recruitment process was certainly non-probabilistic – i.e. not guided by 
statistical theory. 
 
                                            
13
 Sampling techniques are distinguished into probability samplings and nonprobability 
samplings. Probability samplings are sampling techniques that require that (1) each unit of the 
target population or universe must have a known mathematical chance of being selected, (2) 
which must be greater than zero and (3) which must be numerically calculable (UN, 2005, p. 32; 
Lohr, 2009, p. 25; Everitt & Skrondal, 2010, p. 340). In probability sampling, groups of units in 
the sample are represented in the same proportion as in the target population or, when unequal 
probabilities are used, the data are reweighted so as to reflect the target population proportions. 
The purpose of a probability sample is to produce a statistically significant and representative 
sample of the target population, suitable for hypothesis testing and drawing statistical inferences 
(Wilmot, 2005, p. 3). The mathematical nature of probability samplings permits one to consider 
the estimations made with the survey as scientifically grounded. As probability samplings are 
constructed according to statistical theory, the estimations made on the sample can be inferred 
to represent the target population and the sampling errors can be calculated (UN, 2005, p. 32). 
Many possible random selection procedures exist and vary depending on the characteristics of 
the target population and research study. 
Nonprobability samplings are sampling techniques that rely on the subjective judgement of the 
researcher and do not require random selection in the procedure of sample units’ selection 
(Wilmot, 2005, p. 3). As opposed to probability samplings, the use of nonprobability samplings 
is not guided by statistical theory. It follows that they are likely to be affected by biases and that 
the assessment of their reliability can only be done through subjective evaluation. As 
nonprobability samplings fail to abide by probability theory, it is not possible to estimate the 
magnitude and direction in terms of overrepresentation or underrepresentation of their biases 
(UN, 2005, p. 34). Thus, no statistical method exists to determine and measure whether and 
how much, in probabilistic terms, a nonprobability sampling is representative of the target 
population. The general preference for probability samplings over nonprobability sampling is 
based on the belief that the former are more accurate, more rigorous, and less affected by 
biases than the latter (UN, 2005, p. 32). 
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In all four biofuel consultations, the DfT published an invitation document on its 
website with the explicit purpose of opening the consultation to anyone 
potentially interested in participating – either as an individual or as a 
representative of an organisation (DfT, 2004b, p. 29; 2007b, p. 2; 2007a, p. 3; 
2008a, pp. 5-6). In the second and in the fourth (the one under analysis), the 
DfT also invited participants to contact the department with suggestions of other 
possible interested individuals or organisations (DfT, 2007b, p. 2; 2008a, pp. 5-
6). In all four biofuel consultations, the DfT also used preselected lists of 
“stakeholders” to send the invitation documents directly to specific 
organisations. The DfT never clarified what it meant by “stakeholders” and the 
criteria used to create and update the lists. Apparently, it also failed to publish 
the complete lists of stakeholders contacted. The lists of stakeholders published 
in the invitation documents of all four consultations (DfT, 2004b, Annex E; 
2007b, Annex D; 2007a, Annex J; 2008a, Annex C) contain slightly more than 
half of the stakeholders the DfT declared it had contacted in the following 
summaries of responses14 (DfT, 2004a, Introduction; 2007d, p. 3; 2008d, 
Introduction; 2009c, p. 1). Nevertheless, comparison of those (possibly 
incomplete) lists seems to suggest that the DfT most likely updated and 
expanded the list of the first consultation, and used its updated versions in the 
subsequent consultations (see Appendix 2). Furthermore, the nature of the 
stakeholders listed in the invitation documents seems to suggest that the DfT 
most likely aimed to collect expert views and, at the same time, maintain 
heterogeneity among the respondents when compiling the lists. Indeed, the lists 
contain a very heterogeneous mix of organisations, which could all be said to be 
expert in diverse aspects of biofuel policy.  
 
The above instructions can be reinterpreted in terms of sampling techniques. 
The main sampling technique implemented by the DfT was self-selection or 
volunteer sampling15 – i.e. opening the consultation to anyone willing to 
                                            
14
 First consultation: 100 declared in introduction versus 60 listed in annexes; second 
consultation: 400 declared in introduction versus 235 listed in annexes; third consultation: 400 
declared in introduction versus 244 listed in annexes; fourth consultation: 400 declared in 
introduction versus 241 listed in annexes. 
15
 In self-selecting sampling, respondents self-select themselves by volunteering to participate. 
Self-selection sampling tends to recruit the individuals and/or organisations that care the most 
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participate. It also permitted snowball sampling16 – i.e. allowing participants to 
suggest other participants. It remains unclear whether the DfT compiled the lists 
of stakeholders directly invited to participate using expert sampling17 – i.e. 
eliciting expert views – and/or heterogeneity sampling18 – i.e. eliciting 
heterogeneous views – or simply according to convenience. Self-selecting 
sampling belongs to the category of accidental, haphazard, or convenience 
samplings. These non-probability samplings are commonly used when it is 
irrelevant, impractical, or unethical to enlist random units from the target 
population – i.e. they are used mostly because of their practical convenience, 
rather than their relevance to a specific research purpose (Trochim, 2006, 
October 20). Snowball, expert, and heterogeneity samplings belong to the 
general category of purposive or judgmental samplings. In these non-probability 
samplings, the criteria used to recruits participants – e.g. their expertise or 
heterogeneity – are more important than the randomness of the selection 
process or the representativeness of the resulting sample (Trochim, 2006, 
October 20).  
 
The non-probabilistic nature of the consultation’s recruitment process implies 
that neither the participants nor their visions can be said to be statistically 
representative of any populations of stakeholders or universes of vision – 
however such populations and/or universes may be defined. Therefore, the 
                                                                                                                                
about the issues under consultation. The majority of potential respondents usually remain silent, 
resulting in large self-selection biases (Trochim, 2006, October 20). 
16
 In snowball sampling, respondents are firstly identified according to certain criteria of 
inclusion, and then asked to provide further contacts that match the same criteria. Snowball 
sampling tends to recruit respondents that know each other, and therefore, that are likely to 
share similar views. This sampling technique tends to marginalise respondents with different 
views, and not to produce diverse samples (Wilmot, 2005, p. 6; Trochim, 2006, October 20; 
Everitt & Skrondal, 2010, p. 401). 
17
 In expert sampling, respondents are recruited in relation to their demonstrable expertise, 
and/or experience in the specific knowledge areas of interest. The purpose of this sampling 
technique is to elicit the views of specific respondents variously identified as “experts” regarding 
the issues under consultation. Expert sampling can produce representative samples of a 
specific population of experts, provided that the criteria used to identify all expert units 
belonging to such a population are explicitly and unequivocally defined (Trochim, 2006, October 
20).  
18
 In heterogeneity (or diversity) sampling, respondents are recruited primarily because of their 
differing views. The purpose of this sampling technique is to collect as many views as possible 
on the issues under consultation, including outliers or unusual views, in an attempt to 
reconstruct the whole spectrum of all possible views relevant to the specific issues. Therefore, 
the concern is not to represent proportionally the population of respondents holding views in the 
issues of interests, but to elicit the views from participants that are as heterogeneous as 
possible (Trochim, 2006, October 20).  
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findings derived from the analysis of the consultation participants and their 
visions are not generalisable in statistical terms. In other words, the visions of 
the consultation’s participants can only be said to be those of the individuals 
and organisations most interested in participating among those aware or made 
aware of its launch – i.e. they are not statistically representative of all visions 
competing at the time of the consultation’s launch. This conclusion applies to 
the qualitative analysis of the consultation responses made by the UK 
Government, and, by extension, also to my own analysis. Keeping this limitation 
in mind, the consultation responses can be still treated as a convenient and 
purposive sample of documents for a cross-sectional analysis of the visions on 
biofuel policy that were competing at the time when the UK Government 
endorsed its current vision on biofuel policy.  
 
The cross-sectional analysis ultimately addresses the following empirical 
research question: 
 
(5) How have the UK Government’s responsibilities in technology policy 
affected its choice of which visions to select and marginalise within its 
current vision on biofuel policy?  
 
To answer this question, the cross-sectional analysis compares the UK 
Government’s vision with those of the consultation participants. It also identifies 
and emphasises contrasts between the UK Government’s self-definition of its 
own policy responsibilities in biofuel policy and the participants’ views on what 
those responsibilities ought to be. The participants disagreed with the UK 
Government and among themselves on the future of biofuel policy, and, 
implicitly or explicitly, also on what the policy responsibilities of the UK 
Government as executive public authority in biofuel policy ought to be. By 
comparing those visions and views, the analysis reveals how the UK 
Government selected and marginalised voices in relation to its policy 
responsibilities, thus partially explaining the disagreements. 
 
The consultation consisted of two parts, covering a total of 20 questions: Part 1 
– Future levels under the RTFO (the first 13 questions) and Part 2 – Longer-
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term issues related to transposition of the European Directives (the last 7 
questions). The cross-sectional analysis draws evidence from all the responses 
to the 20 questions. However, in the responses to the specific questions listed 
below, the participants revealed their views on the future of biofuel policy and 
on the UK Government’s related policy responsibilities, more than in the 
responses to the other questions. These latter addressed more technical issues 
and were thus less rich in statements of expectations (for the full list of 
consultation questions see Appendix 3). 
 
The first part of the consultation focused on proposed policy changes directly 
affecting short-term support for incumbent producers of first-generation biofuels 
(for a detailed account of the biofuel industrial context see Appendix 4). The 
second, third, and fourth questions in particular confronted the issue of whether 
current support for biofuels – i.e. the annual rates of the Renewable Transport 
Fuel Obligation (RTFO) – should be left unchanged, frozen, or slowed down. 
The sixth question then invited participants to comment on the impact 
assessment produced by the DfT for the three options proposed. The 
responses to these questions were particularly rich in statements of 
expectations on the expected benefits and damages of the current support for 
first-generation biofuels. In these responses, the participants also criticised the 
UK Government for not honouring its responsibilities in biofuel policy, thus 
revealing their views on what those policy responsibilities ought to be. The 
exact wording of the questions: 
 
- Question 2. Do you agree or disagree that the obligation levels should be 
left unchanged?  
- Question 3. Do you agree or disagree with freezing the obligation level at 
2.5 per cent?  
- Question 4. Do you agree or disagree that the rate of increase in the 
RTFO should be adjusted in line with Professor Gallagher’s 
recommendations? 
- Question 6. Do you agree with the costs as set out in the Impact 
Assessment? 
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The second part of the consultation focused on policy changes affecting long-
term support for prospective investors in second-generation biofuels. These 
policy changes were related to the future transposition of two upcoming 
European Directives into UK law. The seventeenth and eighteenth questions in 
particular sought views on the EU proposals to readdress future biofuel policy to 
promote second-generation biofuels and on how to encourage the development 
of second-generation biofuels in general. The twentieth question then invited 
participants to mention any other issue that should have been taken into 
consideration in relation to the two proposed EU Directives. The responses to 
these questions were particularly rich in statements of expectations on how to 
establish the optimal conditions for industry to develop second-generation 
biofuels in the future. In these responses, the participants also criticised the UK 
Government for not honouring its responsibilities in biofuel policy, thus revealing 
their views on what those policy responsibilities ought to be. The exact wording 
of the questions: 
 
- Question 17. Would the double rewards proposed under the RED be 
adequate to encourage second generation biofuels?  
- Question 18. What other mechanisms could better encourage the 
development of second generation biofuels? 
- Question 20. Taking into account the requirements of both draft 
Directives, are there any other issues which need consideration when we 
transpose these into UK legislation? 
 
The sociology of expectations literature has mostly been applied to analysing 
the expectations of technology innovators. Several of the organisations that 
participated in the consultation were technology innovators in biofuels and other 
industrial areas. Several other types of organisation participated, such as public 
authorities, industry associations, consultancies, and non-governmental 
organisations. To expand the focus of the sociology of expectations from 
technology innovators to other types of actor, the cross-sectional analysis 
addresses the following theoretical research question:  
 
85 
 
(6) How do public authorities, industry associations, consultancies, and non-
governmental organisations diffuse expectations?  
(7) How could they be interpreted through the lens of the sociology of 
expectations? 
 
The analysis of the consultation provides an empirical basis for the analysis and 
theoretical reinterpretation of the roles played by these specific types of actor in 
diffusing expectations on technologies and policies in consultations.  
 
The cross-sectional analysis narrows the focus to the invitation document, the 
participants’ responses, and the two summaries of responses of the fourth 
consultation on biofuel policy. These documents have interesting features for 
analysis. 
 
At the launch of the consultation, the DfT published in its website an invitation 
document containing the UK Government’s policy proposals – explained in 
detail – and the list of questions to be used to consult the public. Participants 
were given two months to answer – from the 15th October to the 17th December 
2010. After the closure of the consultation, the DfT analysed the responses and 
published two summaries of responses – one for each part of the consultation – 
to provide its own reply to each question and inform the public of the 
consultation outcome and subsequent policy changes (DfT, 2008a, pp. 5-6).  
The invitation document and the summary of responses are official documents 
that the DfT issued in the name of the UK Government. Within these 
documents, the UK Government presented the reasons and justifications 
behind the policy proposals and self-defined its own responsibilities in biofuel 
policy. By comparing these documents, it is possible to show how the UK 
Government selected and marginalised the voices of the consultation 
participants, and, subsequently, defended the public endorsement of its official 
vision to the whole audience of taxpayers. 
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The participants could choose whether to submit their responses anonymously 
and confidentially or allow the DfT to disclose their responses upon request19 – 
i.e. to make them available to anyone requesting them (DfT, 2008a, pp. 5-6). In 
the summaries of responses, the DfT provided a synthetic account of all 
opinions received from participants for each question. However, to guarantee 
confidentiality, it only listed and synthetised the opinions without any clear 
indication of their authorship.20 To reconnect participants to their respective 
responses, I had to retrieve and analyse the original responses. Responding to 
my request, the DfT forwarded me the responses of 66 organisations. The 
fourth consultation collected 89 responses in total, 68 of them from 
organisations. According to the list of 68 organisations published in the 
summaries of responses, the two missing responses from organisations are that 
of a biofuel producer – Good Fuel Cooperative & Golden Fuels, and that of an 
industry association – Confederation of Passenger Transport (CPT). The 
responses of the “members of the public” – as defined by the DfT – could not be 
made available for this research (DfT, 2009c, Annex A; 2009d, Annex A). 
 
The responses were not meant for publication, but rather to feed into the UK 
Government’s summaries of responses, though, if consent was given, they 
could potentially be released by the DfT to anyone who requested them. These 
documents can thus be considered as primarily addressed to the UK 
Government. This latter is critical to considering the consultation responses as 
authentic documents, revealing how several different actors variously attempted 
to influence the policymaking process with statements of expectations. 
 
To complement and confirm the self-definitions the participants gave in their 
consultation responses, I retrieved additional information from their websites. All 
consultation participants under analysis are organisations with institutional 
websites. Webpages such as “home”, “about us”, “information for investors”, 
“mission”, “statute”, and the like were particularly useful. Within these webpages 
                                            
19
 In accordance with the “code of practice on consultation” (BERR, 2008). 
20
 The only exception was a synthesis of the opinions concerning the obligation levels in the 
executive summary of the first summary of responses (DfT, 2009c, pp. 2-4). In this synthesis, 
several opinions were listed together and referred to two broader and undefined categories, 
namely: the “biofuel producers and a number of other industry organisations” and the 
“environmental groups, NGOs and other organisations” (DfT, 2009c, p. 3). 
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in particular, the organisations describe themselves and their core 
activity/business.  
 
 
4.2 Method of data analysis 
 
My research deploys a method of data analysis that can be categorised as 
thematic analysis – i.e. “the most commonly used method of analysis in 
qualitative research” (Guest et al., 2011, p. 11). 
 
“Thematic analysis is a data reduction and analysis strategy by which 
qualitative data are segmented, categorized, summarized, and 
reconstructed in a way that captures the important concepts within the 
data set.” (Ayres, 2008, p. 867) 
 
Primarily a descriptive strategy, thematic analysis codifies qualitative data to 
ease the identification, arrangement, and systematisation of ideas, concepts, 
and categories uncovered in a specific data set (Ayres, 2008, p. 867). Every 
method of qualitative data analysis involves some sort of coding (Van Den 
Hoonaard & Van Den Hoonaard, 2008, pp. 186-187): 
  
“Coding consists of identifying potentially interesting events, features, 
phrases, behaviors, or stages of a process and distinguishing them with 
labels. These are then further differentiated or integrated so that they 
may be reworked into a smaller number of categories, relationships, and 
patterns so as to tell a story or communicate conclusions drawn from the 
data.” (Benaquisto, 2008, p. 85) 
 
A flexible coding frame – i.e. “a scheme that lays out key concepts, their 
definitions, and criteria for recognition” (Benaquisto, 2008, p. 85) – generally 
emerges and evolves while the analysis progresses. Recurring codes within the 
data – e.g. phrases, terms, expressions and the like – are then regrouped into 
constructs, which are then analysed in connection and in reference to their 
specific sources (Firmin, 2008, p. 869). 
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Such constructs in thematic analysis are referred to as “themes”. Coding in 
thematic analysis may be highly dynamic; coding, data management, the 
development and refinement of themes, and the identification of patterns across 
the data may not occur sequentially as in a clearly predetermined process, but 
throughout the analysis (Ayres, 2008, p. 868). 
 
Thematic analysis may derive themes “both from data (an inductive approach) 
and from our prior theoretical understanding of whatever phenomenon we are 
studying (an a priori, or deductive approach)” (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p. 55). 
When deductively constructed, thematic coding may, for instance, draw “from 
already-agreed-on professional definitions found in literature reviews” (Bernard 
& Ryan, 2010, p. 56), although more often, “themes are derived empirically – 
[i.e.] induced from data” (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p. 56). In particular, the 
inductive approach is preferred in research inspired by Grounded Theory 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p. 273; Glaser & Strauss, 2006, p. 5). Generally, “In 
thematic coding, the analyst frequently begins with a list of themes known (or at 
least anticipated) to be found in the data” (Ayres, 2008, p. 867). 
 
In my research, I deployed what may be defined as a “hybrid process of 
inductive and deductive thematic analysis” where both theory-derived and data-
derived codes were used to codify data (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). In 
the preliminary, explorative phase of the document analysis, many of the terms 
that I encountered in the documents were rather similar to the terminology used 
in the multi-level perspective (MLP) on socio-technical transitions – e.g. 
technological regime, niches, lock-in, etc. This was one of the reasons that 
convinced me to integrate the sociology of expectations with the MLP. The 
resulting classification of expectations into different levels – i.e. niche, regime, 
landscape – is the theory-derived coding that helped me identify and classify 
single statements of expectations. These statements were then reconstructed 
and reduced to visions – i.e. constructs or “themes” regrouping together coded 
expectations – according to the same classification. The visions of the actors 
analysed in my research are the initial themes on which my research focused. 
The process involved going back and forth from raw data – i.e. statements of 
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expectations in the original documents – to visions – i.e. my reproduction of 
those statements – in an effort to identify new themes. Continuous scrutiny and 
comparison of visions then helped me to organise ideas, highlight temporal and 
spatial patterns, and highlight concepts that appeared to emerge from the data. 
During this process, other themes inductively emerged during the analyses: for 
instance, the dilemma over whether preserving support for first-generation 
biofuels was an essential means to fulfil expectations on second-generation 
biofuels becoming available – or else an environmentally dangerous, 
counterproductive means to fulfil those expectations. In the following sections, I 
provide more specific details on the practicalities involved in the application of 
my method of data analysis.  
 
4.2.1 Historical analysis: method of data analysis 
 
In the historical analysis, I started with preliminary readings of all the text of the 
official policy documents and correspondence selected for analysis. This helped 
me to identify and highlight any part of the text containing statements of 
expectations on the future of sustainable road transport and/or biofuel policies. I 
then extracted and recorded in a Word document the highlighted parts of the 
text as quotes – i.e. exact text, referenced to the author and the date of 
publication of the original document. In the Word document, all quotes were 
subdivided by author, put in chronological order, and related to the coevolution 
of contextual conditions. To compare the UK Government’s vision and those of 
the other public authorities under analysis, I placed the quotes extracted from 
the official correspondence into separate sections from those retrieved from the 
official policy documents. Doing so helped me to identify differences and 
similarities between their visions. 
 
The official policy documents and correspondence analysed discussed issues 
pertaining to all three socio-technical levels as theorised in the MLP. For each 
public authority under analysis, I thus processed selected quotes by marking 
statements of expectations according to the distinction among landscape, 
regime, and niche levels. This helped me to reorganise these statements into 
visions. Visions were then reclassified according to the MLP levels and 
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reattributed to their respective authors. This helped me to track the evolution of 
the visions of the public authorities under analysis during the sustainable 
transport and biofuel policy debates. It also allowed me to identify their different 
views on the above dilemma and on what the policy responsibilities of the UK 
Government ought to be. The Word document eventually evolved into the 
“historical analysis” chapter. 
 
4.2.2 Cross-sectional analysis: method of data analysis 
 
In the cross-sectional analysis, I started with preliminary readings of the 
invitation document, all consultation responses, and the two summaries of 
responses. This helped me to identify and highlight any part of the text 
containing statements of expectations on the future of UK biofuel policy. As 
above, the highlighted parts of the text were then extracted and initially 
recorded in a Word document as quotes – i.e. the exact text, referenced to the 
author and the date of publication of the original document. In the analysis, I 
subdivided consultation participants into categories by using their self-
definitions – i.e. the actors’ own definition of their own organisational nature 
and/or institutional role in biofuel policy. I retrieved these self-definitions from 
their consultation responses and/or from their websites (see section 4.3.2 for 
further details). I then subdivided the Word document into separate sections 
representing the categories of actors, and allocated selected quotes within them 
according to the category of actors of their respective authors. Doing so helped 
me to identify differences and similarities across the several categories of actor 
participating in the consultation. 
 
The invitation document, consultation responses, and two summaries of 
responses mostly dealt with issues pertaining to the niche level as theorised in 
the MLP. For each category of actor, I thus processed selected quotes by 
marking statements of expectations according to the niche-level distinction 
between first-generation and second-generation biofuels. This helped me to 
reorganise the statements into visions. Visions were then regrouped in relation 
to the policy proposals of the consultation on current support for first-generation 
biofuels and future support for second-generation biofuels. This helped me to 
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emphasise convergent, divergent, and shifting expectations on first-generation 
and second-generation biofuel technologies and related policies among the 
different categories of actors. It also allowed me to identify the different views of 
the consultation participants on the above dilemma and on what the policy 
responsibilities of the UK Government ought to be. The Word document 
eventually evolved into the “cross-sectional analysis” chapter. 
 
4.3 Reporting evidence 
 
Increasing transparency and allowing the reader to interpret the data have been 
my main guidelines in reporting evidence. To increase transparency and show 
which evidence supports which interpretation, I reported the historical analysis 
and the cross-sectional analysis in two separate parts, respectively Part 1 and 
Part 2 of this dissertation. Each part starts with its respective empirical chapter, 
which reports evidence from the respective analysis. Within each part, 
interpretations and theoretical reflections are condensed in the chapters 
following the empirical ones. In the empirical chapters, quotes containing 
statements of expectations have either been paraphrased or extracted and 
reported in direct quotation. In paraphrasing quotes, I tried to preserve the 
original text as far as possible. The statements quoted directly were those that 
included more statements of expectations than other similar quotes from the 
same author.  
 
4.3.1 Historical analysis: reporting evidence 
 
In the empirical chapter of the historical analysis, evidence is reported in two 
main sections, reflecting an analytical subdivision of the period under analysis 
into two phases. The first section covers the 1990s – i.e. when sustainable road 
transport policy started to be debated in the UK. The second section covers the 
2000s – i.e. when biofuel policy started to be debated in the UK. The official 
correspondence between the UK Government and the RCEP took place in the 
first historical period, the official correspondence between the UK Government 
and EFRAC and the EAC in the second. 
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4.3.2 Cross-sectional analysis: reporting evidence 
 
In the empirical chapter of the cross-sectional analysis, evidence from the 
invitation document, participants’ responses, and summaries of responses is 
reported in separate sections to highlight the differences between the UK 
Government’s vision on biofuel policy ex-ante and ex-post consultation. 
Evidence from consultation responses is further subdivided into actor categories 
to emphasise the contrast between the visions and views of the different types 
of actor participating in the consultation. 
 
To classify participants, I attempted to reconstruct the classification that the DfT 
reported in the summaries of responses (DfT, 2009c, Annex A; 2009d, Annex 
A). The resulting classification approximately matches the DfT’s (see Table 1). 
Reproducing the exact classification of the DfT is not possible for several 
reasons. Firstly, the DfT failed to specify which participants were included in 
which category – it only provided a table counting the participants per category 
and a list of participants in alphabetic order. Secondly, it failed to explain in 
detail the criteria defining the classification labels. Thus, any attempt to 
reproduce its classification is inevitably affected by subjective interpretations of 
those labels. This is particularly problematic in several ambiguous cases, which 
are difficult to classify because they could belong to more than one category. 
Lastly, the DfT miscounted the number of participants, thus adding further 
uncertainty.  
 
Nevertheless, by following (what is likely to be) the approach the DfT deployed 
to classify participants, it is possible to arrive at a similar classification. In the 
invitation document, the DfT asked participants to state whether they were 
responding as single individuals or on behalf of a company or other 
organisation. From those responding on behalf of a representative organisation, 
the DfT requested further details on whom their organisation represented (DfT, 
2008a, p. 5). It is then quite likely that the DfT subdivided participants according 
to the self-definitions they provided in their responses. Most of the organisations 
sent responses containing self-definitions of their core business and/or main 
activity. For those that failed to do so, it remains unclear whether the DfT 
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inferred their nature from sources other than their consultation responses. 
However, given the limited time that the DfT had to analyse and report the 
consultation responses (from the 17th December 2008 to the 28th January 2009 
for the first summary of responses), an in-depth investigation seems unlikely. As 
for the distinction among “oil producers/refiners”, “biofuel producers”, and “other 
business” in particular, the DfT seems to have regrouped industrial actors 
according to their degree of proximity to biofuel production and biofuel policy.  
 
To classify participants, I followed a similar approach to the one described 
above and used the ten categories used by the DfT – though I modified the 
label of two categories to better reflect their nature. More specifically, I tracked 
and analysed the participants’ self-definitions of their core business and/or main 
activity both in their responses and in their websites. To classify industry actors 
in particular, I looked at how their businesses were related to the legal 
requirements of the UK biofuel policy. By doing so, I constructed a classification 
that approximately matches the DfT’s – though some categories are more 
approximate than others (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: DfT classification vs Dissertation classification 
DfT classification   Dissertation classification  
Biofuel producers 12  Biofuel producers (1) 12 
Oil producers/refiners 7  Obligated suppliers (2) 7 
Other business 9  Other business (3) 4 
Other 5  Other (4) 2 
Academic 3  Academic 3 
Trade association 12  Industry associations (5) 20 
Consultancies 1  Consultancies (6) 2 
Non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) 
8  
Non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) (7) 
7 
Local government and non-
departmental public bodies 
(NDPBs) 
10  
Local government and non-
departmental public bodies 
(NDPBs) (7) 
11 
(4+7) 
Members of the public 22  Members of the public (8) 22 
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TOTAL 89  TOTAL (9) 92 
 
(1) The DfT did not provide a response from the biofuel producer Good Fuel 
Cooperative & Golden Fuels. 
(2)  I preferred to rename the DfT’s “oil producers/refiners” category as 
“obligated suppliers” and populate it according to the RFA’s list of obligated 
suppliers for the RTFO obligation year 2008/2009 (RFA, 2010, p. 18). This 
list offers a clear-cut criterion of subdivision that helped me distinguish 
uncertain cases – i.e. organisations potentially belonging to both the 
“biofuel producers” and “oil producers/refiners” categories. My category 
seemingly matches its DfT counterpart.  
(3) The DfT’s “other business” category outnumbers mine by five units – 
probably because mine includes only industrial actors and excludes all 
representative organisations (see note 5).  
(4) The DfT’s “other” category outnumbers mine by three units – probably 
because mine includes only respondents unclassifiable with respect to all 
the criteria here mentioned and excludes all representative organisations 
(see note 5). 
(5) I preferred to rename the DfT’s “trade association” category as “industry 
associations” to underline their role as representative organisations of 
sponsor industries and to avoid confusion with trade unions. The DfT’s 
“trade associations” is outnumbered by my “industry associations” category 
by eight units – probably because mine includes all private organisations 
whose core business is representing an industry irrespective of the core 
business of the industry represented. The DfT did not provide the response 
of an industry association – Confederation of Passenger Transport (CPT). 
(6) The DfT’s “consultancies” category is outnumbered by mine by one unit – 
probably because only one of the two participants clearly stated in its 
response that it was a consultancy. The other respondent included in my 
category appears to be a consultancy from its website – although it 
remains a borderline case between “consultancies” and “industry 
associations”. 
(7) The DfT’s “non-governmental organisations (NGOs)” category outnumbers 
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mine by one unit, while the DfT’s “local government and NDPB” category is 
outnumbered by mine by one unit – probably because of the affinity 
between NDPBs and NGOs. For my classification, I subdivided them 
according to their legal and/or financial links with governmental 
departments, identifying NDPBs as relatively more linked, and NGOs as 
relatively less linked to the UK Government. 
(8) The responses of “members of the public” – as defined by the DfT – were 
not available for this research. 
(9) According to the summaries of the responses, this consultation collected 
89 responses in total, of which 22 were from “members of the public”. 
However, in their annexes, the summaries of responses list the names of 
68 organisations as respondents. Hence, there must be a mistake in the 
DfT’s classification of respondents as these figures do not add up (DfT, 
2009c, Annex A; 2009d, Annex A).  
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Chapter 3 – Historical analysis 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This is the empirical chapter of the historical analysis, which focuses on a 
chronological sequence of official documents issued by several UK and EU 
public authorities during the period 1994-2012. This historical period has been 
divided analytically into two phases. The first covers the 1990s, which saw the 
emergence of the debate on sustainable road transport policy in the UK; the 
second covers the 2000s, which saw the emergence and evolution of the 
debate on biofuel policy in the UK. Official correspondence was undertaken 
between the UK Government and the Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution (RCEP) in the first phase, and between the UK Government and the 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (EFRAC) and the 
Environmental Audit Committee (EAC) in the second phase.  
 
Evidence relating to the two historical phases is reported in two corresponding 
sections: section 1 covers the first phase, section 2 covers the second. 
 
  
1. First phase: the 1990s, landscape and regime visions on road transport 
policy 
 
Even before climate change gained predominance as a policy priority, the UK 
Government had already embraced a sustainable development paradigm in 
policymaking. A notable exception was transport policy, which was neglected by 
the UK Government in its quest for sustainable development until the end of the 
1990s. The national election of 1997 marked a turning point in transport policy. 
The newly elected UK Government abandoned the “predict-and-provide” 
paradigm of its predecessor, and officially endorsed a sustainable development 
paradigm in transport policy (RCEP, 1994, p. 81; Goodwin, 1999). The change 
in paradigm influenced the formation and firm establishment of a new landscape 
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vision. Later on, the UK Government used that landscape vision to justify the 
inclusion of biofuels in its regime vision on sustainable road transport policy. 
Among the participants in the debate ongoing at the time, the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) was one of the most 
authoritative and one of the first to propose the new landscape and regime 
visions on sustainable road transport policy (Ferguson & Skinner, 2002, pp. 6, 
35).  
 
The debate on sustainable road transport policy had been historically framed 
into a series of key drivers, notably: improving air quality, mitigating noise 
pollution, tackling congestion, tackling climate change and ensuring energy 
security (Energy Saving Trust [EST], 2002, p. 9). Before the end of the 1990s, 
air quality had dominated the other key drivers. However, by the end of the 
decade, the priority of policy objectives changed as climate change gradually 
gained predominance, while progressive tightening of emissions standards for 
vehicle manufacturing eased the delivery of air quality objectives (EST, 2002, p. 
9).  
 
In 1997, the Department of Transport (DoT, established in 1981) was reformed 
as the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), and 
its policy responsibilities extended from transport policy to include 
environmental and rural policies. The DETR initially shaped road transport 
policy reflecting the policy priorities dominant at that time – i.e. tackling air 
pollution, traffic congestion, noise pollution, local environmental degradation 
and climate change, this latter gradually gaining predominance over the others. 
Fuel security and fuel poverty were also taken into account and given 
increasing prominence. By 2002, the notion of sustainability – originally defined 
in relation to environmental concerns – had expanded its meaning to include 
economic and social objectives (Perfomance Information Unit of the Cabinet 
Office [PIU], 2002, p. 35). 
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Graph 1: public authorities map – first phase 
 
 
 
 
1.1 UK Government: from predict-and-provide to sustainability 
 
Until the end of the 1980s, forecasts of traffic growth were positively associated 
with a growing economy21 and the expansion of transport infrastructures was 
seen as the appropriate response to those forecasts. UK road transport policy 
was based on the economic principle of comparative advantage: investments in 
transport infrastructure would stimulate economic growth in other sectors of the 
economy by easing the movement of goods and people between areas with 
different comparative advantages (Ferguson & Skinner, 2002, p. 15). 
Preserving economic growth was an imperative, even at the expense of 
environmental degradation.  
 
At the time, the landscape vision of the UK Government on road transport 
predicted that an expanding economy would endanger itself by fuelling an 
uneconomical growth in traffic. The logical response to this economic malaise 
seemed to be provision of additional space, which could be done by expanding 
the road network (RCEP, 1994, p. 81; Goodwin, 1999; Ferguson & Skinner, 
2002, p. 5). The emphasis was on expanding roads rather than on looking for 
more environmentally sustainable ways to regulate and contain traffic growth 
(Ferguson & Skinner, 2002, pp. 15-16). This “predict-and-provide” paradigm 
                                            
21
 As reported by Defra, the DTI and the DfT: “Transport demand is still growing but the rate of 
growth has decelerated since the early 1990s relative to growth in GDP ... Each percentage 
point increase in GDP is accompanied by a significantly smaller increase in the movement of 
goods and people than was the case when Roads to Prosperity was published” (Defra et al., 
2007). 
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constituted the backbone of UK road transport policy (RCEP, 1994, p. 81; 
Goodwin, 1999; Goulden et al., 2014, p. 140).  
 
Nevertheless, as the 1990s approached, a new paradigm based on the concept 
of sustainable development was gaining prominence over the predict-and-
provide paradigm (Goodwin, 1999, p. 660). Building new roads was no longer 
considered a credible solution to traffic growth, and was increasingly criticised 
for leading to unacceptable environmental damage (RCEP, 1994, p. 233). For 
the first time, addressing the forecast increases in traffic with additional road 
supplies was universally recognised as unrealistic (RCEP, 1994, p. 88; 1997, p. 
1; Goodwin, 1999, pp. 658-659). Perhaps the last policy document fully 
endorsing the predict-and-provide paradigm was Roads for Prosperity, a white 
paper published in 1989 promoting a large road-building programme in the UK 
(DoT, 1989). Billed as “the biggest road-building programme since the Romans” 
(Defra et al., 2007, p. 19), the programme encountered opposition from an 
increasingly environmentally concerned public opinion and was eventually 
abandoned (RCEP, 1997, p. 1). 
 
1.2 The RCEP and the UK Government: official correspondence, 1994-
1997  
 
During the 1990s, the debate on the role taken by transport policy in sustainable 
development gained prominence (Goodwin, 1999, p. 662; Ferguson & Skinner, 
2002, p. 6). The RCEP contributed to this debate with its 18th report in 1994 and 
its 20th in 1997 (RCEP, 1994; 1997). 
 
In the UK, the RCEP enjoyed a reputation as a highly authoritative institution. Its 
1994 report Transport and the Environment attracted considerable attention in 
the media and amongst transport and environment professionals, who 
considered the findings of the inquiry ground-breaking (Ferguson & Skinner, 
2002, pp. 6, 35). The RCEP was among the first UK authoritative institutions to 
address the debate on transport policy in a comprehensive and holistic way, by 
looking at innovative solutions to reduce traffic growth and taking into account a 
very broad range of environmental impacts. The overarching conclusion of its 
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1994 report, that current transport trends were far from sustainable, presented a 
substantial challenge to the UK Government (Ferguson & Skinner, 2002, pp. 5-
6). 
 
Criticised for having neglected such an important sector as transport in the 
quest for sustainability, the UK Government felt it had to step into the debate 
and, in April 1996, launched a green paper entitled Transport – The Way 
Forward: The Government’s Response to the Transport Debate. This was the 
first comprehensive statement of policy on inland transport since the 1977 white 
paper (RCEP, 1997, p. 3). The UK Government stated that the green paper 
represented its response to the RCEP’s 1994 report. The green paper 
recognised several of the concerns highlighted in the transport policy debate. 
Still, it was rather insubstantial and lacked any clear policy proposal (Ferguson 
& Skinner, 2002, p. 8). 
 
The UK Government had not always been prompt in responding to the RCEP’s 
reports and did not always accept the Commission’s recommendations. 
However, prior the 1996 green paper, it had always submitted detailed and 
formal responses (Ferguson & Skinner, 2002, pp. 8, 12). The RCEP refused to 
accept the green paper as a Government response to its 1994 report on the 
basis that it did not satisfy the established requirements of formality and detail. 
It also lamented that the green paper did not represent a change in policy in 
consideration of the report’s conclusions (Ferguson & Skinner, 2002, p. 8). The 
RCEP thus called on the UK Government to resubmit a formal response. The 
refusal of the UK Government to satisfy this second call prompted the RCEP’s 
decision to launch a second report on transport policy in autumn 1996 (RCEP, 
1997, p. 1). The RCEP stated that its decision to do so was motivated by its 
“conviction that the full extent of the challenge presented by the future of 
transport was becoming even more starkly evident” (RCEP, 1997, p. 1). It also 
lamented that “recent action has been too little and too slow to provide the 
prospect of a substantial shift in transport trends” (RCEP, 1997, p. 12).  
 
Entitled Transport and the Environment - Developments since 1994, the 
RCEP’s second report was produced much faster than dictated by standard 
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procedure. The RCEP wanted to avoid publishing the report in the immediate 
run-up to the national election, which was set to take place in the first half of 
1997 (Ferguson & Skinner, 2002, p. 9). Yet, it also reckoned that, to exert 
greater influence on the newly elected government, the report had to be 
published not too long after the middle of 1997 (RCEP, 1997, p. 1). The RCEP 
eventually published the report in September 1997, hoping that it would “prove 
timely in relation to preparation of the planned White Paper” of the UK 
Government (RCEP, 1997, p. 1). The 1997 report substantially reiterated what 
was written in the 1994 report. 
 
In 1997, the Labour Party replaced the Conservative Party as the UK 
Government. The orientation of the new government gave the RCEP hope of a 
different reaction to their recommendations on transport policy (Ferguson & 
Skinner, 2002, p. 11). A year later – in July 1998, the newly elected UK 
Government published the first environmentally minded white paper on 
transport (DETR, 1998b), which also announced the forthcoming publication of 
a formal response to the RCEP’s 1997 report – which came in December 1998 
(DETR, 1998a). 
 
1.3 The RCEP: landscape vision in road transport policy 
 
From the end of the 1990s, a new landscape vision permeated the debate on 
sustainable road transport. A sustainability development paradigm replaced the 
previously dominant predict-and-provide paradigm (RCEP, 1994, p. 81; 1997, p. 
1; Goodwin, 1999). The new paradigm reformulated the problem of road 
transport as a trade-off between an economy in expansion and an endangered 
environment. Within the new landscape vision, climate change had gained 
predominance, while air pollution, congestion, noise and environmental 
degradation continued to represent pressing issues. The RCEP was among the 
first public authorities in the UK to promote the new landscape vision and to call 
upon the UK Government for an urgent rethink of road transport policy. Among 
other pressing issues, the RCEP highlighted concerns about the large and 
increasingly detrimental impact of road transport on human health (by 
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increasing air pollution), on climate change (by increasing GHG emissions) and 
on energy security (by increasing fossil fuel consumption).  
 
The transport sector had become the most important source of air pollution, 
almost all air pollutants coming from road transport (RCEP, 1994, p. 24; 1997, 
p. 17). The RCEP warned that “the present use of road vehicles may be 
causing serious damage to human health by triggering or exacerbating 
respiratory symptoms and by exposing people to carcinogens from vehicle 
emissions … [Therefore,] the situation should … be regarded as unsustainable” 
(RCEP, 1994, p. 36; 1997, p. 19).  
The transport sector had also become the fastest growing source of carbon 
emissions in the UK economy, responsible for almost a 25% share of the CO2 
emissions produced by the whole UK economy. Within that share, 87% came 
from road transport (RCEP, 1994, pp. 43, 239; 1997, pp. 25-26). Taking these 
trends into account, for the RCEP, “it would not be acceptable to rely solely on 
reducing emissions from other sectors of the economy” (RCEP, 1994, p. 239). 
The gravity of climate change and “the scale of [GHG emissions] reductions 
needed” warranted action in the transport sector too22 (RCEP, 1994, pp. 43, 
239; 1997, pp. 25-26).  
Road transport in particular had reached a 40% share in the total oil products 
consumed in the UK and was expected to further expand that share in the 
future (RCEP, 1994, p. 21). Even though the RCEP expected oil to remain 
available for some decades, oil was a finite resource, while road transport was 
not expected to reduce its almost complete dependence on it in the short-
medium term. Such considerations led the RCEP to the conclusion that relying 
on oil for transportation should not consequently be regarded as sustainable in 
                                            
22
 The RCEP acknowledged the argument that “reducing carbon dioxide emissions from 
transport may not be the most cost-effective way of reducing total emissions and even that 
some further increase in emissions from the transport sector might be accepted and 
compensated for by larger reductions elsewhere” (RCEP, 1994, p. 44). However, it defended 
the need for intervention by advancing three reasons. Firstly, the scale of the reductions needed 
implied that all sectors of the economy had to make a contribution, as the exemption of any 
sector would have implied an unsustainable policy. Secondly, transport was reckoned to have a 
large potential for increased efficiency in energy use at a relatively affordable cost. Finally, as 
transport has also other undesirable effects on the environment other than affecting climate 
change, policies designed to achieve major reductions in carbon dioxide emissions from 
transport could also bring other important benefits for the environment (RCEP, 1994, p. 239; 
1997, pp. 25-26). 
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the long term (RCEP, 1994, p. 142; 1997, p. 33). Aggravating all the above 
issues were the usual forecasts of dramatic increases in traffic (RCEP, 1994, p. 
239; 1997, pp. 1, 105).  
 
1.4 The RCEP: regime vision in road transport policy 
 
In the 1994 report, the RCEP endorsed an innovative regime vision integrating 
a sustainable development paradigm into transport policy – a vision 
substantially reconfirmed in the 1997 report. This vision for sustainable road 
transport may be framed into short, medium and long terms. 
 
For the short term, the primary aim of sustainable transport policy ought to be 
reducing the need for movement and this could be best achieved by a gradual 
shift away from lifestyles depending on high mobility and especially in the 
intensive use of cars (RCEP, 1994, p. 233). The RCEP stressed the importance 
of integrating transport policy with land use policy in an attempt to minimise the 
need for transport, increase the proportions of trips made by less 
environmentally damaging means and halt any loss of conservation, cultural, 
scenic or amenity areas due to new transport infrastructure development. 
Meanwhile, the demand for new transport infrastructure ought to be reduced to 
a minimum and likewise the use of non-renewable materials in the vehicle 
industry (RCEP, 1994, p. 234; 1997, pp. 105-107). By reducing the dominance 
of cars and lorries and providing alternative modes of access to town and cities, 
the RCEP expected short-term improvements, not least in terms of quality of 
life. 
 
For the medium term, intervening in public transport and influencing motorists’ 
choices would be more effective measures than investing in research and 
development in alternative vehicles technologies and “new low polluting fuels”. 
In the medium term, the RCEP expected technological advancements to be 
mostly limited to improvements of internal combustion engines in reducing 
emission and increasing fuel efficiency, eventually leading to more fuel-efficient 
and less polluting conventional vehicles (RCEP, 1997, p. 33). This because it 
foresaw oil as “unlikely to be replaced in the medium term as the source of 
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power for the great majority of road vehicles” (RCEP, 1994, p. 142; 1997, p. 
33). The RCEP noted that “considerable effort” had been devoted to developing 
alternative propulsion methods of road vehicles to the internal combustion 
types, but there had been “little tangible progress so far” (RCEP, 1994, p. 96). It 
also argued that alternative fuels have disadvantages as well as advantages in 
pollution terms, with no optimum fuel in environmental terms. It then concluded 
that: 
 
“... there would not be any overall environmental advantage in 
widespread use of alternative fuels in the UK, and such use should not 
be expected in the medium term, barring large-scale government or EC 
[European Commission] intervention.” (RCEP, 1994, p. 125; 1997, p. 32)  
 
For the long term, the RCEP instead considered technological advancements in 
new vehicle and fuel technologies to be essential for the transition to 
sustainable road transport. Oil being a finite resource and therefore 
unsustainable in the long term, the RCEP contended that “eventually an 
alternative or alternatives will have to be found” (RCEP, 1994, p. 142; 1997, p. 
33). The RCEP expected hydrogen fuel cells to eventually become “the 
preferred technology for electric propulsion”, since there was “no overall benefit 
for the environment in the widespread use in the UK of electrically powered cars 
and heavy vehicles of the types at present available” (RCEP, 1994, p. 143; 
1997, pp. 34-35).  
 
Within this regime vision, no clear roles were assigned to biofuel expectations.23 
The RCEP only speculated that the above considerations could prompt a 
“closer interest in those fuels that can be obtained from crops [i.e. biofuels], 
despite their higher cost and, in some cases, other drawbacks” (RCEP, 1994, 
pp. 142-143). The drawbacks to which the RCEP was referring were: the 
extensive land required for cultivating energy crops, the possible adverse 
incentive in using unsustainable agricultural practices – with the consequent 
damages to habitats, and the “conflicting findings” about the overall energy 
                                            
23
 Any reference to biofuels disappeared in the RCEP’s 20th Report of 1997. 
106 
 
balance of biofuels (RCEP, 1994, pp. 142-143). The RCEP also commented on 
a proposal for an EU Directive on Bioethanol,24 which at the time was under 
negotiation. The RCEP indicated that the European Commission’s interest in 
biofuels was related to concerns over how to deal with the crop surpluses 
produced under the Common Agricultural Policy. Seemingly casting doubts on 
the real intentions behind the proposal, the RCEP also stressed that 
environmental groups were opposing it (RCEP, 1994, pp. 142-143). 
 
1.5 UK Government: endorsement of the landscape and regime visions 
 
The UK Government led by the Conservative Party up to 1997 refrained from 
embracing the landscape and regime visions proposed by the RCEP, and 
turned down the RCEP’s repeated calls to reply formally and in detail to the 
1994 report. Apart from the provision of new roads, the UK Government 
seemed reluctant to intervene too incisively in transport policy. It had embraced 
a neoliberal economic ideology (Docherty et al., 2004) – an ideology grounded 
in the belief that markets could restore cost efficiency and dynamism to 
inefficient public sectors. Neoliberalism prescribed the transfer of control of the 
economy from the public to the private sectors, with public authorities playing 
the reduced role of market regulators. Endorsing that ideology, the UK 
Government supported and implemented liberalisation and privatisation 
processes in the UK public sectors. 
 
Introducing environmental regulations in transport after its liberalisation and 
privatisation would have reversed previous policy commitments towards private 
industry called to administer the areas of public transport touched by those 
                                            
24
 As Van Thuijl and Deurwaarder pointed out: “During the 1990s the production and use of 
biofuels started in several European countries and expanded significantly. At the same time, 
policy at a European level was initiated, mainly from the viewpoint of security of energy supply. 
EU policy focussed on the possibilities for tax ex-emption, but the Commission failed to get its 
proposals approved by the Member States. Then, the 1997 White Paper ‘Energy for the future: 
Renewable sources of energy’ mentioned a possible 18 Mtoe1 liquid biofuels in 2010. The 2000 
Green Paper 'Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply’ was the start for a 
more comprehensive policy, in which biofuels should contribute to a proposed ambitious target 
of 20% alternative fuels (biofuels, natural gas, hydrogen) in 2020. This policy was more detailed 
in a proposal for a Directive in 2001, where targets for the three alternative fuels were proposed. 
Only the biofuel targets for 2005 (2%) and 2010 (5.75%) made it into an EU Directive in 2003, 
viz. the ‘Directive on the promotion of the use of biofuels or other renewable fuels for transport’“ 
(Van Thuijl & Deurwaarder, 2006, p. 8). 
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processes. In addition, interventions aimed at influencing public choices 
towards more sustainable means of transport could have disappointed 
motorists, who had become a majority of the population (Goodwin, 1999, p. 
660; Ferguson & Skinner, 2002, p. 7). Last but not least, the fragmentation of 
the public transport sector resulting from its liberalisation and privatisation had 
also weakened perceptions about the feasibility of these interventions 
(Ferguson & Skinner, 2002, p. 7). Close to a national election, these policy 
revisions were certainly not an appealing option for the Conservative Party. 
These concerns most likely explain the Conservative Government’s decision not 
to endorse the RCEP’s 1994 report. Nevertheless, such policy resistance did 
not prevent the landscape and regime visions promoted by the RCEP from 
gaining increasing prominence in the sustainable transport debate. 
 
In an attempt to gain a hearing from the newly elected Labour Government, the 
RCEP published its second report on transport soon after the national election 
(Ferguson & Skinner, 2002, p. 11). That report essentially reiterated the findings 
of the first report, that the ultimate goal of transport policy should be a transition 
to sustainable transport, and repeated its call for the UK Government to revise 
road transport policy. As these recommendations seem to imply, the RCEP was 
concerned neither about the negative implications for the industry involved in 
the liberalisation and privatisation processes, nor about the political implications 
for the Conservatives.  
 
Not liable for the policies enforced by its predecessor, the newly elected Labour 
Government realigned transport policy with the RCEP’s visions. In 1998, it 
officially intervened in transport with an environmentally minded white paper, A 
new deal for transport: better for everyone (DETR, 1998b). Soon after, it 
published a detailed and formal response to the RCEP’s 1997 report (DETR, 
1998a, Foreword). The UK Government defined the 1997 report as “a valuable 
and very timely contribution” to its effort to formulate a new transport policy and, 
together with the 1994 report, was “important” in influencing its thinking on the 
issues concerned (DETR, 1998a, Foreword). The UK Government also 
acknowledged the RCEP’s work as “central” in setting its agenda of 
interventions in the transport sector and recognised that there was a “clear 
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resonance” between that work and the white paper (DETR, 1998a, Foreword). 
Among those resonances was the acknowledgement that the consequences of 
forecast traffic growth were unacceptable and that the UK Government had to 
take action to secure more sustainable transport for the future. Previous policies 
were blamed for being “dominated by the short term” (DETR, 1998a, Foreword; 
1998b, p. 5). The predict-and-provide paradigm was rejected on the basis that it 
simply “didn’t work” and that “more and more roads is not the answer to traffic 
growth” (DETR, 1998b, p. 5). 
 
Meanwhile, climate change had become “the greatest global environmental 
threat facing the international community” (DETR, 1998b, pp. 5-6). In 1998, the 
UK Government committed the UK to a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
to 12.5% below 1990 levels over the period 2008-12 according to the Kyoto 
Protocol25 on climate change (United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change [UNFCCC], n.d.-a). In 2000, it further committed the UK to a 
domestic target of carbon dioxide emissions 20% below 1990 levels by 2010 
(DETR, 2000b, p. 6). 
 
By the 2000s, the landscape vision on sustainable road transport was firmly 
established, with UK public authorities endorsing it in their official publications 
(DTLR, 2001, Paragraph 2.4; EAC, 2001, Paragraph 6; DfT, 2002, Foreword; 
EST, 2002, p. 9; PIU, 2002, p. 12; DTI, 2003, p. 63; EFRAC, 2003, p. 8; DTI, 
2006, p. 126; EAC, 2006, p. 14; EFRAC, 2006, p. 5; DTI, 2007, p. 235; DfT, 
2009b, p. 22). By contrast, the role of biofuels in the regime vision kept evolving 
throughout that decade. 
 
 
2. Second phase: the 2000s, biofuels in the regime vision on road 
transport policy 
 
The UK Government marginalised biofuels in its regime vision on sustainable 
transport, at least until 2002, when it proposed the first financial incentive for 
                                            
25
 The UK Government signed the Kyoto protocol on the 29
th
 of April 1998 and ratified it on the 
31
st
 of May 2002 (UNFCCC, n.d.-b). 
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biodiesel. A turning point was the 2003 EU Directive on Biofuels (EU, 2003). 
The EU Directive forced the UK Government to include biofuels in its regime 
vision and to further develop UK biofuel policy. By 2003, biofuels were 
promoted as a means to mitigate climate change, enhance fuel security in road 
transport and foster the rural economy. Another turning point was the 
international controversy over the environmental and socio-economic 
sustainability of biofuels, which erupted in 2006. Biofuel policies became highly 
contentious. By 2006, optimism moved from currently used, but controversial 
“first-generation” or “conventional” biofuels to yet-to-be developed “second-
generation” or “advanced” biofuels. Second-generation biofuels were predicted 
to offer greater carbon saving than first-generation biofuels, while avoiding 
many of the negative environmental and socio-economic implications attributed 
to the previous generation. The UK Government disagreed with EFRAC and the 
EAC on how to envision the future of UK biofuel policy during the whole period. 
 
Extremely transversal, biofuel policy has involved overlapping policy areas as 
diverse as transport, energy, environmental, food and rural policies, calling on 
several UK Government Departments (EFRAC, 2003, p. 17; Defra, 2004, p. 1). 
Between 2001 and 2002, the Department of the Environment, Transport, and 
the Regions (DETR) was reformed as the Department for Transport, Local 
Government, and the Regions (DTLR). In the process, the newly instituted 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) inherited the 
responsibilities over environmental and rural policies from the DETR, and has 
been responsible for the environmental, agricultural and rural aspects of UK 
biofuel policy since then (EFRAC, 2003, p. 17). In 2002, the DTLR was 
reformed again as the Department for Transport (DfT), its remit narrowed to 
transport polices. The DfT has been in charge of the practical implementation of 
all financial incentives for biofuels since then. More specifically, the DfT directly 
administered the fuel duty discounts on biofuels from their inception – 2002 for 
biodiesel, and 2005 for bioethanol – to 2007, when it delegated their 
management to the newly formed Renewable Fuels Agency (RFA). The RFA – 
an agency created by and financially linked to the DfT – managed the fuel duty 
discounts and the 2007 Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO) from 
2007 to 2011. In 2010, all fuel duty discounts on biofuels were withdrawn and, a 
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year later, the RFA was disbanded. Since 2011, the DfT has retaken direct 
control of the RTFO. The HM Customs and Excise Department – which after the 
merger with Inland Revenue in 2005 became the current HM Revenue & 
Customs (HMRC) – has collaborated with the DfT and RFA in implementing 
both financial supporting schemes. Meanwhile, the Treasury has been 
responsible for the fiscal side of all financial incentives since their inception. The 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) had been in charge of energy policy 
until 2008. In 2007, it was reformed as the Department for Business, Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform (BERR) and, a year later, it handed over the energy 
policy area to the newly formed Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC), which has led on energy policy since then. These departments have 
dealt with the energy policy aspects of biofuel policy. 
 
Graph 2: public authorities map – second phase 
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2.1 UK Government: from marginalisation to inclusion of biofuels in the 
regime vision 
 
Until the early 2000s, UK public authorities promoted hydrogen as the “fuel of 
the future” (RCEP, 1997, pp. 34-35; EAC, 2001, Paragraph 86; DfT, 2002, p. 
10). Biofuels were instead dismissed as not suitable for the UK for various 
reasons. The reasons behind such a dismissal varied depending on their more 
or less pronounced sensibility for the environment and fuel security issues. The 
RCEP was concerned about the contested findings about the overall energy 
balance of biofuels and their adverse effect on the local environment (RCEP, 
1994, p. 142; 1997, p. 33). The Alternative Fuel Group of the Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) appeared to be also sceptical 
about the potential of biofuels both in terms of carbon abatement and enhancing 
fuel security in the UK (DETR, 2000a, p. 29). The DETR ignored biofuels in the 
1998’s white paper; then reorganised as Department for Transport (DfT), it 
ignored biofuels again in the 2002 Powering Future Vehicles Strategy (PFVS) 
(DETR, 1998b; DfT, 2002, p. 16). Biofuels were also marginalised in all 
governmental initiatives for research and financial support in alternative fuels 
(DTI, 1999; DETR, 2000a, p. 29; DTI, 2000; 2001; 2002, p. 23; EST, 2002, p. 
11; House of Commons Library [HoC Library] 2002, p. 57).  
 
Nevertheless, by the end of 2001, biofuels started gaining increasing attention. 
In November 2011, the European Commission formalised rumours26 about an 
upcoming EU Directive on the promotion of biofuels into a formal proposal (EC, 
2001). The same year, the UK Government announced a first financial incentive 
for biofuels – meant to be enforced by the 2002 Budget. The financial incentive 
– a duty rate discount of 20 pence per litre compared to the Ultra-Low Sulphur 
Diesel (ULSD) – was anyhow granted only to biodiesel.27 Proposals from Liberal 
Democrats to apply a duty rate discount also to bioethanol and to increase both 
duty discounts up to the greater level granted to road fuel gasses encountered 
                                            
26
 Earlier attempts to introduce a stronger support for biofuels from the European Commission, 
in the form of duty tax reliefs, can be traced back as early as 1992 (EC, 2001, p. 7). 
27
 Prior the introduction of the discounted duty rate, biodiesel was charged the same duty rate of 
ULSD. The financial incentive was meant to offset the higher production cost of biodiesel with 
respect to ULSD’s price. As the duty reduction was granted also to imports of biofuels, the 
initiative failed to boost the emergence of a UK-based biodiesel industry (DfT, 2006, p. 3). 
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the opposition of the UK Government. This latter objected the proposed 
measure as “premature”. Practical difficulties in ensuring the quality and cost 
competitiveness of the biofuel supported through the scheme required time to 
be overcome, implying that a cautious approach would have been preferable. 
While, concerning the extension of the duty discount to bioethanol, the UK 
Government objected that currently available bioethanol was deemed as 
offering few GHG savings on a life-cycle basis (HoC Library, 2002, pp. 23-24). 
Bioethanol from lignocellulosic feedstocks – i.e. second-generation biofuels – 
was seen as a solution granting much greater greenhouse gas savings than 
those obtainable from current bioethanol technologies. However, it was also 
recognised that those technologies were still at the research and development 
phase and that any translation of those technologies from the laboratories to 
commercial plants would be anyhow unlikely at least until 2004 (HoC Library, 
2002, pp. 23-24). 
 
The European Commission’s proposal became the first EU Directive on Biofuels 
in 2003 (EU, 2003). The Directive set non-binding “reference” targets requiring 
EU Member States to include increasing annual rates of biofuels over the total 
national consumption of road transport fuels (i.e. diesel and petrol), precisely: 
2% by 2005 and 5.75% by 2010 per energy content. Member States had the 
option to set their own “indicative” targets and choose how to implement them, 
but were required to justify any divergence from the EU-wide reference targets 
and report on progress towards the targets chosen. The EU Directive thus 
forced the UK Government to include biofuels in the regime vision and to further 
develop its biofuel policy. The UK Government announced the launch of a 
consultation for the first half of 2004 on the definition of the UK indicative targets 
for biofuels and design of the relative biofuel policy for the UK (EFRAC, 2003, p. 
15). This was the first consultation on biofuel policy and was entitled: Towards a 
UK Strategy for Biofuels (DfT, 2004b). 
 
By 2003, EU and UK public authorities were promoting biofuels through 
optimistic expectations for future benefits in mitigating climate change and 
enhancing fuel security in road transport, i.e. in reducing GHG emissions and 
diversifying transport fuel supplies, as well as in fostering the rural economy, i.e. 
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in creating new markets for non-food crops and jobs in the biofuel supply-chains 
(EC, 2001, pp. 31-32; EFRAC, 2003, p. 5; EU, 2003, pp. 42-44). Three months 
before the 2003’s EU Directive, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
intervened in the sustainable transport debate through the publication of a 
White paper on Energy Policy (DTI, 2003). The DTI strengthened the 
considerations on fuel security and fuel poverty in transport policy, while 
reconfirmed the urgency of climate change in the landscape and regime visions 
on sustainable transport. Although hydrogen remained the preferred option for 
the long term, a novelty was the positive consideration of biofuels as an 
important option for carbon abatement in transport (DTI, 2003, p. 70). Biofuels 
were now presented as an “important potential route for achieving the goal of 
zero-carbon transport, creating new opportunities for agriculture in the UK as 
well as globally” (DTI, 2003, p. 69). Another novelty was the mention about the 
opportunities for rural development offered by the production of biofuel 
feedstocks. The UK Government’s optimistic expectations about these 
opportunities contrasted with the RCEP’s previous concerns on the risk of 
unsustainable practices in biofuel feedstock cultivations (RCEP, 1994, pp. 142-
143).  
 
2.2 EFRAC and the UK Government: first official correspondence, 2003 
 
In 2002, the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) 
became responsible for the environmental-agricultural aspects of the newly 
emerging UK biofuel policy (EFRAC, 2003, p. 17). In 2003, the Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs Committee (EFRAC), whose remit is “to examine the 
expenditure, administration, and policy” of Defra “and its associated bodies” 
(EFRAC, 2003, p. iv), assessed how UK biofuel policy could contribute to 
Defra’s policy objectives.  
 
In the 2003 Biofuels report, EFRAC shared the landscape and regime visions 
endorsed by the UK Government: “… all sectors should make a contribution 
towards reducing the United Kingdom’s emissions”, including transport 
(EFRAC, 2003, p. 11). Biofuels were an “important” (EFRAC, 2003, p. 3) and 
“attractive means of doing so for transport”, at least “until hydrogen fuel cells 
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become commercially viable” (EFRAC, 2003, p. 11). Even if EFRAC 
acknowledged that biofuels were not the most efficient way to reduce 
emissions, it also reckoned them as capable of substantial carbon savings and, 
crucially, as the only readily available renewable energy for transport (EFRAC, 
2003, pp. 3, 11).  
 
At that time supporting biofuels, EFRAC welcomed the change in policy 
landscape. However, it lamented that the UK Government appeared as “still 
testing the waters” concerning its commitment in developing a domestic biofuel 
industry, with the current level of support reflecting its “ambivalent attitude” 
(EFRAC, 2003, p. 18). In view of the 2005’s EU target, EFRAC also criticised 
the UK Government’s decision to launch the public consultation on UK targets 
in the first half of 2004. That timing would have left “too little time” to the farmers 
to be able to deliver the extra amount of crops and to the industrials to bring into 
line extra processing capability required for the 2005’s target (EFRAC, 2003, p. 
15).  
 
Notwithstanding its general optimism toward biofuels, EFRAC also 
acknowledged the lack of clear evidence on both future benefits for the rural 
economy (EFRAC, 2003, p. 18) and environmental impacts of expanding biofuel 
production in the UK and elsewhere (EFRAC, 2003, p. 12). On these grounds, it 
recommended the development of an auditing system on the environmental and 
socio-economic impacts of biofuels in the countries in which they were 
produced (EFRAC, 2003, p. 18). Beyond these informational gaps, EFRAC 
lamented that any evaluation of the UK Government’s commitments in biofuels 
was de facto hampered by the lack of an explicit prioritisation among the policy 
objectives to pursue with what defined as a “muddled and unfocussed” biofuel 
policy (EFRAC, 2003, pp. 9-10, 15-17).  
 
In its response to EFRAC’s 2003 report, the UK Government welcomed 
EFRAC’s endorsement of its landscape and regime visions (Defra, 2004, pp. 2-
4). However, it firmly rejected all EFRAC’s critics of UK biofuel policy. About 
EFRAC’s comment on its “unfocused and muddled” nature, the UK Government 
objected that it had always made clear that environmental benefits were at heart 
115 
 
of alternative fuels policies (Defra, 2004, p. 2). The 2003 Pre-Budget Report 
outlined a “clear [and] systematic set of principles applying to decision in this 
sector, with environmental, social and economic considerations all taken into 
account in determining the level of support for these fuels” (Defra, 2004, p. 2). 
Any road transport policy had to be environmentally, economically and socially 
sustainable, with environmental gains as “central priority” (Defra, 2004, p. 3). 
More specifically, any such policy had to “reflect the full environmental impact of 
the fuel” and its “broader considerations of social impact and fairness” (Defra, 
2004, p. 3). It also had to deny support to industries whose survival depended 
on “excessive levels of subsidy unjustified by environmental benefit”, “provide 
value for money” for taxpayers and “the necessary stability, confidence and 
market conditions for investors” (Defra, 2004, p. 3). As for biofuels in particular:  
 
“... capturing the environmental benefits of biofuels is the principal policy 
reason for Government support with duty incentives. Other 
considerations such as economic and social factors, though secondary, 
are also taken into account in the Chancellor’s fiscal decisions. 
 
It is not the Government’s intention to establish industries based on 
excessive Government subsidy not justified by clear and well-established 
evidence of environmental, social, and economic benefits. Where fuels 
fulfil the criteria set, the Government is determined to achieve the best 
outcome for both the tax-payer and the economy as a whole. Support will 
therefore be given where it is both cost-effective and affordable.” (Defra, 
2004, p. 6) 
 
The UK Government accepted EFRAC’s recommendations to investigate on the 
impact of a UK-based biofuel industry on rural development and on biodiversity 
and conservation (Defra, 2004, pp. 4-5). However, it turned down the 
recommendation about setting up a system of auditing for biofuels in order to 
ensure their sustainability in the UK and overseas. The UK Government 
doubted the practical feasibility of an auditing system for biofuels, as “auditing 
the environmental impact of biofuels in the countries in which they are produced 
is extremely problematic and it is unlikely that a cost-effective and robust 
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system of regulation could be introduced” (Defra, 2004, p. 9). It then further 
anticipated that, “in any case, any attempt to refuse imports on the basis of 
perceived or measured environmental impacts could be seen as a barrier to 
free trade and would almost certainly lead to conflict with the World Trade 
Organisation” (Defra, 2004, p. 9). 
 
Against the critique of its “ambivalent attitude” towards supporting biofuels, the 
UK Government defended its biofuel policy objecting that it was “too early to 
judge how far the policy has been a success” (Defra, 2004, p. 8). It pointed out 
that the duty reduction for biodiesel was introduced only in July 2002 and that 
the duty incentive for bioethanol was going to be introduced only in January 
2005, “when it is hoped that British companies will be ready to produce it for the 
UK market” (Defra, 2004, p. 9). However, it avoided commenting on the time 
constraints imposed to the farming and biofuel industries by its decision to set 
the public consultation on UK targets in 2004 – i.e. only a year before the 
2005’s EU biofuel target.  
 
2.3 UK Government: UK biofuel targets set lower than those in the EU 
Biofuel Directive 
 
Article 4 of the EU Directive on Biofuels forced EU Member States to report 
annually to the European Commission on the progresses made and, in case, to 
justify the adoption of different targets from those proposed. In the 2004 report 
on progress to the European Commission, the UK Government announced a 
UK indicative target of 0.3% per volume by 2005 – then reconfirmed in 
November 2005 – as opposed to the much higher28 reference target of 2% per 
energy content as proposed by the 2003’s EU Biofuel Directive.29 It also opted 
to delay the announcement of the target for 2010 to 2007 as allowed by the 
Directive (DfT, 2004c, p. 8).  
 
                                            
28
 Because of the minor energy content of biofuels with respect to fossil fuels, the translation of 
the EU reference target from energy content to volume results in a higher percentage per 
volume, respectively: 2% per energy content is equivalent to 2,5% per volume (RFA, 2008a, p. 
90). 
29
 This confirmed the prediction of EFRAC that the UK Government was “unlikely to set itself 
very ambitious targets, at least for the first deadline” (EFRAC, 2003, p. 15). 
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To justify the lower target, the UK Government pointed out that UK biofuel 
“incentives have only been recently introduced30 and given the UK's low starting 
point; the considerable growth this target implies; and the limited time between 
now and the target period, we feel it represents a challenging but realistic target 
for the UK” (DfT, 2004c, p. 8). Beyond these pragmatic considerations, the UK 
Government also mentioned other reasons that implicitly justified a cautious 
approach: 
 
“Industry has called for a higher level of incentive, but the cost of the 
current incentive already outweighs the monetised carbon benefit, and 
biofuels are currently an expensive method of carbon abatement ... Our 
economic analysis suggests that greater incentive levels at this time 
would largely result in imports, including from outside the EU. This would 
limit the potential benefits to the UK and broader EU agricultural & rural 
sectors of a new market. In addition, there is strong concern that greater 
demand from the EU for biofuel feedstocks could lead to further 
deforestation in South East Asia and South America - thereby 
undermining the environmental benefit sought through the measure.” 
(DfT, 2004c, p. 2) 
 
Thus, the caution of UK Government in increasing support to biofuels seems to 
relate also to financial, environmental as well as fuels security concerns. An 
increase of biofuel imports would have not only wasted opportunities for rural 
development within the UK and the EU, but also undermined the goal of fuels 
security by making the UK and the EU dependent on foreign biofuels.  
 
After having examined the reasons given by the UK and other EU Member 
States to justify their delayed implementation of EU biofuel targets, in a joint 
press release, the European Commission insisted on its targets and objected 
that “the reasons given lack relevance, seem incorrect, [and] put the desirability 
of the Directive itself into question” (EC, 2005). 
 
                                            
30
 At the time, the only financial incentive for biofuels was a fuel duty discount for biodiesel only, 
operative since July 2002. 
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Abiding by the 2003’s EU Biofuel Directive, in November 2005 the UK 
Government eventually announced the future introduction of the Renewable 
Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO). The RTFO was set to impose a legal 
obligation on large-scale transport fuel suppliers to blend increasing annual 
rates of biofuels in the road-transport fuels that they supplied to the UK from 
2008 onward (DfT, 2005b, p. 3). Meant to become the main supporting 
mechanism to promote renewable fuels into the long term, the RTFO was 
presented as more effective than the fuel duty discount. This latter “proved to be 
insufficient to stimulate the level of investment in production capacity and 
infrastructure required to meet the Directive’s objectives … [and] very 
expensive, potentially placing unsustainable pressures on public finances” (DfT, 
2006, p. 3). Nevertheless, that same year, the UK Government extended the 
duty fuel reduction of 20p per litre, which was previously granted only to 
biodiesel, also to bioethanol (DfT, 2005b, p. 2). In 2005, the emergent UK 
biofuel industry saw the first large scale biodiesel plant coming on stream in 
Scotland (DfT, 2005b, p. 5). 
 
In the 2006’s Budget, the UK Government announced the annual rates of the 
RTFO, respectively: 2.5% for 2008/09, 3.75% for 2009/10 and 5% for 2010/11 
all per volume (DfT, 2006, p. 3). Reconfirming earlier caution, even the target 
set for 2010 was far below31 the EU Directive’s reference value – i.e. 5.75% per 
energy content by 2010. In the 2006 report on progress to the European 
Commission, the UK Government justified the lower target by stating that such 
decision was taken after “intensive stakeholder discussion and taking into 
account a number of objective factors” (DfT, 2006, p. 3). Among those factors 
were concerns over the sustainability of biofuel supply chains, indicated as 
“potentially undermining the central environmental policy objective”. Then, 
contradicting its previous objections, it announced the intention to develop an 
                                            
31
 The UK Government announced UK indicative targets that were significantly lower than the 
EU reference targets as set by the European Commission in the 2003’s Biofuel Directive – i.e. 
0.3% per volume against the EU’s 2% per energy content for 2005, and 5% per volume against 
the EU’s 5.75% per energy content for 2010. Biofuels have a lower energy content compared to 
fossil fuels. This means that EU targets translated from energy content into volume results in 
higher percentages per volume, respectively: 2% per energy content is equivalent to 2,5% per 
volume (for 2005), and 5,75% per energy content is equivalent to around 7% per volume (for 
2010) (RFA, 2008a, p. 90). 
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“assurance scheme alongside the Obligation to ensure, as far as possible, 
biofuels are produced from sustainable sources”. Such a scheme was 
emphasised as fundamental to maintain the support of environmental groups in 
UK (DfT, 2006, p. 4).  
  
About the timing of the RTFO, the UK Government reported the findings of the 
DfT’s Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO) feasibility report (DfT, 
2005a), which concluded that the earliest an RTFO could be introduced would 
be April 2008. According to that report, a minimum period of 18 months was 
needed to develop both an assurance scheme for ensuring the sustainability of 
biofuels and for the UK industry to put in line new capacity. More specifically, 
“stakeholders” were reported sustaining that “it takes at least 18 months, and 
typically longer, to bring new capacity on stream”. As for sustainability 
standards, more time was needed “taking into account factors such as setting 
up an administrator to run the scheme; the complex secondary legislation 
required; and developing an IT system and putting new business processes in 
place” (DfT, 2006, p. 4). In addition to that, the UK Government reminded that 
the EU Fuels Quality Standards still imposed a 5% limit on the amount of 
biofuels that could be blended into petrol and diesel, making the setting of a 
legal obligation above that limit “inherently problematic” (DfT, 2006, p. 3).  
 
Thus, despite EU reference targets and biofuel industry’s demands for higher 
support, the UK Government remained cautious and promised lower support to 
biofuels. Implementing the RTFO and developing a system of sustainability 
standards required time; hence implicitly justifying lower biofuel targets. Yet, in 
contradiction to its earlier pessimism on the feasibility of a sustainability 
standards system, from 2005, it started presenting such a system as feasible 
and necessary. 
 
In view of a forthcoming white paper on energy policy (DTI, 2006, p. 10), the 
DTI published an Energy Review in 2006. The review reconfirmed the 
landscape vision on sustainable transport (DTI, 2006, pp. 126-127), although 
adding emphasis on energy security as it acknowledged that the UK would soon 
become a net importer of oil (DTI, 2006, p. 10). A novelty in the review was the 
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UK Government’s formal announcement about its intention of to increase RTFO 
rates above 5% after 2010/2011 only provided that three critical factors were 
met:  
 
“…development of robust sustainability and carbon standards for biofuels 
to ensure that they are delivering high levels of carbon savings without 
leading to biodiversity loss or endangering sensitive habitats; 
development of new fuel quality standards at EU level to ensure existing 
and new vehicles can run on biofuel blends higher than 5%; and costs to 
consumers being acceptable.” (DTI, 2006, p. 127) 
 
By 2006-2007, currently used first-generation biofuels were already widely 
recognised as environmentally and socio-economically problematic (Dunlop, 
2010, p. 352; Palmer, 2010, p. 999; Boucher, 2012, p. 150). Techno-optimistic 
expectations were transferred to second-generation biofuels, foreseen as 
offering greater environmental and socio-economic benefits. Accordingly, the 
future development of effective sustainability standards and second-generation 
biofuels had become crucial expectations to justify current targets. Yet, high 
uncertainty persisted about when these developments would materialise. UK 
biofuel policy faced the dilemma of whether UK mandatory targets should await 
the development of sustainability standards and more sustainable biofuels – or 
else be preserved as a means to stimulate these developments.  
 
2.4 EFRAC and the UK Government: second official correspondence, 2006 
  
In 2006, EFRAC enquired Defra on bioenergy policy through a formal report – 
i.e. the Climate change: the role of bioenergy report (EFRAC, 2006). Bioenergy 
policy included policies on biomass for heat and electricity generation as well as 
biofuels for transport (EFRAC, 2006, p. 3). Only three years after the 2003 
Biofuels report, EFRAC had turned its initial optimism towards biofuels into 
pessimism and reversed its judgement on the UK Government’s attitude 
towards biofuels from a lack to an excess of commitment. 
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In the 2006 report, EFRAC criticised the UK Government for a “disproportionate 
degree” of support to current transport biofuels to the detriment of other 
bioenergy forms, which offered greater carbon savings (EFRAC, 2006, p. 3). 
EFRAC still acknowledged biofuels as one among a limited number of options 
available to reduce carbon in transport. However, given the reduced land 
capacity of the UK and the current technological status of biofuels, it concluded 
that supporting current biofuel technologies did “not present the most effective 
or efficient way of making a significant difference to the UK’s carbon emissions 
in the long term” (EFRAC, 2006, p. 5).  
 
Welcoming the UK Government’s announcement about the future development 
of an assurance scheme for biofuels, EFRAC warned anyhow that the 
evaluation of any energy use of biomass should include all impacts on land use. 
Previously land use for energy purposes was associated with environmental 
risks such as deforestation and loss of biodiversity. A novelty in this report was 
the inclusion of food security among the issues adversely affected by land use 
change (EFRAC, 2006, pp. 33-35).  
 
EFRAC was also “extremely disappointed” by the announcement that the 
auditing of biofuels would not be enforced in the initial phase of the RTFO. 
Without sustainability standards, the RTFO would effectively favour first-
generation biofuels – readily available and cheaper to produce/buy, to the 
detriment of second-generation biofuels – expected to offer greater GHG 
emission savings. Thus, it warned that biofuel support as currently set “could 
‘lock in’ first generation biofuel technologies and so damage the prospects for 
development and use of more advanced fuels” (EFRAC, 2006, pp. 45-46).  
 
For EFRAC, second-generation biofuels deserved priority as they could grant 
much greater carbon abatements and entailed less negative implications, than 
first-generation biofuels (EFRAC, 2006, p. 5). EFRAC inferred and accepted the 
UK Government’s reluctance in picking technology “winners and losers” at this 
early stage. Nevertheless, it was also “vital” that the UK Government engaged 
in finding and removing barriers to second-generation biofuels as well as in 
establishing the level of investments needed to accelerate their development 
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(EFRAC, 2006, p. 24). Second-generation biofuels needed “concerted and 
sustained investment” in order to become commercially viable. Adapting the 
RTFO to reward biofuels according to their carbon savings would have 
facilitated such an investment – i.e. linking the RTFO certification to biofuel 
performances in reducing life-cycle emissions (EFRAC, 2006, p. 3). As a further 
measure, fuel duty reductions could also be made exclusive to biofuels 
generating net carbon savings (EFRAC, 2006, pp. 45-46).  
 
The UK Government welcomed the EFRAC’s 2006 report as a “useful 
contribution to the policy discourse” (Defra, 2006, p. 2). In agreement with 
EFRAC, it acknowledged second-generation biofuels as “less likely to have the 
same impact on world commodity markets as first generation biofuel production, 
which competes with the food industry for corn and oil feedstocks” (Defra, 2006, 
p. 9). It then reiterated its commitment in encouraging the development of fuels 
offering the greatest level of greenhouse gas savings (Defra, 2006, pp. 5-6). 
Again contradicting its earlier pessimism, the UK Government promoted 
sustainability standards as feasible and showed confidence on their future 
realisation. About the issues to include in the system, it said to be “aware that 
land use may be an increasing issue, not only in the UK, but in other Member 
States and beyond”. It then reassured that it will “consider the importance of, 
and the impact of bio-energy developments on land use, biodiversity and 
commodity markets when determining the future support levels of biofuels and 
bioenergy, drawing upon the developing research base” (Defra, 2006, pp. 9-10).  
 
Nevertheless, since a system of sustainability standards did not exist yet, the 
UK Government could neither enforce it from the start of the RTFO nor 
announce when such system was going to be operational. Consequently, it was 
also impossible to adapt the RTFO to reward biofuels according to their GHG 
emissions performances, at least by the time of its launch. Against EFRAC’s 
concerns on these latter points, the UK Government only opposed pragmatic 
considerations. Mentioning the DfT’s RTFO feasibility study (DfT, 2005a), 
“integrating GHG fully into the RTFO was fundamental to ensure the potential of 
the mechanism to achieve its objectives. However ... the additional complexity, 
legal uncertainty and short term implications of incentivising GHG savings 
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directly suggested that a staged approach toward integration was advisable”. 
The UK Government thus endorsed the study’s recommendation to enforce “a 
reporting requirement in the first instance, developing into a hardened carbon 
incentive over time” (Defra, 2006, pp. 10-11). It then declared itself “keen to 
move toward direct incentivisation as soon as it becomes feasible to do so” 
(Defra, 2006, pp. 10-11).  
 
2.5 UK Government: higher UK biofuel targets, but with preconditions 
 
In March 2007, the European Council agreed on a common European strategy 
for energy security and tackling climate change, setting up several renewable 
energy targets to be introduced in a cost-efficient way by 2020 (EU Council, 
2007, p. 21). Despite the biofuel controversy, the agreement committed all 
Member States to a binding target by 2020 of 10%32 per energy content of 
biofuels over the total consumption of petrol and diesel. Although the new 
biofuel target was higher and mandatory, it set a slower increase in annual rates 
than the 2003 Directive had done. The new target was also subject to 
conditions: (1) the production being sustainable, (2) second-generation biofuels 
becoming commercially available and (3) the Fuel Quality Directive being 
amended accordingly to allow for adequate levels of blending (EU Council, 
2007, p. 21). 
 
As announced in the Energy Review of 2006, in May 2007, the DTI published a 
second white paper on energy, entitled: Meeting the Energy Challenge (DTI, 
2006, p. 10; 2007, p. 8). That same month, the DfT published The Low Carbon 
Transport Innovation Strategy (DfT, 2007c, p. 3) and Defra published The UK 
Biomass Strategy (Defra et al., 2007, p. 8). The DTI and the DfT specified that 
the UK Biomass Strategy specifically addressed the role of biomass in transport 
and complemented the white paper on energy (DfT, 2007c, p. 40; DTI, 2007, 
pp. 243, 251). All three documents reiterated the proviso already expressed in 
the 2006’s Energy Review that the increase of the level of the RTFO beyond 
5% after 2010/2011 was subject to, among other conditions, the enforcement of 
                                            
32
 A biofuel target of 10% per energy content would be equivalent to 12,5% per volume (RFA, 
2008a, p. 90). 
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sustainability standards (Defra et al., 2007, p. 33; DfT, 2007c, p. 40; DTI, 2007, 
p. 242). 
 
The UK Biomass Strategy added to the above conditions the European 
Council’s pre-condition of “second generation biofuels becoming commercially 
available” for the new EU target of10% biofuels per energy content by 2020 
(Defra et al., 2007, p. 8). In that document, the UK Government acknowledged 
transport biofuels as the least cost-effective way to reduce GHG emissions by 
converting biomass, but also promoted first-generation biofuels as the only 
available option to fulfil EU obligations. It sustained that biomass use for energy 
purposes needs not reflect that hierarchy because “it does not take into account 
the relative importance of biomass fuel sources in delivering climate change 
goals and targets”; especially “in the transport sector for which there are few 
other options in the short to medium term” (Defra et al., 2007, p. 7). To reinforce 
expectations for future improvements in environmental and socio-economic 
sustainability, the UK Government emphasised second-generation biofuels as 
soon coming on stream: “It is likely that by 2020 second generation biofuel 
technologies will be in place. This should make the production of biofuels from 
land much more efficient, with a reduced area needed to produce a given 
volume of biofuels…” (Defra et al., 2007, p. 22). 
 
In June 2007, the UK Government reconfirmed its intention to delay the 
introduction of a mandatory system of sustainability standards until after 
launching the RTFO in April 2008. However, it also announced that biofuels 
would be rewarded according to their GHG savings from April 2010, and 
become eligible for support only if their feedstocks were certified as sustainable 
from April 2011 (DfT, 2008e, Section 2). 
 
Thus, expectations for future improved sustainability served to justify rising 
future targets, especially in response to biofuel critics. Meanwhile the pre-
conditions on the availability of second-generation biofuels and sustainability 
standards sent the biofuel industry an ultimatum to develop the former and 
implement the latter. In these ways, the EU Council and UK Government 
seemingly sought to find a future way out from their policy commitments to first-
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generation biofuels, especially in case of disappointed expectations on second-
generation biofuels and suitability standards. 
  
In its 2008 proposal for a Renewable Energy Directive, however, the European 
Commission did not include the EU Council’s pre-condition on the availability of 
second-generation biofuels for the 2020 target. It justified the exclusion on the 
following grounds: “The main purpose of binding targets is to provide certainty 
for investors. Deferring a decision about whether a target is binding until a 
future event takes place is thus not appropriate” (EC, 2008, p. 13). Such pre-
condition similarly conflicted with industry’s demands for higher future targets as 
prior requirements to bring about technological advance, especially for second-
generation biofuels (EAC, 2008a, Evidence195). 
 
Meanwhile, the DfT was implementing the public consultations on UK biofuel 
policy, which previously announced in the name of the UK Government. In 
February 2007, the DfT launched the second consultation to seek views on the 
design of the RTFO (DfT, 2007b). The consultation received 6335 responses of 
which 6270 from “members of the public” expressing concerns about the 
environmental impacts of biofuels. The DfT inferred that the quite impressive 
number of responses was due to an advertising campaign run by a coalition of 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – deemed to have prompted more 
than 5000 responses (DfT, 2007d, pp. 2-5). In June 2007, the DfT launched a 
third consultation on the definition of the carbon and sustainability reporting 
system to enforce through the RTFO (DfT, 2007a). Probably due to the 
technical nature of the subject, this consultation received only 54 responses in 
total and all from “stakeholders” (DfT, 2008d).  
 
2.6 The EAC and the UK Government: official correspondence, 2008 
 
By 2008, the UK Government had already started justifying biofuel policy 
through three optimistic expectations: second-generation biofuels would soon 
overcome the problems of first-generation biofuels; sustainability standards 
would soon be effective and implemented; and current first-generation targets 
would stimulate industry to fulfil the previous two expectations. Especially this 
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last expectation was questioned by the Environmental Audit Committee (EAC), 
whose remit is “to consider to what extent the policies and programmes of all 
government departments and non-departmental public bodies contribute to 
environmental protection and sustainable development” (EAC, 2008a, p. iv). 
Reiterating EFRAC’s 2006 report, the EAC’s 2008 report – i.e. Are biofuels 
sustainable? – warned about the risk of a “lock in” of investments in first 
generation biofuels hampering second generation biofuels, and advocated 
priority for supporting these latter and developing sustainability standards.  
 
The EAC argued that biofuels are “often not an effective use of bioenergy 
resources, in terms either of cutting greenhouse gas emissions or value-for-
money” (EAC, 2008a, p. 3), and hardly a solution to improve fuel security in the 
EU (EAC, 2008a, p. 31). Nevertheless, “biofuels can reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions from road transport”33 and that second-generations biofuel 
technologies “might have a sustainable role in the future”34 (EAC, 2008a, p. 3). 
This said, current first-generation biofuels have “a detrimental impact on the 
environment overall”, warranting the enforcement of a system of sustainability 
standards to contain their “serious environmental consequences” (EAC, 2008a, 
p. 14).  
 
Yet, the EAC doubted that current sustainability standards could prevent all 
damage from first-generation biofuels (EAC, 2008a, pp. 14, 19). The EAC 
recommended revising those standards in order to make them inclusive also of 
wider impacts such as biodiversity loss, water pollution, fertiliser and pesticide 
pollution (EAC, 2008a, p. 14), the destruction of carbon sinks internationally 
(EAC, 2008a, p. 19), and worsening of food security in developing countries 
(EAC, 2008a, p. 22). Especially concerning this latter point, the EAC questioned 
whether these biofuels had a long-term role as the long-term demographic and 
climate change trends were already likely to worryingly compromise food 
security worldwide (EAC, 2008a, p. 22). That considered, the implementation of 
an effective sustainability standards system should not be considered just as a 
priority in biofuel production, but also as an opportunity for regulating all 
                                            
33
 ‘can’ is in italics in the original text. 
34
 ‘might’ is in italics in the original text. 
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internationally traded commodities (EAC, 2008a, p. 10). Accordingly, the 
support for first-generation biofuels remained “inappropriate” as long as land 
management was not made sustainable, even considering the benefits to the 
rural economy would get from increased agricultural prices and biofuel support 
mechanisms (EAC, 2008a, p. 30). 
 
It then strongly criticised the missed enforcement of such standards at the start 
of the RTFO and contended that “In the absence of such standards, the 
Government and the EU has moved too quickly to stimulate the use of biofuels” 
(EAC, 2008a, p. 14). On those grounds, it recommended a moratorium on 
biofuel policy to keep biofuels production on hold “until technology improves, 
robust mechanisms to prevent damaging land use change are developed, and 
international sustainability standards are agreed” (EAC, 2008a, pp. 3, 14). It 
then warned that “it will take considerable courage for the Government and the 
EU to admit that the current policy arrangements for biofuels are inappropriate” 
(EAC, 2008a, p. 3). As the term “courage” implied, a policy retreat on higher 
targets could undermine the EU’s and UK Government’s credibility towards the 
biofuel industry, unlike the EAC, which had no responsibility towards it.  
 
In its response to the EAC’s report, the UK Government acknowledged that the 
environmental performances of first-generation biofuels vary considerably 
according to such factors as where and how the feedstocks are grown. 
Depending on those factors, the best biofuels could offer consistent carbon 
savings, while the worst biofuels could offer no carbon savings at all or even 
cause negative social and environmental impacts (DfT, 2008b, p. 6). On the 
contrary, second-generation biofuels have “the potential to reduce pressure on 
land because they can use a wider range of feedstocks, including waste” (DfT, 
2008b, pp. 10-11). However, it contended that: 
 
“The RTFO starts off at an appropriately cautious level, with a 2.5% 
biofuel target (by volume) in 2008/09 rising to 5% in 2010/11. A 
moratorium on policies such as the RTFO would mean missing an 
opportunity to make carbon savings that we believe biofuels can deliver 
now. It would also mean reneging on earlier commitments. Investment 
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decisions by biofuel producers and fuel suppliers have been made on the 
back of those commitments.” (DfT, 2008b, pp. 7-8) 
 
Thus, besides claiming that the RTFO was already set at a “cautious level”, the 
UK Government expressed its concern about biofuel producers and fuel 
suppliers, as their investment decisions had been made on the back of its 
earlier commitments (DfT, 2008b, p. 7). Yet, it also reassured that that it “will not 
support any increase beyond current targets without being satisfied that the 
conditions set by the March 2007 European Council are met” – among which 
was the availability of second-generation biofuels (DfT, 2008b, p. 7). 
 
Furthermore, for the UK Government, “It is by encouraging the first generation 
of biofuels that we can expect to move towards second generation technology” 
(DfT, 2008b, p. 14). In the view of the UK Government, “there needs to be a 
market in biofuels if industry is to have any incentive to make technological 
developments leading to cheaper biofuels with better greenhouse gas savings” 
(DfT, 2008b, pp. 11-12). More specifically: 
 
“In the longer term, second generation biofuel technologies have the 
potential to reduce pressure on land because they can use a wider range 
of feedstocks, including waste. However, the Government does not 
believe it is feasible to wait for technological improvements before 
utilising biofuels. It is through stimulating a market for biofuels that we will 
encourage investment and the development of advanced technology.” 
(DfT, 2008b, p. 11) 
 
In other words, to encourage investors to invest into techno-scientific 
advancement in biofuels, it was necessary to continue stimulating the current 
first-generation biofuel market – i.e. preserving support to biofuels.  
 
The UK Government defined the development of a mandatory system of 
sustainability standard for biofuels as “essential” (DfT, 2008b, p. 6). It also 
agreed with the EAC that such development could lead to similar assurance 
systems in other agricultural commodities markets. Yet, it acknowledged the 
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difficulties involved in applying such systems to wider markets such as the one 
of the food industry (DfT, 2008b, p. 6). About the range of issues addressed by 
sustainability standards, the UK Government stated to “believe” that biofuel 
policy should be progressed “provided that it is accompanied by strong 
sustainability standards in conjunction with wider action for the protection of 
forests and other carbon sinks” (DfT, 2008b, p. 8). It then reassured that it was 
taking the issue of the food security issue seriously (DfT, 2008b, pp. 10-11). As 
a proof to its commitment on the matter, the UK Government reminded about its 
commissioning of the Renewable Fuels Agency to produce a review on “the 
wider economic and environmental impacts, particularly indirect impacts such 
as land use change, of different forms of biofuel production” (DfT, 2008b, p. 7). 
The UK Government ensured that “The results of the study will be relevant to 
the development of both the UK’s and the EU’s policies in this area” (DfT, 
2008b, pp. 7, 10-11). In relation to this issue, the UK Government mentioned 
that the recent proposal for a forthcoming EU Renewable Energy Directive was 
considering the introduction of a mandatory system for biofuels. It then declared 
that, in the negotiations on the Directive, it wished those standards being 
broadened and made as robust as possible in respect of global environmental 
impacts (DfT, 2008b, pp. 10-11). 
 
About the missed enforcement of sustainability standards in the initial phase of 
the RTFO, the UK Government pointed out that the RTFO was already requiring 
obligated suppliers to produce relevant information on the carbon savings and 
sustainability characteristics of their biofuels “as a first important step” (DfT, 
2008b, p. 6). Such a reporting mechanism was supposed to “help to improve 
data gathering among suppliers and assist in the development of these 
standards”, before the actual introduction of a mandatory sustainability 
standards system (DfT, 2008b, pp. 10-11). Thus, the UK Government promised 
the enforcement of sustainability standards and the redirection of support to 
second-generation biofuels only for the future, while insisted that the RTFO 
should proceed as planned and without the immediate enforcement of 
mandatory sustainability standards. 
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In its counter-response, the EAC welcomed the UK Government’s recognition 
that biofuels needed to be cost-effective and sustainable and the relative 
announcement about the upcoming RFA’s review on the wider economic and 
environmental impacts of biofuels. However, it remained “significantly 
concerned” about the UK Government’s continued dismissal of a policy 
moratorium (EAC, 2008b, p. 3). The EAC refused to accept any of the 
arguments provided by the UK Government to justify such dismissal (EAC, 
2008b, p. 3).  
 
The EAC strongly objected that RTFO targets were set at an “appropriately 
cautious level”. It reiterated that the development of biofuels should continue 
conditionally to the enforcement of sustainability standards and wider actions to 
prevent damages from land use change. As neither of these conditions would 
be in place before the start of the RTFO, the EAC warned that pushing forward 
with this policy would be “dangerous” (EAC, 2008b, p. 5). The EAC 
acknowledged the UK Government’s concern on its earlier policy commitments 
to the biofuel industry – i.e. “the concern for those that might have already 
invested in biofuels” (EAC, 2008b, p. 4). Nevertheless, such “concern is 
outweighed by concerns about the potential harm that could arise if the 
development of biofuels continues without the necessary safeguards” (EAC, 
2008b, p. 4). Moreover, “It will be much harder to take decisions about biofuels 
once an industry has fully established itself on a basis that may not be fully 
sustainable” (EAC, 2008b, p. 4). Then, citing the Royal Society, the EAC 
pointed out that current policy was “inadequate” as will direct investment into 
“more established near term options… and little to the more promising long-
term options”, i.e. into first-generation at the expense of second-generation 
biofuels (EAC, 2008b, p. 4). The EAC thus concluded reiterating its call for a 
moratorium and “urged the Government to resist attempts to increase EU 
biofuel targets” (EAC, 2008b, p. 5).  
 
In the response to the EAC counter-response, the UK Government reconfirmed 
its previous arguments and maintained its position unaltered (DfT, 2008c). The 
RTFO came into effect on the 15th April 2008, with blending targets unchanged 
at 2.5% for 2008-09, rising to 3.5% per 2009-10, and to 5% per 2010-11 per 
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volume. Sustainability standards were only set as indicative and not mandatory 
– i.e. obligated suppliers were only required to report on the sustainability of 
their biofuels, but not compelled to respect the indicative sustainability 
standards (DfT, 2008e, Section 1). 
 
2.7 UK Government: UK biofuel targets slow-down 
 
In 2008, a global food crisis sparked, mobilising calls for a change in biofuel 
policies. The World Bank issued an internal report (Mitchell, 2008) – which then 
was leaked (Chakrabortty, 2008a) – where biofuels were indicated as 
responsible for the recent food prices increases, and the consequential food 
crisis. Reframed as “food versus fuel” (Boucher, 2012, p. 150), the international 
controversy on the sustainability of biofuels gained prominence, catching the 
attention of the media (British Broadcasting Company - News [BBC News], 
Chakrabortty, 2008b; Holmes, 2008; 2008a; 2008b). Biofuel policy was 
increasingly blamed to worsen deforestation, food security, and socio-economic 
conditions in developing countries, as well as to contradict its original policy aim 
– i.e. reducing GHG emissions.  
 
Prompted by the wider public controversy and disagreements with 
Parliamentary Select Committees (Palmer, 2010, pp. 993, 1003-1004; Pilgrim & 
Harvey, 2010, Paragraphs 4.17-4.18), on the 21st February 2008, the UK 
Government announced the commissioning of a review on the “emerging 
evidence” on the indirect impacts of biofuel production on food prices, 
deforestation and on biofuel performances in overall carbon abatement. Led by 
Professor Ed Gallagher of the DfT’s Renewable Fuels Agency (RFA), the 
review was produced in only four months and published on the 7th July 2008 
(RFA, 2008a). Known as the Gallagher Review, the study reconfirmed the UK 
Government’s rationale35 that a moratorium would “reduce the ability of the 
                                            
35
 As Dunlop pointed out: “Of course, the fact that the body conducting the review—the RFA—
had been created to implement the RTFO made it unlikely that such drastic action [a policy 
moratorium] would be recommended” (Dunlop, 2010, p. 353). Thus, independently of the 
validity of those arguments, it was anyhow unlikely to expect from the public body (RFA) in 
charge of the administration of the RTFO a drastic recommendation such as a moratorium. A 
moratorium would have implied not only the abrogation of the RTFO, but also the dissolution of 
the RFA itself. 
132 
 
biofuel industry to invest in new technologies or transform the sourcing of its 
feedstock to the more sustainable supplies necessary to create a truly 
sustainable industry” (RFA, 2008a, p. 66). About the future availability of 
advanced biofuels, “a market share of 1-2% by energy of transport fuels by 
2020 seems feasible” (RFA, 2008a, pp. 13, 44), likewise reinforcing techno-
optimistic expectations.  
 
However, the Gallagher Review also concluded that “there is a significant risk 
the current policy will not deliver its intended objective of significant net GHG 
emissions savings” (RFA, 2008a, p. 65). The review acknowledged the 
controversial drawbacks of available biofuels. An uncontrolled large-scale 
application could lead to direct and indirect land-use-changes (dLUC and iLUC), 
which would eventually result in net increases in greenhouse-gasses as well as 
unsustainable impacts on the local environment and socio-economic conditions 
of developing countries. In particular, the displacement of existing agricultural 
land, due to biofuel demand, would lead to carbon sink destructions (e.g. 
deforestation), biodiversity losses, human rights’ abuses and food insecurity in 
developing countries (RFA, 2008a, pp. 8, 18-19). On those grounds, it advised 
the UK Government to slow down the introduction of biofuels “until adequate 
controls to address [land] displacement effects are implemented and are 
demonstrated to be effective” (RFA, 2008a, p. 8). 
 
During 2007-2009, the UK Government also accommodated biofuel critics, the 
biofuel industry, and the EU by increasing R&D funds for second-generation 
biofuels. Such funds have been allocated through Research Councils, mainly 
the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) and the 
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC), whose 
budgets have increased greatly since 2007-09 (UK Energy Research Centre 
[UKERC], 2009, May 15). As part of its wider programme on Sustainable Power 
Generation and Supply (Supergen), the EPSRC set up the Supergen Biomass 
and Bioenergy Consortium, researching also advanced biofuels – its total 
budget increased from £2.9m during 2003-07 to £6.4m during 2007-11. As its 
main conduit for bioenergy R&D funds, the BBSRC set up the Sustainable 
Bioenergy Centre (BSBEC) in 2009 – with an initial funding of £27m. The 
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BSBEC was promoted as a “key contribution which will target research on the 
development of advanced bioenergy and biofuels” (DECC, 2009a, p. 148), and 
“support the build-up of research capacity into how bioenergy can help replace 
fossil fuels with renewable, low-carbon alternatives” (Defra et al., 2007, p. 35). 
As a rationale for such R&D priorities, second-generation biofuels would use 
natural resources more efficiently and sustainably, i.e. by minimising land 
requirements and avoiding food crops.  
 
On the 15th October 2008, the UK Government delegated the DfT to launch a 
fourth consultation on UK biofuel policy to seek views on the UK Government 
proposal to amend the UK biofuel policy in line with the Gallagher Review’s 
recommendations (DfT, 2008a). After the review of the consultation responses, 
the UK Government decided to proceed with the amendments. The RTFO 
(Amendment) Order 2009 was approved by Parliament and enforced in April 
2009 (UK Parliament, 2009). The targets of the RTFO were lowered and 
delayed respectively at 3.25% for 2009/2010, 3.5% for 2010/2011, 4% for 
2011/2012, 4.5% for 2012/2013, 5% for 2013/2014 and subsequent years36 
(DfT, 2009a, p. 2). Meanwhile, biodiesel and bioethanol duty discounts, as 
previously announced, were set to be phased out by March 201037 (DfT, 2009e, 
Section 1). 
 
By endorsing the Gallagher Review and expanding R&D funds for second-
generation biofuels, the UK Government sought to enhance the credibility of its 
policy rationale and expectations against calls for a total policy moratorium. 
Nevertheless, as it argued in the 2008 report on progress to the European 
Commission, “a more cautious approach to biofuel production is necessary” 
                                            
36
 The UK indicative targets as previously announced by the UK Government were already 
significantly lower than the EU reference targets as set in the 2003 Biofuel Directive: i.e. 0.3% 
for 2005 and 5% for 2010 calculated per volume, against the EU reference targets of 2% for 
2005 and 5.75% for 2010 calculated per energy content. The UK slow-down further reduced the 
UK indicative targets as compared to EU reference targets – i.e. 4% for 2010/2011 and 5% for 
2013/2014 calculated per volume, against the EU’s 5% for 2010 and 10 % for 2020 calculated 
per energy content. Due to the minor energy content of biofuels with respect to fossil fuels, the 
translation of EU reference targets from energy content to volume results in higher percentages 
per volume. More in detail, 2% per energy content is equivalent to 2,5% per volume, 5,75% per 
energy content is equivalent to around 7% per volume, and 10% per energy content is 
equivalent to 12.5% per volume (RFA, 2008a, p. 90). 
37
 As exception, the duty incentive for biodiesel from used cooking oil was later announced to 
remain in place until the 31
st
 of March 2012. 
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(DfT, 2008e, Section 2), thus justifying a slowdown in biofuel targets and the 
withdrawal of fuel duty discounts. In the 2009 report on progress to the 
European Commission, the UK Government further sustained that, although 
reduced, RTFO’s biofuel targets, combined with the higher EU target, “should 
still give incentive to the biofuel industry to invest in new technology and 
domestic capacity” (DfT, 2009e, Section 1). 
 
Thus, the UK Government opted for an explicitly cautious approach in 
supporting first-generation biofuels, partially accommodating biofuel critics. Yet, 
this solution also met the interests of the first-generation biofuel industry, by 
dismissing a total moratorium on support. A slowdown in support would not 
solve the problems concerning the unsustainability of biofuels, but would buy 
time to develop sustainability standards and second-generation biofuels. At the 
same time, the incumbent UK first-generation biofuel industry would not go out 
of business, even though the slowdown would heighten its costs and 
uncertainty.38 
 
2.8 Recent developments: expectations on biofuels slowed down 
 
On the 23rd April 2009 – i.e. the same month of the enforcement of the UK 
slowdown, the European Commission (EC) received formal approval from the 
EU Council and Parliament to issue the new Fuel Quality Directive (FQD) and 
Renewable Energy Directive (RED) (EU, 2009FQ; 2009RED). These Directives 
repealed previous Directives on the respective subjects, among which the EU 
Directive on Biofuels of 2003 (EU, 2003). The FQD required fuel suppliers to 
deliver a 6% reduction in life cycle GHG emissions of petrol and diesel by 2020. 
To make reaching that target possible, it invited the European Committee of 
Standardisation (CEN) to adequate the current 5% limit on biofuel blending on 
petrol and diesel in line with the new higher target in transport (EU, 2009FQ, p. 
92). The RED amended the binding target for biofuels that the EU Council 
proposed in March 2007 – i.e. 10% per energy content by 2020 (EU Council, 
2007, p. 21). The target was not anymore referred exclusively to biofuels, but to 
                                            
38
 According to Palmer, extending the targets from 2010/11 to 2013/14 was effectively extending 
the lifespan of the RTFO by an additional 3 years (Palmer, 2010, p. 1004). 
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“energy from renewable sources in transport” in general. As the EC specified in 
the RED: 
 
“The need for energy efficiency in the transport sector is imperative 
because a mandatory percentage target for energy from renewable 
sources is likely to become increasingly difficult to achieve sustainably if 
overall demand for energy for transport continues to rise. The mandatory 
10% target for transport to be achieved by all Member States should 
therefore be defined as that share of final energy consumed in transport 
which is to be achieved from renewable sources as a whole, and not 
from biofuels alone.” (EU, 2009RED, p. 18) 
  
Despite this change in reference, the target was anyhow expected implicitly 
(EU, 2009RED, p. 18) or explicitly (DECC, 2009a, p. 47; DfT, 2010, p. 2) to be 
met mostly through biofuels. The RED also introduced mandatory sustainability 
requirements for biofuels, which had to be enforced from December 2010 (EC, 
2010). The sustainability requirements aimed at covering GHG savings, 
biodiversity, land with high carbon stock value and agro-environmental practices 
(EC, 2011). The EC will review the feasibility of reaching the 10% transport sub-
target whilst ensuring sustainability by the end of 2014 (DECC, 2009a, p. 47).  
 
In 2007 the EU Council stated that the 10% by 2020 binding target would 
depend on the availability of second-generation biofuels (EU Council, 2007, p. 
21). Nevertheless, the EC did not include that pre-condition in the 2009 RED, 
with the target becoming subject only to sustainability standards; future reviews 
would evaluate the environmental and social consequences of the production 
and consumption of biofuels (EU, 2009RED, pp. 17, 43). Such a pre-condition 
also disappeared from UK policy documents.  
 
Since then, techno-scientific advance towards second-generation biofuels has 
disappointed earlier expectations. Nevertheless, the UK Government and the 
EC continue to promote it to justify their biofuel targets. Meanwhile the 
controversy has narrowed around GHG emissions from indirect land-use-
changes, somewhat losing its initial prominence (Boucher, 2012, p. 151). 
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In the 2012 UK Bioenergy Strategy, the UK Government stated that “It is 
important that future policies and incentives are aligned to incentivise low risk 
areas that minimise technology and investment lock in to pathways that may 
become undesirable and minimise lock out of potential vital pathways” (DfT et 
al., 2012, p. 57). Although “low-risk areas” included second-generation biofuels, 
earlier techno-expectations for them were slowed down: “Advanced biofuels 
could start playing an increasing role in reducing road transport emissions in the 
2020s” (DfT et al., 2012, p. 52). Meanwhile, “So long as the sustainability can 
be assured ... some conventional biofuels can offer a cost effective contribution 
to reducing carbon emissions from road transport” (DfT et al., 2012, p. 41).  
 
On the 17th October 2012, the EC issued a proposal to amend the FQD and the 
RED (EU, 2009FQ; 2009RED). In view of the “significant” contribution of 
biofuels in meeting the targets of both Directives, the EC admitted that:  
 
“Whilst both Directives include sustainability criteria including minimum 
greenhouse gas saving thresholds, the greenhouse gas emissions 
associated with changes in the carbon stock of land resulting from 
indirect changes in land use (ILUC) are not subject to reporting 
requirements under the current legislation.” (EC, 2012b, p. 2) 
 
It also acknowledged that: 
 
“Scientific work indicates that emissions from indirect land-use change 
can vary substantially between feedstocks and can negate some or all of 
the greenhouse gas savings of individual biofuels relative to the fossil 
fuels they replace.” (EC, 2012b, p. 2) 
 
The proposal advanced a series of policy amendments supposed to address 
those concerns (EC, 2012b, p. 3; 2012a). Among the most relevant, the EC 
proposed to cap the contribution of first-generation biofuels from food crops – or 
“conventional” biofuels (with a risk of iLUC) emissions – to the EU Directives’ 
targets. More specifically, it capped their contribution “to the current 
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consumption level, 5% up to 2020,39 while keeping overall renewable energy 
and carbon intensity reduction targets” (EC, 2012b, p. 3). The EC also proposed 
to improve market incentives to encourage innovation in biofuel production 
processes in order to reduce the associated emissions and favour the market 
penetration of second-generation – or “advanced (low-iLUC)” biofuels. Finally, 
the EC proposed to improve “reporting of greenhouse gas emissions by obliging 
Member States and fuel suppliers to report the estimated indirect land-use 
change emissions of biofuels” (EC, 2012b, p. 3). 
 
The EC stated that “The aim of the current proposal is to start the transition to 
biofuels that deliver substantial greenhouse gas savings when also estimated 
indirect land-use change emissions are reported” (EC, 2012b, p. 2) – i.e. “to 
promote biofuels that help achieving substantial emission cuts, do not directly 
compete with food and are more sustainable at the same time” (EC, 2012a). 
Yet, the EC contended that “existing investments should be protected”. Hence, 
“The proposal also aims at protecting existing investments until 2020” (EC, 
2012b, p. 3). That said: 
  
“The proposal does not take a position on the actual need for financial 
support to biofuels before 2020. However, the Commission is of the view 
that in the period after 2020 biofuels which do not lead to substantial 
greenhouse gas savings (when emissions from indirect land-use change 
are included) and are produced from crops used for food and feed should 
not be subsidised.” (EC, 2012b, p. 3) 
 
In the related press release, the EC further specified that: 
 
“While the current proposal does not affect the possibility for Member 
States to provide financial incentives for biofuels, the Commission 
considers that in the period after 2020 biofuels should only receive 
financial support if they lead to substantial greenhouse gas savings and 
are not produced from crops used for food and feed.“ (EC, 2012a) 
                                            
39
 Equivalent to the estimated consumption level at the end of 2011 per energy content (EC, 
2012b, p. 14). 
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Therefore, like the UK’s biofuel targets slow-down four years before, the EC’s 
proposal somewhat accommodated controversy over first-generation biofuels’ 
unsustainable feedstocks, while still ensuring them short-term support. 
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Chapter 4 – Policy-promise lock-in 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses how the UK Government’s vision on biofuel policy has 
evolved over time and how the UK Government’s responsibilities in technology 
policy have affected that evolution. It then reflects on how previous policy-
promises made to technology innovators can influence executive public 
authorities in the construction of their visions of the future.  
 
This chapter has two main sections. Section 1 relates the historical analysis to 
relevant analyses from the sociology of expectations and the UK biofuel policy 
literature. It then reinterprets the historical analysis through the sociology of 
expectations integrated with insights borrowed from the multi-level perspective 
(MLP) on socio-technical transitions. Finally, it reinterprets UK biofuel policy in 
terms of a policy-promise lock-in. Section 2 discusses relevant insights from the 
sociology of expectations on public authorities and reputation. By means of a 
simplified analytical model, it then shows how executive public authorities’ 
reputational stakes, through their policy-promises, may be linked to techno-
scientific advancement. Finally, it comments on how policy-promises may be 
conceptualised as simultaneously performative, promises on future 
commitments and strategic resources. 
 
 
1. The evolution of the UK Government’s vision on biofuel policy 
 
Within the sociology of expectations, two analyses in particular have looked at 
the UK Government, although in other policy contexts. The few academic 
analyses that specifically focused on UK biofuel policy deployed other 
theoretical frameworks to investigate that case. In what follows, I relate insights 
from these analyses to those derived from my analysis. 
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1.1 Insights from the sociology of expectations 
 
Within the sociology of expectations, two analyses in particular relate to mine as 
they looked at the UK Government – although in other policy contexts. Beynon-
Jones and Brown analysed xenotransplantation policy in the UK. In their 
analysis, they observed that the UK Government accommodated its policy to 
industry promises of techno-scientific advance – which were ultimately 
unfulfilled. To explain this observation, the authors argued that the UK 
Government may have deferred to industry claims because of its short-term 
perspective (Beynon-Jones & Brown, 2011, p. 647). Eames, McDowall, Hodson 
and Marvin explored the “hydrogen economy” as a guiding vision in the UK. In 
their analysis, they observed that information on hydrogen technologies “is 
frequently left vague or open in the highest-level documents and arguments” of 
policy actors (Eames et al., 2006, p. 367). In explaining this, the authors argued 
that policy actors in particular may avoid in-detail discussion of the technologies 
they support as this would expose the disagreements which usually surround 
their expected developments and thus undermine their efforts to build support 
(Eames et al., 2006, p. 367). Furthermore, in doing so, policy actors “are left 
with nothing concrete to communicate outside the immediate sphere of 
hydrogen enthusiasts” – i.e. they tend to defer to these latter arguments (Eames 
et al., 2006, p. 368). Van Lente also noted the phenomenon of policy actors 
deferring to technology innovators’ arguments. He mentioned that the 
“spokespersons” or “promise champions” that defend the mandate of 
“technologists” may also come from “within the government, which becomes 
more and more involved in technological developments” (Van Lente, 1993, p. 
160). This phenomenon seems also to have occurred in the present case, with 
the UK Government endorsing a vision of biofuel policy rather similar to those 
supported by the biofuel industry. 
 
In my analysis, I relate the similarity between the UK Government’s vision and 
the visions of the biofuel industry to the policy commitments of the former 
toward the latter. In a minor adaptation of the sociology of expectations, I 
analytically distinguish “technological promises” from “policy-promises” – i.e. the 
promises that public authorities make regarding their future policy commitments, 
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such as in the provision of political and financial support to a specific industry 
(see Chapter 1). 
 
1.2 Insights from UK biofuel policy literature 
 
A few academic analyses have specifically investigated UK biofuel policy 
(Dunlop, 2010; Palmer, 2010; Pilgrim & Harvey, 2010; Upham et al., 2011; 
Boucher, 2012). Complementing those analyses, mine looks at UK biofuel 
policy from a distinctive perspective focused on expectations, and investigates 
its evolution from an earlier period (see also Berti & Levidow, 2014). 
 
Palmer analysed the development of the Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation 
(RTFO) from a “discursive-institutionalist perspective”. To explain the similarity 
between the arguments supported by the UK Government and the biofuel 
industry before the publication of the Gallagher Review in 2008, Palmer argued 
that biofuel advocates “successfully transplanted their ecomodernist discourse 
into policy makers’ consciousness and vocabularies”, because of its “superior 
appeal” to that of biofuel critics. Besides, the biofuel industry and the 
policymaking community had become economically interdependent, as “the 
former depended upon significant public sector investment and the latter viewed 
the development of ‘advanced’ biofuels as critical to Britain’s future economic 
competitiveness” (Palmer, 2010, pp. 1002-1005). Not excluding a role for the 
“superior appeal” of the biofuel industry’s argument, my analysis shows, 
however, that behind the similarity of arguments between the UK Government 
and the biofuel industry there were different concerns. 
 
Upham, Tomei and Dendler analysed the opinions held by UK stakeholders at 
the time the biofuel controversy gained prominence. The authors inferred that, 
despite non-governmental organisations (NGOs) turning against biofuel targets 
between 2006 and 2007, “RTFO carbon and sustainability policy has latterly 
reflected the interests of the DfT [Department for Transport] and organisations 
with an interest in motor vehicle-based mobility, interests that biofuels readily 
mesh with” (Upham et al., 2011, p. 2673).  
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Pilgrim and Harvey specifically analysed NGOs’ post-2007 opposition to 
biofuels. They inferred that this opposition was one driver prompting the UK 
Government’s decisions to launch the Gallagher Review in 2008 and eventually 
to slow down UK biofuel targets in 2009 (Pilgrim & Harvey, 2010, Paragraphs 
4.17-4.18). Reconciling the analyses above, mine reinterprets these decisions 
as UK Government’s efforts to preserve its credibility and legitimacy not only in 
the eyes of technology innovators, but also of biofuel critics. 
 
Despite acknowledging the harmful impacts of biofuel policy, in 2009 the UK 
Government only slowed down its biofuel targets, while rejecting calls for a 
policy moratorium. Regarding this decision, Dunlop – who investigated the 
temporal tensions between policy and knowledge developments in UK biofuel 
policy – inferred broader considerations taken by the DfT about “sunk costs, in 
both economic and reputational terms”. Industry had invested on the 
assumption that biofuel targets would rise, hence “any radical re-thinking of 
policy would not only have been legally and economically questionable but 
would also have fatally undermined the DfT’s credibility in the fuel sector” 
(Dunlop, 2010, p. 354). Building on and furthering Dunlop’s inference, my 
analysis emphasises how the “reputational sunk costs” of the UK Government 
have also been linked to techno-scientific advance in emerging biofuels. 
 
Boucher investigated interactions between the UK biofuel controversy and 
regulatory development. He noticed that, between 2007 and 2011, “a potentially 
important shift is observed in regulatory discourse. Just as the framing of the 
technology in the controversy was increasingly reduced to GHG emissions with 
peripheral reference to social and environmental sustainability, government 
documents also increasingly eschewed reference to improving energy security 
and rural economies” (Boucher, 2012, p. 152). My analysis confirms such a 
trend. 
 
Unlike previous analyses of UK biofuel policy, mine emphasises the UK 
Government’s cautious approach in promising lower support for first-generation 
biofuels, relative to EU targets and industry demands. Complementing insights 
from previous analyses, it then shows how the UK Government’s “reputational 
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sunk costs” were linked to the argument justifying biofuel targets for first-
generation biofuels as necessary for techno-scientific advance in the second 
generation. 
  
1.3 Reinterpreting UK biofuel policy: a policy-promise lock-in 
 
This section reinterprets the historical analysis through the lens of the sociology 
of expectations integrated with insights borrowed from the MLP on socio-
technical transitions. 
 
1.3.1 First phase: the 1990s, landscape and regime visions on road transport 
policy 
 
During the 1990s, the UK Government resisted the inclusion in the policy 
agenda of emerging negative expectations of the environmental impacts of its 
road transport policy, which demanded radical policy revisions. Endorsing a 
neoliberal economic ideology, the UK Government, at the time led by the 
Conservatives, promoted liberalisation and privatisation as means to restore 
cost efficiency and dynamism in the public sectors. Having promised and 
enforced deregulation in the transport sector, the Conservative Government 
was responsible for the policy-promises made to the industry called to 
administer the liberalised parts of public transport. 
 
For the Conservative Government, accepting intervention in transport with 
environmentally minded regulations would have meant betraying the policy-
promises made to the industry previously involved in the liberalisation and 
privatisation processes. These responsibilities partly account for the UK 
Government ignoring the RCEP’s repeated calls to reply to its 1994 report and 
to adopt different landscape and regime visions. The election of the new Labour 
Government in 1997 was a turning point. Not liable for the policy-promises 
made by its predecessor, the Labour Government intervened in transport policy 
with environmentally minded regulations (DETR, 1998b). Endorsing similar 
landscape and regime visions to those proposed by the RCEP (DETR, 1998a, 
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Foreword; Ferguson & Skinner, 2002), the UK Government started designing a 
role for alternative fuels and vehicles technologies within them.  
 
The landscape vision was framed into a series of key policy drivers, notably: 
improving air quality, mitigating noise pollution, tackling congestion, mitigating 
climate change and ensuring energy security (RCEP, 1994, p. 36; 1997, p. 19). 
Among these, the large and growing weight of road transport in endangering 
human health with air pollution, aggravating climate change with GHG 
emissions and compromising energy security through increasing oil 
consumption gained dominance (RCEP, 1994, p. 239; 1997, pp. 25-26). In this 
context, road transport had to play its part (RCEP, 1994, p. 239). The landscape 
vision provided a space for the regime vision. 
 
The regime vision balanced expectations on the transition to sustainable 
transport in the short, medium and long term. In the short term, emission 
reductions could be attained by reducing the need for movement, best achieved 
by a gradual shift away from lifestyles depending on high mobility and especially 
in the intensive use of cars (RCEP, 1994, p. 233). In the medium term, further 
emissions reductions could be expected from technological advances in the 
internal combustion engine, with overall performance improvements in reducing 
emissions and fossil fuel consumption. For the long term, the eventual solution 
would have to be found into new vehicle and/or fuels technologies (RCEP, 
1994, p. 142; 1997, p. 33). 
 
1.3.2. Second phase: the 2000s, biofuels in the regime vision on road transport 
policy 
 
Biofuels were marginalised in the UK Government’s regime vision on 
sustainable transport at least until 2002, when it introduced a first duty discount 
for biodiesel. From that initial marginalisation, the UK Government was then 
forced by the 2003 EU Directive to insert biofuels into its regime vision and 
promise higher support to biofuel technology innovators (EU, 2003). By 2003, 
EU and UK public authorities were promoting biofuels through optimistic 
expectations for future benefits in mitigating climate change and enhancing fuel 
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security in road transport, as well as in fostering the rural economy – i.e. in 
reducing GHG emissions, diversifying transport fuel supplies, as well as 
stimulating markets for non-food crops and creating new jobs in biofuel supply-
chains (EC, 2001, pp. 31-32; DTI, 2003, p. 69; EFRAC, 2003, p. 5; EU, 2003, 
pp. 42-44). 
 
The UK Government started endorsing very similar expectations to those of the 
biofuel industry – as observed in other policy contexts, where the UK 
Government seemingly endorsed technology innovators’ arguments (Eames et 
al., 2006, pp. 367-368; Beynon-Jones & Brown, 2011, p. 647). This apparent 
“transplantation” of arguments has been partially explained in cognitive terms as 
resulting from the “superior appeal” of the biofuel industry’s arguments (Palmer, 
2010, pp. 1002-1005). Yet the UK Government acknowledged the drawbacks of 
first-generation biofuels and defended support for the biofuel industry primarily 
as a means to stimulate biofuel innovators to fulfil future EU obligations with 
second-generation biofuels. Furthermore, it promised and delivered lower 
support with respect to EU targets and the biofuel industry’s demands.40 By 
2008, UK biofuel targets were also explicitly referred to as “cautious”, and were 
eventually delayed in 2009 (DfT, 2004c, p. 2; 2008e, Section 2; 2008b, p. 7). 
This caution41 seems to relate to a concern about getting further locked in to the 
first-generation biofuel industry, which the UK Government initially presented as 
environmentally and socio-economically risky and excessively expensive 
(Defra, 2004, p. 6; DfT, 2004c, p. 2). Therefore, the “superior appeal” of the 
                                            
40
 In 2004, the UK Government announced a UK indicative target of 0.3% per volume for 2005 – 
then reconfirmed in November 2005 – as opposed to the 2% per energy content for 2005 as set 
by the 2003 EU Biofuel Directive. It also opted to delay the announcement of the target for 2010 
to 2007 as allowed by the Directive. In 2006, the UK Government announced that the annual 
rates of the RTFO would be set at 2.5% for 2008/09, 3.75% for 2009/10 and 5% for 2010/11, all 
calculated per volume. Thus the UK indicative target for 2010 was also below the EU Directive’s 
reference value of 5.75% per energy content for 2010. Because of the lesser energy content of 
biofuels in respect to fossil fuels, the translation of the EU targets from energy content to 
volume results into higher percentages per volume: 2% per energy content is equivalent to 
2.5% per volume (for 2005); 5.75% per energy content is equivalent to around 7% per volume 
(for 2010) (RFA, 2008a, p. 90). 
41
 Of course, such targets may be seen as ‘incautious’ from an environmental and socio-
economic perspective, as argued by NGOs and Parliamentary Select Committees. But they 
were certainly “cautious” in relation to EU targets and the biofuel industry’s demands, and were 
explicitly justified as such by the UK Government in 2008 – both when responding to the EAC 
and when reporting on progress to the European Commission (DfT, 2008b, p. 7; 2008e, Section 
2). 
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biofuel industry’s arguments for the UK Government offers at best a partial 
explanation for the similarity of their arguments (Palmer, 2010, pp. 1002-1005). 
 
By the time of the 2006-2007 controversy over the unsustainability of first-
generation biofuels, the UK Government had started linking optimistic 
expectations for future sustainability standards, future second-generation 
biofuels and their dependence on current targets for first-generation biofuels. 
This last expectation in particular stirred up disagreements between the UK 
Government and two Parliamentary Select Committees: the Environment, Food 
and Rural Affair Committee (EFRAC) and the Environmental Audit Committee 
(EAC). 
 
In theoretical terms, EFRAC and EAC disagreed with the UK Government about 
whether supporting first-generation biofuels was a stimulus or an obstacle for a 
“promise-requirement cycle” on second-generation biofuels. Considered as 
mature technologies, incumbent first-generation biofuels had become 
controversial due to their unsustainable biomass inputs. Meanwhile second-
generation biofuels depended on emerging technologies gaining “collective 
expectations” (Konrad, 2006, p. 431) – or at least widespread public 
endorsement among public authorities – as means to avoid negative effects of 
first-generation biofuels. The UK Government in particular promoted “second-
generation” biofuels as if they were “self-justifying” because of their greater 
environmental and socio-economic benefits, and appeal to technological 
progress (Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, pp. 222, 223). 
 
Reversing its earlier optimism concerning biofuels (EFRAC, 2003, p. 18), 
EFRAC, joined by the EAC two years later, argued that the UK Government 
should divert support from incumbent first-generation biofuels to the emerging 
second generation (EFRAC, 2006, p. 6; EAC, 2008a, pp. 3, 14). This diversion 
would prevent biofuel technology innovators from locking-in further investments 
in incumbent first-generation biofuels, and thus consolidating a socio-technical 
regime pre-empting a promise-requirement cycle on second-generation biofuels 
(EFRAC, 2006, pp. 45-46; EAC, 2008b, p. 4). By contrast, the UK Government 
presented its support for first-generation biofuels as still necessary to stimulate 
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biofuel innovators not only to fulfil future EU targets, but also to generate a 
promise-requirement cycle on emerging second-generation biofuels (DfT, 
2008b, pp. 7, 10-12, 14). 
 
Underlying the latter stance is an implicit rationale, which appears to be specific 
to public authorities with executive roles in technology-policy (see section 2): 
fulfilling previous policy-promises of support towards incumbent technological 
niches is a requirement to maintain credibility in the eyes of current and 
prospective technology innovators in emerging technological niches. At stake is 
the effectiveness of future technology policy in mobilising current and 
prospective technology innovators. Linking these reputational stakes to techno-
scientific advancement, executive public authorities may delay a complete 
redirection of support from incumbent to preferable emerging technologies, and 
present such a delay as instrumental for stimulating techno-scientific 
advancement towards the latter. This linkage can be theorised as a policy-
promise lock-in when previous policy-commitments towards technology 
innovators of incumbent technologies have become controversial. Potentially 
driven by several imperatives, these controversial policy-commitments are 
officially justified as necessary for the development of preferable, emerging 
technologies.  
 
The UK Government was constrained by several imperatives: its EU 
obligations, its dependence on the new-born UK biofuel industry necessary for 
fulfilling them and its need to establish credible incentives for its technology 
policy. Given its EU obligations, the UK Government’s dependence on first-
generation biofuel suppliers drove policy-promises to that industry, thus 
imposing “reputational sunk costs” on the DfT (Dunlop, 2010, p. 354). These 
reputational stakes were linked to techno-scientific advance through 
expectations for second-generation biofuels. For the UK Government, the 
endorsement and promotion of these expectations justified short-term support 
for incumbent biofuels, but potentially resulted in a lock-in (Van Lente & Rip, 
1998a, p. 217).  
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Such links between reputational stakes and policy-promises seem in any case 
neither unmovable nor permanent. When the biofuel controversy gained 
prominence in 2007-2008, the EU Council and UK Government subjected their 
2020 target to a pre-condition on the future availability of second-generation 
biofuels (Defra et al., 2007, p. 8; EU Council, 2007, p. 21). The EU Council and 
UK Government seemingly sought thus a future way out of their policy 
commitments to first-generation biofuels, especially in case of disappointed 
expectations on second-generation biofuels and sustainability standards. By 
making their policy-promises of support to first-generation biofuels conditional 
upon prior fulfilment of technological expectations for second-generation 
biofuels by technology innovators, they were effectively delegating responsibility 
for any possible disappointed expectations on second-generation biofuels to 
technology innovators. Beyond minimising reputational damage, these 
conditional targets were also providing a reason to withdraw policy-promises of 
support to first-generation biofuels, in case of failed expectations for second-
generation biofuels. In theoretical terms, they made their policy-promises 
conditional upon technology innovators fulfilling those technological 
expectations – i.e. they set temporal limits to their policy-promises.  
 
Prompted by the wider public controversy and disagreements with 
Parliamentary Select Committees (Palmer, 2010, pp. 993, 1003-1004; Pilgrim & 
Harvey, 2010, Paragraphs 4.17-4.18), in 2008 the UK Government 
commissioned the Gallagher Review. The review recommended slowing down 
support while waiting for technological advancements and sustainability 
standards to be realised (RFA, 2008a, p. 8). However, it also reconfirmed the 
UK Government’s rationale that a degree of support to current biofuels was 
necessary to stimulate industry to invest in new technologies (RFA, 2008a, p. 
66). Endorsing the Gallagher Review, the UK Government slowed down UK 
biofuel targets in 2009. This decision partially reversed its prior commitments to 
the EU and biofuel industry, but effectively preserved current financial support 
to biofuels against prominent calls for a moratorium – e.g. from NGOs and 
Parliamentary Select Committees. Therefore, through such endorsement and 
partial policy reversal, the UK Government not only sought wider legitimacy 
among biofuel critics (Pilgrim & Harvey, 2010, Paragraphs 4.17-4.18), but also 
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sought to appease biofuel technology innovators (Upham et al., 2011, p. 2673) 
– see also Chapter 6. 
 
The partial policy reversal of the UK Government anticipated by four years a 
proposal for a similar initiative by the European Commission. Although the 2009 
Directives omitted any pre-condition for the availability of second-generation 
biofuels (EC, 2008, p. 13; EU, 2009FQ; 2009RED), in 2012 the European 
Commission proposed to cap support for first-generation biofuels produced from 
food crops at current levels42 (EC, 2012b, pp. 3, 8, 14). Like the UK 
Government’s slow down, the European Commission’s proposal, which is still 
under negotiation, somewhat accommodates the controversy over first-
generation biofuels’ unsustainable feedstocks, while still ensuring them short-
term support.  
 
Since 2007-2008, however, the controversy has narrowed to focus on GHG 
emissions from indirect land-use-changes, somewhat losing its initial 
prominence (Boucher, 2012, p. 151). 
 
1.4 Reflections on the integration of the sociology of expectations with the 
multi-level perspective and on the contributions of the analysis 
 
The integration of the sociology of expectations and insights from the MLP has 
proved to be an extremely valuable theoretical framework for this analysis. 
Through this framework, I managed to reconstruct the evolution of the UK 
Government’s vision on biofuel policy since its origins in the sustainable road 
transport debate. It helped me to analyse how the landscape and regime visions 
on sustainable road transport were initially negotiated, and eventually endorsed 
among UK public authorities, thus opening a space for biofuel policy to emerge. 
It also helped me discover how executive public authorities in biofuel policy 
                                            
42
 The 2009 EU Directives introduced a target of 10% per energy content for 2020. Referred to 
“renewable fuels” rather than biofuels specifically, the target is widely expected to be mostly met 
by biofuels – 10% per energy content is equivalent to 12.5% per volume of biofuels (RFA, 
2008a, p. 90). The 2012 proposal of the European Commission aims at limiting the contribution 
of first-generation biofuels from food crops to 5% per energy content until 2020 – i.e. half the 
target of the 2009 EU Directives and equivalent to the estimated consumption level at the end of 
2011 per energy content (EC, 2012b, p. 14). 
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have linked their reputational stakes, via their policy-promises, to techno-
scientific advancement in biofuel technologies.  
 
UK biofuel policy in particular may be explained in terms of a policy-promise 
lock-in, whereby the UK Government’s “reputational sunk costs” towards first-
generation biofuel suppliers were linked to future techno-scientific advance in 
second-generation biofuels (see also Berti & Levidow, 2014). Firmly rejected by 
Parliamentary Select Committees, that linkage was instead endorsed and 
promoted by the UK Government and the biofuel industry – as in other policy 
contexts, the UK Government seemingly deferred to technology innovators’ 
arguments (Eames et al., 2006, pp. 367-368; Beynon-Jones & Brown, 2011, p. 
647). This finding refines previous academic analyses of UK biofuel policy 
(Dunlop, 2010; Palmer, 2010; Pilgrim & Harvey, 2010; Upham et al., 2011; 
Boucher, 2012). 
 
More generally, executive public authorities can face a policy dilemma about 
whether preserving support for controversial incumbent technological niches 
should be considered a transitional requirement – or a counterproductive 
measure – for promoting development in emergent, preferable technological 
niches. Whenever executive public authorities publicly endorse the first view, 
they may be said to be in a policy-promise lock-in. In this situation, executive 
public authorities may delay a full redirection of support from incumbent 
technologies to preferable, emerging technologies, despite the fact that support 
for the former has become controversial. This may appear either to contradict or 
be in line with the logics of promise-requirement cycles – whereby support 
ought to be redirected from “old” and “obsolete”, to “new” and emerging 
technologies, especially when incumbent technologies have disappointed their 
initial expectations (Van Lente, 1993, p. 167; Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, pp. 216, 
222-223; Van Lente, 2000, p. 60; 2006, p. 215). This ultimately depends on the 
outcome expected from delaying a full redirection of support from incumbent to 
emerging technologies. Such a delay would appear to be in line with the logics 
of promise-requirement cycles if intended as a transitional requirement for 
executive public authorities to preserve their reputation in the eyes of current 
and prospective technology innovators. By preserving their credibility among 
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these latter, executive public authorities would preserve the effectiveness of 
their technology policies in stimulating techno-scientific advancement in 
emerging technologies. By contrast, the logics of promise-requirement cycles 
would appear to be contradicted if such a delay is only expected to consolidate 
a socio-technical regime of incumbent technologies locking-out emerging 
technologies. 
 
 
2. Public authorities, policy-promises and reputational stakes 
 
This section discusses how public authorities’ reputational stakes may be 
linked, through their policy-promises, to techno-scientific advancement. Within 
the sociology of expectations, the way in which public authorities relate their 
reputational stakes to their policy-promises is an overlooked issue. In the next 
section, I briefly summarise the insights on reputation provided by the sociology 
of expectations. 
 
2.1 Insights from the sociology of expectations 
 
In a promise-requirement cycle, when technological expectations have become 
increasingly shared, technology innovators are held responsible for their 
practical fulfilment by “others” willing to give political-financial support, such as 
public authorities. Conversely, these latter are called to provide support. If 
technological expectations are fulfilled, the promise-requirement cycle keeps 
mobilising resources towards techno-scientific advances. If technological 
expectations are unfulfilled, however, technology innovators are blamed for their 
practical failure, and the “others” may redirect support (Van Lente, 1993, p. 167; 
Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, p. 216; Van Lente, 2000, p. 60). 
 
Especially in the early stages of technological development, it is important for 
technology innovators to induce relevant actors, such as investors or public 
authorities, to invest resources in their technology. However, in doing so, they 
tend to optimistically inflate their statements of expectations (Borup et al., 2006, 
p. 289). Hype is not always the result of involuntary and genuine over-optimism. 
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Technology innovators may also voluntarily hype their statements for strategic 
reasons – e.g. to catch the attention of “(financial) sponsors” (Geels & Smit, 
2000, p. 881).  
 
The optimistic “noise” created by technology innovators poses threats. By 
involuntarily or voluntarily hyping statements, technology innovators may cause 
disappointments as a result of an excessive mismatch between past 
expectations and ex-post perceptions of actual developments. Overoptimistic 
“expectations and the frequent disappointments to which they lead are 
accompanied by serious costs in terms of reputations, misallocated resources 
and investment” (Borup et al., 2006, p. 289). These costs concern both the 
technology innovators who make such statements (Brown, 2003, p. 6; Brown & 
Michael, 2003, p. 9) and the public authorities that endorse them: “… in the 
context of large governmental programs and initiatives, while both public and 
private sectors have an obligation to justify decisions and investments, this is far 
more pressing for public sector legitimacy” (Borup et al., 2006, p. 295). 
 
Within the sociology of expectations, reputation appears then to be 
conceptualised as a sort of deterrent for the enunciation and/or endorsement of 
strategically hyped and/or genuinely overoptimistic expectations as these may 
lead to misallocations of resources and reputational damage. By extension, 
public authorities should be adverse to the risk of endorsing overoptimistic 
expectations because they are worried about the negative implications of 
disappointments.  
 
In the next section, I relate the different deployment of expectations of UK public 
authorities to their reputational stakes in UK biofuel policy. Drawing on my 
observations, I analytically distinguish public authorities with executive roles in 
technology policy from those with other policy remits, as their reputational 
stakes in promise-requirement cycles differ accordingly.  
 
2.2 Reinterpreting public authorities’ disagreements in UK biofuel policy 
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Disagreements between the RCEP, EFRAC, the EAC and the UK Government 
can be related to their different reputational stakes in promise-requirement 
cycles.  
 
Acting as policy advisers/monitors, the reputation of the RCEP, EFRAC and the 
EAC were dependent on pursuing ultimate policy goals (e.g. sustainability) and 
holding other public authorities accountable for doing so – in this case, the UK 
Government’s responsibility towards Parliament and taxpayers – at least in 
principle (House of Commons Information Office [HoC IO], 2009). By contrast, 
the UK Government – as a public authority in charge of executive roles in 
technology-policy – had multiple reputational stakes relating to the biofuel 
industry, the EU, the UK Parliament and UK taxpayers – at least in principle. 
Thus, while the Royal Commission and Parliamentary Select Committees could 
not commit themselves to policy-promises of support, the UK Government did 
and was held directly responsible for them.  
 
Those different responsibilities partly explain the sharp disagreements between 
the UK Government and the RCEP over sustainable transport policies and 
between the UK Government and EFRAC and the EAC over biofuel policy. The 
RCEP insisted on an environmentally minded intervention in road transport 
policy, regardless of the implications for the industry and the UK Government. 
EFRAC and the EAC were not worried about the implications of a policy-
moratorium on the incumbent first-generation biofuel industry and on the UK 
Government, to the point that they would let that industry collapse. By contrast, 
the UK Government always maintained a cautious and pragmatic approach, 
mindful of the consequences for its reputation of not fulfilling its policy-promises 
of support, especially those towards technology innovators. 
 
Summing up, not all public authorities relate their reputational stakes to 
promise-requirement cycles in the same way. Through their policy-promises, 
public authorities with executive roles link their reputational stakes not only to 
taxpayers as a whole, but also and in particular to technology innovators. By 
contrast, public authorities with other remits appear less concerned about 
reversals of policy-promises and the related consequences for technology 
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innovators. In the next section, I propose a conceptualisation of how executive 
public authorities relate their policy-promises to their reputational stakes when 
dealing with a policy-promise lock-in, by means of a simplified analytical model. 
 
2.3 Executive public authorities: policy-promise lock-in 
 
Executive public authorities may be conceptualised as managing a double 
identity of selector of expectations and stakeholder in technologies. Such a 
double identity implies two forms of reputation: as selector – among all 
taxpayers, and as stakeholder – among technology innovators.  
 
Graph 3: executive public authorities in technology policy: double 
identity 
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Executive public authorities need to safeguard a reputation as a competent 
selector of expectations to convince all taxpayers of the legitimacy of their 
policy-promises – at least in principle (Modernisation Committee, 2006, pp. 5, 
11, 12, 17). Intuitively, their responsibility as selectors would further increase 
whenever they promised support in the form of direct investments of public 
resources. In such a case, executive public authorities would become 
answerable to taxpayers about whether public resources have been directed to 
appropriate techno-scientific developments. 
 
Executive public authorities also need to safeguard a reputation as a reliable 
stakeholder in the eyes of technology innovators in order to preserve the 
effectiveness of their technology policies in mobilising them. This linkage 
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between reputational stakes and technology policy effectiveness thus prompts 
and/or provides justifications for executive public authorities to maintain their 
previous policy-promises to technology innovators. The underlying rationale 
predicts that if executive public authorities withdraw the support they have 
promised with their previous policies – without first offering technology 
innovators a way to recover their initial investments – these latter may withdraw 
investments from current technology policies, as well as refuse to engage in 
future technology policies.  
 
In a policy-promise lock-in, the reputation as stakeholder is related to techno-
scientific advancement across technological niches. More specifically, the 
credibility of executive public authorities among technology innovators of 
incumbent and controversial technological niches, is linked to the effectiveness 
of future technology policies in mobilising current and prospective technology 
innovators into niches of preferable, emerging technologies.  
 
The UK Government in particular argued that if it withdrew support from 
incumbent technology innovators in first-generation biofuels, current and 
prospective investors would have been discouraged from investing in emerging 
second-generation biofuels.  
 
When dealing with a policy-promise lock-in, executive public authorities may 
struggle to balance their double reputation. Having become controversial, 
previous policy-promises made to incumbent technologies place executive 
public authorities in a dilemma about whether to risk their reputation as selector 
or their reputation as stakeholder (see Graph 4). By immediately implementing 
changes to controversial policy-promises, executive public authorities would 
secure their reputation as a selector among taxpayers as a whole. However, by 
doing so, they would risk compromising their credibility among technology 
innovators. By delaying changes to controversial policy-promises, executive 
public authorities would preserve their reputation as stakeholders, and thus their 
ability to mobilise technology innovators towards – revised – future technology 
policies. However, by doing so, executive public authorities would risk losing 
legitimacy among the rest of the taxpayers. Which course of action is 
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considered right in the future will depend on whether expectations for emerging, 
preferable technologies are eventually perceived as fulfilled or failed.  
 
The UK Government opted to delay changes to previous policy-promises to 
incumbent biofuel suppliers, despite the controversy over first-generation 
biofuels. By doing so, it preserved its reputation as a stakeholder, but risked its 
reputation as a selector by relying on the future fulfilment of expectations on 
second-generation biofuels. 
 
Graph 4: policy dilemma: controversial, incumbent technologies versus 
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2.4. Reflections on policy-promises 
  
The distinction between “technological promises” and “policy-promises” helps 
better understand how executive public authorities relate their policy 
commitments to their reputational stakes in technology policy. As technology 
promises, policy-promises may be viewed as simultaneously performative, 
promises on future commitments and strategic resources. 
 
When viewed as performative, previous policy-promises may shape executive 
public authorities’ beliefs about their own responsibilities and funding priorities 
towards techno-scientific advancement; for instance, by inducing them to 
believe that they are in a policy-promise lock-in. When this is the case, previous 
policy-promises would induce executive public authorities to preserve policies 
regarding incumbent technologies, even when these have become 
controversial, in order to allow the fulfilment of techno-expectations on 
preferable emerging technologies. In terms of temporal dynamics then, techno-
expectations may combine with policy-promises and create patterns into which 
not only technology innovators, but also public authorities “may be locked” (Van 
Lente & Rip, 1998a, p. 217). 
 
When viewed as promises on future commitments, policy-promises generate 
accountability, especially for public authorities with executive roles in technology 
policy. These are those primarily held responsible for missing or misallocated 
policy-promises of support based on what are perceived as mistaken or biased 
choices of expectations. By contrast, public authorities with different policy 
remits seem less concerned about reversing their previous endorsements of 
expectations, and about the consequences that policy-promise reversals may 
entail for technology innovators. In terms of spatial dynamics then, policy-
promises generate more accountability for public authorities with executive roles 
than those with different policy remits. Arguably, “policy-promises of support” 
generate more accountability than other types of policy-promise – e.g. promises 
not to change or introduce regulations – as they directly affect public finances. 
The accountability of public authorities, as generated by their policy-promises, 
also differs from that of technology innovators, which are instead directly 
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affected by and held responsible for the practical fulfilment of the techno-
expectations they promote (Van Lente, 1993, p. 167; Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, 
p. 216; Van Lente, 2000, p. 60).  
 
When viewed as strategic resources, controversial previous policy-promises 
may be strategically linked to techno-scientific advancement as a means to 
preserve their credibility in the eyes of technology innovators, and the legitimacy 
of their policy-promises in the eyes of the rest of taxpayers – i.e. a policy-
promise lock-in may be simply a strategic creation. Executive public authorities 
dealing with a policy-promise lock-in may endorse and promote expectations for 
emerging technologies accordingly. A policy-promise lock-in would then be one 
possible situation in which executive public authorities appear to act as 
“promise champions” for a technological field – as previously observed in other 
technology policy contexts (Van Lente, 1993, p. 160; Van Lente & Rip, 1998b, 
pp. 231-232). However, in deploying expectations and policy-promises, their 
primary imperatives seem to be protecting their reputation in technology policy, 
avoiding responsibility for any disappointment about technological development 
and promoting technology development per se. This use differs from that of 
technology innovators, who usually promote techno-optimistic expectations 
primarily to attract resources and/or policy support for the technologies on 
whose development they depend (Van Lente, 1993, pp. 185, 190; Geels & Smit, 
2000, p. 882). 
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PART 2 
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Chapter 5 – Cross-sectional Analysis 
 
 
Introduction  
 
This is the empirical chapter of the cross-sectional analysis. This analysis 
focuses on the invitation document, participants’ responses and summaries of 
responses of the consultation on amending the 2009 Order on the Renewable 
Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO) launched by the Department for Transport 
(DfT) on the 15th October 2008 in the name of the UK Government.  
 
Evidence from the invitation document, participants’ responses and summaries 
of responses is reported in separate sections to compare the UK Government’s 
expectations ex-ante and ex-post consultation. Evidence from consultation 
responses is further subdivided into actor categories to emphasise the contrast 
between the visions and views of the different types of actor participating in the 
consultation. Section 1 reports evidence from the invitation document. Section 2 
reports evidence from the participants’ responses. Section 3 reports evidence 
from the summaries of responses. 
 
 
1. The UK Government: the invitation document 
 
In the invitation document, the UK Government outlined the proposals under 
consultation, and the arguments against and in favour of each proposal. It also 
provided a definition of its own responsibilities in biofuel policy, as the next 
section reports. 
 
1.1 The UK Government’s responsibilities in technology policy 
 
The UK Government justified its own intervention in biofuel policy as a 
correction of a market failure. A market failure occurs whenever “the free market 
acts in a way which does not maximise society’s welfare” – e.g. when it 
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generates negative externalities such as GHG emissions, which are causing 
climate change (DfT, 2008a, p. 45). Whenever “there is no incentive for the free 
market to rectify [such negative externalities] … it may be appropriate for public 
policy to do so through government intervention in the market” (DfT, 2008a, p. 
45).  
 
Endorsing the Stern Review, the UK Government agreed on the importance of 
taking action on three fronts, namely: (i) creating a common carbon price to 
reflect the marginal damage of greenhouse gas emissions; (ii) promoting a shift 
towards low-carbon technologies; and (iii) removing barriers to behaviour 
change. As specified by the UK Government, the RTFO fit the second front, 
given its aim to incentivise innovation and the development of lower-cost, low-
carbon technology in transport. 
 
Emerging technologies, in general, “take considerable time to develop in terms 
of their functionality, efficiency and affordability as well as their public 
acceptability” (DfT, 2008a, p. 45), thereby requiring the policy intervention of the 
government. In particular: 
 
“One reason for the delay in such technologies entering the market can 
be unease over the level of risk in investment decisions with uncertain 
outcomes and payback periods. If the government can intervene in the 
market to reduce these uncertainties, possibly through regulations which 
create a minimum level of demand, then it would be reasonable to expect 
investment to increase.” (DfT, 2008a, p. 45) 
 
According to the UK Government, its own responsibility in biofuel policy would 
then be “maximising society’s welfare” by providing a protected space to 
emerging biofuel technologies – i.e. a policy intervention meant to correct the 
failure of the market in creating the right conditions for investments in emerging 
biofuels to increase. 
 
1.2 The consultation proposals 
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The consultation consisted of two parts. The first proposed policy changes 
directly affecting short-term support for producers of incumbent first-generation 
biofuels. The second part contemplated policy changes affecting long-term 
support to potential investors in second-generation biofuels and related to the 
future transposition of two upcoming European Directives in UK law. In the 
following sections, I report the arguments against and in favour of each 
proposal as provided by the UK Government in the invitation document of the 
consultation. 
 
1.1.1 Part 1 – Future levels under the RTFO 
 
The first part of the consultation sought views on the UK Government’s proposal 
to slow down support to currently available first-generation biofuels – i.e. the 
annual rates of the RTFO – in line with the Gallagher Review’s 
recommendations43 (DfT, 2008a, p. 5). In the introduction of the invitation 
document, the UK Government explained that: 
 
“New scientific evidence has emerged … which suggests that the 
greenhouse gas savings of biofuels may have been overestimated and 
there is a risk that their production could in some cases lead to increases 
in emissions rather than reducing them. Concerns have also been 
expressed about some of the wider environmental and social impacts of 
biofuels, including their impact on food prices. These concerns led the 
Government to commission a major review of the indirect effects of 
biofuel production in February 2008. The review was led by Professor 
Gallagher, Chair of the Renewable Fuels Agency.” (DfT, 2008a, pp. 7-8) 
 
The UK Government – via the then Secretary of State for Transport (BBC 
News, 2008b) – addressed the UK Parliament on the 7th July 2008 to report on 
the findings of the Gallagher Review. Endorsing the review’s conclusions, the 
                                            
43
 The Gallagher Review recommended the UK Government to slow down the RTFO rates to a 
lower annual increase rate of 0.5% per annum to reach 5% in 2013/14, instead of 2010/11, as 
originally planned. Such a slowdown was proposed to prevent a large-scale development of 
biofuels before assurance mechanisms were enforced and demonstrated to be effective in 
directing biofuel production on marginal or idle land (DfT, 2008e, Section 2; RFA, 2008a, p. 64). 
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UK Government stated “that there was a need for the Government’s support for 
biofuels to proceed with caution until the evidence is clearer about the wider 
environmental and social effects of biofuels” (DfT, 2008a, pp. 7-8). It also 
announced the future launch of a public consultation on slowing down the rate 
of increase in the RTFO, as recommended by the review. The first part of the 
consultation here analysed is the fulfilment of that commitment (DfT, 2008a, pp. 
7-8). 
 
Mirroring the options analysed in the Gallagher Review, part 1 of the 
consultation allowed participants to choose among: leaving the RTFO’s rates 
unchanged (Option 1), “freezing” the RTFO at the current level of 2.5% biofuel 
inclusion (Option 2), or slowing down the RTFO’s rates in line with the 
recommendations of the Gallagher Review (Option 3). The UK Government 
excluded a priory a total moratorium on biofuel policy, again in line with the 
Gallagher Review’s recommendations.  
 
The invitation document listed the main arguments pro and against each of the 
above options. Having contemplated “both sides of the argument”, the UK 
Government reconfirmed previous announcements about its intention to slow 
down the RTFO’s targets “because it best meets both the sustainability 
concerns and the need for a future framework for producers and to encourage 
investment” (DfT, 2008a, p. 14). Such a “cautious approach strikes the right 
balance between the need to address these risks and the need for a 
sustainable biofuel industry” (DfT, 2008a, p. 13). 
 
The arguments against a freezing or a slowdown of the RTFO focused on the 
damages such measures would cause to the biofuel industry’s ability to 
innovate. Either freezing or slowing down the RTFO would mean altering it only 
one year after its launch, thus contradicting one of its primary purposes, that is, 
“to give long-term certainty to the oil and biofuel industries” (DfT, 2008a, p. 10). 
In line with the conclusions of the Gallagher Review, freezing or, worse, 
withdrawing the RTFO “could reduce the ability of the biofuel industry to invest 
in new technologies or transform the sourcing of its feedstock to the more 
sustainable supplies necessary to create a truly sustainable industry. [A 
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moratorium or freezing could, therefore,] … make it significantly more difficult 
for the potential of biofuels to be realised … [by increasing the] risk [of having 
an] industry … less prepared to invest in new technologies or source feedstock 
that does not cause land-use change” (DfT, 2008a, p. 12). That said, in view of 
the upcoming EU Directives, “It could … be argued that it is better to defer any 
major changes to obligation levels to incorporate them with other major changes 
that will be required anyway in order to implement the Directive” (DfT, 2008a, p. 
10). This would reduce uncertainty for the industry, while leaving open the 
possibility of “slowing down the target in 2010/11 in the light of any future 
emerging evidence about the environmental effects of biofuel production” (DfT, 
2008a, p. 10).  
 
The arguments in favour of a freezing or a slowdown of the RTFO focused on 
the “risk … [of] possible adverse environmental outcomes of uncontrolled 
biofuel production [as] identified in the Gallagher review” (DfT, 2008a, p. 11). 
The current design of the RTFO may “lead to uncontrolled expansion and 
unsustainable changes in land use, such as the destruction of the rainforest to 
make way for the production of crops, which could increase emissions and 
impact upon biodiversity” (DfT, 2008a, p. 11). As currently set, RTFO levels 
may “put too much strain on available land and feedstock supply and have 
adverse effects including, in the absence of appropriate, agreed and 
enforceable sustainability criteria, a risk of perversely increasing greenhouse 
gas emissions” (DfT, 2008a, p. 11). Therefore, “The existing obligation levels do 
not adequately reflect the possible risks of biofuel production and in particular 
the indirect impacts” (DfT, 2008a, p. 11). This considered, and in line with the 
recommendations of the Gallagher Review, “a slower rate of increase [of 
obligation levels – at least,] until the evidence is clearer about the wider 
environmental and social effects of biofuels [–] … will allow more time to 
develop adequate controls to address displacement effects and to reduce these 
risks” (DfT, 2008a, p. 11). Furthermore, “proceeding from 2.5% to 5% in only 
three years could lead to locking in more investment into unsustainable 
production”, as opposed to a slower increase (DfT, 2008a, p. 14). Whereas, the 
risk that “a slower increase in obligation levels might lead to a reduction in 
investment in advanced biofuel production processes … may in part be offset 
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by proposals under the draft Renewable Energy Directive to give double reward 
for biofuels from wastes and non food material etc.” (DfT, 2008a, pp. 10-14).  
 
1.1.2 Part 2 – Longer-term issues related to transposition of the European 
Directives 
 
The second part of the consultation sought views on how to improve support for 
second-generation biofuels and on the proposal of the European Commission 
(EC) to double reward second-generation biofuels to favour their development. 
 
At the time of the consultation, the drafts of the Renewable Energy Directive 
(RED) and the Fuel Quality Directive (FQD) were under negotiation (EC, 2007; 
2008). In those two drafts, the EC proposed new, higher targets44 requiring 
Member States to increase the share of biofuels or other renewable fuels over 
the total of transport fuels consumed by 2020 (EC, 2007, p. 8; 2008, p. 2). Both 
Directives were expected to be agreed by the end of 2008, thus requiring 
Member States to transpose them into national law by spring 2010 (DfT, 2008a, 
p. 9). As explained by the UK Government: 
 
“Part Two of this consultation document aims to help gather 
stakeholders’ views on issues that may need to be addressed when 
considering transposition of the European Directives into UK legislation. 
[However, i]t should be noted that the European Directives are currently 
being negotiated and, until they are adopted, it will be uncertain what 
                                            
44
 The drafts of the FQD and the RED were set to repeal the currently enforced 2003 EU 
Directive on Biofuels – once approved by the European Council and Parliament. The EC issued 
the FQD draft in January 2007, proposing the adoption of a binding target of 10% reduction in 
the life-cycle GHG emissions of road transport fuels between 2010 and 2020 (EC, 2007, p. 8). 
In March 2007, the EU Council gave instructions to the EC to produce a draft Directive including 
a new biofuel target of 10% per energy content by 2020 of the total consumption of transport 
fuels. This target was proposed as binding, and subject to pre-conditions, among them the 
sustainability of biofuels submitted and the availability of second-generation biofuels (EU 
Council, 2007, p. 21). Abiding by the indications of the EU Council, the EC issued the RED draft 
in January 2008, which included the new target (EC, 2008, p. 2). Unlike the EU Council’s 
proposal, the European Commission’s proposal did not include the pre-condition on the 
availability of second-generation biofuels (EC, 2008, p. 13). The RED Directive further deviated 
from the EU Council’s proposal by referring the target to “energy from renewable sources in 
transport” in general, and not biofuels alone (EU, 2009RED, p. 18). Despite this change in 
reference, the target was expected implicitly (EU, 2009RED, p. 18) or explicitly (DECC, 2009a, 
p. 47; DfT, 2010, p. 2) to be met mostly through biofuels. 
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flexibility Member States will have in implementing them. It is possible 
that not all of the matters raised in Part Two will be matters for the 
discretion of the Government. Nevertheless it seems appropriate to 
consult at this stage, before we know the final text of the Directives, 
because there will be very little time to develop the implementation 
measures for April 2010.” (DfT, 2008a, pp. 8-9) 
 
In the introduction of the invitation document, the UK Government pointed out 
that the RED’s and FQD’s renewable fuel targets were most likely going to be 
met entirely by biofuels as “Other renewables, such as hydrogen and renewable 
electricity in electric cars … are likely to only make a relatively small contribution 
in the foreseeable future” (DfT, 2008a, p. 9). Therefore, the two proposed EU 
Directives45 “will have critical implications for the future levels of biofuels” (DfT, 
2008a, p. 8). 
 
Reconfirming the statement to Parliament of the 7th July 2008 – from the then 
Secretary of State for Transport (BBC News, 2008b), the UK Government 
stated that the EU target of 10% renewable transport fuels by 2020 could 
remain an overall objective, although subject to clear conditions – i.e. that “the 
EU-level [biofuels] sustainability criteria currently being negotiated must address 
indirect, as well as direct, effects on land use”; and that “the 10 per cent target 
must be subject to rigorous review in the light of emerging evidence [on the 
wider environmental and social impacts of biofuels], so that we can make an 
informed decision at EU level” (DfT, 2008a, p. 20). 
 
                                            
45
 The draft of the RED initially proposed a target of 10% per energy content by 2020 for 
biofuels – equivalent to 13% per volume (DfT, 2008a, p. 9). The draft of the FQD initially 
proposed a 10% reduction in the lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions of road transport fuels 
between 2010 and 2020. This target would have been equivalent to about a 20% inclusion of 
biofuels on total transport road supply – assuming that only biofuels were used to meet the 
target and those biofuels delivering around 50% GHG savings on average (DfT, 2008a, p. 9). 
Therefore, this target would have required an even bigger biofuel inclusion than the one 
proposed in the draft of the RED. The target in the draft of the FQD was eventually reduced 
from 10% to 6% by the 2009 Fuel Quality Directive (EU, 2009FQ). In this way, it has been 
realigned with the target of the draft of the RED, which eventually referred to all renewable 
transport fuels (i.e. not only to biofuels) and reconfirmed at 10% per energy content by the 2009 
Renewable Energy Directive (EU, 2009RED). 
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The draft of the RED included a proposal to double reward biofuels from non-
food sources in order to promote their development. When commenting on this 
proposal, the UK Government declared itself “keen to encourage the 
development of renewable transport fuels which offer high level of carbon 
savings with minimum adverse environmental impacts” (DfT, 2008a, p. 22). 
Accordingly, it agreed on the aim “to target support on the development of lower 
carbon and other so called ‘second generation’ biofuels” (DfT, 2008a, p. 22) 
though “the majority of these advanced processes have not yet reached a 
commercial scale” (DfT, 2008a, p. 22). The UK Government associated such a 
delay with “the large capital costs that may be required [to develop second-
generation biofuels] and which could take considerable time to recoup in 
comparison with cheaper ‘first’ generation alternatives” (DfT, 2008a, p. 22). That 
said, it maintained that, with the “right incentives, it is possible that the 
development of second generation biofuels will be encouraged” (DfT, 2008a, p. 
22). 
 
The UK Government then recalled its announcement of the 21st June 2007 
about its two aims to reward biofuels under the RTFO “in accordance with the 
carbon saving that they offer from April 2010”46 and “only if the feedstocks from 
which they are produced meet appropriate sustainability standards from April 
2011” (DfT, 2008a, p. 25). It reconfirmed that rewarding biofuels according to 
their carbon savings was “still” its aim and that it would advance this option in 
the ongoing negotiations at the EU level. Nevertheless, it specified that the 
enforcement of these measures was subject to compatibility with the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, EU Technical Standards requirements and the 
European Commission’s future reviews of EU biofuel policy. Then, mentioning 
the Gallagher Review, it also pointed out that “current methodologies do not 
adequately take into account the indirect greenhouse gas consequences” (DfT, 
2008a, p. 25). Nevertheless, the proposal of the forthcoming RED “will help to 
meet the first aim” by imposing minimum sustainability standards (DfT, 2008a, 
p. 25). Meanwhile, the proposal of the forthcoming FQD “will provide another 
                                            
46
 By rewarding biofuels according to their GHG emission saving performances, second-
generation biofuels – expected to generate greater GHG emission savings – would be 
automatically advantaged over first-generation biofuels. 
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mechanism for rewarding biofuels in accordance with their greenhouse gas 
savings” (DfT, 2008a, p. 25). On rewarding biofuels only produced from certified 
feedstock from April 2011, the UK Government explained that the matter “has 
now been overtaken by proposals in the RED for minimum sustainability 
standards”, defining the situation as “an example of an issue where we are 
constrained by the requirements of the Renewable Energy Directive” (DfT, 
2008a, p. 25). 
 
 
2. Consultation participants: the responses 
 
This section reports the statements of expectations of the consultation 
participants as extracted from their responses. Participants are subdivided per 
type into ten subsections (Graph 5) – according to the classification explained in 
Chapter 2 (Table 1). 
 
Graph 5: consultation participants by type  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: 
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Proximity to the centre emphasises the degree of involvement of the types of 
participant with biofuel technologies and biofuel policy. “Industry associations” 
are portrayed with colour gradations reflecting their links with the industries 
represented. “Non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs)” are portrayed with 
colour gradations reflecting their focus on different environmental, 
administrative, market issues.  
 
Note that my classification includes 90 respondents (not 89):  
According to the summaries of responses, this consultation collected 89 
responses in total, among which 22 from “members of the public” (see also 
Chapter 2 – Table 1). In their annexes, the summaries of responses list the 
names of 68 organisations as respondents. There must therefore be a 
mistake in the DfT’s classification as these numbers do not add up (DfT, 
2009c, Annex A; 2009d, Annex A).  
 
Responses not available for analysis: 
The DfT omitted the response of a biofuel producer – Good Fuel Cooperative 
& Golden Fuels – and the response of an industry association representing 
the bus, coach and light rail industries – the Confederation of Passenger 
Transport. Also unavailable for this research are the twenty-two responses 
from the “members of the public” who participated in the consultation. 
However, according to the summaries of responses, the members of the 
public submitted responses of identical content or very similar to those 
submitted by some NGOs. 
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1. Biofuel producers 
 
“Biofuel producers” varied in size and type of biofuel produced. In the 
2008/2009 obligation year, 38 biofuel-only producers submitted their biofuels 
under the RTFO (RFA, 2010, p. 24). Five47 of these participated in the 
consultation (Argent, 2008; Convert2Green, 2008; Gasrec Ltd, 2008; Good Fuel 
Co-operative & Golden Fuels, 2008; Verdant Fuel Ltd, 2008). Besides these, 
seven other biofuel producers participated. Two were investing on large-scale 
bioethanol plants in the UK (Ensus, 2008; Vireol, 2008). Two were foreign 
producers of biodiesel (Daka Biodiesel, 2008; Neste Oil, 2008). One was a 
sugar producer (British Sugar, 2008), owning the only operational bioethanol 
plant in the UK at that time. One was a producer of electricity from biomass 
(Helius Energy, 2008). One was a prospective producer of second-generation 
biofuels (Energexia, 2008).  
 
All biofuel producers were disappointed about current biofuel policy and all, 
except one (Verdant Fuel Ltd, 2008), strongly criticised the slowdown proposal. 
In the legal text of the RTFO, there was a drafting error in the definition of 
transport fossil fuels used to calculate the amount of biofuels that obligated 
suppliers had to supply in order to satisfy obligation levels (RFA, 2010, pp. 6, 
12). A number of biofuel producers believed that this error had substantially 
reduced the demand of biofuels from obligated suppliers (British Sugar, 2008, p. 
1; Convert2Green, 2008, p. 1; Ensus, 2008, p. 6). Some even blamed it 
responsible for the collapse of the certification market in the first obligation year 
(Argent, 2008, p. 2; Convert2Green, 2008, p. 4). Defining it as “by far the 
gravest threat to the continued existence of the industry in UK of all”, a biofuel 
producer pointed out that the drafting error was affecting biofuel producers far 
more than any other part of the supply chain (Argent, 2008, pp. 2, 4).  
 
Biofuel producers were crucially dependent on UK biofuel policy for their own 
survival. That fact was reflected in their responses. A number of them warned 
                                            
47
 The DfT did not provide a response from the biofuel producer – Good Fuel Cooperative & 
Golden Fuels 
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the UK Government about the serious consequences for the UK based industry 
if actions to improve financial support were not taken in time (Argent, 2008, p. 4; 
Convert2Green, 2008, p. 2; Energexia, 2008, p. 1). The collapse of the RTFO 
certificate market, the competition with cheaper and subsidised biofuels from 
abroad and the financial crisis were already straining this small sized industry 
(Convert2Green, 2008, p. 1; Ensus, 2008, p. 7; RFA, 2010, pp. 6, 45, 46). 
Considering the situation, further uncertainty in future financial support was 
particularly unwelcome. Therefore, as one biofuel producer emphasised, it was 
“absolutely vital that the RTFO …[was made] an un-wavering and reliable 
Order” (Argent, 2008, p. 1).  
 
The majority of biofuel producers rejected both the slowdown and freezing 
options (Argent, 2008, p. 5; British Sugar, 2008, p. 2; Convert2Green, 2008, p. 
2; Ensus, 2008, p. 7; Gasrec Ltd, 2008, p. 1; Helius Energy, 2008, p. 2; Neste 
Oil, 2008, p. 1; Vireol, 2008, p. 12). For one of these, “a contraction of the UK 
biofuel market could have wider implications negative for investor confidence in 
renewable technologies and this Government’s commitment to its own 2020 
and [2]050 targets for renewable energy and climate change mitigation” (Helius 
Energy, 2008, p. 2). Furthermore, “reducing short-term demand for biofuels is 
likely to prevent investment in UK biofuel production, resulting in a policy which 
is dependent on imported fuels which may have different carbon reduction 
properties and which reduces UK fuel security in this area” (Helius Energy, 
2008, p. 2). Another biofuel producer explained that any reduction of the RTFO 
would, “in turn, send signals to investors in biofuels that the UK is not a suitable 
place to invest in” (Vireol, 2008, p. 2). More specifically, a “slowdown will cause 
the UK to export its ability to meet the new Renewable Energy Directive (RED) 
targets on a sustainable basis, to third country producers” (Vireol, 2008, p. 2). 
Such a “perverse outcome” would occur “at the very time when the UK is in the 
grip of a recession and ‘green collar’ jobs are touted as part of the solution” 
(Vireol, 2008, p. 2). 
 
Instead of slowing down or freezing the RTFO, the majority of biofuel producers 
sustained that UK domestic targets should be harmonised with the RED’s 10% 
target by 2020 (British Sugar, 2008, p. 2; Gasrec Ltd, 2008, p. 1; Helius Energy, 
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2008, p. 2; Neste Oil, 2008, p. 2; Vireol, 2008, p. 2). Harmonising the RTFO 
with EU targets – as a biofuel producer stressed – was particularly relevant 
considering that the vast majority of the target would have to be met with 
biofuels (Vireol, 2008, p. 6). By contrast, any reduction in targets would reduce 
“the UK’s ability to meet the longer term 10 percent RED energy target”, as 
there would be “insufficient time to invest in [production] plant[s] to meet the 
volumes required” (Vireol, 2008, p. 12). Furthermore, it would make farmers 
“less able to drive the yield improvements that can deliver sustainable 
feedstocks” (Vireol, 2008, p. 12). Another biofuel producer explained that “to 
encourage investment, and to maximise the emissions reduction in the transport 
sector, it is important that the trajectory is linear between 2010 and 2020”48 
(British Sugar, 2008, p. 3). As pointed out by another biofuel producer, a 
reduction in targets “would [instead] give the UK one of the lowest biofuel 
targets in the EU in 2010 ... undermining the UK’s ability to inform and lead on 
sustainability issues in the EU and globally” (Ensus, 2008, p. 5). 
 
Many biofuel producers casted doubt on the Gallagher Review’s conclusions 
(British Sugar, 2008, p. 2; Ensus, 2008, pp. 5, 8; Helius Energy, 2008, p. 2; 
Verdant Fuel Ltd, 2008, p. 4). One of these objected that “subsequent events 
have shown the food concerns to be inconsequential and the risk of 
unsustainable biofuels in UK to be somewhat overstated” (Argent, 2008, p. 2). 
Another one observed that “much of the science and debate about indirect land 
use change is uncertain, with a number of respected academics criticising the 
key studies by Searchinger et al. and Fargione et al.,49 as well as expressing 
fundamental concerns with assumptions made in the Gallagher Review” (Helius 
Energy, 2008, p. 2). Another one pointed out that “many of the issues that 
provoked the Gallagher report have now abated”, since “biofuel production 
worldwide has continued to rise while food commodity prices have fallen 
substantially demonstrating that the primary impact on food production costs is 
energy not biofuel demand” (Verdant Fuel Ltd, 2008, p. 4). This biofuel producer 
also optimistically sustained that “indirect land use issues can be managed 
within the existing policy framework by taking a much stricter approach to 
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 Academic studies raising the issue of the indirect effect of first generation biofuels. 
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unknown sourcing of feedstocks” (Verdant Fuel Ltd, 2008, p. 4). Another biofuel 
producer contended that “significant falls in food commodity prices since July 
make it clear that rising biofuel production did not contribute significantly to 
recent food price increases. In addition, evidence provided to the Gallagher 
review, together with initial results of the RTFO’s carbon and sustainability 
reporting demonstrate that UK-supplied biofuels currently offer better 
greenhouse gas savings and meet a higher proportion of the environmental 
and/or social criteria (as defined under the RTFO) than other sources of biofuel” 
(Ensus, 2008, p. 5). Consequently “a target slowdown will adversely affect UK 
investment in such ‘Good biofuels’ [ i.e. UK domestic biofuels] - both in the short 
term due to lower target levels, and in the longer term due to the perception of 
policy risk in this area” (Ensus, 2008, p. 5). 
 
A case in point was a producer of pure plant oil from rapeseed. Producing a bio-
oil, which required engine modifications in vehicles and could not be directly 
blended into petrol and diesel, this biofuel producer was the only one backing 
the slowdown proposal. It sustained that “blending biofuels is not the only way 
to use existing biofuel feedstocks” (Verdant Fuel Ltd, 2008, p. 2), and that by 
using its rapeseed “Pure Plant Oil” instead of common biodiesel, it could be 
possible to achieve the same carbon abatements as originally planned, with a 
reduced need for land for feedstock production as compared to conventional 
biodiesel. This would provide time to solve the sustainability and land-use-
change issues, while attaining the same results in carbon abatement. Thus, the 
UK Government should promote the conversion of engines to its bio-oil rather 
than going ahead by blending biodiesel in transport diesel (Verdant Fuel Ltd, 
2008, p. 2). Another case in point was a producer of biodiesel, which only 
replied to one consultation question about the proposal to exclude animal fat 
(tallow) from the list of sustainable feedstocks for biofuels – i.e. question 19 
(Daka Biodiesel, 2008). This biofuel producer “strongly disagree[d] with this 
course proposed by the UK Government, which looks like a strong 
discrimination of tallow as a feedstock for biofuel production” (Daka Biodiesel, 
2008, p. 1). It contended instead that “discriminating action towards animal fat 
for biofuel production, will harm the whole agricultural sector” (Daka Biodiesel, 
2008, p. 1). 
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Biofuel producers tended to stress the importance of introducing a rigorous and 
mandatory system of sustainability standards. Such a system would have made 
their biofuels more attractive to obligated suppliers – since the feedstock used 
by the most of them automatically met sustainability standards. In favour of 
measures supporting advanced biofuel technologies, this group expressed 
anyhow concerns over the unconditional preference of the EU and the UK 
Government for second-generation biofuels. Some biofuel producers reminded 
that the feedstocks they used for their biofuels (mostly organic wastes) ensured 
substantial GHG savings, even though their technologies were considered as 
first generation. Blamed as “undefined and misleading” by one of them (Argent, 
2008, p. 7), the label second-generation was feared as threatening future 
support to their first-generation biofuels. Besides, as pointed out by another 
biofuel producer, “it is not entirely clear that versus some current technologies 
that the promotion of ‘second generation’ will deliver the policy outcomes 
expected. The Gallagher Review points out that, depending on where the 
feedstocks are grown for ‘second generation’, can have a significant impact of 
the GHG savings of that fuel. All of this needs to be properly evaluated before 
real encouragement to ‘second generation’ can and should take place” (Vireol, 
2008, p. 18). 
 
On the issue of how to improve support second-generation biofuels, biofuel 
producers agreed on avoiding discriminating biofuels on the basis unclear 
classifications of technologies into generations. The rewarding system should 
instead ensure neutrality by rewarding biofuels according to their performances 
in reducing GHG emissions (Argent, 2008, p. 7; British Sugar, 2008, p. 8; 
Energexia, 2008, p. 4; Ensus, 2008, p. 6; Gasrec Ltd, 2008, p. 2; Neste Oil, 
2008, p. 5; Vireol, 2008, p. 18). Furthermore, the double reward is “a very blunt 
policy instrument” – as a biofuel producer pointed out (Vireol, 2008, p. 18). As 
specified by another biofuel producer, double rewarding second-generation 
biofuels would be acceptable “as long as it is in a level technology playing 
field, with technology- and feedstock-neutral support measures in the 
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form of GHG incentives that fully account for ILUC effects and recognise the 
contribution to other sectors through co-products”50 (Ensus, 2008, p. 6).  
 
A case in point was a biofuel producer planning “to introduce a 2nd Generation 
Biofuels process into the UK that will convert biomass into renewable diesel” 
(Energexia, 2008, p. 1). This prospective producer of second-generation 
biofuels stated that the double reward, “whilst crude”, approximately reflected 
the GHG savings provided by its process compared to most first-generation 
technologies. However, it further specified that it could not say “if the same can 
be said of all 2nd Generation processes and therefore a rewards mechanism 
based on GHG savings would be fairer” (Energexia, 2008, p. 4). 
 
2. Obligated suppliers 
 
For the 2008/2009 obligation year, the RFA identified a total of fourteen 
obligated suppliers (RFA, 2010, pp. 18-24), seven of which participated in the 
consultation (British Petroleum [BP], 2008; Chevron, 2008; Conoco Phillips, 
2008; Greenergy, 2008; Ineos, 2008; Mabanaft, 2008; Shell, 2008). 
 
Three obligated suppliers opposed both the slowdown and the freezing options, 
and advocated maintaining UK biofuel policy as previously set (BP, 2008; 
Greenergy, 2008; Mabanaft, 2008). One of these three owned two operating 
large scale biodiesel plants in the UK and declared to supply “over a third of the 
[UK] biofuel market” (Greenergy, 2008, p. 1). Because of its “wide-ranging 
position in the market”, this obligated supplier considered itself “uniquely placed 
to be able to access the impact of the issues raised in the … consultation 
throughout the biofuel industry and UK transport fuel market” (Greenergy, 2008, 
p. 2). For this obligated supplier, “the RTFO has already been successful in 
delivering lower carbon emissions, promoting sustainable biofuels and 
increasing awareness of what is required to deliver further benefits within the 
supply chain” (Greenergy, 2008, p. 2). However, such “success is being 
undermined by the threat to lower the scheme’s obligation levels so early in its 
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development, particularly coming after the RTFO drafting error which has 
already reduced the requirement for biofuels” (Greenergy, 2008, p. 2). 
Therefore, “a clear priority is that the drafting error in the RTFO Order is put 
right” (Greenergy, 2008, p. 1). This obligated supplier further contended that 
either a freezing or a slowdown “would be imprudent and damaging to the UK’s 
ability to deliver sustainable low-carbon biofuels now and in the future” 
(Greenergy, 2008, p. 8). By implementing those measures, the UK Government 
would “risk damaging the credibility of the RTFO and future UK initiatives and 
diluting the positive impacts” (Greenergy, 2008, p. 8). As “biofuels have a vital 
role to play in helping the UK to meet its greenhouse gas (GHG) and renewable 
energy targets … the Government must maintain a stable regulatory and fiscal 
framework to encourage the necessary investment throughout the supply chain” 
(Greenergy, 2008, p. 2). The current financial crisis and the drafting error were 
already fuelling uncertainty in the market. Hence, “the only prudent route 
forward is to minimise the changes to the RTFO until the implementation of the 
Renewable Energy Directive (RED) and Fuel Quality Directive (FQD)” 
(Greenergy, 2008, p. 2).  
 
On the issue of sustainability standards, this obligated supplier endorsed “the 
UK Government’s concern about Indirect Land Use Change (iLUC) and in 
particular the potential impact that the reported carbon benefits of biofuels 
supplied may not be achieved in reality” (Greenergy, 2008, p. 3). Nevertheless, 
biofuels remained “an important tool for alleviating some of the structural 
challenges facing the world today”, while it was “important that the UK 
Government does not damage this important national and international resource 
through decisions taken on out of date or incomplete evidence” (Greenergy, 
2008, p. 11). This obligated supplier emphasised its record as “the first 
company to have biofuels sustainability criteria approved by the Renewable 
Fuels Agency (RFA)” to reinforce its claim that the introduction of its standards 
had “already led to improvements in the sustainability of the entire supply chain, 
[with] … a disproportionately positive impact not only on bioethanol supplied 
into the UK market but also, importantly on the sustainability of bioethanol, and 
indeed sugar, for non UK supply” (Greenergy, 2008, p. 1). After such premises, 
it casted doubt on the reliability of the evidence gathered by the Gallagher 
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Review. In particular, it recommended “caution against over reliance on early 
academic thinking, which in some cases has already been shown to be of 
limited worth” (Greenergy, 2008, p. 3). Furthermore, it pointed out that “the 
Gallagher Review was produced in a very short time, to meet a specific and 
limited brief in a ‘hot house’ politically charged period where there was general 
fear of commodity inflation” – which were no longer the case (Greenergy, 2008, 
p. 4).   
 
A second obligated supplier – at the time building a large scale bioethanol plant 
in the UK – declared to agree with the Gallagher Review’s conclusion that 
freezing the obligation is “not justified and indeed would be a counterproductive 
measure in terms of tackling road transport GHG emissions and improving 
supply diversification” (BP, 2008, p. 3). A freezing “would likely result in the 
deferment and cancellation of existing and future UK’s biofuels investments due 
to the resulting impact on investor confidence” (BP, 2008, p. 3). A number of 
“detrimental consequences” would follow. Firstly, the first-generation biofuel 
industry would fall and consequently with it an important “technological bridge to 
facilitate the development and introduction of advanced biofuels”. Secondly, 
R&D on biofuels would expatriate, with the UK loosing technological 
competitiveness in such an emerging sector. Thirdly, a “perceived withdrawal of 
the UK from the biofuel policy space would significantly weaken the UK’s future 
influence both at the European and global level”. Therefore, the current UK 
leadership role in setting up sustainability standards would be also lost. In 
addition to that, a biofuel policy freezing in the UK would only marginally reduce 
the international production of biofuels, while compromising the chance of the 
UK to positively influence the EU Directive on Renewable Energy (BP, 2008, p. 
3). Even a slowdown of biofuel targets was “felt” as an ineffective measure to 
mitigate biofuel indirect effects, particularly “at a European and Global level”. By 
contrast, it would have risked both damaging investor confidence, the future 
evolution of the UK biofuel sector and the eventual attainment of the 2020 10% 
target under the Renewable Energy Directive (BP, 2008, p. 2).  
 
The third obligated supplier complained that both a freezing and a slowdown 
would “penalise those companies that have made efforts to adopt the original 
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RTFO targets and provide uncertainty to the UK industry” (Mabanaft, 2008, p. 
1). Whereas, “the focus now should be on the adoption of the RED and 
adapting our current systems to accommodate it” (Mabanaft, 2008, p. 1). 
 
By contrast, the other four obligated suppliers endorsed the UK Government’s 
argument that a slowdown of biofuel targets was striking the right balance in 
between ensuring the survival of a sustainable industry, while addressing 
sustainability concerns (Chevron, 2008; Conoco Phillips, 2008; Ineos, 2008; 
Shell, 2008). Among these four, one in particular emphasised that it was 
supporting “existing and planned mandates on the condition that they recognise 
GHG performance, social and environmental criteria as well as supply feasibility 
factors” (Shell, 2008, p. 1). This obligated supplier also mentioned its work with 
“its suppliers to incorporate clauses in supply contracts that will seek to ensure 
that bio-components are not knowingly linked to: violation of human rights 
(including child/forced labour), and recent clearing of areas of high biodiversity 
value as defined by feedstock specific multi-stakeholder initiatives and national 
regulations” (Shell, 2008, p. 2). 
 
All obligated suppliers acknowledged second-generation biofuels as potentially 
better performing than first-generation biofuels. An obligated supplier in 
particular sustained that, beyond “delivering significant GHG reductions, while 
avoiding/minimising indirect effects”, advanced biofuels have “significant 
potential …[for] providing future road transport fuels requirements” (BP, 2008, p. 
3). This obligated supplier mentioned the Gallagher Review’s conclusion that 
“there is sufficient land for food, feed and biofuels, provided that there is timely 
development and introduction of advanced biofuels” to reinforce its own 
estimation that “there exists the potential from advanced biofuels using non-
food crop feedstock to provide in future up to 30% of road transport fuel 
requirements” (BP, 2008, p. 2). On the issue of how to better support second-
generation biofuels, there was almost an unanimous agreement on promoting 
biofuels according to their GHG abatements performances – as opposed to 
unclear definitions of biofuel generations (BP, 2008, p. 9; Conoco Phillips, 2008, 
p. 6; Greenergy, 2008, p. 12; Mabanaft, 2008, p. 4; Shell, 2008, p. 6). In the 
view of obligated suppliers, the choice of which technology to apply, under the 
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constraints imposed by the RTFO, should have been left to the market – i.e. to 
them. According to an obligated supplier, the RTFO should limit itself to “drive 
behaviour by setting out the clear objective of sustainably reducing carbon 
emission”, and refrain from defining “specific company behaviour” (Mabanaft, 
2008, p. 4). Another obligated supplier added that the double reward as 
proposed by the RED, although “useful in concept”, contained a number of 
“flaws” (BP, 2008, p. 9). As currently set, the double reward would not 
“accurately reflect the true additional costs gaps that currently exist between 
advanced biofuel technologies and existing technologies”, nor would 
differentiate support according to the different stage of development of these 
advanced technologies (BP, 2008, p. 9). The “definition of advanced 
technologies eligible for this additional reward is too narrow and purely 
feedstock based”, failing to identify those technologies that might overcome 
non-economic barriers better than others (BP, 2008, p. 9). 
 
A case in point was a large foreign oil refiner and producer (Ineos, 2008) that 
incorporated an advanced biofuel business unit and responded on behalf of a 
UK obligated supplier (Morgan Stanley) (RFA, 2010, p. 28). This respondent 
favoured the introduction of a double reward system, since it “is simpler to 
administer, and provides a higher degree of certainly for investors than a 
system based on linking certificates to greenhouse gas savings, which 
introduces a whole new set of assumptions around the alternative fates of the 
biomass wastes used to make the biofuel” (Ineos, 2008, p. 10). 
 
 
3. Other businesses 
 
The “other businesses” that participated in the consultation were two electricity 
suppliers (Energy ON [E.ON], 2008; Electricité de France [EDF], 2008), and two 
carmakers (Bentley, 2008; General Motors [GM], 2008). The two electricity 
suppliers referred to environmental concerns as reasons to support the 
slowdown option (E.ON, 2008; EDF, 2008). These industrial actors also 
contended that priority should be given to the development of electric vehicles. 
The two carmakers participating in the consultation opposed the slowdown and 
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were favourable to leave the RTFO unchanged (Bentley, 2008; GM, 2008). The 
specific environmental/business strategy of these two carmakers focused on 
adapting their models to greater use of biofuels.  
 
 
4. Others 
 
The category “others” only includes two private clubs, among which one 
representing owners of historic vehicles in the UK (Federation of British Historic 
Vehicle Clubs [FBHVC], 2008), and the other representing car owners in 
general (Royal Automobile Club Foundation [RAC Foundation], 2008). These 
private clubs were mostly concerned about the risk of biofuel blending 
compromising fuel quality – thus threatening the viability of older vehicles – and 
supported the slowdown option. 
 
 
5. Academic 
 
Three “academic” groups participated in the consultation (ESRC Centre for 
Business Relationships, Accountability, Sustainbility and Society [BRASS], 
2008; Royal Academy of Engineering [RAE], 2008; Sussex Energy Group, 
2008). Two of these accepted the recommendation of the Gallagher Review to 
slowdown biofuel policy (RAE, 2008; Sussex Energy Group, 2008). These two 
presented a slowdown in biofuel targets as the option striking the right balance 
between the need to preserve a UK domestic biofuel industry and containing 
the negative implications of biofuel production on the environment. One of these 
also stressed that decision-making in UK biofuel policy needed greater 
legitimacy. Since the RTFO would increase imports of biofuels from developing 
countries, affected stakeholders in those countries should also be included in 
policymaking appraisals (Sussex Energy Group, 2008). Both academics 
indicated the promotion of further research on second-generation biofuels as a 
requirement for and a responsibility of the UK Government. By contrast, the 
third academic advocated the inclusion of renewable electricity as road 
transport fuel supported by the RTFO (BRASS, 2008). This academic sustained 
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that leaving the RTFO targets as originally planned would send the right signal 
to promote the adoption of electric vehicles. 
 
 
6. Industry associations 
 
The industry associations that participated in the consultation defined 
themselves as organisations whose activities focused on information 
dissemination, political representation, and networking promotion on behalf of 
their sponsor industrial members. Among these, seven represented “biofuel 
producers”, two represented “obligated suppliers” and eleven represented 
“other businesses”. 
 
6.1 Industry associations of “biofuel producers” 
 
Seven industry associations variously represented small-medium scale biofuel 
producers. Two represented renewable energy industries in general 
(Environmental Industries Commission [EIC], 2008; Renewable Energy 
Association [REA], 2008). Two represented a specific territorial cluster of biofuel 
producers in the UK (North East Process Industry Cluster [NEPIC], 2008; North 
East Biofuels, 2008). Three represented producers of specific biofuels 
(Biopower, 2008; European Biodiesel Board [EBB], 2008; Lyondell Basell & 
EFOA, 2008). All these industry associations declared to reflect the specific 
interests of their sponsor industries and to respond on behalf of all their 
members – i.e. also of those that did not participate in the consultation. 
 
The two industry associations representing renewable energy industries 
advocated the interest of small-scale UK biofuel producers – regardless of the 
type of biofuel produced. One of the two defined itself as “the largest renewable 
industry body in the UK, with over 530 member companies”, of which “some 50 
members with direct and indirect interests in biofuels for transport” (REA, 2008, 
p. 1). Reiterating biofuel producers’ critiques, this industry association casted 
doubt on the validity of the evidence gathered by the Gallagher Review. It 
contended that “the danger of making assumptions without evidence to support 
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them is highlighted by the behaviour of global food prices. Some estimates 
blamed biofuels for most of this year’s food price peaks, but recent events have 
demonstrated this is not the case” (REA, 2008, p. 5). Even if “an increase in 
demand for biofuels is likely to have some impact on [food] prices … [it is 
however] clear that those impacts have been grossly exaggerated” (REA, 2008, 
p. 5). Furthermore, “the main cause for … [food price] fluctuations is a 
combination of volatility in the oil price, speculators looking for new markets to 
invest in and poor harvests around the world followed by farmers responding to 
higher prices by planting more crops” (REA, 2008, p. 5). “For the avoidance of 
doubt”, it then specified that its “members support the carbon and sustainability 
reporting under the RTFO, which we regard as a world-leading scheme and a 
model for others to follow” (REA, 2008, p. 2). Against the “clear” risk of “an 
unmanaged expansion of biofuels”, this industry association optimistically 
sustained that future initiatives of the EU on tackling indirect effects and the 
“mandatory standards contained in the RED will address this” (REA, 2008, p. 3). 
 
This industry association advocated the arguments of biofuel producers against 
the proposed slowdown in biofuel targets. Mentioning a survey conducted 
among its members, “the decision to reduce targets has had and will have a 
serious effect on investor confidence and there is now a real risk that there will 
be no further investment in the UK” (REA, 2008, p. 6). The economic crisis and 
the drafting error had already “considerably” worsened investors’ confidence. 
Meanwhile, the new EU target was requiring “higher levels of biofuel use than 
are currently planned” (REA, 2008, p. 1). In this context, a slowdown of RTFO 
targets would “significantly harm the development of a sustainable domestic 
biofuel industry … undermine ... the UK’s acknowledged leadership on biofuel 
sustainability [and] make it harder to meet the UK’s overall targets for the RED” 
(REA, 2008, p. 8). Meanwhile, it “would have negligible impacts on the global 
sustainability concerns” (REA, 2008, p. 8). Furthermore, “the risks to investment 
of slowing down the targets apply to an even greater degree for investment in 
new technologies – which carries an inherently higher risk of failure” (REA, 
2008, p. 17). This considered, “If the industry is to make this investment, it will 
need … Binding, long-term targets – and certainty on the policy mechanism to 
reach them … [and] …Sufficient certainty on sustainability/GHG requirements to 
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be able to implement them through global supply chains … If these are not 
present, there is a significant risk that the policy will fail” (REA, 2008, p. 3). This 
is because “delivering sustainable biofuels requires substantial capital 
expenditure and a long operational life if this investment is to be recouped” 
(REA, 2008, p. 3). Thus, the UK Government should leave the RTFO targets 
unchanged, especially in consideration of the fact that “the science required to 
underpin such a policy change does not yet exist” (REA, 2008, p. 8).  
 
Reiterating biofuel producers’ arguments, second-generation biofuels “are not 
necessarily better than current technologies in land-use terms once co-products 
are taken into account … [and] unlikely ... to be available in quantity before 
2020” (REA, 2008, p. 16). About the proposed double reward, the measure was 
seen as “not … sufficient … to encourage ‘second generation’ biofuels” (REA, 
2008, p. 16). This “very blunt instrument” would not distinguish between cost-
competitive technologies and others requiring more support (REA, 2008, p. 16). 
As opposed to a double reward, “a more focused approach, possibly based 
around specific incentives or with tapered, time-limited support under a GHG-
linked RTFO is more likely to succeed” (REA, 2008, p. 16).  
 
The other renewable industry association defined itself as “the largest trade 
association in Europe for the environmental technology and services (ETS) 
industry … [and] enjoying … [the] “support of leading politicians from all three 
major UK political parties as well as trade union leaders, environmentalists and 
academics” (EIC, 2008, p. 1). This industry association claimed to represent 
“over 330 member companies [of which] … over 70 organisations from small 
biofuel producers to multinational commodity companies and has actively 
participated in policy development and practical implementation of biofuels in 
the UK and the EU” (EIC, 2008, p. 1). This industry association advocated the 
arguments of biofuel producers in favour of leaving the RTFO unchanged, 
rewarding second-generation biofuels on the base of GHG performances, and 
maintaining the reward system technology neutral. About the supposed link 
between first and second-generation biofuels, this industry association 
sustained that “the pursuit of second generation biofuel is too often used as an 
excuse to avoid engagement with first generation technology. The ‘wait and 
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see’ mentality that it encourages, adds to the policy uncertainty demonstrated in 
the Gallagher review, and will turn the UK into a transient import market. 
Government intervention in technology should be restricted to focused R&D 
support. Commercial rewards should be delivered via the encouragement of a 
vibrant carbon market, and the differential award of certificates to superior 
technologies for carbon reduction” (EIC, 2008, p. 5). 
 
The two industry associations representing the same industry cluster were joint 
into a partnership (NEPIC, 2008, p. 1; North East Biofuels, 2008, p. 5). In their 
responses, both industry associations reflected the specific interests of the 
industrial members of that cluster – which included several biofuel producers. 
As specified by one of the two, the industry cluster had “a gross domestic 
product nearing £8bn”, and was set to become “a key driver of the regional 
economy over the next decade and beyond” (NEPIC, 2008, p. 1). Representing 
“the whole supply chain”, the other industry association said that its members 
were a “collection of companies and organisations ... uniquely well placed to 
offer a perspective on the current RTFO consultation” (North East Biofuels, 
2008, p. 1). Deploying the same exact text in their responses, both industry 
associations warned the UK Government that “the importance to prospective 
investors of stability and the ability to make reasonable predictions about the 
marketplace should not be underestimated” (NEPIC, 2008, p. 2; North East 
Biofuels, 2008, p. 1). With its decision to slowdown the RTFO, the UK 
Government was about to create “a very serious issue with trust”51, as a 
slowdown would leave “investors wondering if they can rely on any Government 
target in making an investment decision” (NEPIC, 2008, p. 2; North East 
Biofuels, 2008, p. 1). The RTFO should instead be left unchanged as that was 
“the basis on which the fuel industry and biofuel investors have laid their plans” 
(NEPIC, 2008, p. 3; North East Biofuels, 2008, p. 2). In their view, even by 
maintaining these levels, the UK would “still fall significantly short of the leaders 
in Europe at a time when the UK should be setting out to seize the European 
and international biofuel growth opportunity” (NEPIC, 2008, p. 3; North East 
Biofuels, 2008, p. 2). These two industry associations further contended that 
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“those who seek to portray a slowdown as exercise of the ‘precautionary 
principle’ should remember that climate change will not slow down while we 
engage in protracted intellectual debate – and there is nothing ‘precautionary’ 
about delaying CO2 emissions reduction” (NEPIC, 2008, p. 3; North East 
Biofuels, 2008, p. 2). 
 
About second-generation biofuels, one of the two industry associations stressed 
that “prior to talk of second generation biofuels, the UK ... must have a 
productive, profitable and sustainable first generation industry” (NEPIC, 2008, p. 
4). Using the same exact text in their responses, both industry associations 
sustained that “the UK should aspire ... to be a hub of international development 
in biofuel technology into the long-term future, building on a successful 
introduction of first generation biofuels” (NEPIC, 2008, p. 4; North East Biofuels, 
2008, p. 4). Whereas, the double reward was “welcome but not adequate” 
(NEPIC, 2008, p. 4; North East Biofuels, 2008, p. 4). A better strategy would 
involve direct R&D funding, while the reward system ought to take into account 
“both the carbon saving delivered and the difficulty penetrating the market 
sector (which reflects in part the differences in how we tax fuels in different 
sectors)” of any specific technology (NEPIC, 2008, p. 4; North East Biofuels, 
2008, p. 4). 
 
Among the three industry associations representing producers of specific types 
of biofuels, two represented the interests of biodiesel producers (Biopower, 
2008; EBB, 2008), while one represented producers of fuels oxygenates 
(Lyondell Basell & EFOA, 2008). One of the two industry associations 
representing biodiesel producers claimed that its “members account for around 
85% of the biodiesel produced in Europe and two thirds of global production” 
and declared to respond “on behalf of our UK members and companies 
concerned with the development of the UK biodiesel market” (EBB, 2008, p. 1). 
Reiterating biodiesel producers’ critiques, this industry association rejected the 
conclusions of the Gallagher Review since “the erroneous argument that 
biofuels development was the cause for food price increases in late 2007/ early 
2008 can be observed to be untrue by the 50% decrease in food prices since 
May 2008, despite increasing biofuel production and adoption of a higher 
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biofuel target” (EBB, 2008, p. 3). On the contrary, the industry association 
contended that “sustainable biofuels present the potential to bring essential 
investment to agricultural productivity in developing nations which could 
improve food security” (EBB, 2008, p. 3). Furthermore, “the Gallagher review 
findings and subsequent recommendations are not representative of the 
biofuels produced by UK and European biodiesel producers who would supply 
the majority of any increased level of biofuels when strict sustainability criteria 
are applied” (EBB, 2008, p. 3). The “UK and European producers are already 
particularly sustainable. They deliver consistently and significantly high 
greenhouse gas emission savings compared to fossil fuels. In some cases 
(especially UK producers) current greenhouse gas savings reach as high as 
86.8% according to RTFO calculation method for recycled vegetable oil” (EBB, 
2008, p. 3). This industry association was also “confident that early 
implementation of RED sustainability criteria combined with higher levels of 
obligation will lead to the use of only the most sustainable feedstocks and as an 
attractive market could lead to even stronger implementation of sustainable 
management for ... all ... feedstocks” (EBB, 2008, p. 3). In addition, “the RTFO 
has already proven its ability to monitor and increase the level of sustainability 
control from biofuels, and European and UK suppliers are particularly 
successful in this regard” (EBB, 2008, p. 4).  
 
This industry association underlined the “severe challenges facing the UK 
biodiesel industry under the Renewable Transport Fuels mechanism, amid 
unfair competition from heavily subsidised biodiesel from the United States of 
America … and the coming implementation of the EU Renewable Energy 
Directive and biofuels sustainability criteria” (EBB, 2008, p. 1). In addition, the 
drafting error “effectively halved the volume of expected biofuels required for 
2008/09 … [causing the industry to lose] expected revenue in the order of many 
millions of pounds” (EBB, 2008, p. 1). This considered, “it is … fair to say … that 
without more certainty around target-driven demand, there is an increasing 
chance that there will be no indigenous UK production to deliver the RTFO in 
the near future” (EBB, 2008, p. 2). In this context, “any suggestion to delay or 
reduce obligation levels would be devastating to the UK ambitions to develop an 
increasingly sustainable biofuel industry, bringing greenhouse gas emissions 
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reductions, fuel security and sustainable employment. Most importantly, a 
freezing or a slowdown of biofuel targets would be at variance with the 
ambitious 10% binding EU objective for renewables in transport” (EBB, 2008, p. 
2). This “hesitation in obligation levels in the UK would … [ultimately] result in 
the retarded development of the UK industry and require the importation of less 
sustainable biofuels to meet the obligated market in 2010” (EBB, 2008, p. 2). 
On the basis of these arguments, this industry association recommended “an 
increased level of obligation to meet the EU Biofuels Directive 2003/30 
target of 5.75% biofuels by 2010, or at least maintenance of the 3.75% by 
2010 level as intended, but with immediate correction of the obligation 
level for 2008/09 to preserve the value of [RTFO certificates] this year and in 
the future”52 (EBB, 2008, p. 3). For this industry association, “it would be 
unconceivable that national objectives would prevent producers from meeting 
the EU objectives” (EBB, 2008, p. 2). 
 
About second-generation biofuels, this industry association claimed that they 
will be viable, provided ”considerable private and public investment[,] … no 
sooner than 20 to 50 years in development” (EBB, 2008, p. 4). Besides being 
still “completely economically and technically unviable”, second-generation 
technologies “also provide little environmental benefit” (EBB, 2008, p. 4). As 
opposed to second-generation biofuels, “[first-generation] biofuels represent the 
most practical option for delivering greenhouse gas emission reductions from 
the UK transport sector in the short and medium term” (EBB, 2008, p. 4). About 
double rewarding second-generation biofuels, the industry association 
sustained that such a rewarding system “does not fully account for the long term 
investment in research and development required for the commercialisation of 
these types of fuels nor their environmental advantages beyond those 
mentioned, including services of waste disposal, desertification prevention, and 
land remediation” (EBB, 2008, p. 7). Besides, “reliance on this method alone 
may encourage these fuels to be developed solely by international mineral oil 
suppliers with the research and development capacity to invest years in 
advance of commercialisation and double rewarding” (EBB, 2008, p. 7). This 
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industry association also lamented that the definition of second-generation 
biofuels in the RED was “not … suitable” as it would exclude from the reward 
“existing biofuels [that] can already produce verifiable lifecycle greenhouse gas 
savings of up to 86.8% ... compared to as yet unproven technologies regarded 
as second generation” (EBB, 2008, p. 7). Greater research funding should 
instead be extended “to biodiesel producers to upgrade their greenhouse gas 
efficiencies and develop more sustainable feedstock options such as waste oils, 
algae, and jatropha”, while avoiding “second generation terminology” (EBB, 
2008, p. 7). Such funding would also reach “UK producers [currently] pioneering 
development of biodiesel feedstocks from degraded and contaminated land by 
the use of jatropha and algae biomass” (EBB, 2008, p. 4).  
 
The other industry association represented small-scale UK producers of 
biodiesel derived from used cooking oil (UCO) (Biopower, 2008, p. 2). 
Sustaining rather radical positions, this industry association questioned the 
overarching approach of the UK Government in biofuel policy, while did not 
respond in detail to the consultation questions. For this industry association, the 
UK “should not be seen as a nation that is simply trying to meet minimal targets 
… [It should rather be seen] “setting an outstanding example of radical 
environmental policy that will shame other nations like the USA” (Biopower, 
2008, p. 1). Meanwhile, “the RTFO should be abandoned completely, and much 
more assertive and effective measures used to directly encourage and promote 
the public use of alternatives to mineral hydrocarbon fuels”, for instance by 
freeing of Excise Duty “all non mineral, non-fossil derived hydrocarbon 
materials” (Biopower, 2008, p. 1). Furthermore, the UK Government should 
“ensure that all new vehicles can run on simple bio-fuels (Straight Vegetable Oil 
or SVO), and existing vehicles can be converted to run on SVO” (Biopower, 
2008, p. 1). In this respect, the UK Government should avoid being “fooled … 
by reports created by the motor industry designed to show that engines will fail 
if SVO is used as a fuel” (Biopower, 2008, p. 4). In the opinion of this industry 
association, those reports just reflected that “to a large extent ... the motor 
industry is steered by the interests of the petrochemical industry” (Biopower, 
2008, p. 4). The industry association concluded that “the RTFO should be 
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scrapped”53 and substituted with courageous policies whose “primary aim must 
be to reduce our national use of fossil derived hydrocarbons … [and] secondary 
aim must be to dramatically reduce the need for so much transport” (Biopower, 
2008, p. 5). These “two aims can only be achieved by providing real alternatives 
to fossil carbons, and by educating people on how to use them. Also, by making 
major changes to the way we work and meet our needs” (Biopower, 2008, p. 5). 
Implicit was that among those “real” alternatives were the biofuels produced by 
the industry association’s members. Biofuels locally produced from waste 
materials should get the priority and only when all available waste materials 
(such as UCO) are converted, then “local production of alternative non-food 
grade bio-energy feedstock” should be encouraged (Biopower, 2008, p. 7). The 
UK Government “should be acting far more assertively to force the greater use 
of [these kinds of ] bio-fuels, and reduce the use of fossil fuels” (Biopower, 
2008, p. 7). The RTFO should be then scrapped as it “does not achieve this … 
[and] simply creates a huge burden of extra administrative work that can be 
carried by large companies but is daunting for smaller companies” (Biopower, 
2008, p. 7). As an alternative, “by using existing legislation to increase the 
levels of Excise Duty on fossil derived fuels, and remove totally the Excise Duty 
on all non-fossil derived materials”, the localised production of bio-fuel in the UK 
would become economically viable (Biopower, 2008, p. 7). Nevertheless, this 
industry association also stated that it did “not agree … in any reduction in the 
very necessary swing from the use of fossil fuels to bio-fuels”, thus supporting 
leaving the RTFO unchanged as a second best solution (Biopower, 2008, p. 7). 
 
A case in point was also an industry association that represented producers of 
bio-ethers and advocated the inclusion of those fuels in the RTFO scheme. In 
particular, it sought “support from DfT in seeking the proper and specific 
recognition of bio-ethers, and bio-ETBE in particular, in relation to U.K. policy 
and regulation, especially the RTFO” (Lyondell Basell & EFOA, 2008, p. 1). This 
industry association presented these fuels as biochemical derivatives of 
bioethanol “with substantially superior blending and environmental performance 
                                            
53
 Bold in original text. 
190 
 
compared to the direct blending of bioethanol” (Lyondell Basell & EFOA, 2008, 
p. 1). 
 
6.2 Industry associations of “obligated suppliers” 
 
Two industry associations declared to represent the specific interests and 
respond on behalf of all large-scale producers/refiners/suppliers of transport 
fuels – i.e. also of those that did not participate in the consultation (Association 
of the United Kingdom Oil Indepenedents [AUKOI], 2008; United Kingdom 
Petroleum Industry Association [UKPIA], 2008). In particular, one declared that, 
even though some of its members sent their individual responses, the 
organisation was responding “on behalf of all its members” (AUKOI, 2008, p. 1). 
Similarly the other one specified that its response reflected “the industry’s view 
on the best way forward” (UKPIA, 2008, p. 1). However, the two industry 
associations disagreed on the policy option to recommend, reflecting the split in 
opinions observed among obligated suppliers. 
 
One industry association represented the obligated suppliers54 that supported 
the option to leave the RTFO unchanged. Reiterating their arguments, this 
industry association invited the UK Government to reassess the Gallagher 
Review’s recommendations. These recommendations “were taken at a time 
when there was huge concern about rising oil and food prices and therefore, its 
recommendations to urge caution by cutting back on the rate of inclusion of 
biofuels was perhaps understandable. However, market changes in recent 
months have demonstrated that there is really no simple linkage between oil 
pricing and food prices … [which] … have now fallen back ... The 
recommendations should therefore be reviewed in the light of recent 
unprecedented price volatility in these markets and the overall drive to reduce 
GHG’s/carbon should be reset as a government priority to meet internationally 
agreed targets” (AUKOI, 2008, p. 2). For this industry association, “the way in 
which industry is setting about the process of sourcing its biofuels is already 
having a marked and positive effect in terms of sustainability and land use 
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criteria at source. This process, led by the industry, should be monitored 
certainly but importantly, it must be trusted and encouraged” (AUKOI, 2008, p. 
1). It further contended that “If this is done positively and cooperatively … the 
concerns expressed in the Gallagher Report would be addressed and the 
original targets contained in RTFO could be preserved to ensure the required 
contribution to carbon saving is made from the transport sector”55 (AUKOI, 
2008, p. 1). In view of the higher EU targets, “Any further changes in the interim 
will detract from market confidence and so represent a serious risk to the 
successful introduction of the Renewable Energy Directive” (AUKOI, 2008, p. 
1), thus warranting leaving the RTFO unchanged.  
 
The other industry association represented the obligated suppliers56 that 
supported the option to slowdown targets. Reiterating their arguments, this 
industry association acknowledged that “Indirect land use change poses a 
potential threat to the sustainability of biofuels so it appears prudent to adopt a 
more cautious approach to the use of biofuels in line with that proposed by 
Professor Gallagher” (UKPIA, 2008, p. 4). Nevertheless, “Investment by the oil 
industry in biofuels and other new fuels … requires consistent, stable policy by 
HMG [the UK Government]. We therefore encourage HMG to develop a robust 
strategy for sustainable biofuels/biomass with a much longer horizon than the 
current three years (say to 2020). This should be possible as the RTFO does 
not depend on duty incentives post April 2010. This will provide a basis for 
investment by obligated companies and biofuel suppliers to meet future targets” 
(UKPIA, 2008, p. 4). 
 
About second-generation biofuels, both industry associations reflected the 
general agreement among obligated suppliers that biofuels should be rewarded 
in a technology neutral way – i.e. not by discriminating biofuels on the base of 
uncertain definitions of generations – and that the industry should be left free to 
decide which technology to apply (AUKOI, 2008, p. 3; UKPIA, 2008, p. 8). 
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6.3 Industry associations of “other businesses” 
 
Ten57 industry associations of “other businesses” participated in the consultation 
(Agricultural Industries Confederation [AIC], 2008; Confederation of Passenger 
Transport [CPT], 2008; Croda et al., 2008; European Association for the Animal 
Fats and Animal By-Product Processing Industry (EFPRA), 2008; Food and 
Drink Federation [FDF], 2008; Federation of Petroleum Suppliers [FPS], 2008; 
National Farmers Union [NFU], 2008; Rail Safety and Standards Board [RSSB], 
2008; Seed Crushers and Oil Processors Association [SCOPA], 2008; Society 
of Motor Manufacturers and Traders [SMMT], 2008; United Kingdom Renderers 
Association [UKRA], 2008). 
 
One industry association represented “the majority of distributors in the UK from 
the small family business, which forms the greater part, to the distribution arms 
of some of the major oil companies” – none of which obligated suppliers. This 
industry association reflected the concerns of its members about the risk 
involved in transporting biofuels (FPS, 2008, p. 1). It mentioned both 
environmental and distribution problems caused by the transport of biofuels as 
reasons to support a freezing of the RTFO. Three industry associations 
represented respectively the food (FDF, 2008), agricultural products (AIC, 
2008), and chemical (Croda et al., 2008) industries. These industry associations 
mentioned environmental concerns as reasons to slow down RTFO targets, 
substantially reiterating the arguments listed in the invitation document to the 
consultation. One industry association represented the rail industry (RSSB, 
2008). This industry association mentioned environmental concerns as reasons 
to slow down RTFO targets and indicated the electrification of transport as a 
better option whenever applicable. One industry association represented the 
motor/engine industry (SMMT, 2008). This industry association reported the 
concerns of its members about the deterioration of transport fuels’ quality due to 
increasing biofuel blending, as another reason – beside environmental concerns 
– to slow down RTFO targets. It also indicated second-generation biofuels as 
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preferred technologies given their expected superior fuel quality. Two industry 
associations represented respectively the farming (NFU, 2008) and vegetable 
oil (SCOPA, 2008) industries and advocated to leave the RTFO unchanged. 
These industry associations lamented that a slowdown of biofuel targets would 
be a missed opportunity for the industries they represented. The industry 
association of the farming industry also casted doubt on the validity of the 
Gallagher Review’s recommendations. In particular, “a lack of understanding of 
agriculture and commodity markets in both the main report document and 
supporting documents of the Gallagher review led to misconceptions in 
assumptions and misunderstanding of how production and markets operate. 
The result led to the weak conclusions and misinformed recommendations, on 
which this current consultation is based” (NFU, 2008, p. 4). Concerning the 
double reward for second-generation biofuels, both industry associations 
sustained that the support to biofuels should be technology neutral and linked to 
GHG abatement performances, as opposed to unclear definitions of biofuel 
generations. Cases in point were two industry associations representing the 
rendering industry (EFPRA, 2008; UKRA, 2008). These industry associations 
only replied to one consultation question about the proposal to exclude animal 
fat (tallow) from the list of sustainable feedstocks for biofuels – i.e. question 19. 
They criticised the UK Government’s proposal to remove biodiesel from tallow 
as qualifying fuel for the RTFO as based on “flawed” scientific assessments 
(EFPRA, 2008, p. 1; UKRA, 2008, p. 1). Rather, the UK Government “should 
continue with its present proposals to include tallow within the ROCs scheme 
and to define tallow based biodiesel as a qualifying fuel within the RTFO” 
(UKRA, 2008, p. 4).  
 
 
7. Consultancies  
 
Two “consultancies” participated in the consultation. One explicitly defined itself 
as a “specialist consultancy” working “at the heart of the UK's energy, 
environment and water sectors … [and providing] a range of services to 
Government departments, regulators, trade associations and market 
participants” (Gemserv, n.d.). The other one did not provide a self-definition in 
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the consultation response. However, in its website, it defined itself as an adviser 
– whose grant-providers included biofuel operators – possessing “specialist 
knowledge of both UK and global vehicle markets with particular emphasis on 
developing Biofuels, LPG and Natural Gas in the UK” (Joulevert, n.d.).  
 
The first consultancy declared to be “operating independently at the market 
level and not as a representative organisation” (Germserv Ltd, 2008). This 
consultancy substantially reiterated the arguments supporting a slowdown of 
biofuel policy. At the same time, it warned that, even though right in principle, 
supporting second-generation biofuels might lead to some technologies being 
wrongly excluded if done with blunt instruments as double rewards based on 
unclear definitions of biofuels’ generations (Germserv Ltd, 2008). The adviser 
failed to specify whether it was responding on behalf of third parties and 
advocated to leave the RTFO unchanged (JouleVert, 2008, p. 1). Essentially 
reiterating the main arguments of biofuel producers, this adviser contended that 
a reward system should be based on GHG performances so as to reward both 
best performing first-generation and second-generation biofuels (JouleVert, 
2008, p. 6). 
 
 
8. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
 
Seven NGOs participated in the consultation (Catholic Agency For Overseas 
Development [CAFOD], 2008; Econexus, 2008; Friends of the Earth [FoE], 
2008; Greenpeace, 2008; Oxfam GB, 2008; Royal Society for the Protection of 
Birds [RSPB], 2008; World Wide Fund for Nature [WWF], 2008).  
 
NGOs stressed the gravity of the short-medium term damages produced by 
current biofuel policy in terms of increases in food prices, land grabbing, 
deforestation and net GHG emissions due to direct and indirect land use 
changes in developing countries. One NGO explained that an uncontrolled 
large-scale development of biofuels from food crops would lead to “inflationary 
impacts on agricultural commodity prices”. Higher commodity prices would hit 
“those living in poverty the hardest” as these “tend to buy more unprocessed 
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and unpackaged foods” – whose prices are closely associated with commodity 
prices – and “may typically spend between half and three quarters of their 
income on food” (Oxfam GB, 2008, p. 1). A large expansion of biofuels would 
also increase the demand for agricultural land, thus worsening the phenomenon 
of land grabbing in developing countries. Searching for land, biofuel crop 
growers would displace “vulnerable communities and indigenous peoples”, 
while creating the conditions for “other associated human rights abuses” (Oxfam 
GB, 2008, p. 1). “Alarmed” by such prospects, another NGO said to be “anxious 
that efforts to avoid land-use change by moving agrofuel production to ‘marginal 
land’ will have a significant impact on those communities who rely upon 
marginal land for their subsistence” (CAFOD, 2008, p. 2). Another NGO noted 
“with concern but little surprise that no formal attempt appears to have been 
made to consult with organisations or communities from the global south about 
those impacts” (Econexus, 2008, p. 1). The higher demand for land would also 
create the conditions for further direct and indirect land use changes to occur, 
thus potentially offsetting the GHG emissions savings of biofuels – as 
emphasised by one NGO (Oxfam GB, 2008, p. 1). All looking for new land, 
biofuel crop growers, food growers, and displaced communities might end up 
clearing forests and other carbon sinks, thus destroying biodiversity and 
perversely increasing the net GHG emissions associated to a large-scale 
biofuel crop production. Another NGO explained that in a world “already 
witnessing massive loss of natural habitats ... due to rapid agricultural 
expansion ... the large volumes of liquid biofuels required to fulfil even a small 
percentage of the world’s transport needs have the potential to drive further 
losses, including the loss of carbon rich forests, savannahs, grasslands and 
wetlands, in some of the most sensitive ecosystems in the world” (RSPB, 2008, 
p. 2).  
 
About sustainability standards, many NGOs dismissed the mandatory system 
proposed by the RED as inadequate and incomplete for containing those 
negative outcomes. One NGO contended that the proposed sustainability 
criteria and GHG thresholds “will do nothing to address this situation – partly 
because they are the flawed product of political compromise in order to keep 
the 10% target at all costs, but also because of limitations in global, regional 
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and local systems to implement, monitor and enforce them” (RSPB, 2008, p. 2). 
This NGO went further by alleging that the “European Commission and the 
Council of Ministers have failed to respond to sound scientific evidence and 
logic on this issue, and have pushed blindly ahead with an energy-based target 
at an unsustainable level. In this, they have clearly bowed to powerful industry 
and sector lobby groups and to Member States and producer countries with 
clear vested interests” (RSPB, 2008, p. 7). Another NGO agreed that there was 
“no guarantee that the sustainability standards introduced in 2011 will be strong 
enough to alleviate current concerns” (Greenpeace, 2008, p. 1). Independently 
of whether the sustainability standards and GHG emissions thresholds 
proposed by the RED will prove to be effective in the future, it remained a fact 
that current biofuels were produced out of any mandatory assurance system. As 
reminded by one NGO, the same Gallagher Review pointed out that the current 
RTFO was “unable to protect against these unintended impacts”. Hence – it 
continued, “the RTFO presents a significant cost to the UK taxpayer whilst 
offering no assurances of net GHG reductions, and potentially exacerbating 
global poverty through its indirect impacts on global poverty and land-use” 
(Oxfam GB, 2008, p. 1). As pointed out by another NGO, “whilst it is expected 
that the Government will introduce some level of sustainability standards in 
2011, this will mean that billions of litres of biofuels will have been sold in the 
UK which could well have caused significant environmental damage and social 
harm” (Greenpeace, 2008, p. 1). Another NGO similarly sustained that “it would 
be irresponsible to plough ahead with a policy that will swallow billions of 
pounds while delivering uncertain climate benefits and at the same time leading 
to proven disastrous impacts on biodiversity and the World’s poor”, as well as 
potentially generating land-use-changes, which might “completely subvert or 
indeed inverse the rational of the RTFO to save ghg emissions” (FoE, 2008, p. 
1). Also endorsing those views, another NGO warned that, “as ... currently 
produced, biofuels can be worse of the climate than the fossil fuels they 
replace” (Greenpeace, 2008, p. 1). 
 
Six NGOs out of seven agreed that biofuel targets should be ideally withdrawn, 
or at least frozen, until the sustainability of biofuels can be guaranteed. Four of 
these criticised the slowdown option as an ineffective remedy to contain the 
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risks and damages produced by the current biofuel policy (CAFOD, 2008, p. 4; 
FoE, 2008, p. 3; Greenpeace, 2008, p. 2; RSPB, 2008, p. 6). According to one 
of these four, such a measure would “only save a small amount of biofuels 
during the decreased rate”, as “the overall target will still be the same” (FoE, 
2008, p. 3). Making no “significant difference”, a slowdown “can not be regarded 
as a serious way to address the catastrophic impacts of biofuels” (FoE, 2008, p. 
3). By enforcing such a measure, “the UK will still continue to be an accomplice 
in land grabs, violent conflicts, deforestation, slave-like working conditions, food 
shortages, biodiversity loss, water shortages and potentially increased ghg 
emissions globally” (FoE, 2008, p. 3). A case in point was the only NGO 
agreeing with the UK Government proposal to slowdown the biofuel policy 
according to the Gallagher Review’s recommendations. According to this NGO, 
“The biofuel industry at this early point in its development does need a level of 
clarity about its long term prospects. However it also needs greater clarity about 
what performance standards are expected of it. The RTFO ought to include 
genuinely mandatory sustainability standards covering both direct and indirect 
impacts” (WWF, 2008, p. 1). 
 
Several NGOs contested some of the arguments advocated by the Gallagher 
Review, especially those in relation to the rationale justifying current support to 
first-generation biofuels as necessary to have second-generation biofuels. A 
NGO rejected the Gallagher Review’s argument that a moratorium could reduce 
the ability of the biofuel industry to invest into new technologies (Oxfam GB, 
2008, p. 2). This NGO objected that, even though the distribution and blending 
infrastructure could be shared, the production processes of first-generation 
biofuels were completely different from those of second-generation biofuels. 
The emergence of these latter would make obsolete the former – first-
generation biodiesel in particular. “Therefore continued support for the current 
generation of biofuels risks technological lock-in, and [also] the creation of 
dependent special interest groups within agriculture which may resist moves 
towards more sustainable second generation feedstocks” (Oxfam GB, 2008, p. 
5). This NGO implicitly alluded to a likely resistance by the first-generation 
industry to the adoption of new technologies once it had established with 
previous technologies. It finally concluded that “a more appropriate policy on the 
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part of Government would be to eliminate support for the current generation of 
expensive and ineffective biofuels, and with some of the savings, invest in R&D 
into more promising second generation technologies” (Oxfam GB, 2008, p. 5). 
Seeing it as “a problem of Government policy”, the industry should be then 
supported “to invest in new technologies with the money that would be saved by 
setting the obligation level to 0 per cent” (Oxfam GB, 2008, p. 2). As stated by 
another NGO, “In regards to the argument that high targets for current biofuels 
are needed in order to stimulate investment into future technologies it has to be 
said that the opposite is true as it is already evident that targets fuel investment 
into current first-generation biofuel from crops, particularly into acquisition and 
clearing of large amounts of land; money that is diverted away from research 
into energy technologies that are environmentally and socially safer and that 
deliver far better ghg savings” (FoE, 2008, p. 3). 
 
An NGO contested the Gallagher Review’s argument that a moratorium would 
reduce the ability of the biofuel industry to transform the sourcing of its 
feedstock to the more sustainable supplies (Oxfam GB, 2008, p. 2). As this 
NGO pointed out, the argument “presupposes that first generation biofuels, if 
sourced sustainably, are a desirable way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
However this fails to take account of their poor economic performance in this 
regard – a pound spent on carbon abatement through biofuels for transport 
achieves far less than a pound spent on alternative activities. Far greater 
greenhouse gas savings could be achieved by directing public money towards 
alternative uses of biomass, such as combined heat and power, or investing in 
improved vehicle efficiency” (Oxfam GB, 2008, p. 2). Another NGO objected the 
Gallagher Review’s argument that a moratorium is likely to lead to a stagnant, 
and unprofitable industry (FoE, 2008, p. 3). For this NGO, such an argument 
appeared “extremely weak ... given that according to RFA figures (August 2008) 
only 8% of biofuels consumed in the UK are from UK feedstock” (FoE, 2008, p. 
3). Only the relatively small UK industry depended on UK biofuel targets, while 
these were hardly essential for the survival of the larger Brazilian and US 
biofuel industries. Hence, “weighing up of profits for a small UK industry against 
the huge negative environmental and social impacts from biofuels appears 
completely skewed at a time in that climate change is the greatest threat facing 
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humanity” (FoE, 2008, p. 3). Another NGO went further, dismissing the 
Gallagher Review’s recommendations as “insufficient and out of step with the 
comprehensive analysis of evidence included within the review itself”, and 
concluding that they “could therefore only have arisen as a result of political 
compromise” (RSPB, 2008, p. 6). The UK Government should instead “take the 
lead in developing and implementing sustainable land use planning policies, 
and assisting other countries to follow suit” (RSPB, 2008, p. 3). 
 
About how to support second-generation biofuels, the NGOs that addressed the 
issue maintained that the rewarding system should be linked to GHG abatement 
performances, while taking into account the overall sustainability of the 
technologies (Greenpeace, 2008; RSPB, 2008; WWF, 2008). Mentioning the 
findings of the Gallagher Review, two of these NGOs warned that some 
second-generation biofuels risked being less sustainable than first-generation 
biofuels (Greenpeace, 2008; RSPB, 2008). One in particular explained that 
“rewarding anything which can be labelled ‘second generation biofuels’, -which 
is a broad and disputed term including a wide range of feedstocks and 
processing technologies, with varying and even unknown sustainability and 
carbon implications -, will not deliver the best biofuels in terms of carbon 
savings and environmental protection” (RSPB, 2008, p. 15). This considered, 
the most sensible approach would be rewarding biofuels on the basis of life 
cycle assessments of GHG emissions coupled with additional measures such 
as mandatory minimum standards to prevent unwanted indirect effects on food 
production and working conditions in developing countries.  
 
9. Local governments 
 
Four local government authorities participated in the consultation: a statutory 
regional transport partnership (Highlands and Islands Strategic Transport 
Partnership [HITRANS], 2008); a regional development agency (Highlands and 
Islands Enterprise [HIE], 2008); a local council (Highland Council, 2008) – all 
representing local communities in the same territory; and a regional 
development agency – representing an industry cluster in another territory 
(North East Regional Strategy Board [North East RSB], 2008). 
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The three local government authorities representing local communities in the 
same territory asked the UK Government to take into consideration the possible 
problems created by the introduction of biofuels within their communities. As 
explained by one of them, in that area of the country “people ... have to travel 
further to access basic services and employment than normal and, due to the 
sparsity of population and relatively low levels of public transport, the reliance 
on movement using private cars and its related costs is more acute in this 
region than elsewhere in the UK” (HITRANS, 2008, p. 1). Consequently, “unless 
some means of supplying non-bio gasoline can be found without imposing 
additional cost to consumers ... there is the potential for this region uniquely to 
face significant increased costs for fuel compared with that elsewhere as a 
result of the introduction of RFTO” (HITRANS, 2008, p. 1). That considered, 
these three local government authorities backed “the proposed amendment to 
RTFO, as this will delay introduction of Bioethanol and give breathing space to 
allow possible solutions to the inherent problems of introducing this fuel in low 
volume areas of consumption to be found” (HITRANS, 2008, p. 1). Major 
sources of concern for these local government authorities were the technical 
difficulties in distributing and storing bioethanol as well as the consequential 
additional cost on consumers. Acting in the interests of their communities, they 
saw a freezing the RTFO as a preferable solution to buy more time to find 
solutions to those difficulties (HIE, 2008; Highland Council, 2008, p. 2; 
HITRANS, 2008, p. 2). Only one of these local government authorities 
addressed the issue of second-generation biofuels. In its view, “the 
development of Second Generation biofuels should proceed as quickly as 
possible, given the limitations of first generation biofuels. It is however important 
that due consideration is given before approval of any such products for supply 
in the UK, as to whether such fuels can be distributed to, and retailed in, all part 
of the country without creating constraints that could adversely impact on local 
communities” (HITRANS, 2008, p. 3).  
 
By contrast, the regional development agency representing the industrial cluster 
in the other territory advocated leaving the RTFO unchanged. The industrial 
cluster was hosting several biofuel suppliers whose number was expected to 
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rise provided further support (North East RSB, 2008, p. 2). The response of this 
local government authority largely shared the same exact text of the responses 
of the two industry associations representing the same industrial cluster. In their 
responses, they warned that “the importance to prospective investors of stability 
and the ability to make reasonable predictions about the marketplace should not 
be underestimated” (NEPIC, 2008, p. 2; North East Biofuels, 2008, p. 1; North 
East RSB, 2008, p. 2). By slowing down the targets, the UK Government would 
“create a very serious issue with trust”58, as would “leave existing and potential 
investors wondering if they can rely on any Government target in making an 
investment decision” (NEPIC, 2008, p. 2; North East Biofuels, 2008, p. 1; North 
East RSB, 2008, p. 2). Therefore, the RTFO should be left unchanged because 
that was “the basis on which the fuel industry and biofuel investors have laid 
their plans” (NEPIC, 2008, p. 2; North East Biofuels, 2008, p. 1; North East 
RSB, 2008, p. 3). Then, they lamented that “those who seek to portray a 
slowdown as exercise of the ‘precautionary principle’ should remember that 
climate change will not slow down while we engage in protracted intellectual 
debate, and there is nothing ‘precautionary’ about delaying CO2 emissions 
reduction” (NEPIC, 2008, p. 2; North East Biofuels, 2008, p. 1; North East RSB, 
2008, p. 3). About second-generation biofuels, this local government authority 
and the two industry associations representing members in the same industrial 
cluster sustained that “prior to talk of second generation biofuels, the UK ... 
must have a productive, profitable and sustainable first generation industry” 
(NEPIC, 2008, p. 4; North East Biofuels, 2008, p. 4; North East RSB, 2008, p. 
4). In their view, “the UK should aspire ... to be a hub of international 
development in biofuels technology into the long-term future, building on a 
successful introduction of first generation biofuels” (NEPIC, 2008, p. 4; North 
East Biofuels, 2008, p. 4; North East RSB, 2008, p. 4). Concerning second-
generation biofuels, the double rewards were “welcome but not adequate”, as 
“the levels of support should be adjusted accordingly to the level of 
development of the technology, to give more support to those less developed” 
(NEPIC, 2008, p. 4; North East Biofuels, 2008, p. 4; North East RSB, 2008, p. 
4).  
                                            
58
 Text underlined in the original response. 
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10. Non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) 
 
Seven NDPBs participated in the consultation. Four were environmental 
protection agencies (Envrionmental Agency [EA], 2008; Natural England [NE], 
2008; Scottish Environment Protection Agency [SEPA], 2008; Scottish Natural 
Heritage [SNH], 2008), one was dedicated to the promotion of energy saving 
solutions (Energy Saving Trust [EST], 2008), one was dedicated to the 
promotion of industrial non-food crop uses, including the production of biofuels 
for transport (National Non-Food Crops Centre [NNFCC], 2008b), and one was 
the RTFO administrator and author of the Gallagher Review (Renewable Fuels 
Agency [RFA], 2008b). 
 
The four environmental NDPBs supported the UK Government’s decision to 
follow the Gallagher Review’s recommendation to slowdown biofuel targets and 
agreed with the arguments sustaining it. One of them agreed that “if a 
moratorium was imposed on the UK biofuel industry at this stage, this would 
seriously undermine the potential for future investment in this area and would 
not address the risk of further increasing emissions from the transport sector” 
(NE, 2008, p. 3). Furthermore, as another one explained, “while there could be 
immediate environmental benefits to a freeze, we came to the conclusion that in 
the medium term freezing the obligation level at 2.5 per cent could be 
counterproductive. On the one hand, even though the UK is potentially an 
important market, a freeze is unlikely to have a significant impact on the 
expansion of the biofuel industry globally. On the other hand, the UK and the 
EU have led on developing policies for biofuels that integrate sustainability 
requirements, and this leverage should not be lost. To maintain commitment 
from the industry in the development and production of sustainable biofuels and 
create a momentum for the adoption of sustainability criteria across producer 
countries, we believe it is important that the UK and EU markets offer 
opportunities for continued growth and profitability” (SNH, 2008, p. 3). However, 
a review on the environmental implications of the policy and the imposition of a 
mandatory sustainability standard system were seen as necessary 
requirements for justifying biofuel policy. As explained by one environmental 
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NDPB, “it is clear that there are significant risks even at this level of support. 
This recommendation should, therefore, only be pursued on condition that 
sustainability standards in the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) are 
strengthened, sustainability and greenhouse gas emission reporting is made 
mandatory, and a review is conducted to investigate the impacts of biofuel 
policy on the wider bioenergy sector” (EA, 2008, p. 1). As stressed by another 
environmental NDPB, “with many biofuels there are associated serious risks to 
increasing greenhouse gas emissions, air pollution, land use change, loss of 
biodiversity, habitat loss, desertification, landslides and other environmental 
damage from use of pesticides, or increased acidification and/or eutrophication 
from increased use of fertilisers” (SEPA, 2008, p. 1). That considered, “slowing 
the rate of increase of obligation levels will allow time for [developing] controls 
to protect against unsustainable direct or indirect land use change resulting 
from an increased use of biofuels in the UK” (SEPA, 2008, p. 1). 
 
The two environmental NDPBs that replied to the questions about how to 
support second-generation biofuels warned that these were not all necessarily 
sustainable and advocated a rewarding system discriminating technologies 
according to their GHG abatement performances (EA, 2008; SNH, 2008). One 
of them sustained that a “key policy objective … should be to 
facilitate/incentivise the industry to invest in new technologies or transform the 
sourcing of its feedstock to more sustainable supplies to create a sustainable 
industry” (SNH, 2008, p. 8). To that objective, “the development of second 
generation biofuels, which rely on a wider feedstocks base and achieve greater 
greenhouse gas savings, should be encouraged” (SNH, 2008, p. 8). This said, 
“second generation biofuels should not be presumed sustainable”, as the 
production of dedicated feedstocks for second-generation biofuels, although 
enabling a “more efficient use of the land than for first generation biofuels, it 
could still displace other land uses” (SNH, 2008, p. 8). Therefore, “sustainability 
criteria and minimum greenhouse gas savings performance should remain the 
only discriminating factors”, with support given to the “most carbon- and 
resource-efficient uses, noting sustainability criteria” (SNH, 2008, p. 8). Sharing 
the same views, the other environmental NDPB similarly pointed out that “the 
objective should be to encourage biofuels that deliver higher GHG emission 
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savings than current biofuels, either through increased efficiency or through 
minimising the risk of direct and indirect land use change. Second generation 
biofuels may or may not deliver this objective. Failing to define this term may 
therefore result in poor performing biofuels being incentivised simply because 
they employ a new technology in their production or processing. The term 
should therefore be clearly defined as a biofuel that delivers a GHG emission 
saving above a certain percentage (e.g. 90%), or that comes from a feedstock 
that is grown on marginal land or sea” (EA, 2008, p. 3). 
 
The NDPB focused on the promotion of energy savings solutions recommended 
a freezing of the RTFO. Mentioning the Gallagher Review, this NDPB reminded 
that “existing policy could lead to destruction of environmentally sensitive lands 
with a detrimental impact for biodiversity and a perverse increase in greenhouse 
gas emissions” (EST, 2008, p. 2). Therefore, any increase in support to biofuels 
should be subjected to the contemporaneous enforcement of a sustainability 
standards system capable to prevent the negative environmental and socio-
economic implications of biofuels. Only once such a system will be operative 
and no evidence about environmental concerns is found, biofuel policy could 
proceed cautiously as recommended by the Gallagher Review (EST, 2008, p. 
2). This NDPB acknowledged that “changing the level of the obligation (to that 
originally planned) risks undermining the signal set to industry for medium term 
business planning”. However, “the urgency of climate change makes this a risk 
worth taking” (EST, 2008, p. 3). According to this NDPB, “the main priority 
should be to improve efficiency of the transport sector through: consumers 
choosing ‘best in class’, tighter vehicle standards, smarter driving techniques, 
and low carbon alternatives to the car” (EST, 2008, p. 1). About second-
generation biofuels, this NDPB agreed on a rewarding system based on GHG 
abatement performances being a preferable option in principle (EST, 2008, p. 
5). 
 
The NDPB administrating the RTFO and author of the Gallagher Review 
reconfirmed “the view [as previously expressed in the review] that a reduction 
from the targeted use of biofuels is appropriate given the considerable 
uncertainties on the overall impacts of biofuels”, and agreed “with the intent of 
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the Government’s proposals to reduce the increase in targets” (RFA, 2008b, p. 
1). This NDPB also reconfirmed that “global biofuels targets should be reined in 
whilst adequate controls are put in place to address both direct and indirect 
impacts of production. However ... the industry should be allowed to grow, albeit 
more slowly, to ensure continued investment” (RFA, 2008b, p. 4). Again 
reiterating its Gallagher Review, this NDPB pointed out that advanced biofuels 
“are currently immature, expensive and will require specific incentives to 
accelerate their market penetrations” (RFA, 2008b, p. 9). About how to 
stimulate their development, this NDPB reckoned that, in principle, a rewarding 
system should be based on the sustainability of the feedstocks, rather than the 
particular technology employed (RFA, 2008b, p. 9). However, it also objected 
that rewarding biofuels according to their carbon savings would require solving 
several difficulties. More specifically, legal and technical problems may arise in 
enforcing a complex system of standards based on several measures, as well 
as, in ensuring its monitoring by the 2010 deadline imposed by the EU 
Directives (RFA, 2008b, p. 10). 
 
The NDPB promoting industrial uses of non-food crops was the only NDPB 
backing the option to leave the RTFO unchanged. Jointly funded by the UK 
Government, an industrial sponsor and a subscriber base, this NDPB has been 
“established to help realise the potential of renewable fuels, energy and 
materials by supporting and promoting the delivery of sustainable non-food crop 
products and technologies” (NNFCC, 2008b, p. 1). While agreeing with the UK 
Government that “policies should address possible adverse consequences of 
production of the wrong biofuels”, this NDPB sustained that “it is also vital to 
remember that biofuels can offer substantial greenhouse gas savings, reduce 
dependence on foreign oil and provide economic benefits” (NNFCC, 2008b, p. 
4). Accordingly, “the priority needs to be to get UK targets in line with the 
Renewable Energy Directive and the RTFO Order should therefore be left 
unchanged in respect of obligation levels until there is a complete plan for the 
implementation of the Renewable Energy Directive” (NNFCC, 2008b, p. 4). By 
contrast, “reducing the obligation level for 2009/10 is clearly likely to be a further 
blow to the confidence of the industry and to potential investors (at a time when 
investor confidence is very low across the economy)” (NNFCC, 2008b, p. 4). 
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Besides, “it would be seen as casting official doubt on the 10% target which is 
set out in the Renewable Energy Directive” (NNFCC, 2008b, p. 4). Even a 
slowdown as recommended by the Gallagher Review was seen as not striking 
the “appropriate balance, particularly in the light of recent economic 
developments” (NNFCC, 2008b, p. 4). This NDPB contested that there was “no 
analysis - in the Gallagher Review, the Impact Assessment included in the 
present consultation or elsewhere – that provides persuasive evidence that this 
change would bring a real benefit. Indeed it seems likely that there will be no 
appreciable impact on the volumes of biofuels produced outside the UK or on 
the methods of production or choice of feedstock. The only impact is likely to be 
on UK production, which the RFA’s initial monitoring confirms is far more likely 
clearly to meet sustainability standards than is production in other parts of the 
world” (NNFCC, 2008b, p. 5). 
 
About second-generation biofuels, this NDPB reckoned that “it was perfectly 
possible that advanced technologies could have a real presence in the market 
by 2020” (NNFCC, 2008b, p. 11). Nevertheless, “formidable obstacles” needed 
to be overcome. In particular, “many of the technologies have capital costs well 
in excess of those for current bioethanol and biodiesel technologies. They are 
also, by definition, new and developmental. This would present a challenge in 
obtaining finance even in the most favourable circumstances” (NNFCC, 2008b, 
p. 11). In such a scenario, “to obtain the necessary financial support at this time 
of credit constraint and in the face of apparent Government cooling towards 
renewable fuels will be a much greater obstacle” (NNFCC, 2008b, p. 11). 
Furthermore, in order to make sure that investment in advanced technologies 
would take place in the UK and the EU – rather than elsewhere in the world, 
incentives should be made as much as possible substantial and credible. For 
that aim, “the double rewards proposed in the RED are not the most appropriate 
or effective means to widen the available range of biofuel technologies” 
(NNFCC, 2008b, p. 11). Since the main purposes of the RED and the RTFO are 
to deliver “environmental benefits by bringing the right renewable fuels to the 
market in the greatest possible volumes”, it would be more “appropriate that the 
rewards attracted by a biofuel relate to the extent to which it delivers the desired 
benefits, not to whether it carries a ‘second generation’ label” (NNFCC, 2008b, 
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p. 11). For that purpose, “it would be more useful to reward increased 
greenhouse gas savings on a sliding scale [and] … where possible … [taking 
into account] the extent to which different technologies and products require 
support”, so as to ensure support also to more innovative technologies 
(NNFCC, 2008b, p. 11). Especially for these latter, “double rewards are unlikely 
to be sufficient to leverage the required investment” (NNFCC, 2008b, p. 11). As 
currently proposed, double rewards would be then an “insufficiently precise 
instrument”, as they would set “the level of reward unnecessarily high for some 
current technologies and too low for developing, capital intensive technologies” 
(NNFCC, 2008b, p. 11).  
 
 
3. The UK Government: the summaries of responses 
 
In the summaries of responses (DfT, 2009c; 2009d), the UK Government 
substantially reconfirmed its previous positions: (1) that preserving current 
biofuel targets was a requirement to have better biofuels in the future; and (2) 
that slowing down such targets was striking the best solution between industry 
interests and environmental concerns. 
 
The UK Government rejected a freezing or a total moratorium of the RTFO as 
they would “hinder the development of a sustainable industry and deter 
investment required to meet future renewable energy targets for transport” (DfT, 
2009c, p. 6). Such options “would not be in the longer term environmental 
interest given the potential for good biofuels to develop and play a role in 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions” (DfT, 2009c, p. 6). Furthermore, an on-
going RTFO scheme coupled with a carbon and sustainability reporting 
mechanism would allow gathering “better data about the origin and 
environmental characteristics of biofuels” (DfT, 2009c, p. 7). Through such an 
improved data gathering, the UK could “play a key role and influence the 
development of a methodology to address indirect impacts” (DfT, 2009c, p. 7). 
 
Nevertheless, the UK Government acknowledged the risk that the overall 
impact of current biofuel policy could turn out to be negative. Therefore, “a 
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cautious approach is of most benefit to the longer term development of a 
sustainable biofuel industry to help us meet … [EU] targets” (DfT, 2009c, p. 6). 
It then reaffirmed its proposal to slow down the increases of the RTFO in line 
with the Gallagher Review’s recommendations – although in the awareness that 
doing so would mean posing a further “challenge” for the UK’s biofuel industry 
called “helping the UK to meet the 10% renewable energy targets for transport 
by 2020” (DfT, 2009c, p. 6). 
 
Facing an almost unanimous agreement over rewarding biofuels according to 
their performances in reducing GHG emissions, the UK Government somewhat 
retreated from its initial agreement on that point. More specifically, it pointed at 
the constraints imposed by EU biofuel policy as an implicit justification for not 
taking a clear commitment in this regard. The UK Government acknowledged 
second-generation biofuels as capable to avoid the indirect impacts associated 
with some first-generation biofuels. However, it reminded that the issue of how 
to support these technologies is a matter where the UK has to abide by EU 
regulations. In particular, the introduction of a double reward for second-
generation biofuels was a requirement imposed by the EU Directive on 
Renewable Energy. However, it announced that the issue was subject to further 
future consultation (DfT, 2009d, pp. 5-6). 
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Chapter 6 – Stakeholders’ visions on UK biofuel policy 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter identifies and compares the visions on biofuel policy that were 
competing at the time when the UK Government adopted its current vision on 
biofuel policy. It then reflects on how the UK Government’s responsibilities in 
technology policy have affected its choice of which visions to select and 
marginalise within that vision. 
 
The chapter has five sections. Section 1 briefly reviews the literature on public 
engagement mechanisms and, more specifically, on stakeholders’ opinions on 
UK biofuel policy. Section 2 summarises the main policy proposals of the biofuel 
policy consultation under analysis. Section 3 illustrates consultation participants’ 
visions on UK biofuel policy. Section 4 compares the UK Government’s vision 
with those of the consultation participants to determine which visions the UK 
Government selected and/or marginalised in the consultation. Section 5 relates 
disagreements on how to envision UK biofuel policy to disagreements on what 
the UK Government’s policymaking responsibilities in technology policy ought to 
be. 
 
 
1. Literature on public engagement mechanisms 
 
Over the last 20 years academic as well as policymaking circles have 
extensively discussed the benefits and challenges of public engagement with 
science (Irwin, 2014, p. 71; Stilgoe et al., 2014, pp. 4-5). Within the literature on 
public engagement with science (PES), analysts have confronted the limits of 
public consultation initiatives in terms of issue framing, over-short deadlines, as 
well the tendency of experts to dismiss inputs from the public because they 
show knowledge deficits (Irwin, 2014, pp. 71-73). A core discussion within this 
literature concerns the limits, challenges and solutions to overcome the “deficit 
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model” – i.e. a widely held belief that presumes the public is not in possession 
of the appropriate expertise/knowledge to make policy decisions, and that 
narrows down public engagement in terms of unidirectional transfers of 
information between expert and the non-expert public (Irwin, 2014, pp. 71-73; 
Sturgis, 2014, p. 38). In an effort to move “from deficit to democracy”, a “two 
way dialogue” between science experts and the public should be sought instead 
(Irwin, 2014, pp. 71-73; Sturgis, 2014, p. 38). This stance is grounded in the 
“recognition that publics possess important local knowledge and the capacity to 
understand technical information sufficiently to participate in policy decisions” 
(Burgess, 2014, p. 48). Nevertheless, moving “from high theory to complex and 
messy practice” remains an “awkward transition”, hampered by several 
difficulties (Sturgis, 2014, p. 38). More focused on those practical difficulties is 
an emerging literature that aims at evaluating public engagement methods in 
terms of procedural as well as substantive effectiveness – i.e. in terms of the 
fairness and efficiency of the process/mechanism in achieving its intended 
purpose (Rowe & Frewer, 2000, p. 10; 2004, pp. 517-541; 2005, p. 262; Rowe 
et al., 2005, p. 332; Rowe et al., 2008, p. 420). Identifying appropriate sets of 
criteria through which to evaluate public engagement mechanisms is the core 
aim of this literature (Rowe & Frewer, 2000, p. 10; 2004, p. 513; 2005, p. 253). 
 
Engaging in a theoretical discussion on the benefits and challenges of public 
engagement, and/or in a comprehensive evaluation of biofuel consultations as 
public engagement mechanisms is beyond the scope of my research. I analyse 
the fourth consultation on UK biofuel policy to investigate which visions the UK 
Government marginalised and selected around the time when it endorsed its 
current vision on UK biofuels policy. For my cross-sectional analysis, two 
investigations are particularly relevant as they specifically looked at 
stakeholders’ opinions on UK biofuel policy. These analyses are reported in the 
next section. 
 
1.1 Literature on stakeholders’ opinions on UK biofuel policy 
 
Not much literature can be found on stakeholders’ opinions on UK biofuel 
policy. As pointed out by the investigators of one of the two analyses discussed 
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here: “As of early 2010, there remains little research on biofuel stakeholder 
opinion per se, outside of the grey literature” (Upham et al., 2011, p. 2670) – i.e. 
“there is little literature, academic or otherwise, on stakeholder opinion 
differences with respect to biofuels” (Upham & Tomei, 2010, p. 9) – and this 
remains so in early 2014. 
 
Particularly relevant for my analysis is an investigation of the second and third 
consultations on UK biofuel policy – i.e. the two consultations preceding the one 
analysed here (Upham & Tomei, 2010, pp. 3-4; Upham et al., 2011, p. 2670). 
The second consultation sought views on the design of the Renewable 
Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO), while the third consulted on the system of 
sustainability standards accompanying the RTFO. The investigators found that 
“NGO [non-governmental organisation] voices have been given little weight in 
the design of the RTFO” (Upham & Tomei, 2010, pp. 3-5, 11). In particular, “the 
RTFO development process had marginalised most of the environment and 
development NGOs” (Upham & Tomei, 2010, p. 10). They further contended 
that “it is clear that, despite initial and early support by NGOs for biofuels pre-
2007, RTFO carbon and sustainability policy has latterly reflected the interests 
of the DfT [Department for Transport] and organisations with an interest in 
motor vehicle-based mobility, interests that biofuels readily mesh with” (Upham 
et al., 2011, p. 2673). Relevant for my cross-sectional analysis is also an 
investigation of a consortium of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that 
lobbied for restricting the use of biofuels after 2007. The investigators inferred 
that NGOs’ opposition was successful in driving the UK Government to launch 
the Gallagher Review in 2008 and eventually slow down UK biofuel targets in 
2009 (Pilgrim & Harvey, 2010, Paragraphs 4.17-4.18). This conclusion seems 
then to partially contradict that of the previous investigation, which instead 
noticed a marginalisation of NGOs’ views. 
 
The UK Government – via the DfT – launched the fourth consultation on biofuel 
policy on the 15th October 2008. The fourth consultation sought views on the 
UK Government’s proposal to slow down UK biofuel targets in 2009. Through a 
distinctive perspective focused on statements of expectations on technologies 
and policies, my analysis reveals that the UK Government partially marginalised 
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NGOs’ views in the fourth consultation too. As I will argue, the UK 
Government’s decisions to marginalise NGOs’ views and enforce a slowdown in 
UK biofuel targets can be related to a policy-promise lock-in. 
 
 
2. The fourth consultation on UK biofuel policy 
  
The fourth consultation on UK biofuel policy consisted of two parts: Part 1 – 
Future levels under the RTFO; and Part 2 – Longer-term issues related to 
transposition of the European Directives. 
 
The first part of the consultation proposed changes affecting short-term support 
for producers of first-generation biofuels. Mirroring the options analysed in the 
Gallagher Review, the UK Government structured Part 1 of the consultation as 
a choice between leaving the RTFO’s rates unchanged (Option 1), “freezing” 
the RTFO at the initial rate of 2.5% (Option 2), or slowing down the RTFO’s 
rates as recommended by the Gallagher Review (Option 3). In line with the 
recommendations of the Gallagher Review, the UK Government promoted the 
slowdown option, excluding a priory the option of a total moratorium on UK 
biofuel policy. To be accepted, the slowdown option required consensus on the 
three expectations at the core of the UK Government’s vision on biofuel policy: 
(1) the expectation that second-generation biofuels would overcome the 
problems of first-generation biofuels; (2) the expectation of sustainability 
standards being effective and efficient in ensuring the sustainability of biofuels; 
and (3) the expectation of continued support for first-generation biofuel industry 
as a requirement for second-generation biofuels. This last expectation in 
particular stirred up disagreements among consultation participants. 
 
The second part of the consultation contemplated future changes in EU biofuel 
policy intended to encourage investors to invest in second-generation biofuels. 
The UK Government invited participants to comment on how to improve support 
for second-generation biofuels and, in particular, on the European 
Commission’s proposal to double-reward second-generation biofuels to favour 
their development. To be accepted, this proposal required a consensus 
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primarily on the expectation of second-generation biofuels being 
environmentally superior to first-generation biofuels. Furthermore, to work in 
practice, the proposal needed clear and undisputed definitions of what was 
meant by “first generation” and “second generation” biofuels. Not all participants 
agreed that second-generation biofuels were or would be unquestionably 
superior to first-generation biofuels, while the classification of biofuels into 
generations was a highly contested issue. By contrast, there was general 
agreement with rewarding biofuels according to their performance in reducing 
GHG emissions. Within such a reward system, if second-generation biofuels 
proved to be superior to first-generation biofuels – however their classification 
was defined – the former would be automatically advantaged over the latter. 
Furthermore, as financial support would be calibrated to the environmental 
performance of any biofuel – independently of its technological classification – 
such a rewarding system would effectively eliminate the need to classify 
biofuels as first- and second-generation. The general consensus on a 
technology-neutral reward system was, however, driven by very different 
reasons. 
 
Variously affected by the proposals under consultation, the participants 
attempted to influence the UK Government by advocating their own visions on 
UK biofuel policy, as illustrated in the next section. 
 
3. Visions on UK biofuel policy: UK stakeholders and the UK Government 
 
The UK Government proposed three alternative options for biofuel support: 
maintaining it as previously set, freezing it at current levels, or slowing it down. 
Participants opted for the policy option more aligned with their own visions on 
UK biofuel policy. In the following, I subdivide participants according to the 
policy option they supported and summarise their visions as expressed in their 
responses. The resulting three groups of participants are named in relation to 
the policy option they supported: pro-biofuels are those recommending to 
maintain support as currently set, anti-biofuels are those recommending to 
freeze biofuel support and precautionary approach are those recommending to 
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slow down biofuel policy (see Graph 6). At the end of this section, I summarise 
the stance taken by the UK Government after the consultation. 
 
Graph 6: consultation participants by option supported 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: 
Proximity to the centre emphasises how well participants described their own 
vision on UK biofuel policy in their response, the participants closer to the 
centre providing the most comprehensive descriptions.  
 
Responses not available for analysis: 
The DfT omitted the response of a biofuel producer – Good Fuel Cooperative 
& Golden Fuels – and the response of an industry association representing 
the bus, coach and light rail industries – the Confederation of Passenger 
Transport. Also unavailable for this research are the twenty-two responses 
from the “members of the public” who participated in the consultation. 
However, according to the summaries of responses, the members of the 
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3.1 Pro-biofuels 
 
Advocating to leave the RTFO unchanged – or rather to increase its rates, the 
twenty-eight participants of this group strongly rejected the slowdown option 
and, even more so, the freezing option (see also Graph 6): 
 
- eight biofuel producers (Argent, 2008; British Sugar, 2008; 
Convert2Green, 2008; Ensus, 2008; Gasrec Ltd, 2008; Helius Energy, 
2008; Neste Oil, 2008; Vireol, 2008) 
- one prospective producer of second-generation biofuels (Energexia, 
2008) 
- seven industry associations representing biofuel producers (Biopower, 
2008; EBB, 2008; EIC, 2008; Lyondell Basell & EFOA, 2008; NEPIC, 
2008; North East Biofuels, 2008; REA, 2008) 
- three obligated suppliers (BP, 2008; Greenergy, 2008; Mabanaft, 2008) 
- one industry association representing the above obligated suppliers 
(AUKOI, 2008) 
- one non-departmental public body (NDPB) with the policy remit of 
promoting industrial uses of non-food crops, and many biofuel producers 
as members (NNFCC, 2008b) 
- two industrialists in other industries (Bentley, 2008; GM, 2008) 
- two industry associations of other businesses (NFU, 2008; SCOPA, 
2008) 
- one local government representing a biofuel industrial cluster in the UK 
(North East RSB, 2008) 
- one consultancy/adviser whose grant-providers are biofuel market 
operators (JouleVert, 2008)  
public submitted responses of identical content or very similar to those 
submitted by some NGOs. 
 
Responses not aligned with any policy option: 
A biofuel producer (Daka Biodiesel, 2008) and two industry associations 
representing the rendering industry (EFPRA, 2008; UKRA, 2008) only replied 
to one consultation question about the proposal to exclude animal fat (tallow) 
from the list of sustainable feedstocks for biofuels (question 19). These 
respondents did not comment on the other policy proposals. 
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- one academic (BRASS, 2008) 
 
More than others within this group, biofuel producers, obligated suppliers and 
their respective industry associations casted doubt on the evidence gathered 
and arguments supported by the Gallagher Review. Not dismissing 
environmental concerns, these participants maintained nevertheless that the 
Gallagher Review’s argument that first-generation biofuels may have caused 
the food crisis at the beginning of the year was an overstatement disproved by 
facts – i.e. by the eventual recovery from that crisis and by recent research 
findings indicating that other factors were involved. 
 
Biofuel producers, obligated suppliers and their respective industry associations 
in particular promoted the expectation foreseeing current support for first-
generation biofuels as stimulating the UK biofuel industry to meet EU biofuel 
targets and to undertake future investments in technological innovation. They 
warned the UK Government about the negative impacts on its credibility and on 
investors’ confidence following such an unwelcome change in policy. Altering 
the RTFO only one year after its launch would undermine the long-term 
certainty demanded by the UK biofuel industry to invest in improvements to first-
generation biofuels and eventually in the development of second-generation 
biofuels. Thus, as implicit rationale for that expectation, the UK Government had 
to maintain the trust of the industry to preserve technology policy effective in 
stimulating techno-scientific advancement. The current financial crisis, the fierce 
competition with biofuels from abroad and a drafting error in the RTFO were 
mentioned as issues already putting strain on the UK domestic biofuel market, 
which therefore did not need further uncertainty fuelled by an unpredictable 
policy. Added to that, future EU biofuel targets were set high and not very far in 
the future, thus urging a harmonisation between higher EU and lower UK 
targets. By contrast, a freezing or, to a lesser extent, a slowdown of UK biofuel 
targets would have detrimental effects on the UK biofuel industry, which would 
be discouraged from investing in new technologies and/or in converting the 
sourcing of biofuel feedstock to more sustainable supplies, thus compromising 
the creation of a sustainable biofuel market. The domestic industry of first-
generation biofuels would fall and with it an important technological bridge for 
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facilitating the development and introduction of second-generation biofuels. 
Meanwhile, R&D of biofuels would migrate to other countries. As a result, the 
UK would lose its leadership in setting sustainability standards internationally 
and its influence on EU biofuel policy. Least but not last, while severely affecting 
the still emerging UK biofuel industry, such measures would have hardly any 
impact on the global scale. 
 
First-generation biofuels were promoted as capable of substantial GHG savings 
and as the only sustainable alternative to transport fossil fuels available in the 
short-medium term – and, thus, for fulfilling EU targets. Meanwhile, future 
sustainability standards were optimistically foreseen as effective in addressing 
the environmental concerns related to their production. Therefore, any reduction 
in support would be inappropriate, since it would have meant losing the 
opportunity for important carbon savings.  
 
By contrast, second-generation biofuels were not promoted as necessarily 
superior to first-generation biofuels in either environmental or socio-economic 
terms. As opposed to already viable first generation, second-generation biofuels 
were instead downplayed as needing a long time to become commercially 
viable and not necessarily performing better than the previous generation, even 
in environmental terms. Particularly concerned about the prospect of a shift in 
support from first-generation to second-generation biofuels, biofuel producers 
and obligated suppliers within this group insisted that the decision about which 
biofuel technologies to develop should have be left to their discretion by 
enforcing a technology-neutral approach in policy. 
 
3.2 Anti-biofuels 
 
Advocating to freeze the RTFO – or rather a total moratorium on biofuel policy, 
the ten participants of this group rejected the slowdown option and even more 
so the option to leave the RTFO unchanged (see also Graph 6): 
 
- six NGOs (CAFOD, 2008; Econexus, 2008; FoE, 2008; Greenpeace, 
2008; Oxfam GB, 2008; RSPB, 2008) 
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- one NDPB with the promotion of energy saving solutions as policy remit 
(EST, 2008)  
- three local government authorities (HIE, 2008; Highland Council, 2008; 
HITRANS, 2008) 
 
Within this group, NGOs stressed that in the absence of effective sustainability 
standards, biofuel expansion would increase the amount of carbon released into 
the atmosphere, thus contradicting the core aim of biofuel policy. Furthermore, it 
would compromise living standards in developing countries and negatively 
affect wildlife. Uncontrolled large-scale production of biofuels would result in 
adverse effects such as increasing direct and indirect changes in land use 
leading to increased deforestation, biodiversity losses and ultimately increased 
carbon emissions, as well as worsening of food crises, land grabbing and 
human rights abuses in developing countries.  
 
Two NGOs in particular objected to the Gallagher Review’s argument that a 
moratorium on biofuel policy would reduce the ability of the industry to invest in 
new technologies and/or to transform the sourcing of its feedstock into more 
sustainable supplies. For these NGOs, the implicit rationale sustaining that 
expectation – i.e. maintaining the trust of the industry as a requirement to keep 
technology policy effective in stimulating techno-scientific advancement – risked 
instead producing an adverse outcome. Although the distribution and blending 
infrastructure could be shared, the production processes of first-generation 
biofuels were completely different from those of second-generation biofuels. 
Furthermore, the emergence of second-generation biofuels would render the 
previous generation obsolete. In arguing this, these NGOs implicitly alluded to 
the likely resistance of the first-generation industry to the adoption of new 
technologies once it had established previous technologies. In such a context, 
preserving biofuel targets as currently set could lead to a technological lock-in 
to first-generation technologies, by creating special interest groups, even within 
agriculture, that may become dependent on first-generation biofuels and then 
resist the introduction of the second generation. Furthermore, withdrawing the 
RTFO would have hardly affected multinationals in biofuel production. At the 
same time, it would have been senseless to keep the RTFO only to protect the 
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profit of a small-scale UK-based industry, considering the huge negative 
environmental and social impacts of biofuels. Policy support should have been 
redirected instead to cheaper and more effective emission abatement 
alternatives and directly to R&D into newer technologies. Thus, maintaining the 
promises made to the first-generation biofuel industry was not a requirement for 
the UK Government to avoid discouraging any potential investor in undertaking 
investments in second-generation biofuels. It was rather an unjustified and risky 
policy. 
 
NGOs strongly downplayed the expectation of sustainability standards being 
able to contain the negative implications of the production of both first- and 
second-generation biofuels. Present and future sustainability standards – i.e. 
those in the RTFO and those announced in the EU Directives – were deemed 
insufficient and ineffective in containing both the environmental and the socio-
economic drawbacks of biofuel production. Limitations at the global, regional 
and even local levels impeded an effective implementation, monitoring and 
enforcing of any system of sustainability standards. Independently of the 
effectiveness of such systems, it remained a fact that current biofuels were 
produced outside of any mandatory system of sustainability standard. Thus, as 
currently set, the RTFO would be harming, without any guarantee of carbon 
savings. 
 
NGOs also downplayed the expectation that second-generation biofuels were 
superior to first-generation biofuels in both environmental and socio-economic 
terms. Although preferring second-generation to first-generation biofuels, NGOs 
warned that they should not be presumed to be sustainable, given that they 
could still displace land. To ensure sustainability, the rewarding system should 
have been linked to GHG abatement performance, while taking into account the 
overall impacts of the technologies. Such a technology neutral rewarding 
system – coupled with additional measures such as mandatory minimum 
standards to prevent unwanted indirect effects on food production and working 
conditions in developing countries – would have avoided the problems of 
discriminating between first- and second-generation biofuels. 
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3.3 Precautionary approach 
 
Advocating to slow down the RTFO, the twenty-five participants of this group 
agreed with the Gallagher Review that this option would strike the right balance 
between environmental concerns and industry needs (see also Graph 6): 
 
- one NDPB administering the RTFO and author of the Gallagher Review 
(RFA, 2008b) 
- four NDPBs with environmental policy remits (EA, 2008; NE, 2008; 
SEPA, 2008; SNH, 2008) 
- four obligated suppliers (Chevron, 2008; Conoco Phillips, 2008; Ineos, 
2008; Shell, 2008)  
- one industry association representing two of the above obligated 
suppliers (UKPIA, 2008) 
- one consultancy (Germserv Ltd, 2008) 
- two academics (RAE, 2008; Sussex Energy Group, 2008) 
- one industry association representing fuel distributors in the transport 
sector – not obligated suppliers (FPS, 2008) 
- two industrialists of other businesses (E.ON, 2008; EDF, 2008) 
- five industry associations of other businesses (AIC, 2008; Croda et al., 
2008; FDF, 2008; RSSB, 2008; SMMT, 2008) 
- one NGO (WWF, 2008). 
- one producer of pure plant oil from rapeseed – a type of biofuel not 
currently supported by the RTFO, and different from those of the other 
biofuel producers (Verdant Fuel Ltd, 2008). 
- two private clubs representing vehicle owners (FBHVC, 2008; RAC 
Foudation, 2008) 
 
More than others within this group, obligated suppliers and their industry 
associations supported the expectation that current support for first-generation 
biofuels would stimulate potential investors to invest in technological innovation 
– especially in second-generation biofuels. UK and EU markets should keep 
offering opportunities for continued growth and profitability in the biofuel market 
in order to maintain the industry’s commitment to developing and producing 
sustainable biofuels and to create momentum for the adoption of sustainability 
criteria across producer countries. Thus, as implicit rationale for that 
expectation, the UK Government had to maintain the trust of the industry as a 
requirement to preserve a technology policy effective in stimulating the techno-
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scientific advancement. By contrast, a freezing or, worse, a moratorium at this 
early stage of biofuel policy would seriously undermine the potential for future 
investment in this area, and not address the risk of further increasing emissions 
from the transport sector. In addition, a freezing or a moratorium would reduce 
the UK’s influence in promoting biofuel policies that integrate sustainability 
requirements at the international level, which would have an insignificant impact 
on the expansion of the biofuel industry globally. 
 
Within this group, NDPBs in particular acknowledged that there were significant 
risks at the current level of support. Many biofuels would risk increasing 
greenhouse gas emissions, air pollution, land-use-change, biodiversity losses, 
desertification, landslides and other environmental damages, such as 
acidification and/or eutrophication of waters. All these environmental drawbacks 
warranted the enforcement of a mandatory system of sustainability standards 
and future reviews of the environmental implications of biofuel policy. 
Notwithstanding the complexity and uncertainty involved, sustainability 
standards were nevertheless optimistically promoted as effective and efficient in 
containing the negative implications of first- and second-generation biofuels.  
 
More than others within this group, NDPBs remained cautious about the 
expectation that second-generation biofuels were superior to first-generation 
biofuels in both environmental and socio-economic terms. Second-generation 
should not be presumed to be sustainable since they could still displace land 
and then cause indirect effects. That taken into consideration, biofuel policy 
should aim to redirect investments towards innovation in advanced technologies 
as a matter of priority. For this aim, sustainability criteria and minimum GHG 
savings should be the discriminating factors when deciding the amount of 
support to give to a specific technology as opposed to unclear definitions of 
biofuel generations. As such, a rewarding mechanism linked to sustainability 
standards and GHG emission performance should be preferred to the double 
reward, which is a blunt and ineffective instrument. Only one NDPB pointed out 
that such a rewarding system would require first overcoming several difficulties. 
As NDPBs, obligated suppliers advocated a technology-neutral approach in 
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policy, although they emphasised that the decision on whether and when to 
invest in newer generations of biofuels should be left to their discretion. 
 
3.4 The UK Government 
 
In the invitation document, the UK Government supported the slowdown option, 
while excluding a priory a moratorium on biofuel policy as an option (DfT, 
2008a). In the aftermath of the consultation, the UK Government reconfirmed its 
previous stance (DfT, 2009c; 2009d). Preserving the first-generation biofuel 
industry remained a requirement for the UK Government to ensure the fulfilment 
of current EU obligations. Furthermore, the UK Government justified continued 
support for the industry as a requirement for ensuring techno-scientific 
advancement in future generations of biofuels. A freezing or, worse, a 
moratorium in biofuel targets would have been counterproductive, as they would 
have reduced the ability of the industry to shift from first-generation biofuels to 
second-generation biofuels. The UK Government continued to support a 
slowdown as a solution that would buy some time to produce and enforce 
effective sustainability standards, while alleviating the negative impacts caused 
by a rapidly expanding first-generation biofuel industry. Even if going against 
the EU’s higher targets and not welcomed by the most of the UK biofuel, this 
solution still ensured a future for first-generation biofuels, while softening 
environmental concerns as raised by biofuel critics. The UK Government 
agreed with consultation participants that biofuels should be rewarded 
according to their environmental performance. Nevertheless, it reiterated that 
the matter of how to promote second-generation biofuels was subject to EU 
regulation – i.e. not under its direct responsibility. 
 
 
4. Which voices did the UK Government select and/or marginalise in the 
consultation? 
 
The similarity between the UK Government’s vision and those of biofuel 
technology innovators and their industry associations is remarkable. The RTFO 
placed responsibility for the implementation of sustainability standards on 
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biofuel technology innovators. For these latter, supporting the expectation on 
sustainability standards as efficient and effective in tackling the negative 
drawbacks of biofuel production was de-facto to show self-confidence in their 
ability to implement them. By promoting that same expectation, the UK 
Government endorsed biofuel technology innovators’ self-confidence. They also 
shared the implicit rationale maintaining the expectation of continued support as 
a prerequisite to promote the implementation of sustainability standards and 
techno-scientific advancement in biofuel technologies. Yet they had different 
priorities about which technologies to favour. Against pressing calls for a 
moratorium, the UK Government relied on the prospect of second-generation 
biofuels as the main justification for its current policy and presented current 
support to first-generation biofuels as primarily aimed to stimulate techno-
scientific advancement into newer biofuel generations. By contrast, biofuel 
technology innovators presented current support to first-generation biofuels as 
worthwhile per se – not only as a transitional measure to favour the emergence 
of second-generation biofuels. Furthermore, they insisted that the decision 
about which technologies to adopt should have been left to their discretion, and 
advocated a technology-neutral approach in rewarding biofuels. Biofuel 
producers in particular saw second-generation biofuels as a possible threat to 
their support. They tended to present second-generation biofuels as not 
necessarily superior to the first generation and far from coming into stream.59 By 
contrast, the majority of obligated suppliers tended to share the expectations 
that second-generation biofuels were environmentally superior and the current 
market of first-generation biofuels were a necessary technological bridge to 
techno-scientific advancement towards second-generation biofuels. Amidst 
these diverging views, the UK Government opted to share similar expectations 
to this latter group of biofuel technology innovators.  
 
Notable also is the similarity between the visions of NGOs and the 
Parliamentary Select Committees scrutinised in the historical analysis. Both 
believed that biofuel policy as currently set would risk offsetting any potential 
                                            
59
 These technology innovators objected that such definitions could have excluded highly 
sustainable technologies from support simply because they were defined as “first generation” – 
e.g. biodiesel from used cooked oils (UCO), and/or provided support to second-generation 
technologies whose environmental performances had yet to be fully proved. 
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benefit from second-generation biofuels – which they acknowledged as 
potentially superior – by aggravating damage from the first generation. NGOs 
and Parliamentary Select Committees strongly rejected as counterproductive 
the implicit rationale prescribing continued support for first-generation biofuels 
to favour the development of the second generation. By consolidating first-
generation biofuels into a socio-technical regime, this rationale – they argued – 
could lead to a technological lock-in to first-generation biofuels, thus preventing 
second-generation biofuels from coming on stream. Biofuel policy needed 
instead to redirect support to second-generation biofuels and to be immediately 
integrated with efficient and effective sustainability standards. NGOs and 
Parliamentary Select Committees also agreed on sustainability standards, 
strongly criticising the delay in their enforcement, and doubting their supposed 
enhanced effectiveness in the future. 
 
By contrast, NDPBs advocated the rationale justifying current support and 
showed optimism regarding both second-generation biofuels and sustainability 
standards. Although stressing the importance of preserving the environmental 
objectives of biofuel policy as the main priority, NDPBs shared the UK 
Government’s view about a biofuel policy slowdown as a sufficiently 
precautionary measure to tackle current negative issues. The NDPBs’ vision 
was more optimistic than the NGOs’ about finding solutions to the 
environmental concerns in the short-medium term, while marginalising the 
socio-economic implications of biofuels in developing countries. The vision of 
NDPBs thus appears more concerned with domestic than international issues – 
as opposed to that of the NGOs. Like the NDPBs, the UK Government failed to 
comment explicitly on the argument about first-generation biofuels consolidating 
into a socio-technical regime preventing the development of the second 
generation, and marginalised this concern in its vision on UK biofuel policy. 
 
To conclude, participants – or “stakeholders” – disagreed substantially on UK 
biofuel policy, not just between groups (e.g. biofuel producers and NGOs), but 
also within groups (e.g. obligated suppliers). Variously affected by the three 
policy options proposed in the consultation, participants opted for the one most 
aligned with their own visions on UK biofuel policy. Between the extremes of 
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leaving the RTFO unchanged and freezing it, slowing it down looked like a 
measure to conciliate biofuel supporters and critics. By endorsing this option, 
the UK Government appeared to be a “consensus seeker” between two 
opposing sides. Nevertheless, by limiting the choice to only three options, the 
UK Government effectively marginalised the visions of the participants that 
advocated more extreme alternatives – e.g. the visions of the NGOs that 
demanded a biofuel policy moratorium or the biofuel technology innovators that 
demanded further increases in biofuel support. These extreme policy options 
and related visions were effectively reduced and linked to two opposing, milder 
policy options – i.e. freezing the RTFO or leaving it unchanged. These latter 
then ensured that the slowdown option and related vision would “fall near the 
middle” and so appear to be a reasonable compromise. This seems to suggest 
that the UK Government most likely sought the appearance of a consensus 
seeker, and perhaps even used it in an attempt to justify its decision to enforce 
a slowdown as initially proposed in the invitation document. That said, if one 
looks at the content of its official vision, the UK Government seems, moreover, 
to have given more weight to the visions of biofuel technology innovators than 
those of NGOs. This observation seemingly confirms past trends as observed 
by other investigators in the second and third consultations on biofuel policy, in 
which the UK Government appears to have privileged the interests of the biofuel 
industry over the concerns of NGOs (Upham & Tomei, 2010, pp. 3-5, 10-11; 
Upham et al., 2011, p. 2673). However, it contradicts the conclusions of other 
investigators who have inferred a greater influence for NGOs in the UK 
Government’s decision to slowdown UK biofuel targets (Pilgrim & Harvey, 2010, 
Paragraphs 4.17-4.18). As I will argue in the next section, in the fourth 
consultation on UK biofuel policy, the marginalisation of NGOs’ arguments and 
the UK Government’s decision to enforce a slowdown of the RFTO can be 
related to a policy-promise lock-in. 
 
 
5. Discussion: the UK Government’s policy-promise lock-in  
 
Disagreements among consultation participants on how to envision UK biofuel 
policy can be interpreted in relation to technology innovators’ and public 
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authorities’ responsibilities in promise-requirement cycles. In promise-
requirement cycles, when technology innovators’ technological expectations 
become increasingly shared, they are held responsible for their practical 
fulfilment by “others” willing to give political-financial support, such as public 
authorities. Conversely, the latter are called to provide support. If technological 
expectations are fulfilled, the promise-requirement cycle keeps mobilising 
various resources towards techno-scientific advance. If technological 
expectations are unfulfilled, however, technology innovators are blamed for their 
practical failure, and the “others” may redirect support (Van Lente, 1993, p. 167; 
Van Lente & Rip, 1998a, p. 216; Van Lente, 2000, p. 60). 
 
Participants disagreed in particular about whether supporting first-generation 
biofuels was necessary or counterproductive for the development of the second 
generation. Considered mature technologies, their unsustainable biomass 
inputs had made incumbent first-generation biofuels controversial. Second-
generation biofuels, on the other hand, were emerging technologies gaining 
collective expectations that they could avoid those negative effects.  
 
For the pro-biofuels group, the passage to a promise-requirement on second-
generation biofuels was not presented as a priority, but as a matter that should 
be left to the discretion of biofuel technology innovators. The market of 
incumbent first-generation biofuels was a protected space worthy of support 
independently of its supposed role in opening up an incubation room or niche 
for second-generation biofuels. Executive public authorities were those in 
charge of the provision/maintenance of protected spaces; hence, they were 
urged to preserve or, better, increase support for incumbent technologies. 
Technology innovators were those in charge of taking care of the future cycle of 
promise and requirement on emerging preferable technologies. Thus, biofuel 
technology innovators needed to be left free to decide whether and when to 
engage in the future cycle of promise and requirement on second-generation 
biofuels. A neutral approach in rewarding technologies was deemed necessary 
to granting that independence. The future socio-technical transition to more 
sustainable first-generation biofuels and possibly, but not necessarily, second-
generation biofuels, was conditional on the maintenance of current targets as 
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previously promised – or, better, increased. This group did not mention the 
argument about incumbent first-generation biofuels consolidating into a socio-
technical regime locking out emerging second-generation biofuels. 
 
The anti-biofuels group presented the passage to a promise-requirement cycle 
on second-generation biofuels as the priority, and as a matter that should not be 
left to the discretion of biofuel technology innovators. The market of incumbent 
first-generation biofuels was a protected space currently unsustainable, and 
likely to lead to a technological lock-in to first-generation biofuels preventing the 
start of a promise-requirement cycle for second-generation biofuels. Executive 
public authorities were those in charge of the provision/maintenance of 
protected spaces; hence, they were warned to reshape the protected space to 
minimise the risk of incumbent technology innovators resisting change, and to 
stimulate prospective technology innovators to invest in techno-scientific 
advancement in emerging preferable technologies. For that aim, a neutral 
approach in rewarding technologies, but primarily discriminating on the basis of 
environmental and socio-economic performances, would favour emerging 
preferable technologies over harmful incumbent technologies. The future socio-
technical transition to second-generation biofuels was deemed highly unlikely, 
especially if support was maintained as previously promised.  
 
The precautionary approach group presented the passage to a promise-
requirement cycle on second-generation biofuels as a priority, and as a matter 
that required appropriate incentives for biofuel technology innovators. The 
market of incumbent first-generation biofuels was a protected space in which to 
implant the niche of second-generation biofuels. The executive public 
authorities were those in charge of the provision/maintenance of protected 
spaces; hence, they were required to maintain sufficient support for incumbent 
technologies in order to preserve incentives for incumbent and prospective 
technology innovators to invest in techno-scientific advancement in preferable 
technologies. A neutral approach to rewarding technologies would better drive 
technology innovators to adopt preferable technologies. The future socio-
technical transition to more sustainable first-generation biofuels and eventually 
second-generation biofuels was conditional on the maintenance of support – 
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although not necessarily as much as previously promised. The precautionary 
approach group did not mention the argument about incumbent first-generation 
biofuels consolidating into a socio-technical regime locking out emerging 
second-generation biofuels.  
 
The UK Government initially proposed and then endorsed a similar vision to this 
latter group. These visions are based upon an underlying rationale – advocated 
by some biofuel technology innovators, but strongly rejected by NGOs and 
Parliamentary Select Committees – that is specific to executive public 
authorities in technology-policy – i.e. fulfilling previous policy-promises of 
support for incumbent technological niches is a requirement to maintain 
credibility among current and prospective technology innovators in emerging 
technological niches. This would ensure the effectiveness of future technology 
policy by mobilising current and prospective technology innovators. On the 
basis of this rationale, the UK Government officially justified previous policy-
commitments towards technology innovators of incumbent first generation 
biofuels – although controversial and also driven by EU targets – as necessary 
for the development of preferable emerging second generation biofuels. This 
finding reconfirms the conclusion of the historical analysis that the UK 
Government’s vision on UK biofuel policy can be interpreted in relation to a 
policy-promise lock-in (see Chapter 4). 
 
Executive public authorities may truly believe themselves to be in a policy-
promise lock-in and/or use one as a strategic creation to preserve their 
credibility among technology innovators and the legitimacy of their previous 
policy-promises towards the rest of taxpayers. Linking reputational stakes to 
techno-scientific advancement, a policy-promise lock-in may then induce – 
when truly believed – and/or serve as a justification for – when strategically 
used – executive public authorities to delay a complete redirection of support 
from incumbent to preferable emerging technologies. By endorsing a policy-
promise lock-in – either as a genuine belief, or as a strategic creation – the UK 
Government marginalised the argument of NGOs (and Parliamentary Select 
Committees) about first-generation biofuels consolidating into a socio-technical 
regime preventing second-generation biofuels. This marginalisation seems to 
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reconfirm past trends as observed in the second and third consultations on UK 
biofuel policy, in which the UK Government seemingly privileged the interests of 
the biofuel industry over NGOs’ concerns (Upham & Tomei, 2010, pp. 3-5, 10-
11; Upham et al., 2011, p. 2673). Nevertheless, by implementing a slowdown of 
RTFO targets, the UK Government also partially reversed its prior commitments 
to the EU and the biofuel industry. As emerged in the historical analysis, the UK 
Government had already promised and delivered lower support than the EU’s 
targets and biofuel industry’s demands (see Chapter 4). By 2008, the UK 
Government explicitly called for a more “cautious approach” to biofuel support, 
eventually slowing down RTFO targets (DfT, 2004c, p. 2; 2008e, Section 2; 
2008b, p. 7). Probably concerned about getting further locked into what it 
initially presented as a risky, both environmentally and socio-economically, and 
excessively expensive industry (Defra, 2004, p. 6; DfT, 2004c, p. 2), the UK 
Government did not completely dismiss NGOs’ concerns and/or policy 
opposition to first-generation biofuels – as also previously suggested by other 
investigators of the case (Pilgrim & Harvey, 2010, Paragraphs 4.17-4.18). 
Reconciling previous analyses on UK stakeholders’ opinions, my analysis 
reinterprets the UK Government’s decisions to marginalise NGOs’ arguments 
and slow down UK biofuel targets as efforts to balance its credibility and 
legitimacy between technology innovators and biofuel critics. 
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Chapter 7 – Intermediaries of promise 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses how public authorities, industry associations, 
consultancies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) individually diffuse 
expectations. It then reflects on how these actors could be interpreted through 
the lens of the sociology of expectations. 
 
The chapter has four sections. Section 1 shows that the technology innovators 
that participated in the consultation behaved in similar ways as observed in 
previous analyses in the sociology of expectations. Section 2 introduces the 
work of Pollock and Williams on promissory organisations. Section 3 describes 
how industry associations, consultancies, NGOs and public authorities mediate 
expectations among different parties, and then compares these actors with 
promissory organisations. Section 4 proposes broad definitions of public and 
private intermediaries of promise. 
 
 
1. Technology innovators and beyond 
 
Technology innovators deploy expectations for diverse strategic purposes, 
notably to legitimise decisions, communicate strategic intentions and catch the 
attention of other actors considered as having an important role in technology 
development (Van Lente, 1993, p. 185). Concerning this latter use, their 
ultimate goal is to foster the development of their technology by reinforcing their 
protected space (Geels & Smit, 2000, p. 881). Technology innovators could 
then promote their own technology with the purpose of enhancing their chances 
of market survival, by inducing relevant actors, such as investors or public 
authorities, to invest resources in their technology. 
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Extending the above theoretical insights and assumptions to my case study, 
biofuel technology innovators should thus attempt to influence the UK 
Government whenever they have the opportunity to do so, and especially in 
public consultations. Winning consent in public consultations entails an obvious 
return for technology innovators: the UK Government’s endorsement of their 
expectations, and consequent provision of political support according to their 
interests. The amount of resources that the UK Government is capable of 
mobilising with its policies is undoubtedly relevant. The UK Government’s direct 
investments in technological development often represent a large share of the 
overall resources spent on technologies, particularly for emerging technologies. 
Even when the UK Government does not directly support technologies with 
investments of public resources, its policies still greatly affect their development.  
 
My analysis seems to confirm the validity of the above theoretical insights and 
assumptions on the behaviour of technology innovators. Here interpreted as 
technology innovators in biofuel technologies, obligated suppliers and biofuel 
producers were among the largest groups of participants in the fourth 
consultation. The analysis of their responses clearly showed that they 
attempted to influence the UK Government to adopt a vision of the future that 
ensured them a protected space in the market. Technology innovators of other 
industries also participated, but in much smaller numbers and mostly through 
their industry associations. The futures presented by these were apparently 
oriented towards their market interests in the policy. Thus, technology 
innovators seemingly attempt to secure their market survival by strategically 
promoting and diffusing technological and policy expectations favouring their 
respective technologies wherever they have a chance to – as previous analyses 
in the sociology of expectations have observed.  
 
Beyond technology innovators, other types of actor were involved in the 
consultation and played specific roles in the diffusion of expectations on 
technologies and policies. Among these were the UK Government (as 
organiser), and several industry associations, consultancies, NGOs and other 
public authorities (as respondents). How these types of actor influence the 
diffusion of expectations appears to be a neglected issue in the sociology of 
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expectations. This framework has been primarily concerned with investigating 
the content and dynamics of expectations, and has mostly been applied to 
analysing the expectations of technology innovators. There has been less 
attention on how and on behalf of whom these types of actor diffuse 
expectations among different parties. A partial exception is Pollock and 
Williams’ analysis of industry analysts as “promissory organisations”. The next 
section summarises the relevant insights from that analysis.  
 
 
2. Insights from Pollock and Williams’ analysis of promissory 
organisations 
 
Pollock and Williams investigated the roles that industry analysts on IT 
technologies play in the “markets of expectations” where they operate (Pollock 
& Williams, 2010, pp. 7-8). As pointed out by the authors, 
 
“… whilst there has been extensive research on the efforts of scientists 
and technology developers to mobilize particular expectations around 
proposed technical advances, much less attention has been given to 
intermediary organizations devoted to the production, communication 
and selling of expectations-based products and services.” (Pollock & 
Williams, 2010, p. 18) 
 
Pollock and Williams analysed industry analysts on IT technologies and 
conceptualised them as “promissory organisations” (Pollock & Williams, 2010, 
p. 2). A promissory organisation is “defined as an intermediary that routinely 
and prodigiously produces future-oriented knowledge claims” (Pollock & 
Williams, 2010, p. 8) and whose activity focuses on the mobilisation of promises 
and expectations from suppliers to user communities (Pollock & Williams, 2010, 
p. 2). These intermediaries enact a “market” populated by at least three 
categories of actors interacting with each other, i.e. “users”, “intermediaries” and 
“vendors” of expectations. Promissory organisations represent an influential 
class of knowledge producers that proliferate in and, at the same time, enact a 
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lucrative and prosperous market for future-oriented knowledge claims (Pollock 
& Williams, 2010, pp. 7-8): 
 
“The business of technological expectations is increasingly commercial in 
orientation, product-minded in ambition and potent in influence.” (Pollock 
& Williams, 2010, p. 18) 
  
Thus, two distinctive characteristics of promissory organisations are their 
“business orientation” in mediating expectations between different parities and, 
consequently, their intermediate position between different parties. 
 
Promissory organisations investigate the evolution of emerging technological 
fields and the related business contexts (Pollock & Williams, 2010, p. 7) and 
“both articulate generic visions of the evolution of a technical field and subject 
the promissory work of innovators to scrutiny” (Pollock & Williams, 2010, p. 8). 
This “influential class of knowledge producer[s]” critically assesses other actors’ 
claims by “heralding a much more elaborate system of consultancy and advice 
that attempts to subject vendor statements about new offerings to a more 
systemized and formalized evaluation” (Pollock & Williams, 2010, p. 7). Their 
activity might also “include articulating and mobilizing support for generic 
technological visions (with some analysts aligning themselves with specific 
vendor visions)” (Pollock & Williams, 2010, p. 7). Pollock and Williams observe 
that: 
 
“... a large number of these analysts try to subject the promissory work of 
specific innovation players to a certain level of scrutiny and 
accountability. Their work does not aim to generate specific promises, 
but to circulate different promises and expectations mobilized by others. 
It includes the production of expectations based on – and often critically 
oriented to – assessments about vendors and their offerings.” (Pollock & 
Williams, 2010, p. 7) 
 
Promissory organisations also reduce the complexity of claims about current 
and projected performances of complex products that otherwise would be 
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extremely difficult for other interested parties to assess (Pollock & Williams, 
2010, p. 18). As Pollock and Williams state, 
 
“In a context of growing competition between diverse technology 
suppliers, articulating claims about the current performance and further 
development of their highly complex products, which are extremely 
difficult for potential adopters to assess, promissory organizations’ serve 
to regulate and systematize that competition.” (Pollock & Williams, 2010, 
p. 18) 
 
Thus, as distinctive features of their activity, promissory organisations can 
critically subject other actors’ claims to scrutiny and accountability, and/or 
articulate and mobilise support for other actors’ claims, while simplifying the 
complexity of those claims.  
 
Pollock and Williams looked at the specialisation of resources as a source of 
power. As specialised actors, promissory organisations benefit from that power 
and – as Pollock and Williams argue – exert an “increasing influence … [by] 
changing the nature and dynamics of the promissory space” (Pollock & 
Williams, 2010, p. 18). More specifically, 
 
“Promissory organizations create themselves as centres of power by 
building a wide and variegated range of expectations and assembling the 
organizational machinery for disseminating them. This includes 
mechanisms and networks for developing and communicating 
‘successful’ claims, but also those needed for dealing with more 
contentious, problematic, and ‘failing’ claims. One of the most interesting 
things about industry analysts is that they produce prodigious amounts of 
research. Many of the larger firms make dozens of claims on a daily 
basis about a vast range of innovations.” (Pollock & Williams, 2010, p. 8) 
 
Another distinctive feature of promissory organisations, therefore, is their 
resource specialisation in disseminating expectations (Pollock & Williams, 2010, 
p. 8). 
235 
 
 
Pollock and Williams reach an interesting conclusion concerning the different 
levels of accountability of specific claims on the future: 
 
“... promissory organizations sometimes produce and communicate a 
kind of knowledge with which they never attempt to do anything. The 
performative reading of this is that some types of expectations based 
knowledge have limited or ‘temporary’ effects. These expectations are 
simply launched into the ether: they are visions let loose.” (Pollock & 
Williams, 2010, p. 14) 
 
The point being made here is that not all expectations are equally relevant and 
influential in affecting reputations. Indeed, “Contrary to what some have argued 
(for example Brown, 2003), we found that mistaken predictions could be openly 
discussed in some public venues!” (Pollock & Williams, 2010, p. 20). However, 
Pollock and Williams also noted that not all promissory work is treated in the 
same way. More specifically: 
 
“At one end is promissory work that is researched and defended robustly, 
and which appears to ‘matter’ to promissory organizations and others 
who use it. At the other end are kinds of promissory work that seem more 
like ‘provocations’ that attempt to capture interest. Intriguingly, it did not 
seem very important when provocations failed, perhaps because such 
failures do not explicitly damage reputations.” (Pollock & Williams, 2010, 
p. 20) 
 
Thus, even if not all claims have the same impact on the reputation of a 
promissory organisation, Pollock and Williams seem to imply that 
intermediaries, like any other actor, remain concerned about building and 
maintaining a positive reputation among their audiences. 
  
Pollock and Williams aimed to unveil how these intermediaries shape innovation 
and how their claims are performative (Pollock & Williams, 2010, p. 18). 
Departing from that aim – but building upon their insights – I investigate how 
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and on whose behalf industry associations, consultancies, NGOs and public 
authorities mediate expectations. In doing so, I narrow the focus to their 
functional roles and interrelations in diffusing expectations among different 
parties. On the basis of this investigation, I then reflect on how these types of 
actor may be defined through the lens of the sociology of expectations. In the 
following sections, I describe how these types of actor mediate information and 
compare them with promissory organisations. 
 
 
3. Mediation of expectations  
 
Mediating expectations in similar ways to promissory organisations – and thus 
potentially interpretable as intermediaries – are industry associations, 
consultancies, NGOs and – to a broader extent – public authorities. In the 
following, I highlight similarities and/or differences in the way in which these 
types of actor mediate expectations on behalf of other parties. To that end, I 
relate their funding structures to the informational services that these actors 
provide in their standard business/activity and in public consultations in 
particular.  
 
3.1 Industry associations 
 
Industry associations mostly rely on a continuous flow of financial subscriptions 
from industrial sponsors. Thus, at least in principle, their business consists of 
trading a service of diffusion of statements of expectations in exchange for 
subscriptions. This implies that their market survival depends on the satisfaction 
of their industrial sponsors with their informational services. The fact that 
industry associations participated in large numbers in this and the previous 
three consultations on biofuel policy suggests that consultations are part of their 
business area. 
 
The industry associations participating in the consultation declared themselves 
to be responding as “representatives” and tended to reflect the futures of their 
respective sponsor industries. The two industry associations sponsored by 
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obligated suppliers reflected their split in opinion about which options to support 
in the consultation. One represented obligated suppliers opposing the slowdown 
and freezing options, and reiterated their arguments against those measures. 
The other represented obligated suppliers in favour of a slowdown, and 
advocated their arguments. Industry associations of biofuel producers 
supported their arguments for leaving biofuel policy unchanged and reflected 
their disappointment and alarmism about the uncertainty created by the 
proposals under consultation. All the industry associations of obligated suppliers 
and biofuel producers reflected their consensus on how to deal with second-
generation biofuels. As for the industry associations of other industries, it is not 
possible to establish whether they reflected the visions of their respective 
industries. The majority of the technology innovators from other industries 
preferred not to participate directly, and to delegate their policy representation 
to their industry associations. Therefore, the terms of comparisons are missing. 
However, the futures presented by these industry associations were seemingly 
oriented towards the specific interests of their respective sponsor industries. As 
general trends emerging from the consultation, the participation rates of 
technology innovators and their industry associations seem to be correlated to 
their organisational scale and level of involvement in biofuel policy. More 
specifically, technology innovators of larger dimensions and those relatively 
more exposed to the issues under consultation tended to participate 
independently from their industry associations. On the other hand, technology 
innovators of smaller dimensions and of industries relatively less affected by the 
issues under consultation tended to delegate their representation to their 
industry associations and not to participate. Obligated suppliers were the largest 
technology innovators participating to the consultation and among the most 
financially involved in biofuel policy. In 2008, the Renewable Transport Fuel 
Obligation (RTFO) identified fourteen transport fuel companies as obligated 
suppliers. Among these, seven participated together with their two industry 
associations (see Annex 4 for further information). Biofuel producers varied 
from medium to small scale and were the technology innovators most financially 
dependent on biofuel policy. In 2008, the RFA certified biofuels from a large 
number of biofuel producers. Among these, only twelve participated in the 
consultation (see Annex 4 for further information). However, seven industry 
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associations represented their industry. Four large technology innovators of 
other industries – two carmakers, two electricity generation/distribution 
companies – also participated, but not their industry associations. Eleven 
industry associations of other industries participated, but none of the technology 
innovators that they represented.  
 
To conclude, the mere existence of industry associations implies that 
technology innovators often prefer to delegate their own policy representation to 
specialised actors, rather than to specialise their own resources and directly 
engage in that activity. The main activity of industry associations is providing 
assistance to technology innovators in their policy representation. This seems to 
be particularly true for technology innovators of smaller scale – i.e. those likely 
to have resource constraints, and thus limited capacity to specialise resources 
for policy representation. These seem to find convenient pooling resources with 
other technology innovators and to engage specialised actors such as industry 
associations for political representation, at least in policy arenas such as 
consultations. The functional role of industry associations is thus to provide 
policy representational support to specific industries, by diffusing statements of 
expectations on their behalf. 
 
3.2 Consultancies 
 
Consultancies rely on grants from grant-providers who seek informational 
advice. Thus, at least in principle, their business consists of trading an advisory 
service on statements of expectations in exchange for grants. This implies that 
consultancies’ market survival depends on their grant-providers’ satisfaction 
with their provision of reliable and expert information. In this particular 
consultation, the consultancies participating as respondents supposedly did so 
disconnected from any grant-provider. This seems at odds with their standard 
business. Nevertheless, only two consultancies participated in this consultation, 
and only three or four consultancies on average participated in the previous 
three consultations on biofuel policy. Such low rates of participation seem to 
confirm that participation in consultations as respondents is not part of 
consultancies’ standard business.  
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One of the two consultancies participating in the consultation under analysis 
defined itself as a specialist consultancy in the energy, environment and water 
sectors, providing a range of services to government departments, regulators, 
trade associations and market participants. In its response, it explicitly stated 
that it was acting independently and that its response represented only its own 
voice. As for the content of the response, it reflected the vision of the UK 
Government as reported in the invitation document of the consultation. The 
other consultancy defined itself as an adviser possessing specialist knowledge 
of both UK and global vehicle markets with particular emphasis on developing 
biofuels, LPG and natural gas – its grant-providers thus included biofuel 
operators. In its response, it failed to state whether it was acting independently 
and whether its response represented only its own voice. The content of its 
response reflected the visions of small-scale biofuel producers. Participation in 
this consultation was on a voluntary basis and did not entail any form of 
financial compensation – i.e. the UK Government did not “hire” any participant. 
Therefore, both consultancies supposedly participated on a voluntary basis and 
independently from any grant-provider – which also means that it is not possible 
to look at the rate of participation between these consultancies and their grant-
providers. Behind their participation, there might have been a public-spirited 
intention to advise and/or, perhaps, to advertise themselves to the UK 
Government. 
 
To conclude, the mere existence of consultancies implies that there are 
individuals and organisations that prefer to rely on specialised actors to be 
informed. In their standard business, consultancies serve specific grant-
providers through the provision of an advisory service in exchange for grants. 
Consultancies tend to get involved in consultations primarily when specifically 
hired for the preparation of informative reports and related consultation 
documents, as was the case for the Gallagher Review, whose production 
involved eight consultancies. Their functional role would then be to provide 
advisory services to specific grant-providers by screening statements of 
expectations on their behalf. 
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3.3 Non-governmental organisations 
 
NGOs rely on a continuous flow of subscriptions and donations from specific 
groups of individuals and organisations that are or want to be seen as 
particularly sensitive to specific socio-political issues. Thus, their business 
consists of trading informational services in exchange for subscriptions and 
donations from their affiliates/subscribers – at least in principle. This implies that 
their market survival depends on whether their affiliates/subscribers are 
satisfied with their informational services – among them advising and policy 
representation in consultations. The fact that NGOs participated in all the 
consultations on biofuel policy suggests that consultations are part of their 
business areas. Yet it often remains unclear on whose behalf NGOs mediate 
information. NGOs tend to define themselves in connection to political activism 
around specific socio-political issues, not specific groups of actors.  
 
The NGOs participating in the consultation declared themselves to be 
representing the interests of the “environment”, “biodiversity” and/or the “poor”, 
and proposed visions centred on the impacts of biofuel technologies on those 
undefined categories of referents. All NGOs except one advocated the freezing 
option as a second best option to a moratorium – which was not included 
among the policy options in the invitation document of the consultation. In their 
view, the environmental and socio-economic damages caused by biofuel policy 
in developing countries in the short term would outweigh its potential benefits 
for the long term, thus warranting a moratorium on biofuel targets. In this 
consultation and in two of the previous three, NGOs also prompted single 
individuals to make their voice heard. The responses of the “members of the 
public” could not be made available for this research. Therefore, it is not 
possible to establish the related rate of participation in the consultation between 
NGOs and their affiliates/subscribers –i.e. to verify whether there were NGOs’ 
affiliates/subscribers among the members of the public. However, according to 
the first summary of responses of the fourth consultation, the twenty-two 
participants who declared themselves as replying as individuals raised 
substantially the same concerns and solutions proposed by NGOs (DfT, 2009c, 
p. 6). NGOs also participated in the previous three biofuel consultations and 
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seemingly mobilised members of the public to participate in two of these. As the 
Department for Transport (DfT) inferred from the analysis of previous 
consultations, NGOs induced members of the public to respond to the first and 
second biofuel consultations. In the first, all twenty-nine members of the public 
who participated raised similar concerns to those raised by the NGOs. In 
particular, twenty-one responses were identical (DfT, 2004a, Private 
Individuals). In the second biofuel consultation, NGOs mobilised, via a press 
advertising campaign, more than 5,000 members of the public to participate – 
out of 6,270 members of the public in total and out of 6,335 total participants 
(DfT, 2007d, p. 5). By contrast, in the third biofuel consultation, there were no 
members of the public among the participants. This was probably due to the 
highly technical nature of the issues covered in that consultation. Nevertheless, 
a few NGOs participated (DfT, 2008d).  
 
To conclude, the mere existence of NGOs implies that there are individuals and 
organisations that prefer to rely on specialised actors to be informed about and 
politically represented in specific socio-political issues. The functional role of 
NGOs is thus to provide a mix of informative and representational services, by 
producing and diffusing statements of expectations on behalf of their 
affiliates/subscribers – at least in principle. 
 
3.4 Public authorities  
  
A public authority is here generally defined as an institution funded by public 
revenue (e.g. taxes) and supposed to perform its roles in the public interest (i.e. 
common well-being or general welfare). By publishing official documents, public 
authorities provide a mix of informative, representational and simplification 
services. Their provision of informational services is not linked to a trade, but to 
democratic obligations (Modernisation Committee, 2006, pp. 5, 11, 12, 17, 18). 
Funded by public revenue, they are supposed to provide these services on 
behalf of all taxpayers. The rate of participation between public authorities and 
those they represent is thus directly reflected by the composition of this 
consultation as all participants were, in principle, represented by them. 
Nevertheless, as shown by the disagreements here analysed, public authorities 
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may differ in the way they fulfil their democratic obligation by representing 
information in different ways. Such differences partially relate to the specific 
remit public authorities assume towards specific audiences and appear to be 
connected to the degree of involvement with technology innovators. 
 
3.4.1 Local government authorities and non-departmental public bodies 
 
Four local government authorities and seven non-departmental public bodies 
(NDPBs) participated in the consultation as respondents. All but one of these 
public authorities were fully funded by the UK Government. The exception is an 
NDPB whose policy remit is the promotion of non-food crops’ industrial uses. 
This NDPB was funded by both the UK Government and industrial actors’ 
subscriptions.  
 
The four local government authorities provided self-definitions clearly indicating 
which groups of taxpayers they were representing. Among these, three 
represented local communities that could be negatively affected by a large-
scale adoption of biofuels, while one represented a biofuel industry cluster in 
another territory. The three local government authorities representing the same 
territory advocated the freezing option, limiting their considerations to the 
negative implications of biofuels in their communities and instrumentally using 
environmental concerns to reinforce their position. By contrast, the authority 
representing a biofuel industry cluster in another territory advocated leaving 
biofuel targets unchanged – or, better, increasing their targets. This local 
government authority submitted a response identical in content to those of two 
industry associations of biofuel producers in the same territory. This alliance 
advocated the interests of its cluster of biofuel producers. 
 
The seven NDPBs provided self-definitions connected to specific policy remits. 
Four defined themselves as environmental protection agencies. One defined 
itself as an NDPB dedicated to the promotion of energy saving solutions. One 
defined itself as an NDPB dedicated to the promotion of industrial uses of non-
food crops for energy purposes. One defined itself as the NDPB administrating 
the RTFO. The four environmental NDPBs and the NDPB administrator of the 
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RTFO agreed with the slowdown option and the arguments supporting it. The 
NDPB dedicated to the promotion of energy saving solutions advocated a 
freezing of biofuel targets and redirecting policy support to energy saving 
policies. The NDPB dedicated to the promotion of non-food crops’ industrial 
uses was the only one advocating leaving the biofuel targets unchanged – or, 
better, increasing them. Apart from this last NDPB, which represented small-
scale biofuel producers and advocated their interests, the other NDPBs 
provided self-definitions and responses that did not clarify which audiences they 
aimed to represent.  
 
3.4.2 The UK Government 
 
The UK Government did not participate as a respondent, but as organiser of the 
consultation, and responded to the consultation questions via its summaries of 
responses. In the invitation document to the consultation, the UK Government 
defined itself as the public authority responsible for correcting a market failure in 
transport policy on behalf of the well-being of the whole society – i.e. reducing 
GHG emissions in transport via technology policy intervention (DfT, 2008a, p. 
45). It seems that, for the UK Government, this correction implied – in practice – 
balancing the general interests of taxpayers with the specific interests of biofuel 
technology innovators. 
 
In the aftermath of the consultation, the UK Government continued to advocate 
a slowdown as the solution striking the right balance between the industry’s 
interests and environmental concerns. By doing so, it acted as a mediator 
between diverging parties. Even if going against the EU’s higher targets and not 
welcomed by the most of the biofuel industry, this solution still ensured a future 
for first-generation biofuels, while softening the pressure created by the other 
actors lobbying for environmental concerns.  
 
To conclude, in principle the functional roles of public authorities include the 
provision of a mix of advice and political representation to their taxpayers. 
However, it often remains unclear whether this role is carried out on behalf of all 
taxpayers or specific subgroups of taxpayers only. The future they support 
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cannot always be explicitly associated with the interests of defined interested 
parties. The UK Government in particular balanced diverging interests between 
technology innovators and the rest of taxpayers. This observation confirms the 
validity of the analytical distinction between executive public authorities and 
public authorities with other policy remits (see Chapter 4). 
 
In the next section, I compare industry associations, consultancies, NGOs and 
public authorities with “promissory organisations” as described by Pollock and 
Williams. In this comparison, public authorities with executive roles in 
policymaking (e.g. the government) are distinguished from those with different 
remits (e.g. local governments, NDPBs, etc.) 
  
3.5 A broader definition than promissory organisations  
 
Promissory organisations are specialised intermediaries devoted to the 
production, communication and sale of expectations-based products and 
services (Pollock & Williams, 2010, pp. 8, 18), which set up a lucrative and 
prosperous market for future-oriented knowledge claims (Pollock & Williams, 
2010, pp. 7-8). Some tend to, at times, subject the promissory work of 
innovators to scrutiny (Pollock & Williams, 2010, p. 8), and, at times, articulate 
and mobilise support for generic technological visions, aligning themselves to 
specific vendors of visions (Pollock & Williams, 2010, p. 7). In operating such 
mixed informational services, they also reduce the complexity of claims about 
current and projected performances of complex products that would otherwise 
be extremely difficult for other interested parties to assess (Pollock & Williams, 
2010, p. 18). 
 
On the basis of the observations made in my analysis, the description of 
promissory organisations appears too narrow to be applied to all categories of 
actors that could be interpreted as intermediaries; at the same time, it is also 
too broad to be applied to one specific category of intermediary. The description 
matches more actors, such as industry associations, consultancies and NGOs, 
as opposed to public authorities – i.e. private organisations that trade 
expectations-based products and services and set up a lucrative and 
245 
 
prosperous market for future-oriented knowledge claims (Pollock & Williams, 
2010, pp. 7-8). Nevertheless, some of the features of promissory organisations 
are also present in public authorities with and without executive roles in 
technology policy (see Table 2 – parts 1 and 2). 
 
My suggestion is to define intermediaries primarily in relation to their mediation 
of expectations between different parties. In that way, their definition would 
become more inclusive and flexible – i.e. inclusive of all actors that perform 
mediations of expectations. In the next section, I propose intermediaries of 
promise as one possible definition. 
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Table 2 – part 1 – promissory organisations vs industry associations, consultancies, public authorities 
promissory organisations industry 
associations 
consultancies NGOs public 
authorities 
with different 
policy remits 
(e.g. local 
governments, 
NDPBs, etc.) 
executive public 
authorities 
(e.g. government) 
Specialised actors devoted to 
the production, communication 
and sale of expectations-
based products and services 
(Pollock & Williams, 2010, pp. 
8, 18) 
YES YES YES YES 
especially those 
with advisory 
and monitoring 
remits 
YES 
through 
departments with 
specialised 
subdivisions 
devoted to 
informational 
services 
Set up a lucrative and 
prosperous market for future-
oriented knowledge claims 
(Pollock & Williams, 2010, pp. 
7-8) 
YES  
trade 
statements of 
expectations in 
exchange for 
subscriptions 
YES 
trade 
statements of 
expectations in 
exchange for 
grants 
YES 
trade 
statements of 
expectations in 
exchange for 
subscriptions 
and donations 
NO  
release 
statements of 
expectations to 
abide by their 
democratic 
obligations 
NO 
release 
statements of 
expectations to 
abide by their 
democratic 
obligations  
Reduce the complexity of 
claims about current and 
projected performances of 
complex products that 
otherwise would be extremely 
difficult for other interested 
parties to assess (Pollock & 
Williams, 2010, p. 18) 
YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 2 – part 2 – promissory organisations vs industry associations, consultancies, public authorities 
promissory organisations industry 
associations 
consultancies NGOs public 
authorities with 
different policy 
remits (e.g. local 
governments, 
NDPBs, etc. 
executive public 
authorities (e.g. 
government) 
May articulate and mobilise 
support for generic 
technological visions (Pollock 
& Williams, 2010, p. 7) 
YES  
act as political 
representatives 
of sponsors 
NO 
act as informers 
for grant 
providers 
YES  
act both as 
policy 
representatives, 
and informers 
for members. In 
doing so, they 
also help 
mobilise the 
voices of other 
interested 
parties 
YES  
act as policy 
representatives, 
in principle for 
all taxpayers, 
although with 
special regards 
for often 
unclearly 
defined 
audiences 
YES  
act as policy 
representatives, 
in principle for all 
taxpayers, which 
in practice often 
means also 
considering the 
specific interests 
of technology 
innovators 
May align themselves with 
specific vendors’ visions 
(Pollock & Williams, 2010, p. 
7) 
YES 
align 
themselves to 
the visions of 
the technology 
innovators that 
sponsor them 
NO 
appear not to 
align 
themselves with 
any specific 
vision 
 
NO 
seem to bring 
forward their 
own vision  
UNCLEAR AT TIMES 
align itself with 
the visions of the 
technology 
innovators 
supported by 
previous policies 
May subject the promissory 
work of innovators to scrutiny 
(Pollock & Williams, 2010, p. 
8) 
NO YES YES YES YES 
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4. Intermediaries of promise 
 
Intermediaries of promise may be generally defined as organisations that 
collect, reformulate and re-present expectations on technologies and policies on 
behalf of specific third parties. Their activities consist of bringing together and 
synthesising statements of expectation – often taken from several sources – 
and tailoring the resulting syntheses to the level of expertise and specific 
informational requirements of targeted interested parties. Through such 
informational mediation, they remain linked to the logic of building and 
maintaining reputation. Intermediaries specialised in serving specific actors 
display a tendency to link their reputation to the satisfaction of these latter, on 
which they depend. Depending on the parties on whose behalf they operate, 
these organisations may then serve different interests when diffusing 
statements of expectations. 
 
All these features are shared by industry associations, consultancies, NGOs as 
well as public authorities with or without executive roles in policymaking. 
Nevertheless, the former three types of actor trade and diffuse statements of 
expectations on behalf of specific “clients” in very different ways. The latter two 
mediate statements of expectations on behalf of all “taxpayers” – at least in 
principle – because of their democratic obligations. In consideration of these 
differences, the former and the latter could be respectively conceptualised as 
private and public intermediaries of promise.  
 
5. Reflections on intermediaries of promise 
 
My definition of intermediaries underlines the importance of paying attention to 
their endowments and specialisation of resources when analysing their roles in 
diffusing expectations. As also pointed out by Pollock and Williams, it is “By 
assembling the organizational machinery” for disseminating successful claims 
and for dealing with those more “problematic”, that “promissory organisations 
create themselves as centres of power” (Pollock & Williams, 2010, p. 8). My 
definition of intermediaries also acknowledges that expectations may be 
“traded” in “markets of expectations” (Pollock & Williams, 2010, pp. 7-8) – not 
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only used as tools to legitimise decisions, reduce uncertainty by fostering 
cooperation or promote technologies (Van Lente, 1993, p. 185; Geels & Smit, 
2000, p. 882). This acknowledgement prompts one to distinguish public from 
private intermediaries and to investigate the incentives behind their 
informational mediation when analysing how they diffuse expectations. Looking 
at their human and physical capital, funding structure and relationship with third 
parties helps understand how these types of actor affect the dynamics of 
expectations. 
 
Intermediaries not only diffuse expectations on behalf of third parties, but also 
contribute to their production. In the present case, NGOs in particular appear to 
have publicly advocated their own visions. Nevertheless, in the process of 
selecting, reformulating and re-presenting expectations, all intermediaries 
shape expectations’ production, and impact on their dynamics. In terms of 
temporal dynamics, intermediaries affect the temporal evolution of expectations. 
This may be towards either optimism or pessimism – i.e. towards hype or 
disappointment. In the present case, biofuel industry associations and the UK 
Government boosted optimistic expectations on UK biofuel policy, against 
pessimistic expectations from NGOs (see Chapter 6). In terms of spatial 
dynamics, intermediaries affect the spatial distribution of expectations. This may 
be towards either the general or the particular – i.e. towards the collectivisation 
or individualisation of expectations. In the present case, industry associations, 
NGOs, the UK Government and the other public authorities publicly advocated 
“standardised” statements of expectations meant to represent specific third 
parties in their totality. These standardised statements of expectations were 
disseminated in an attempt to generate consensus. By contrast, consultancies 
tailor “customised” statements of expectations for and specifically and uniquely 
addressed to specific grant-providers. Very few consultancies participated in the 
biofuel consultation, against several industry associations, NGOs and public 
authorities. This may be taken as an indication of their disinterest in promoting 
consensus.  
 
Intermediaries of promise constitute an influential class of actor. By selecting 
expectations on behalf of specific parties or promoting expectations of specific 
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parties, they profoundly affect the visibility of expectations – thus acting as 
catalysers of the above dynamics. This may be purposefully sought or an 
indirect result of different purposes – i.e. it is purposeful when intermediaries act 
as policy representatives, and indirectly when they act as advisers. The extent 
to which intermediaries can influence the dynamics and visibility of expectations 
crucially depends not only on their specialisation of resources, but also on the 
reputation they enjoy among the third parties they represent and the audiences 
they target. As I argue in the next chapter, reputation, understood as 
encompassing expectations on the expertise and reliability of specific 
information sources, plays a crucial role in the diffusion of expectations.  
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Chapter 8 – A space for intermediaries of information on 
technologies: some insights from economics 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter follows parts 1 and 2 of the dissertation. Within this separate 
chapter, I wish to further discuss how I have come to conceptualise the roles of 
intermediaries of promise in mediating information on technologies among 
different parties. My conceptualisation has been greatly influenced by both the 
sociology of expectations as well as by my previous background in economics, 
which I believe is strongly complementary to the sociological approach and very 
useful when reflecting on the overall findings of my research. In what follows, I 
thus make reference to some insights taken from the economics literature – 
mostly information economics – as well as the scholarship on the sociology of 
expectations. Reflections and insights from these literatures are organised and 
presented as an analytical model, which helps illustrate the roles of 
specialisation of resources, expertise and reputation in the diffusion of 
expectations on technologies and policies. The intermediaries of promise 
observed in my case studies are then reinterpreted through that analytical 
model. 
 
The chapter has two main sections. Section 1 introduces the analytical model 
through which to conceptualise the roles of specialisation of resources, 
expertise and reputation in the diffusion of expectations on technologies and 
policies. Section 2 reinterprets the intermediaries of promise that I analysed 
through that model.  
 
 
1. An analytical model to conceptualise specialisation of resources, 
expertise and reputation 
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Economics provides some useful insights with which to interpret the roles 
played by specialisation of resources, expertise and reputation in the diffusion 
of expectations on technologies and policies (Stigler, 1961; Akerlof, 1970; 
Spence, 1973; Klein, B. & Leffler, 1981; Salop & Stiglitz, 1982; Shapiro, 1982; 
1983; Stiglitz, 2000; Spence, 2002). This literature deals extensively with 
information and the dynamics underlining its exchange – or mediation, as I 
prefer to call it – but adopts a different perspective and terminology and is 
applied to different cases with respect to the sociology of expectations. My 
background in economics has silently accompanied me through my PhD. Its 
presence did not particularly affect the way I set up and conducted the empirical 
analyses, or how I interpreted and applied the sociology of expectations to my 
findings in previous chapters. However, it is influential in my interpretation of the 
roles of intermediaries of promise in mediating information on technologies 
among different parties, which I intend to discuss in this chapter. Thus, before 
explaining my interpretation of these roles, I believe it is appropriate to discuss 
the insights from economics that influence it. 
 
I think that a good way to illustrate these insights to the reader is to present 
them by means of an analytical model that simplifies and abstracts reality. 
Hence, I now invite the reader to temporarily set aside the framework of the 
sociology of expectations, and engage with a simplified analytical model, which, 
although compatible with that framework, is based upon a particular perspective 
and internalises insights from economics.  
 
To start with, I invite the reader to think in terms of mediations of expectations at 
the micro level of individual actors. In its most elementary form, a mediation of 
information is here meant to occur whenever an actor accepts a statement from 
another actor as expert and reliable – independently of their respective 
interpretations of the same statement. These statements might concern 
expectations on technologies and policies as well as other information. In the 
following, expectations on technologies and policies – such as potential and 
expected environmental and socio-economic impacts of technologies and their 
respective policies – are included in the broader category of information on 
technologies. 
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1.1 Information sources and counterparts: expertise and reliability 
 
Knowledge is never given to any actor in its totality (Hayek, 1945, p. 520). All 
actors have physiological and psychological limits with respect to their 
computational and predictive ability, which undermine their ability to analyse 
information in their attempt to reduce uncertainty (Alchian, 1950, p. 212; Simon, 
1955, p. 101). “Knowledge is power”, but remains costly to raise (Stigler, 1961, 
p. 213). Raising information is often costly to search and asymmetric in its 
distribution among actors (Stiglitz, 2000, p. 1441). Thus, it is impossible to 
obtain all the relevant information at the right time – or, in economic terms, 
“perfect information” is impossible to achieve (Stiglitz, 1985, pp. 23, 36; 2000, p. 
2; 2002, p. 461).  
 
My analytical model functions on the view that all actors have limited capacities 
to process information and an imperfect access to it. This implies that no actor 
will ever be able to eliminate all uncertainties. Nevertheless, actors still gather 
what they believe is key information in an attempt to reduce that imperfection 
and the resulting uncertainties. By key information, I mean information that 
actors view as relevant given their subjective informational needs. Based on 
that general observation, I assume that all actors share the belief that 
specialising more resources into developing expertise increases the chances of 
successfully finding key information. Resources are here meant in a broad 
sense: not only in terms of differentials in amount of time, physical and human 
capitals, skills, experiences and so on, but also in terms of favourable 
conditions, such as specific situational advantages that some actors have or 
believe they have in comparison with others. This does not mean that actors 
who specialise resources into developing expertise have access to the “truth” 
(Collins & Evans, 2002, pp. 236, 242-243). I simply assume that actors believe 
that specialising resources into developing expertise increases their capability 
to reduce uncertainties. In other words, developing expertise is believed to grant 
better access to key information and, at the same time, to require specialisation 
of resources.  
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Yet resources are limited and unequally distributed. Thus, actors are 
constrained in their choice of whether to specialise resources and for what kind 
of expertise. An alternative is to look for other actors who may possess the 
pertinent expertise and then negotiate the mediation of key information with 
them. Arguably, the choice of whether to self-produce key information or to look 
for other actors that may possess it and then negotiate its mediation is 
conditional on the possibility and related convenience of developing expertise 
with respect to the other actors. Directly producing key information may become 
attractive whenever that information is not available or not accessible through 
mediations from other actors, and, at the same time, is considered of high value 
and achievable given the resources available. For instance, an actor who 
believes him/herself to be relatively well placed in terms of resources to produce 
key information compared to other actors may choose to develop expertise and, 
possibly, negotiate the mediation of such information with other interested 
actors. Conversely, an actor who considers him/herself to be relatively badly 
placed in terms of resources compared to other actors may prefer to negotiate 
its mediation with these latter. Ultimately, specialisation of resources 
accentuates the unequal distribution of resources among actors and extends 
the asymmetries in their access to key information. At the same time, it 
improves the conditions for mediations of key information to take place by 
creating expert and non-expert actors potentially interested in mediating it. 
 
My analytical model then further assumes that actors receiving and accepting 
key information from other actors implicitly recognise themselves as lacking 
expertise with respect to those from whom they decide to acquire information – 
at least concerning the specific information mediated. More specifically, actors 
are assumed to formulate judgements about their differentials in expertise as 
based on their subjective estimations of their differentials in resource 
endowments and levels of specialisation of resources. Accordingly, actors 
possessing and specialising more resources than others into producing or 
searching key information are then likely to believe themselves, and be believed 
by other actors, to be more successful in researching it. 
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Economists of information assume that actors are opportunists, rationally limited 
and strategically exploiting asymmetries of information (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 
1973; Stiglitz, 1975; Salop, 1977; Stiglitz, 2000; 2002; 2003; 2004). The 
asymmetric distribution of information among actors creates spaces for strategic 
behaviours where more informed actors can exploit their informational 
advantage to the detriment of less informed actors (Salop, 1977, p. 393; Stiglitz, 
2000, p. 1456; 2003, p. 16). The observation of sociologists of expectations 
about technology innovators optimistically distorting their statements of 
expectations to catch the attention of other interested parties seemingly 
validates the above assumptions (Van Lente, 1993, p. 185; Geels & Smit, 2000, 
p. 882). When disclosing information on technologies, technology innovators 
may voluntarily distort their statements towards optimism with respect to what 
they actually believe in order to influence the perceptions of other actors in line 
with their strategic interests. 
 
My analytical model shares the above view. Thus, it further assumes that all 
actors as opportunists, rationally limited and strategically exploiting 
asymmetries of information as well as aware of their own nature. This implies 
that actors receiving and accepting key information from other actors are also 
implicitly recognising these latter as reliable – at least concerning the specific 
information mediated. More specifically, actors are here assumed to formulate 
judgements about the reliability of their information sources based on their 
subjective estimations of the incentives of these latter to voluntarily distort 
information for strategic reasons. 
 
Independently from the kind of information mediated, when the actors 
recognised as experts and reliable have an incentive to disclose key information 
and those self-identifying as non-experts are interested in acquiring that 
information, a mediation of key information might take place. Any such 
mediation implies a mutual recognition between information sources and other 
interested counterparts.  
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1.2 Counterparts seeking additional information on their information 
sources 
 
Any mediation of key information, which entails non-expert counterparts 
identifying and selecting specific expert and reliable information sources, also 
entails a mediation of additional information on the information sources from 
these latter to their counterparts.  
 
Counterparts need and seek additional information on their information sources 
to inform their subjective judgements on the expertise and reliability of these 
latter. By definition, counterparts self-identify as non-experts in relation to what 
they identify as their expert information sources. Hence, they need and seek 
information on the level of expertise of their information sources so as to 
determine whether these have the pertinent expertise for the information 
sought. All actors are also assumed to be aware of their opportunistic and 
strategic nature. Hence, counterparts also need and seek information on the 
reliability of their information sources so as to determine whether these disclose 
key information according to their actual thinking and not distorted for strategic 
reasons.  
 
In this view, information on technologies remains the key information sought by 
counterparts. Meanwhile, additional information on the expertise and reliability 
of information sources is instrumental to allow the mutual recognition between 
information sources and counterparts and, consequently, the mediation of key 
information. 
 
Aware of this demand for additional information from counterparts, information 
sources, which intend to be identified as such, strategically release information 
about their expertise and reliability to allow such mutual identification.  
 
1.2.1 Information sources advertising themselves to counterparts: key and 
collateral information 
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Evidence of the strategic use of information to signal expertise and reliability 
can easily be found everywhere in the real world. As stated by Joseph Stiglitz: 
 
“… we see banks signalling their trustworthiness by the size of their 
edifices, guarantees signalling a firm’s confidence in the quality of its 
products, owner-managers of firms signalling their confidence that the 
firm is not overvalued by restricting the number of their own shares they 
sell.” (Stiglitz, 2000, pp. 1452-1453) 
 
All the additional information that information sources disclose to induce any 
potential counterpart to formulate speculations on their expertise and reliability 
is here generally referred to as collateral information.60 This might include 
information signalling the information source’s expertise, such as information on 
its level of investments in physical and human capital, as well as reliability, such 
as information on previous performances or experiences, on its reputation, and 
so on. The following example helps clarify what I mean by collateral information. 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is widely considered 
the leading institution among the information sources on climate change. In its 
website and documents, the institution highlights the large number of scientists 
participating in its assessments and the authority of the funding institutions and 
users of its assessments (IPCC). The “organisation” webpage of the institution’s 
website states that: 
                                            
60
 This terminology refers to the term “collaterals” used in economics to indicate the information 
on assets and future revenues of a debtor or insured, which is used to assess their debt 
solvability or insurance risk. Creditors or insurers usually require their debtors or insured to 
provide information on their assets or future revenues in order to assess their future solvability 
or risk. A mortgage is an example of collateral for a loan. A debtor contracting a mortgage on 
his/her house in order to get a loan is expected to behave responsibly as failing to repay back 
the debt would entail losing the house. By contracting a mortgage, the debtor is signalling 
his/her good future intentions and capability to repay the debt (or solvability) to his/her creditor. 
Other examples are franchise contracts in car insurance. A debtor who accepts to pay up to a 
threshold of the potential damage caused in case of accident is expected to behave responsibly 
as he/she would be forced to pay part of the damage caused in case of accident. The insurance 
premiums for franchise contracts tend to be lower in absolute terms than those covering 100% 
of damage. However, the franchise contracts tend to be more expensive than those covering 
100% of damage in relative terms. This means that franchise contracts are convenient only for 
those with a low-risk profile. Analogously to the debtor case, the insured in this way is signalling 
his/her good future intentions to maintain low-risk behaviour to the insurer (Spence & 
Zeckhauser, 1971; Spence, 1973). 
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“Because of its scientific and intergovernmental nature, the IPCC 
embodies a unique opportunity to provide rigorous and balanced 
scientific information to decision makers. By endorsing the IPCC reports, 
governments acknowledge the authority of their scientific content. The 
work of the organization is therefore policy-relevant and yet policy-
neutral, never policy-prescriptive.” (IPCC) 
 
The information about the number of scientists involved, the structure of the 
funding system, the authority of the users – in this case, governments – 
provides indications about the expertise and reliability of the institution as an 
authoritative information source on climate change. That information does not 
refer to any projection on climate change, but signals the expertise embedded 
in and reliability of the assessments provided by the institution. According to the 
definition given above, that information is collateral information – i.e. information 
that the institution uses in order to inspire trust in itself as an expert and reliable 
source of key information and ultimately in the validity of its projections on 
climate change. Information on climate change remains the key information 
sought by the institution’s counterparts. Meanwhile, collateral information is 
instrumental to induce counterparts to identify the institution as an expert and 
reliable information source on climate change assessments. 
 
1.3 Counterparts selecting information sources: the role of reputation  
 
Economists argue that, whenever in an exchange the quality of the goods 
exchanged is not directly observable before purchase, the reputation of the 
seller might become an alternative criterion of selection to direct quality 
assessments of the goods exchanged (Shapiro, 1982, pp. 21-22; 1983, pp. 659-
660; Stiglitz, 2000, pp. 1448-1449). Examples of markets where reputation 
matters abound in the real world. “Virtually all services are impossible to 
evaluate until they are used” (Shapiro, 1982, p. 21): for instance, medical and 
legal services, but also vehicle repair, plumbing, electrical works as well as 
informational services such as advising and political representation. The 
impossibility of evaluating these services before purchase implies other forms of 
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ex-ante evaluation, among them the reputation of the seller. This also applies to 
the “purchase” of information as a special “commodity”, as Joseph Stiglitz 
explains: 
 
“Information [is] ... fundamentally different from other “commodities”[:] ... 
its consumption is nonrivalrous [i.e. not affected by problems of scarcity – 
the same piece of information can be equally ‘consumed’ by any user at 
the same time], and so, even if it is possible to exclude others from 
enjoying the benefits of some piece of knowledge, it is socially inefficient 
to do so; and it is often difficult to exclude individuals from enjoying the 
benefits. The issue of appropriating the returns to investments in 
information and knowledge is thus central. Moreover, each piece of 
information is different from others. A piece of information cannot be 
purchased like a chair. An individual can look at a chair and ascertain its 
properties before purchasing it. But if the seller of information tells the 
information that he wishes to sell to the buyer (before he has bought it), 
there is no reason that the individual will pay for it. And while an 
individual may repeatedly buy, say, the same product from some store, 
each piece of information, by definition, has to be different from other 
pieces of information (otherwise, it is not new information – the buyer 
already knows the information). In this sense, markets for information are 
inherently characterized by imperfections of information concerning what 
is being purchased; and mechanisms like reputation ... are central.” 
(Stiglitz, 2000, pp. 1448-1449) 
 
The above applies even more to the “purchase” of expectations on technologies 
and policies – i.e. information on the potential of technologies and expected 
environmental and socio-economic impacts of related technology policies. By 
definition, expectations refer to projected outcomes that do not yet exist, thus 
they are even more difficult to verify at the time of their mediation. Their quality 
assessment would entail preliminary assessments of their predictive value, 
which are inherently difficult.  
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From my case studies, industry associations, consultancies and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) are all actors “trading” informational 
services on technologies, thus facing problems in appropriating the investments 
made in researching and diffusing expectations on technologies and policies. 
Industry associations trade their service of expectation diffusion in exchange for 
financial subscriptions from their industrial sponsors. NGOs trade their service 
of expectation research and diffusion in exchange for financial 
subscriptions/donations from individuals and organisations that are or want to 
be seen as sensitive about specific issues. In both cases, the 
subscription/donation is a pre-condition to getting full access to their 
informational services. Consultancies trade their service of expectation research 
in exchange for grants that their grant-providers usually award before the actual 
delivery of their informational services. These temporal lags between ex-ante 
“purchase” and ex-post “delivery” of expectations confirm the presence of 
problems in appropriating returns on investments in developing expertise. 
These temporal lags also imply a role for reputation as a signal on quality in 
these markets of expectations.  
 
Arguably, reputation matters even when the “exchange” of key information 
occurs at a “zero price”. Counterparts may accept key information on 
technologies from industry associations, consultancies and NGOs as well as 
directly from biofuel producers, scientists, public authorities and so on, even if 
they have not paid a price for it. Yet, these counterparts are likely to speculate 
on the possible strategic interests behind any “free” disclosure of costly key 
information and decide whether and how much to trust it also depending on the 
reputation they attribute to its sources. 
 
For instance, as observed by sociologists of expectations, technology 
innovators often publicly release expectations on technologies to promote them 
(Van Lente, 1993, p. 185; Geels & Smit, 2000, p. 882). The reputation of 
technology innovators as information sources matters even in this case – i.e. 
when expectations on technologies are used as a sort of freely available 
“advertisement”. As observed in other technological contexts, technology 
innovators can lose their reputation when releasing expectations excessively 
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biased towards optimism (Brown, 2003, p. 6; Brown & Michael, 2003, p. 9; 
Borup et al., 2006, p. 289). In general, all actors seem to care about reputation, 
although not all expectations are considered as having the same impact on it 
(Pollock & Williams, 2010, pp. 14, 20). These observations suggest that the 
reputation of the information source plays an important role even when 
expectations are simply mediated and/or used as an advertisement, and not 
only when they are exchanged via a formal purchase.  
 
Summing up, the reputation of the information source always matters since the 
“quality” of key information is rarely observable. Even among “peers”, who may 
be said to be experts in the same field, the trust and reputation of colleagues 
matter when they assess the validity of each other’s work (Smith, R., 2006). 
This applies when key information is released for free or as a sort of 
advertisement – e.g. technology innovators – but even more when it is 
exchanged against financial transactions – e.g. industry associations, 
consultancies and NGOs. In this latter case, problems in appropriating returns 
on investments in expertise force information sources demanding ex-ante 
payments for an ex-post delivery of informational services. Trust in the 
information source thus becomes the main criterion of selection, and 
consequently reputation acquires central importance. This would be even more 
true for free mediations or paid exchanges of expectations, because of 
problems created by the future orientation of these latter. 
 
The reputation of information sources consists of the counterparts’ subjective 
estimations of the information sources’ expertise and reliability. Aware of the 
importance of reputation, information sources attempt to influence the 
inferences made by their counterparts through a strategic use of signals on their 
expertise and reliability. 
 
1.3.1 Collateral Information as signals to build reputation 
 
Economists think of reputation formation as a type of signalling activity, where 
signals on the expertise and reliability of a seller are also confirmed or rejected 
on the basis of their observable past performance (Shapiro, 1983, pp. 659-660). 
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Economists then implicitly assume the existence of a learning process wherein 
the buyer learns from observable past performances of the seller and a shared 
conceptualisation between seller and buyer of past performances as signals on 
quality. As Stiglitz has pointed out, market participants care about how their 
actions will be interpreted by others (Stiglitz, 2000, pp. 1452-1453), since 
“actions (including choices) convey information, market participants know this, 
and this affects their behaviour” (Stiglitz, 2003, p. 13). 
 
Interpreting successful past performances as signals on expertise and reliability 
relies on a widely shared assumption, which is implicit in economic literature. 
The assumption is that actors that have been successful in the past are more 
likely to be so in the future. The widespread use of past performance as a signal 
on expertise and reliability confirms that this assumption is widely shared in 
society – e.g. a resumé or curriculum vitae is essentially a collection of past 
performances used to convince about the expertise and reliability of an 
individual in undertaking future work commitments. Thus, signals on expertise 
and reliability include not only information on resources’ endowments and 
specialisations, but also on previous actions and performances. 
 
Translating the above insights into the context of mediations of information on 
technologies, information sources and counterparts would both conceptualise 
every release of key information on technologies of the former as signals on 
their quality in terms of reliability and expertise. Accordingly, information 
sources would signal their expertise and reliability to their counterparts not only 
with information on their resources’ endowments and specialisations – such as 
information on physical and human capitals, skills, experiences and so on – but 
also with information on their past performances as expert and reliable 
information sources.  
 
Examples of the use of information on past performance as a signal on 
expertise and reliability can also be drawn from my case study. Industry 
associations tend to highlight their large membership as a means to convince 
about their professionalism in policy representation. Consultancies tend to 
advertise their previous work with authoritative institutions, such as public 
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authorities or international organisations, as a means to inspire trust in their 
value as advisers and, ultimately, in their selections of expectations on 
technologies and policies. NGOs tend to emphasise their successes in their 
campaigns to convince about their involvement in the issues concerned and 
professionalism in policy representation. Biofuel producers tend to boast about 
the level of investments in developing facilities and past successes in 
developing biofuels as a means to inspire trust in their professionalism as 
technology developers and, indirectly, as technological forecasters. Scientists 
list their previous publications, industrial patents and current network of 
connections to inspire trust in their qualities as professional researchers and, 
ultimately, in their statements of expectations.  
 
As previously noted, both information sources and counterparts are here 
assumed to be aware of the importance of signals in inspiring trust. This implies 
that they think of collateral information as another form of relevant information 
sought by counterparts and strategically used by information sources.  
 
1.4 A space for intermediaries 
 
As previously argued, any mediation of key information that entails non-expert 
counterparts identifying and selecting specific expert and reliable information 
sources also entails a mediation of collateral information on the information 
sources. In particular, counterparts need and seek collateral information on their 
information sources to inform their subjective judgements on the expertise and 
reliability of these latter.  
 
Counterparts can look for collateral information on the level of resources that 
information sources have invested and specialised in developing expertise. This 
should provide them with some indications about the performances of those 
information sources in producing key information with more embedded 
expertise than other sources. However, the asymmetries in expertise between 
information sources and counterparts complicate such an assessment. 
Counterparts, as non-experts, lack the expertise of their expert information 
sources. Therefore, they may be unable to assess the level of expertise 
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possessed by specific sources or embedded in their statements. In the worst-
case scenario, they may not even know what kind of expertise is required for 
researching the key information they seek. Additionally, specific expertise may 
be required to understand experts’ language (Collins & Evans, 2002, p. 254). 
Problems of communication may also arise if the experts’ statements have not 
been properly tailored to the specific level of expertise and informational 
requirements of their non-expert addressees. 
 
Counterparts can also look for collateral information on the strategic interests 
that information sources may have in distorting key information. However, 
searching for this type of collateral information is not straightforward. A first and 
obvious obstacle is the likely misguiding attitude of the information source itself. 
An information source may be reasonably expected to try its best to keep this 
information undisclosed. Furthermore, a satisfying estimation of the reliability of 
an information source is likely to require a considerable amount of resources 
and possibly dedicated expertise.  
 
As can be observed in the real world, counterparts still look for key information 
on technologies tailored to their specific informational requirements, and for 
collateral information on their information sources, despite all the difficulties 
involved. Meanwhile, information sources continue to release information about 
their expertise and reliability in order to be identified as such. 
 
This demand and offer for key and collateral information opens a space for 
intermediaries – i.e. for actors that choose to specialise resources and develop 
expertise in mediating key information and collateral information between 
information sources and counterparts.  
 
 
2. Intermediaries of promise  
 
Within the analytical subdivision so far discussed – i.e. between information 
sources and counterparts – intermediaries would be counterparts of the 
information sources from which they get information and information sources for 
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the counterparts they inform. Their functional role would be to facilitate the 
mutual recognition between information sources and counterparts, as the next 
section explains. 
 
2.1 The functional role of intermediaries: reducing the cost of searching 
and advertising 
 
Economists argue that, in a world characterised by imperfect information, 
sellers are forced to “advertise” themselves in order to be identified by their 
buyers, while buyers are forced to “search for information” in order to identify 
the best sellers – and thus get the best deals. However, both advertising and 
searching information involve costs (Stigler, 1961, p. 216). Taking the second-
hand cars market as an example, there are sellers who need to find buyers and 
buyers looking for good second-hand cars. In the absence of car dealers, 
sellers would be forced to advertise their car in the market, while buyers would 
be forced to search for information on the market. Both activities involve costs. 
Car dealers offer a service, which reduces both costs. By easing the mutual 
recognition between sellers and buyers, intermediaries such as car dealers 
reduce the buyer’s costs of searching and the seller’s costs of advertising 
(Stigler, 1961, p. 216). Similarly, in the mediation of information on 
technologies, counterparts struggle to find information sources and information 
sources struggle to be recognised as such by their counterparts – because they 
all live in a world characterised by imperfect information. 
 
Applying the above view to the mediation of information on technologies, 
intermediaries of promise could be then interpreted as specialised “dealers” of 
key and collateral information. In Chapter 7, I proposed a general definition of 
intermediaries of promise as organisations that collect, reformulate and re-
present expectations on technologies and policies on behalf of specific third 
parties. The activities of these intermediaries consist of bringing together and 
synthesising accounts of expectations on technologies and policies – often 
taken from several sources – and tailoring the resulting syntheses to the level of 
expertise and specific informational requirements of targeted interested parties. 
Through such informational mediation, intermediaries remain linked to the logic 
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of building and maintaining reputation. When they specialise in serving specific 
third parties, they display a tendency to link their reputation to the satisfaction of 
the latter – on which they depend. Depending on the parties on whose behalf 
they operate, these organisations may then serve different interests when 
diffusing expectations. 
  
When producing accounts on expectations on technologies and policies, 
intermediaries not only provide specific counterparts with tailored accounts of 
key information on technologies, but also explicit or implicit indications about 
which information sources should be trusted – for instance, they often explicitly 
rank information sources, or do so implicitly by referencing them in their 
accounts. In other words, intermediaries of promise may also be seen as 
providers of (explicit or implicit) assessments of collateral information on 
information sources.  
 
According to this interpretation, a functional role played by intermediaries of 
promise is to ease the mutual recognition between information sources and 
counterparts. Indeed, intermediaries help information sources in their 
“advertising” efforts – i.e. diffusing their key and collateral information – and 
counterparts in their “search for information” – i.e. finding their key and collateral 
information. In economic terms, easing the mutual recognition between 
information sources and counterparts would be explained as lowering the 
advertising costs for information sources and searching costs for counterparts.  
 
Summing up, the demand for and offer of key and collateral information open up 
a space for intermediaries that choose to specialise resources and develop 
expertise in mediating key information and collateral information between 
information sources and counterparts. Private intermediaries of promise, such 
as industry associations, consultancies and NGOs, enter into this space to 
enact their markets of expectations. Public intermediaries of promise, such as 
public authorities, enter into this space to fulfil their democratic obligation to 
inform their audiences about their policy interventions (see also Chapter 7).  
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In the following section, I reinterpret industry associations, consultancies, non-
governmental organisations and public authorities through the above 
conceptualisations.  
 
2.2 Intermediaries of promise as political representatives and as advisers 
 
Industry associations are private intermediaries of promise acting as political 
representatives. Industry associations serve industrial sponsors who are 
interested in promoting their technologies and in boosting the chances of their 
accounts of key information on technologies having an impact. In the biofuel 
consultation, industry associations released accounts of expectations that 
tended to favour the technologies of their industrial sponsors. Thus, their 
sponsors would commission them to produce accounts of key information on 
technologies for promotional purposes. In line with what I have previously 
argued, these sponsors can be reasonably assumed to be interested in making 
their accounts of key information on technologies as visible and accessible as 
possible to targeted counterparts. Therefore, the satisfaction of the sponsors 
and, consequently, the reputation of the intermediaries depend on the 
performance of the latter in providing higher visibility to their sponsors’ 
accounts. Thus, industry associations can be reinterpreted as intermediaries 
specialising resources in advertising information – or political representation – 
on behalf of specific sponsors promoting themselves as information sources. 
 
Consultancies are private intermediaries of promise acting as advisers. Their 
grant-providers commission them to produce accounts of key information on 
technologies for informative purposes. For instance, the RFA hired eight 
consultancies to produce reports synthesising the latest accounts of the issues 
fuelling the controversy on biofuel production, which were then used to inform 
the Gallagher Review. In line with what previously argued, these grant-providers 
can be reasonably assumed to be interested in getting access to the most 
reliable expert key information on technologies available – i.e. not strategically 
distorted by information sources. The satisfaction of these grant-providers and, 
consequently, the reputation of these intermediaries thus depend on the 
performance of the latter in screening information sources per expertise and 
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reliability. Consultancies can therefore be reinterpreted as intermediaries 
specialising resources in searching for information – or advising – on behalf of 
specific grant-providers self-identifying as non-experts counterparts.  
 
NGOs are private intermediaries of promise acting simultaneously as political 
representatives and advisers. Yet, it is often unclear on whose behalf they are 
operating. For their market survival, NGOs rely on financial subscriptions and 
donations from individuals and/or organisations that are or want to be seen as 
particularly sensitive to specific socio-political issues and to increase the 
chances of their voices to be heard. In the consultation, NGOs released 
accounts of key information on technologies that tended to advocate socio-
political issues about which their affiliates/subscribers seemingly cared. Thus, 
NGOs serve non-expert affiliates who seek advice and at the same time want to 
be represented, at least in principle. Their service is both informative and 
representative. The satisfaction of these affiliates/subscribers and, 
consequently, the reputation of these intermediaries depend on the 
performances of the latter in both screening information sources per expertise 
and reliability and providing higher visibility to accounts reflecting the interests 
of their affiliates/subscribers. NGOs can thus be reinterpreted as intermediaries 
specialising resources in providing hybrid informational services – integrating 
advice with political representation – on behalf of affiliates/subscribers that 
simultaneously seek advice and want to be represented, at least in principle. 
 
Public authorities – both with and without executive roles in policymaking – are 
public intermediaries of promise, and act simultaneously as political 
representatives and advisers. Public authorities collect key information on 
technologies from various information sources to reformulate and propose it to 
their audiences via their official publications. In principle, public authorities 
operate their informational mediation on behalf of all taxpayers; that is, to fulfil 
their democratic obligation to legitimise their opinions or interventions in 
technology policy. Their service is both informative and representative. 
Therefore, the satisfaction of taxpayers and, consequently, the reputation of 
public authorities depend on the performances of the latter in both screening 
information sources per expertise and reliability, and representing and 
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protecting the interests of taxpayers as a whole – at least, in principle. Public 
authorities can thus be broadly reinterpreted as intermediaries specialising a 
part of their resources to the provision of hybrid informational services. These 
services integrate advice with political representation and are operated on 
behalf of all taxpayers in compliance with democratic obligations, at least in 
principle. 
 
 
3. Conclusion of the chapter  
 
In a world where searching information is believed to reduce uncertainties, 
actors that possess and specialise more resources than others in producing or 
searching key information on technologies are likely to believe themselves, and 
be believed by other actors, to be more successful in finding it. However, 
resources are asymmetrically distributed. This drives actors to specialise their 
resources in different ways, further accentuating these asymmetries. The 
asymmetries in distribution and specialisation of resources create counterparts 
and information sources that seek each other. Reputation plays a crucial role in 
their mutual identification by providing counterparts with an imperfect criterion 
by which to select information sources. In their attempt to bypass the problems 
of assessing the expertise embedded in and reliability of the key information 
sought, counterparts screen information sources on the basis of their reputation. 
Information sources know this and seek to build and maintain their reputation by 
signalling collateral information on their expertise and reliability. Within such a 
world, intermediaries of promise specialise in mediating key and collateral 
information. Through this informational mediation, intermediaries reduce the 
costs of advertising and searching for information sources and counterparts 
respectively, thus improving the visibility of the former and their statements. 
These “dealers of visibility” also abide by the logic of reputation, and depend on 
it for their own visibility. The significance of this analytical model will be made 
evident in the next and final chapter. 
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Chapter 9 – Conclusions 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this final chapter, I wish to further discuss the phenomenon of technology 
innovators hyping their statements of expectations. While doing so, I will 
emphasise the main conceptualisations that I have proposed in this dissertation. 
The chapter concludes by inviting scholars to consider some of the findings and 
insights presented in this dissertation and to undertake further research on 
issues yet to be explored by the sociology of expectations. 
 
 
1. Technology innovators: voluntary hype 
 
Hyped statements of expectations are not always the involuntary result of 
genuine over-optimism. Another reason explaining why expectations are often 
too optimistic relates to their use as resources to catch attention (Geels & Smit, 
2000, pp. 881-882). Especially in the early stages of technology development, 
the promotion of expectations is a determinant in catching the attention of 
investors and other relevant actors (Borup et al., 2006, p. 289). However, as 
frequently observed, this promotional effort often goes further, into 
overoptimistic exaggerations – i.e. in voluntary and/or involuntary hype, with 
negative implications in terms of disappointment and related damages to 
investments and reputations (Brown, 2003, p. 6; Brown & Michael, 2003, p. 9; 
Borup et al., 2006, p. 289). 
 
This framework has typically been applied to investigate the expectations of 
technology innovators. Thus, technology innovators in particular may voluntarily 
create early surges of hype to catch attention and mobilise interests. Arguably, 
this phenomenon can be related to a technological lock-in,61 which locks 
                                            
61
 A technological lock-in is a phenomenon in which technologies appear to follow specific paths 
that are difficult to escape because of the costs involved in shifting to an alternative technology. 
Because of those shifting costs, technologies tend to persist over time (Arthur, 1989, p. 129; 
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technology innovators in to the successful development of their respective 
technologies, as the next section explains.  
 
1.1 Technology innovators: technological lock-in 
 
Technology innovators invest and specialise the majority of their resources into 
specific technologies. Their market survival is consequently intrinsically related 
to the development of their technologies, as this will determine the future value 
of their investments. For instance, in the case of a rival technology gaining 
predominance, their market survival is threatened, as the resources invested in 
their technologies decrease in value. Conversely, if their technology gains 
predominance, their market survival is secured as the resources invested into 
their technologies increase in value. Moved by this logic, technology innovators 
– when acting as information sources – attempt to promote their technologies at 
their best in order to secure their market survival. Intuitively, this phenomenon is 
more likely to occur when the competition among technologies intensifies. 
 
Here interpreted as technology innovators in biofuel technologies, obligated 
suppliers and biofuel producers were the largest groups of participants and 
those most exposed in financial terms to the issues covered in the fourth 
consultation. From the analysis of their responses, it clearly emerged that they 
advocated maintaining support to their technologies in an attempt to secure the 
value of their previous and planned investments in biofuel development. To that 
end, they promoted optimistic expectations on their technologies and on the 
related supporting policies – at least, compared to the expectations of the other 
participants (see Chapter 5 and 6). That said, on the basis of the evidence 
analysed in this dissertation, it is not possible to determine whether the 
optimistic confidence of technology innovators in their own technologies was 
                                                                                                                                
Foxon, 2002, p. 2). Even the presence of potentially superior substitutes may not ensure a lock 
out from a dominant technology. The notorious dominance of fossil fuel technologies over 
renewable energy technologies provides an example of a technological lock-in in the energy 
system – or a “carbon lock-in” (Unruh, 2000, p. 827; 2002, p. 317; Unruh & Carrillo-Hermosilla, 
2006, p. 1185). In my dissertation, I apply this concept to the individual level of technology 
innovators – i.e. the actors who have most of their investments locked-in to an incumbent 
technology and, consequently, are particularly exposed to the costs involved in shifting to 
emerging technologies. 
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involuntary or instead hid voluntary hype.62 Nevertheless, given the stakes of 
biofuel technology innovators in biofuel policy, the possible presence of 
voluntary hype in their statements is a risk that should not be dismissed. This 
adds to the risk of involuntary hype as genuine over-optimism, which is 
constant. 
 
Summing up, technology innovators can be reasonably expected to be 
concerned about the values of the resources that they have invested in their 
technology and thus promote it no matter what they know/believe about it. Thus, 
while problems of involuntary hype should never be excluded, problems of 
voluntary hype may increase whenever technology innovators are identified as 
sources of expectations. 
 
Beyond technology innovators, this dissertation also looked at other types of 
actor. Among these, my investigation focused on the UK Government in 
particular, but also on other public authorities as well as several industry 
associations, consultancies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
Within this dissertation, all these actors have been conceptualised as 
“intermediaries of promise” (see Chapter 7). Intermediaries of promise play an 
important role in mediating and diffusing statements of expectations, and thus 
also in influencing the diffusion of hype.  
 
 
2. Intermediaries of promise 
 
Intermediaries of promise may be seen as actors specialising their resources in 
offering informational services – ranging from political representation to advice – 
on behalf of third parties. By mediating information among different parties, this 
influential class of actor affects the visibility of expectations, at times by 
                                            
62
 The analysis of their consultation responses and websites alone is insufficient to identify the 
possible presence of hype in their statements. One would need “confessions” from technology 
innovators about the extent to which their statements were intentionally skewed towards 
optimism. It is difficult to obtain such confessions, even in interview – the sources of statements 
may be expected to prefer not to reveal any distortion or bias. Besides, hype may also be 
involuntary, the sources of statements being carried away in their optimism without being aware 
of it.  
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promoting expectations of specific parties, at others by scrutinising expectations 
on behalf of specific parties. Intermediaries whose core business is “trading” 
such informational mediation are here identified as private intermediaries of 
promise. Intermediaries enacting such informational mediation in compliance 
with democratic obligations are here identified as public intermediaries of 
promise. 
 
2.1 Private intermediaries of promise: reputational lock-in 
 
Private intermediaries of promise, such as industry associations, consultancies 
and NGOs, all operate in different “markets of expectations” (Pollock & 
Williams, 2010, pp. 7-8). They trade different informational services, ranging 
from political representation to advice, and specialise in serving different 
categories of clients on whose satisfaction they depend for their own market 
survival. Private intermediaries are likely to be seen as more technology neutral 
than technology innovators given the lower extent to which they have resources 
invested in technological development. Yet they are constrained by the logic of 
building/maintaining reputation and may eventually fall into a situation that may 
be called reputational lock-in. Intermediaries affected by a reputational lock-in 
may reflect the interests of the actors on whose satisfaction they depend and 
therefore mediate their voluntary (as well as involuntary) hype accordingly.  
 
Industry associations are private intermediaries of promise acting as political 
representatives on behalf of specific sponsors promoting themselves as 
information sources. Their industrial sponsors are interested in promoting their 
technologies and in boosting the chances of their statements of expectations 
having an impact. The satisfaction of the sponsors and, consequently, the 
reputation of the intermediaries, thus depend on the performances of the latter 
in providing higher visibility to their clients’ statements. 
 
Consultancies are private intermediaries of promise acting as advisers on 
behalf of specific grant-providers looking for expert and reliable statements of 
expectations. Their grant-providers commission them to produce tailored 
syntheses of statements of expectations for informative purposes. The 
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satisfaction of the grant-providers and, consequently, the reputation of the 
intermediaries thus depend on the performances of the latter in screening 
information sources per expertise and reliability. 
 
NGOs are private intermediaries of promise acting simultaneously as political 
representatives and advisers. Yet it is often unclear on whose behalf they 
operate. For their market survival, NGOs rely on financial subscriptions and 
donations from affiliates who seek advice and at the same time want to be 
represented; hence, they should operate on behalf of their affiliates/subscribers, 
at least in principle. The satisfaction of the affiliates/subscribers and, 
consequently, the reputation of the intermediaries thus depend on the 
performance of the latter in both screening information sources per expertise 
and reliability and providing higher visibility to statements of expectations 
reflecting the interests of their affiliates/subscribers. 
 
Arguably, the risk of a reputational lock-in inducing intermediaries to reflect the 
hype of their clients appears more likely to occur among industry associations, 
rather than consultancies or NGOs. However, none of these intermediaries 
should be presumed immune to the problem. 
 
2.2 Public intermediaries of promise: policy-promise lock-in 
 
Public authorities – both with and without executive roles in policymaking – can 
be broadly seen as public intermediaries of promise that specialise a part of 
their resources in the provision of hybrid informational services combining 
political representation and advice. They do so in compliance with democratic 
obligations, and thus on behalf of all taxpayers, at least in principle. The 
satisfaction of taxpayers and, consequently, the reputation of public authorities 
thus depend on the performance of the latter in both screening information 
sources per expertise and reliability and representing and protecting the 
interests of taxpayers as a whole – in principle at least. 
 
Preserving their reputation as a selector is even more important for executive 
public authorities. More than public authorities with different policy remits, 
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executive public authorities are directly held to account for their policy-promises 
towards what may be perceived as appropriate or inappropriate choices of 
expectations – especially when entailing investments of public resources. In 
addition to their reputation as a selector of expectations, executive public 
authorities in particular also respond to technology innovators as reliable 
stakeholders. The satisfaction of technology innovators, and consequently the 
reputation of executive public authorities as stakeholders, depends on the 
fulfilment of previous policy-promises of support. Particularly when dealing with 
a policy-promise lock-in, executive public authorities may struggle to balance 
these multiple reputations (see Chapter 4). 
 
A possible risk in terms of hype diffusion is that public intermediaries may defer 
to overoptimistic expectations of technology innovators when endorsing 
technological expectations. In deferring in this way, public intermediaries may 
inadvertently contribute to the diffusion of hyped statements of expectations.  
 
In sum, the risk of voluntary hype should increase whenever the sources of 
statements of expectations are technology innovators, or intermediaries whose 
reputation is locked to technology innovators. That said, involuntary hype 
remains a permanent problem as any actor may fail to appropriately identify 
hype and thus inadvertently diffuse it. The next section further argues that the 
risk of dealing with voluntary hype should increase whenever the expectations 
sought are believed to require information sources with techno-specific 
expertise in the technologies. 
 
 
3. Techno-specific expertise in the technologies: a higher risk of voluntary 
hype  
 
Arguably, technology-specific expertise entails the specialisation of resources in 
that technology. Information sources that invest their resources into developing 
such expertise are thus technology innovators. As argued before, technology 
innovators are more prone to voluntarily hype their statements of expectations. 
Distortions in the form of voluntary hype should thus be more likely in 
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expectations believed to require information sources mastering techno-specific 
expertise in the technologies. This would implicitly relate to the belief that 
developing expertise grants better access to key information and, at the same 
time, requires the specialisation of resources (see Chapter 8). 
 
An example related to biofuels may clarify what I mean by technology-specific 
expertise. Biofuels’ potential as a sustainable solution to mitigating climate 
change by substituting oil in transport is the subject of debate. Such debate 
involves both expectations on technical issues as well as on the environmental 
and socio-economic impacts of biofuel technologies. For expectations 
concerning technology-specific issues, such as projections of cost abatements 
in biofuel production and/or research outcomes in the newest biofuel 
technologies, counterparts seek information sources with technology-specific 
expertise. In other words, dealing with that kind of information on technologies 
is associated with technical knowledge about biofuel innovations and 
processes. Instead, for expectations concerning environmental and socio-
economic impacts of the technologies – such as deforestation, food prices 
increases or land use changes – counterparts seek information sources with 
different sorts of expertise – technology-specific expertise being relatively less 
of a critical requirement. In other words, highly specialised technical expertise 
on biofuel innovations or production processes is not seen as the primary 
requirement to estimate the impacts of biofuel feedstock production on food 
prices, deforestation or land use changes. The next section illustrates the 
argument developed in this section by means of an example taken from my 
case study.  
 
3.1 Technology-specific expertise in biofuels and voluntary hype: an 
example 
 
Take for instance the following statement of expectations: 
 
“In the longer term, second generation biofuel technologies have the 
potential to reduce pressure on land because they can use a wider range 
of feedstocks, including waste. However, the Government does not 
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believe it is feasible to wait for technological improvements before 
utilising biofuels. It is through stimulating a market for biofuels that we will 
encourage investment and the development of advanced technology.” 
(DfT, 2008b, p. 11) 
 
Endorsing this statement implies confidence in the capacity and incentives of 
current biofuel scientists and industrialists to translate second-generation 
biofuel technologies from their laboratories to industrial facilities and to replace 
first-generation biofuels some time in the future. The UK Government has 
publicly endorsed this statement, while biofuel scientists and industrialists 
support very similar statements.  
 
Let us now assume that the UK Government, when endorsing the above 
statement, was driven by the belief that developing expertise grants better 
access to key information and, at the same time, requires the specialisation of 
resources (see Chapter 8). The UK Government is then likely to have identified 
biofuel scientists and industrialists as key information sources for its statement 
because of their specialisation of resources in biofuel technologies. In other 
words, if assessing the predictive value of the above statement is believed to 
require expertise in biofuel technologies and their technological performances, 
biofuel scientists and industrialists are more likely to have been identified as the 
actors possessing the appropriate techno-specific expertise to conjecture 
whether that translation is feasible.  
 
However, biofuel scientists and industrialists are technology innovators. Their 
experience and expertise required investments of considerable resources into 
biofuel technologies. The value of those investments is likely to maintain value 
conditional on the successful development of the technology. Such a 
technological lock-in thus connects the future market survival of biofuel 
scientists and industrialists to that of their technologies and thus provides them 
an incentive to promote their technologies for strategic reasons. As argued 
before, that incentive may eventually induce biofuel scientists and industrialists 
to promote expectations voluntarily distorted towards optimism in order to seek 
strategic advantages.  
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Thus, there is a risk that the statement taken as an example above contains 
voluntary (and/or involuntary) hype, given its resemblance to the statements 
supported by the biofuel industry. Whether the benefits of second-generation 
biofuels would offset all the damage caused by the first generation and whether 
it is necessary to support first-generation biofuels to favour the transition to 
second-generation biofuels are still controversial issues. That said, the UK 
Government has endorsed the statement. By doing so, it has shared what 
technology innovators have said about the future of their technologies, and thus 
has endorsed that risk. 
 
More generally, whenever technology innovators are identified as key 
information sources of expectations believed to require technology-specific 
expertise, surges of voluntary hype should be more likely, as the next section 
argues. 
 
3.2 Technology-specific expectations and surges of voluntary hype 
 
Technology innovators can hire intermediaries specialising in policy 
representation to extend the range and effectiveness of their promotional effort. 
These intermediaries specialise in translating statements of expectations into 
forms more accessible for targeted groups of counterparts on behalf of the 
technology innovators that sponsor them. Industry associations are an example 
of such intermediaries. As seen in the consultation, biofuel industrialists hired 
industry associations as political representatives to target the UK Government.  
 
Industry associations link their own reputation to the successful promotion of 
statements of expectations on behalf of their clients. Depending on their degree 
of dependence on their clients, these intermediaries may find themselves 
directly linked to the market survival of the same class of actor they are 
representing. If their clients are technology innovators, these intermediaries 
may eventually become indirectly dependent on the market survival of the 
technology supported by their clients. In general, the greater the strength of 
their reputational lock-in with technology innovators, the stronger the link 
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between the future market survival of these intermediaries and that of the latter 
and their technology. Thus, besides direct investments in technology 
development or in developing technology-specific expertise, another factor that 
can affect an actor’s tendency to voluntarily distort statements of expectations is 
the possible presence of direct or indirect reputational links to the technology. 
Industry associations are examples of intermediaries closely linked to specific 
technology innovators. Accordingly, they are likely to share the concerns of their 
sponsor industries about the future development of specific technologies. In the 
consultation, the industry associations linked to the first-generation biofuel 
industry advocated preserving support to currently available first-generation 
biofuels, attempting to ensure the market survival of their sponsor industry’s 
technology.  
 
The joint effort of technology innovators and their political representatives can 
eventually inflate bubbles of optimistically distorted statements of expectations, 
increasing the risk of loss of resources and reputation following their possible 
burst. As previously mentioned, sociologists of expectations argue that 
alternating “cycles of hype and disappointments” appear innate in the way in 
which expectations operate in science and technology (Borup et al., 2006, p. 
290). Actors may intentionally create surges of hype to get a hearing and 
mobilise the interest of other actors (Geels & Smit, 2000, pp. 881-882). As 
argued above, when doing so, technology innovators may hire political 
representatives to extend their reach and further inflate hype. 
 
Public authorities are among the actors that technology innovators and their 
political representatives prefer to target. Executive public authorities in particular 
can mobilise substantial resources for technological development as well as 
provide great visibility to the statements they endorse through their publications. 
All public authorities act as selectors of statements of expectations by 
technology innovators. At the same time, they act as information sources for 
taxpayers when providing justifications for their technology policies via official 
documents. Thus, they effectively operate as public intermediaries between 
information sources and taxpayers, supposedly on behalf of all taxpayers, at 
least in principle.  
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Public authorities may defer to the overoptimistic expectations of technology 
innovators when endorsing expectations for emerging technologies. Through 
such deferral, they may eventually amplify optimism about certain technologies 
and thus increase the risk of future reputational damages and misallocation of 
resources. This risk is greater for executive public authorities in technology 
policy, which are held directly responsible for investment of public resources via 
their policy-promises of support. Given the reputational stakes, all public 
authorities may be expected to care about the expertise and reliability 
embedded in statements of expectations to prevent possible ex-post 
disappointments. To filter – and protect their reputation from – the “noise” 
created by technology innovators and their policy representatives, public 
authorities often hire specialist advisory intermediaries. Consultancies are an 
example of such intermediaries.  
 
Consultancies specialise in screening information sources and producing 
tailored accounts of statements of expectations matching the informational 
requirements of clients who look for expert and reliable information on 
technologies. In the case study analysed, the Renewable Fuels Agency (RFA) 
commissioned eight consultancies to produce the Gallagher Review. They 
screened several information sources to come up with reports synthesising the 
main points of the ongoing debate on biofuels, among which whether second-
generation biofuels would solve the problems of first-generation biofuels and 
whether supporting first-generation biofuels is necessary or counterproductive 
in favouring the transition to second-generation biofuels. 
 
Taxpayers may not only want to be informed, but also wish to have their voice 
heard through intermediaries other than public authorities. In order to acquire 
knowledge and visibility, many individuals and organisations prefer to rely on 
intermediaries specialising in providing hybrid services, which range from 
advice to political representation. Examples of these hybrid intermediaries are 
NGOs, which act as both advisers and political representatives seemingly on 
behalf of specific groups of clients that are or want to be seen as particularly 
sensitive to specific issues. In the consultation, NGOs informed and then 
politically represented their clients concerning specific issues affected by the 
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continued support for first-generation biofuels, such as deforestation, food price 
increases and worsening socio-economic conditions in developing countries. 
 
Summing up, actors whose resources and reputations are locked into a 
technology may voluntarily inflate bubbles of optimistically distorted statements 
and cause ex-post damages in terms of resources’ misallocation and reputation 
losses. The risk of surges of hype then increases whenever technology 
innovators are seen as key information sources. Technology innovators enjoy a 
privileged position whenever counterparts seek expectations that are believed 
to require techno-specific expertise in their technologies. In that case, 
technology innovators are likely to be considered experts and, consequently, 
primary information sources by all other actors. Technology innovators as 
information sources may then exploit the asymmetries in expertise in their 
favour and attempt to “lock-in” other actors to their technology via their 
statements. Catching public authorities and advisers provides technology 
innovators with greater access to resources, higher visibility and a certain 
degree of protection from sudden policy changes. When technology innovators 
have successfully convinced advisers and public authorities to endorse their 
projections, these latter groups may find it hard to change position in the 
immediate future as their reputation is linked to those projections. This is 
especially true for executive public authorities. Their endorsement of the 
techno-expectations of incumbent technology innovators – and subsequent 
translation into policy-promises of support – may eventually result in a policy-
promise lock-in. This policy-promise lock-in may then induce and/or be used as 
justification to preserve support for incumbent technologies – even when these 
have become controversial – supposedly to favour techno-scientific 
advancement in preferable emerging technologies. This situation would benefit 
– and is likely to be sought by – incumbent technology innovators, at least in the 
short term.  
 
 
4. Final remarks and recommendations for further research 
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In the introduction to this dissertation, I stated that a key empirical contribution 
of my research is an explanation of how the UK Government’s responsibilities 
towards technology policies have affected the construction of its vision of the 
future. Through the lens of the sociology of expectations, my analysis 
highlighted the linkage made between the UK Government’s “reputational sunk-
costs” in first-generation biofuel suppliers and future techno-scientific advance 
in second-generation biofuels (see also Berti & Levidow, 2014). More 
specifically, the UK Government was constrained by several imperatives: its EU 
obligations, its dependence on a new-born UK biofuel industry necessary for 
fulfilling them and its need to establish credible incentives for its technology 
policy. Given its EU obligations, the UK Government’s dependence on first-
generation biofuel suppliers drove policy-promises to that industry, thus 
imposing “reputational sunk costs” on the Department for Transport (DfT) 
(Dunlop, 2010, p. 354). Those reputational stakes were linked to techno-
scientific advance through expectations for second-generation biofuels. The UK 
Government’s endorsement and promotion of those expectations justified short-
term support for incumbent biofuels, but potentially resulted in a lock-in (Van 
Lente & Rip, 1998a, p. 217). Such linkage complements insights from previous 
analyses of UK biofuel policy (Dunlop, 2010; Palmer, 2010; Boucher, 2012). 
 
Contributing more broadly to the literatures on technology policies, this 
investigation unveiled how executive public authorities may find themselves 
facing a policy dilemma over distributing support across technological niches. 
More specifically, a dilemma may emerge over whether preserving support to 
controversial, incumbent niches should be considered a transitional requirement 
– or a counterproductive measure – to promoting development in preferable, 
emergent niches.  
 
I have shown how the first view above relates to an underlying rationale specific 
to executive public authorities in technology policy – i.e. fulfilling previous policy-
promises of support to incumbent technological niches is a requirement to 
maintain credibility in the eyes of current and prospective technology innovators 
in emerging technological niches. Such credibility is essential to ensure the 
effectiveness of future technology policy in mobilising current and prospective 
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technology innovators. This linkage between reputational stakes and techno-
scientific advancement has been theorised here as a policy-promise lock-in 
when previous policy-commitments to technology innovators of incumbent 
technologies have become controversial. Potentially driven by several 
imperatives, these controversial policy commitments are officially justified as 
necessary for the development of preferable emerging technologies.  
 
When dealing with a policy-promise lock-in, executive public authorities may 
delay a full redirection of support from incumbent to emergent technologies, 
despite the fact that support for the former has become controversial. This may 
be interpreted as contradicting or in line with the logics of promise-requirement 
cycles whereby support ought to be redirected from “old” and “obsolete” to 
“new” and emerging technologies, especially when incumbent technologies 
have failed to fulfil their initial expectations (Van Lente, 1993, p. 167; Van Lente 
& Rip, 1998a, pp. 216, 222-223; Van Lente, 2000, p. 60; 2006, p. 215). When 
seen as a transitional requirement, such a delay would appear to be in line with 
the logics of promise-requirement cycles. When seen as leading to a socio-
technical regime in which incumbent technologies prevent the development of 
emerging technologies, such a delay would appear instead to contradict those 
logics. 
 
Executive public authorities dealing with a policy-promise lock-in may endorse 
and promote expectations for emerging technologies accordingly. A policy-
promise lock-in would then be one possible situation in which executive public 
authorities appear to act as “promise champions” for a technological field – as 
previously observed in other technology policy contexts (Van Lente, 1993, p. 
160; Van Lente & Rip, 1998b, pp. 231-232). However, in deploying 
expectations, their primary imperatives seem to be protecting their reputation in 
technology policy, avoiding responsibility for any disappointment regarding 
technological development and promoting technology development per se. 
When endorsing expectations on biofuel technologies and policies, the UK 
Government seemingly deferred to the expectations of the incumbent biofuel 
industry – as in other policy contexts in which the UK Government appears to 
have deferred to industrialists’ arguments (Eames et al., 2006, pp. 367-368; 
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Beynon-Jones & Brown, 2011, p. 647). Given the kind of evidence analysed, my 
analysis cannot reveal whether and how much voluntary and/or involuntary 
hype is hidden in those expectations. However, on the basis of all the 
observations and considerations made, this risk that should not be dismissed. 
Against the risk of endorsing hyped expectations, executive public authorities 
may benefit from interacting with other public authorities that act uniquely as 
selectors of expectations – i.e. those that monitor policymaking on behalf of 
taxpayers as a whole and are less involved with incumbent industries. These 
selectors of expectations would set a benchmark for executive public authorities 
to calibrate their double nature as selectors and stakeholders. This would 
eventually increase their chances of striking the right balance between the 
interests of technology innovators and those of the rest of taxpayers. According 
to this view, the decision of the current UK Government to close down the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution in March 2011 has perhaps helped 
improve public finances in a time of economic crisis, but has hardly improved 
the balance of interests in any debate on sustainability in the UK. 
 
The UK Government’s vision on biofuel policy has stirred up disagreements. 
These disagreements concern the three expectations sustaining it: (1) that 
emerging second-generation biofuels will overcome the drawbacks of 
incumbent first-generation biofuels; (2) that future sustainability standards will 
be effectively implemented and capable of containing the damages of both first- 
and second-generation biofuels; and (3) that current support for first-generation 
biofuels will stimulate current and prospective investors to develop second-
generation biofuels. As has been seen, this last expectation has been the most 
controversial, with stakeholders strongly disagreeing with the underlying 
rationale interlinking the UK Government’s reputational stakes on first-
generation biofuel industry with techno-scientific advancement in second-
generation biofuels. The UK Government is still supporting these expectations 
and rationale. The first-generation biofuel industry has promoted this rationale 
and most of the above expectations. NGOs and Parliamentary Select 
Committees have instead firmly rejected the rationale, though partially 
endorsing the other expectations. These observations seem to partially confirm 
past trends as observed by other analysts in the second and third consultations 
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on biofuel policy, in which the UK Government seemingly privileged the 
interests of the biofuel industry over the concerns of NGOs (Upham & Tomei, 
2010, pp. 3-5, 10-11; Upham et al., 2011, p. 2673). Yet the UK Government 
promised and delivered support for first-generation biofuels below EU targets 
and the biofuel industry’s demands. By 2008, UK biofuel targets were also 
explicitly referred to as “cautious”, and were eventually delayed in 2009 (DfT, 
2004c, p. 2; 2008e, Section 2; 2008b, p. 7). This seems to suggest that the UK 
Government did not completely dismiss NGOs’ concerns and policy opposition 
to first-generation biofuels, as previously suggested by other investigators of the 
case (Pilgrim & Harvey, 2010, Paragraphs 4.17-4.18). Following previous 
analyses of stakeholders’ opinions on UK biofuel policy, my analysis 
investigates the fourth consultation on UK biofuel policy using a distinctive 
perspective focused on expectations, and reconciles previous interpretations of 
the UK Government’s decisions to partially marginalise NGOs’ views and 
enforce a slowdown of the Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO). 
Those decisions are here interpreted as efforts to preserve the government’s 
credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of both technology innovators (Upham & 
Tomei, 2010, pp. 3-5, 10-11; Upham et al., 2011, p. 2673) – since current 
support was effectively preserved against calls for a policy moratorium – and 
biofuel critics (Pilgrim & Harvey, 2010, Paragraphs 4.17-4.18) – as current 
support was further reduced and justified primarily in relation to the 
development of second-generation biofuels. 
 
The research method I deployed in my research could be applied to conduct 
similar analyses of other EU Member States or to scale up the analysis at the 
EU level. Though not appropriate for producing statistical generalisations, case 
studies remain a powerful research method to draw context-contingent 
generalisations with a high degree of explanatory power in relation to the 
specific case under analysis (Hartley, 2004, pp. 323-336; George & Bennett, 
2005, pp. 19-23; Gerring, 2006, pp. 39-43; Yin, 2013, pp. 5-15). In my 
investigation, the case study method proved to be the appropriate choice for 
exploring, describing and deriving explanatory concepts from a single case 
study – i.e. the UK Government’s endorsement of its current vision on UK 
biofuel policy (Yin, 2003, pp. 5-6; 2013, pp. 7-8). Thanks to the flexibility of this 
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research method (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 19-22; Gerring, 2006, pp. 39-
43), my research derived insights into the case that refined previous 
explanations of UK biofuel policy, and the theoretical framework deployed in the 
analysis. As a follow up to my analysis, case studies on other EU Member 
states would provide a base upon which to conduct comparative studies and 
shed light on cross-national differences in biofuel policy developments within 
the EU. With such a base, it would also be possible to test the generalisability of 
the context-contingent generalisations I drew from my analysis (Yin, 2013, pp. 
53, 61). The case study method could also be applied to European 
policymaking institutions. This would help confirm whether EU biofuel policy is 
also affected by a policy-promise lock-in. More generally, the research design 
deployed in my investigation could be applied to other technological contexts to 
verify whether policy dilemmas over distributing support between controversial 
and incumbent versus preferable and emergent technological niches are 
general phenomena or peculiar to UK biofuel policy. 
 
In the introduction to this dissertation, I also stated that a key theoretical 
contribution of my research was expansion of the relatively narrow focus of the 
sociology of expectations on technology innovators. My analysis focused on 
types of actor that have mostly been neglected in that literature, such as, 
notably, the government, but also other public authorities as well as industry 
associations, consultancies and NGOs. Complementing previous analyses in 
the sociology of expectations, my analysis investigated these types of actor 
through a distinctive analytical perspective that looks at their functional roles 
and interrelations when diffusing expectations among different parties. To 
emphasise their roles in mediating expectations on behalf of third parties, I 
defined these types of actor as private and public intermediaries of promise. 
The definitions of private and public intermediaries of promise only provide a 
starting point for a deeper analysis of the role played by the various types of 
actor that mediate expectations where technology policies are debated. Such 
definitions nevertheless prompt one to consider the importance of a number of 
issues that are still marginal within the literature of the sociology of 
expectations. More specifically: (1) how specialisation of resources influences 
the diffusion of expectations, (2) the performative role of intermediaries of 
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promise in providing visibility to expectations and, (3) the role played by 
reputation as collective expectations in reinforcing the performativity of 
expectations on technologies and policies. All these issues are grounded in the 
acknowledgement that visibility is an essential element for statements of 
expectations to become performative. 
 
In a world in which it is impossible to obtain all the relevant information at the 
right time – or, in economic terms, where access to information is imperfect – 
visibility is power. In such a world, intermediaries specialise in the provision of 
informational services that reduce the costs of searching and advertising for 
information sources and counterparts. Through these services, intermediaries 
increase the visibility of specific information sources and their statements of 
expectations. Industry associations specialise their resources in increasing the 
visibility of specific statements on behalf of their industrial sponsors. 
Consultancies specialise in screening statements from different sources on 
behalf of grant-providers that mostly look for expert and reliable information. 
NGOs specialise their resources in informing about and increasing the visibility 
of statements related to specific socio-political issues and do so on behalf of 
their affiliates/subscribers – in principle at least. Public authorities select 
statements from various sources and use them to legitimise their opinions on 
polices, on behalf of all taxpayers, at least in principle. Through their activities, 
all these intermediaries eventually increase the visibility of the statements of 
expectations that they select, reformulate and re-present to interested parties. 
In a way, intermediaries – although in different ways, to different audiences and 
on behalf of different actors – may all be interpreted as dealers of visibility. By 
making specific statements more visible, intermediaries increase the chances of 
those statements becoming widely accepted and shared, and thus becoming 
influential and performative. 
 
In the words of Pollock and Williams, “By assembling the organizational 
machinery” for disseminating successful statements and for dealing with those 
that are more “problematic”, “promissory organisations create themselves as 
centres of power” (Pollock & Williams, 2010, p. 8). In light of what previously 
discussed, Pollock and Williams’ claim may be reinterpreted and rephrased as: 
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“by specialising resources and expertise in collecting, reformulating, and re-
presenting statements of expectations, intermediaries create themselves as 
centres of power, and manage it by influencing the visibility of those statements” 
– i.e. by making their diffusion more successful. Like promissory organisations, 
intermediaries such as industry associations, consultancies, NGOs and public 
authorities can all be seen as playing an important role in increasing the 
performativity of selected statements of expectations by making them more 
visible. 
 
In providing these informational services, intermediaries of promise abide by the 
logic of building and maintaining reputation. Reputation, understood as 
encompassing expectations on the expertise and reliability of specific 
information sources, plays a crucial role in the mutual identification between 
information sources and counterparts. A positive reputation makes information 
sources and their statements more visible and more likely to be trusted by 
counterparts. Like any other information source, intermediaries themselves 
depend on reputation for their own visibility and rely on it to exert their power. 
Reputation may then be interpreted as another set of expectations, which 
combine with and reinforce the performativity of statements of expectations on 
technologies and policies, by providing more visibility to their information 
sources. Interestingly, within the sociology of expectations, reputation seems to 
have no explicit role in the mutual recognition between technologists and the 
rest of society – or among different types of actor, let alone in driving actors to 
strategic behaviours aimed at building or maintaining it. From the few insights 
on reputation currently available in the literature, reputation still appears to be 
primarily conceptualised as a sort of deterrent for the enunciation and/or 
endorsement of strategically hyped or genuinely overoptimistic expectations as 
these may lead to misallocations of resources and reputation damages. 
 
The observations and reflections I have made during my research open up 
future research avenues. At the theoretical level, sociologists of expectations 
may engage in a deeper reflection on the importance of gaining visibility in a 
world characterised by imperfect information. Future analyses could further 
extend the investigation of the interrelations between expectations on 
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technologies and policies and expectations on the expertise and reliability of 
their sources – e.g. how these latter affect the visibility of the former, thus 
catalysing their dynamics and performativity. At the empirical level, the 
investigation may then combine analyses of expectations on technologies and 
policies with analyses of the signals that their sources send on their expertise 
and reliability. This would help refine the theoretical insights here discussed into 
the roles played by reputation and intermediaries of promise in providing 
visibility to expectations on technologies and policies and, thus, further increase 
the interpretative power of the framework of the sociology of expectations. My 
contention is that these issues should not be neglected by scholars interested in 
studying the social dynamics underlying the dissemination of expectations. 
Rather, I see these issues as crucial to the future development not only of the 
sociology of expectations, but of science and technology studies as a whole. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
This appendix provides further details on how the UK Government publishes 
official documents and launches public consultations via its departments. It also 
describes the formal procedures that characterise the official correspondence 
among the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP), the 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (EFRAC), the Environmental 
Audit Committee (EAC) and the UK Government.  
 
 
1. The UK Government and its official documents 
 
UK Government departments issue “Departmental Papers” and “Command 
Papers” with the formula “by Command of Her Majesty” (House of Commons 
Information Office [HoC IO], 2010, p. 3; The Stationery Office [TSO], n.d.). 
These official documents are generally referred to as “green papers” or “white 
papers” and usually include detailed accounts explaining the reasons and 
justifications for specific policy proposals or statements of policy. 
 
Green papers and white papers are labels lacking a clear and formal definition. 
However, over the years, it has become accepted that green papers are 
proposals published with the intent of initiating a public debate, while white 
papers are announcements of more definite statements of policy (HoC IO, 
2010; TSO, n.d.). More specifically, a green paper would be an invitation for 
stakeholders to take part in a consultation. The purpose of a consultation would 
be to provide the UK Government with useful insights on its own policies. Those 
insights are supposed to help the UK Government produce an effective set of 
statements of policy. After the revision of the responses to the green paper, a 
white paper may follow. A white paper consists of a more defined set of 
statements of policy, which are made public to allow a further stage of pre-
legislative scrutiny. Therefore, green papers are released with the intention of 
gathering knowledge from stakeholders in relation to the announcement of 
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specific policy proposals, while white papers are released with the intention of 
testing reactions to more definite statements of policy. That said, the publication 
of a green paper is not a prerequisite to issuing a white paper, which can be 
published in isolation and need not be preceded or followed by an open 
consultation (HoC IO, 2010, pp. 10-11).  
 
The decision about whether to conduct a formal consultation or adopt other 
methods to seek inputs from interested parties is at the discretion of 
government departments. When it has been decided to run a formal, written, 
public consultation exercise, government departments should abide by the 
Code of Practice on Consultation. Introduced in 2000, the code is not legally 
binding and cannot prevail over statutory or mandatory requirements 
(Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [BERR], 2008, p. 
5). If government departments choose not to proceed with a formal consultation 
or to deviate from the code, they are encouraged to clarify the reasons for their 
decision (BERR, 2008, pp. 5-6).  
 
At some stage, the policy proposals set out in green and/or white papers are 
translated into primary legislation with the submission of a draft bill to 
Parliament. Following the instructions of the government department 
concerned, a team of lawyers in the Parliamentary Counsel Office (within the 
Cabinet Office) proceeds with the drafting of the bill. Bills may also be published 
beforehand in draft form to allow further parliamentary scrutiny (House of 
Commons Library [HoC Library], 2010, pp. 10-11). The practice of publishing 
draft bills for pre-parliamentary scrutiny is relatively new. Conservative 
administrations first introduced the pre-legislative scrutiny of draft bills in the late 
1980s. However, it became an established practice after the election of the 
Labour Government in 1997 (HoC Library, 2010). Once a bill passes through 
both Houses of Parliament, it receives royal assent and becomes and Act (HoC 
Library, 2010, p. 11). The choice of whether to submit a proposed bill to pre-
legislative scrutiny by publishing beforehand a green paper (i.e. consultative) 
and/or a white paper (i.e. statement of policy) on the same subject remains at 
the discretion of the UK Government. It can even choose to present a bill to 
Parliament without any prior public announcement (HoC IO, 2008, p. 3). 
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2. The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
 
Established in 1970 “to advise the Queen, Government, Parliament, the 
devolved administrations and the public”, the RCEP was an independent 
standing body funded by the Department of Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (Defra) (RCEP, 2011, March 22). Defra was responsible for selecting the 
members of the RCEP, who were drawn from a variety of backgrounds, ranging 
from academia to industry to public life. Members’ expertise and experiences 
covered disciplines such as science, medicine, engineering, law, economics 
and business. The initial term for a newly elected member was three years. 
Every member was selected through an open competition and could serve up to 
three terms. Every member was required to declare whether there might be any 
interests that could conflict with their role as commission members (RCEP, 
2011, March 22). The current UK Government formally closed the RCEP in 
March 2011 (Vaughan, 2010; RCEP, 2011, March 22). 
 
Reports of the RCEP were “virtually” considered “Command Papers” (HoC IO, 
2010, p. 4). The UK Government was neither obliged to accept the RCEP’s 
recommendations, nor to act upon them. However, it was an established 
practice for the UK Government to respond formally and explicitly to the RCEP’s 
reports. The formality of the response process reflects the importance the UK 
Government gave to the RCEP’s advisory role (Ferguson & Skinner, 2002, p. 
48). 
 
 
3. The Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, and the 
Environmental Audit Committee 
 
The Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (EFRAC) and the 
Environmental Audit Committee (EAC) are Select Committees of the House of 
Commons. EFRAC examines the expenditure, administration and policy of 
Defra and its affiliated public bodies (EFRAC, n.d.). Established in 1997, the 
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EAC scrutinises policies and programmes across all government departments 
and non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) regarding their contribution to 
environmental protection and sustainable development. It also audits their 
performance against sustainable development and environmental protection 
targets (EAC, n.d.). In 2005, the EAC decided to focus on climate change in 
recognition of the urgency of the threat (HoC IO, 2009, p. 6).  
 
Select Committees decide upon their own subject of inquiry within the scope of 
their remits. Inquiries may focus on several areas, including topical issues, 
departmental spending and the scrutiny of draft bills. Once the subject of inquiry 
has been chosen, Select Committees announce a forthcoming report via press 
notices and launch a call for evidence (HoC IO, 2009, p. 4). Once the evidence-
gathering phase is concluded and the final draft of the report is agreed by 
members, Select Committees publish their report and make them publicly 
available in their websites. The government departments addressed by the 
reports of Select Committees are expected to reply formally within 60 days. 
Select Committees normally publish the responses received from the UK 
Government as Special Reports. In their responses, government departments 
respond in name of “the Government”. They may also decide to respond to a 
Select Committee report by publishing a white paper. In Special Reports, Select 
Committees may include their counter-response to the UK Government’s 
response or white paper (HoC IO, 2009, p. 5). Noteworthy features of Select 
Committees are their members’ composition and their consensus-based 
approach in conducting inquiries. Members of Selects Committees are drawn 
from the governing and opposition parties to reflect the composition of 
Parliament and tend to adopt decisions unanimously (HoC IO, 2009, pp. 2, 3, 
5). In the aftermath of the national election of 6th May 2010, the EAC and 
EFRAC were reappointed with new members reflecting the composition of the 
newly elected House of Commons. 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
This appendix compares the lists of stakeholders that the Department for 
Transport (DfT) declared it had invited directly to participate in all four biofuels 
consultations. More specifically, it compares the lists for all four consultations as 
published in the invitation documents (DfT, 2004b, Annex E; 2007b, Annex D; 
2007a, Annex J; 2008a, Annex C) with those published in the following 
summaries of responses (DfT, 2004a, Introduction; 2007d, p. 3; 2008d, 
Introduction; 2009c, p. 1). 
 
 
1. Comparison of the DfT’s lists of stakeholders 
 
According to the summary of responses of the first consultation, a list of “nearly 
100 stakeholders” (DfT, 2004a, Introduction) was used to directly invite specific 
organisations. In this consultation, the DfT received a total of 129 responses 
(DfT, 2004a, Introduction), 79 of which from organisations (DfT, 2004a, Annex 
A). However, the “Stakeholder Consultee List” published in the invitation 
document of the consultation contains only 60 organisations (DfT, 2004b, 
Annex E). 
 
According to the summary of responses of the second consultation, the 
invitation document was “sent electronically to about 400 stakeholders” (DfT, 
2007d, p. 3). In this consultation, the DfT received 85 responses from 
organisations (DfT, 2007d, Annex A) and 6,27063 responses from members of 
the public64 (DfT, 2007d, p. 3). The list of directly invited stakeholders published 
in the invitation document contains only 235 organisations (DfT, 2007b, Annex 
                                            
63
 As reported by the DfT: “The 6,270 replies from members of the public focused on their 
concerns about the environmental impacts of the feedstock production that would be required to 
meet the biofuel demand created by the RTFO. In particular, more than 5,000 of these were 
prompted by the press advertising campaign run by a coalition of NGOs highlighting the 
dangers of uncontrolled biofuel cultivation in sensitive environmental habitats in SE Asia” (DfT, 
2007d). 
64
 There is a drafting error here as the number of total answers reported in the Summary of 
Responses is 6,335. The 6,270 members of the public added to the 85 organisations makes a 
total of 6,355. 
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D). This latter list includes most of the organisations listed in the invitation 
document of the previous consultation. 
 
According to the summary of responses of the third consultation, the invitation 
document was “sent electronically to approximately 400 stakeholders” (DfT, 
2008d, Introduction). In this consultation, the DfT received 5465 responses in 
total. The summary of responses of this consultation does not include a list of 
respondents. The list of directly invited stakeholders published in the invitation 
document contains only 244 organisations (DfT, 2007a, Annex J). This latter list 
almost coincides with the one published in the invitation document of the 
previous consultation. 
 
According to one of the two summaries of responses for the fourth consultation, 
the invitation document was, again, “sent electronically to about 400 
stakeholders” (DfT, 2009c, p. 1). In this consultation, the DfT received a total of 
89 responses, among them 6866 from organisations (DfT, 2009c, Annex A; 
2009d, Annex A). The list of directly invited stakeholders published in the 
invitation document contains 241 organisations (DfT, 2008a, Annex C), and 
almost coincides with the list published in the invitation documents of the two 
previous consultations. 
 
Thus, according to the total numbers of organisations that the DfT declared it 
had directly invited, a list of circa 100 organisations was used in the first 
consultation, while lists of circa 400 organisations were used in the following 
consultations. 
 
 
 
                                            
65
 I reconstructed a list of respondents through the analysis of the original responses. The 
original responses I received from the DfT numbered 50 (not 54), all from organisations.  
66
 There is a drafting error in the Summary of Responses: the total responses is 89, the number 
of “members of the public” is 22, and the total organisations listed by name in the Annex A is 68. 
These numbers do not add up. 
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Table 3: biofuel consultations – stakeholders directly invited 
Biofuel Consultations 
1st: 
26/04/2004 
2nd: 
22/02/2007 
3rd: 
21/06/2007 
4th: 
15/10/2008 
Stakeholders directly 
invited according to: 
 
- invitation 
document (listed 
name by name) 
60 235 244 241 
- summary of 
response(s) 
(only declared 
as total 
indicative 
number) 
circa 100 circa 400 circa 400 circa 400 
- Number of 
responses 
received: 
    
- in total 129 6,335 (a) 54 89 
- from 
organisations 
79 85 54 68 
(a): There is a drafting error as the number of total answers reported in the 
Summary of Responses is 6,335. The total of 6,270 members of the public 
added to the 85 organisations is 6,355. 
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Appendix 3 
 
 
This appendix reports the questions of the consultation under analysis – i.e. 
Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (Amendment) Order 2009 (DfT, 2008a) 
 
 
1. Part One – Future Levels under the RTFO  
 
Question 1: Do you agree or disagree that if the obligation levels were left 
unchanged at 3.75 per cent for 2009/10 this would only have a marginal impact 
on the amounts of bioethanol used by obligated suppliers to meet their 
obligation in that period?  
Question 2: Do you agree or disagree that the obligation levels should be left 
unchanged?  
Question 3: Do you agree or disagree with freezing the obligation level at 2.5 
per cent?  
Question 4: Do you agree or disagree that the rate of increase in the RTFO 
should be adjusted in line with Professor Gallagher’s recommendations?  
Question 5: Do you agree or disagree that agreed mandatory sustainability 
criteria would benefit both bioethanol and biodiesel producers in the UK?  
Question 6: Do you agree with the costs as set out in the Impact Assessment?  
Question 7: Do you agree or disagree that the definitions in the draft amending 
order at Annex B for biobutanol and renewable diesel are appropriate?  
Question 8: If HPRD is made an eligible fuel, do you agree or disagree that a 
minimum proportion of it should be attributable to renewable sources? If you 
agree, what would be a suitable level, for example, 5 per cent?  
Question 9: Do you agree or disagree that the volume of biomass fed into the 
processing unit is the appropriate way to measure the volume of HPRD which is 
attributable to biomass?  
Question 10: Do you have views as to whether it is technically possible and 
practical to identify accurately the part of HPRD which is derived from biomass? 
If so, would this represent a better way forward than designating HPRD as a 
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whole as a renewable transport fuel and issuing certificates only for that 
proportion of it which is attributable to biomass?  
Question 11: Do you agree or disagree that if it is possible to legislate in order 
to add HPRD (or a part of HPRD) to the list of eligible fuels under the RTFO 
during the 2009/10 obligation period, this would be preferable to waiting until the 
revision of the RTFO order to implement the RED?  
Question 12: Do you have views about how the production of these new fuels 
might encourage the use of certain feedstocks, and are there additional 
sustainability issues that arise?  
Question 13: Do you have any other comments on the draft order at Annex B?  
 
 
2. Part Two – Longer term issues related to transposition of the European 
Directives 
 
Question 14: Do you agree or disagree that an amended RTFO scheme should 
be the principal mechanism to deliver biofuels to help meet the requirements of 
the Renewable Energy Directive?  
Question 15: What would be an appropriate mechanism to address other 
renewables for transport, eg electricity?  
Question 16: What would be a suitable mechanism to implement the 
requirements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in transport in the FQD, 
bearing in mind that such a mechanism might need to encompass not only the 
contribution made from renewable fuels but also other ways of reducing 
emissions such as reduced flaring, carbon capture etc?  
Question 17: Would the double rewards proposed under the RED be adequate 
to encourage second generation biofuels?  
Question 18: What other mechanisms could better encourage the development 
of second generation biofuels?  
Question 19: – Do you agree or disagree that this is the right course of action 
with regards to tallow?  
Question 20: Taking into account the requirements of both draft Directives, are 
there any other issues which need consideration when we transpose these into 
UK legislation?  
299 
 
Appendix 4 
 
 
This appendix provides a synthetic account of the biofuel industrial contexts of 
the consultation under analysis.  
 
 
1. Biofuel industry context in the UK 
 
The Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO) came into effect on the 15th 
April 2008. The RTFO identified refiners and importers of fossil fuels for 
transport supplying at least 450,000 litres per obligation year as “obligated 
suppliers” (RFA, 2010, p. 8). Obligated suppliers were required to supply 
increasing annual rates of biofuels calculated on the total of transport fossil 
fuels they had supplied in each obligation year. Under the 2007 Order (UK 
Parliament, 2007), the obligation levels were set at 2.5% for 2008/09, 3.75% for 
2009/10 and 5% for 2010/11 – all calculated on volume basis (DfT, 2006, p. 3). 
The RTFO also enforced a reporting scheme with carbon and sustainability 
targets to benchmark the level of performance that the UK Government 
expected from obligated suppliers over the obligations years – also in view of 
the forthcoming EU mandatory system of sustainability standards. However, 
obligated suppliers were only required to report on, not certify the sustainability 
of, the biofuels used. Furthermore, the carbon and sustainability targets were 
not mandatory and there was no penalty for failing to meet them (RFA, 2010, p. 
20).  
 
The Renewable Fuels Agency (RFA), a small non-departmental public body 
funded by the Department for Transport (DfT), was created to administer the 
RTFO. The RFA was in charge of verifying and awarding RTFO certificates to 
the biofuels supplied by both biofuel producers and obligated suppliers. 
Obligated suppliers were obliged to accumulate enough certificates to match 
the obligation levels as prescribed by the increasing annual rates of the RTFO. 
They could do so by self-producing biofuels, buying biofuels domestically or 
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abroad, buying biofuel certificates from biofuel producers or other obligated 
suppliers, or paying a buyout price as set by the RTFO.  
 
One of the aims of the RTFO was to promote the development of a UK-based 
biofuel industry. Before the introduction of the RTFO, financial support for 
biofuels was granted through fuel duty discounts, since 2002 for biodiesel and 
2005 for bioethanol. These discounts proved insufficient to upgrade the small-
scale UK biofuel industry to a larger scale, driving multinational suppliers of 
transport fossil fuels to import cheaper biofuels from international markets. The 
RTFO was supposed to overcome the drawbacks of fuels duty discounts. The 
creation of a certificate market was meant to provide small-sized UK biofuel 
producers with a secure demand (from obligated suppliers) to trade out the 
certificates they could obtain by submitting their biofuels to the RFA (DfT, 2006, 
p. 3). 
 
Nevertheless, in the first year of the RTFO – obligation year 2008/2009 – the 
market of certificates collapsed. Multinational suppliers of transport fossil fuels – 
now obligated suppliers – continued to self-produce or outsource their biofuels 
internationally (see Tables 2 and 3). Of over 1,250 million certificates awarded 
in total, only 164 million certificates were traded, 155 of them among obligated 
suppliers only. Biofuel-only producers were able to trade away just over 9 
million certificates only – mostly to obligated suppliers (RFA, 2010, pp. 18-19). 
According to the RFA’s report on the 2008/09 obligation year, 
 
“The scarcity of small trades indicates that most of the biofuel-only 
suppliers did not access the 2008/2009 certificate market, and therefore 
did not, to October 2009, realise any financial benefit from reporting 
under the RTFO.” (RFA, 2010, p. 19) 
 
In the first obligation year, the RTFO thus failed to set up a certificate trading 
system capable of supporting small-scale UK biofuel producers, as these latter 
could not sell their certificates and only survived thanks to the still-enforced fuel 
duty discounts on biofuels. 
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Obligated suppliers were the most legally compelled by UK biofuel policy. They 
were obliged by the RTFO to blend increasing amounts of biofuels into their 
transport fossil fuel supplies and to report on the sustainability of the biofuels 
used to fulfil the obligation. Their core business was producing-refining and/or 
trading transport fossil fuels on a large scale. Although some were also large-
scale producers of biofuels, their involvement with UK biofuel policy was mostly 
related to the investments previously made and currently planned to respond to 
the RTFO requirements. Belonging to a marginal business compared to their 
core, these investments were nonetheless rather consistent.  
 
Biofuel-only producers were the most financially dependent on UK biofuel 
policy. Their economic viability crucially depended on the financial support 
provided by the UK Government. Their core business was the production of 
biofuels. The majority of UK biofuel-only producers were small- to medium-sized 
producers of biodiesel from used cooking oils (UCO). Among the 38 biofuel-only 
companies that submitted biofuels to the RFA in the obligation year 2008/2009, 
32 submitted biodiesel only or mostly produced from UCO, making up 85% of 
the biofuel supplied by UK domestic suppliers. Biofuels from UCO automatically 
met the Qualifying Standards Level of sustainability since it was classified as a 
by-product (waste) and, therefore, was considered to deliver high GHG savings 
while not causing direct or indirect land-use-change (RFA, 2010, p. 25). 
 
The above considerations support the case to consider obligated suppliers as a 
distinctive group with respect to biofuel producers. They differ not only in their 
business core, but also in their approach to biofuel trading/production, with 
biofuels produced from different technologies and feedstocks. Besides, in the 
obligation year of the fourth consultation, obligated suppliers did not undertake 
any relevant commercial transactions with biofuel producers.  
 
In the obligation year 2008/09, there were seven medium-large plants in 
operation in the UK, two more under construction and another seven planned 
(NNFCC, 2009) (see also Tables 5 and 6). The biofuel producers participating 
in the consultation and owning-constructing-planning the construction of biofuel 
plants were:  
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- a first biofuel producer (Argent), which owned one medium-large 
biodiesel plant in operation;  
- a second biofuel producer (Ensus), which owned a large bioethanol plant 
under construction;  
- a third biofuel producer (Vireol), which was planning the construction of 
two large-scale bioethanol plants; and  
- a fourth biofuel producer (British Sugar), which owned the only 
bioethanol plant in operation and whose the core business was the 
production of sugar (included among biofuel producers because it not an 
obligated supplier).  
The obligated suppliers participating in the consultation and owning-
constructing-planning the construction of biofuel plants were:  
- an obligated supplier (British Petroleum), which was collaborating with 
the sugar supplier above on the construction of another large-scale 
bioethanol plant; and 
- an obligated supplier (Greenergy), which owned two large-scale 
biodiesel plants in operation. 
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Graph 7: biofuels used to fulfil the RTFO in the UK: country of origin 
I retrieved the graphs below from the Renewable Fuels Agency website. 
Source: RFA verified data set for Year One of the RTFO (RFA, 2011, April 10)  
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Table 4: biofuel supplies to the UK from 1999/2000 to 2008/2009 
I constructed the table below using data taken from the Hydrocarbon Oils 
Bulletin of August 2009 provided by HM Revenues & Customs. The biodiesel 
supply has outstripped the bioethanol supply both because biodiesel was 
granted a fuels discount from July 2002, while bioethanol waited until January 
2005, and because in general the biodiesel supply can be more easily 
integrated into the existing infrastructure (RFA, 2010, p. 16). The table below 
shows biofuel clearances since they began in 2002. 
 Petrol  Diesel  Total 
Unit: 
Million 
Litres 
Bioe
than
ol 
Total 
Petrol 
Bioethanol 
as % Petrol 
Share 
Biodiesel 
and 
Bioblended 
(i) 
Total 
Diesel 
Biodiesel 
as % 
Diesel 
Share 
Biofuels 
as % 
Total 
Petrol 
and 
Diesel 
(ii) 
        
Financial Year       
1999/00 0 28,640 0.00% 0 18,295 0.00% 0.00% 
2000/01 0 27,532 0.00% 0 18,493 0.00% 0.00% 
2001/02 0 28,229 0.00% 0 19,113 0.00% 0.00% 
2002/03 0 27,837 0.00% 5 20,102 0.02% 0.01% 
2003/04 0 27,407 0.00% 22 21,230 0.10% 0.04% 
2004/05 14 26,555 0.05% 21 22,395 0.10% 0.07% 
2005/06 90 25,541 0.35% 49 23,499 0.21% 0.28% 
2006/07 107 24,530 0.44% 220 24,545 0.90% 0.67% 
2007/08 170 23,897 0.71% 365 25,844 1.41% 1.08% 
2008/09 208 22,312 0.93% 1,026 25,335 4.05% 2.59% 
notes: (i) 
 
Data show only the proportion of the fuel liable at the biodiesel 
duty rate 
 (ii) 
 
Not including Road Fuel Gases (Natural 
Gas/LPG) 
  
Source: HM Revenue & Customs – Hydrocarbon Oils Bulletin – August 2009 
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Table 5: obligated suppliers participating in the consultation 
I constructed the table below using data taken from a variety of sources. 
Unfortunately, official sources do not contain exhaustive and precise 
information. Sources: consultation responses; organisations’ websites; 
(BERR, 2003; NNFCC, 2006; BERR, 2007; NNFCC, 2008c; 2008a; DECC, 
2009b; NNFCC, 2009; 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Nationality Biofuel Type Biofuels Plants Research 
submitted Number Biofuel Type Stage Capacity Location 2nd Gen
7 Obligated Suppliers to RTFO biofuels
4 ONLY Traders and Distributors of
Transport Fossil Fuels & Biofuels
NOT biofuels producers
Mabanaft Germany BD+BE 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/I
Shell UK UK/NL BD 1 2nd Gen - BE demonstrational 1  MLPY Canada Yes
1 Biogasoline demonstrational 0.038 MLPY USA
Chevron USA BD 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes
ConocoPhillips USA BD 1 BD demonstrational N/I Ireland Yes
1 BD demonstrational N/I USA
3 ALSO Biofuels Producers
current or prospective
Greenergy UK BD+BE 1 BD operational 100,000 TPA UK Yes
1 BD operational 100,000 TPA UK
Ineos UK BD 1 BD operational 110,000 N/I France Yes
(on behalf of Morgan Stanley Capital Group) 1 BD planned 500,000 TPA UK
British Petroleum UK BD+BE 1 BE under  construction 320,000 TPA UK Yes
1 BE operational 435 MLPY Brazil
LEGEND:
BE - bioethanol TPA - tonnes per annum
BD - biodiesel MLPY - million litres per year
N/A - not applicable MW - megawatt
N/I - no information found either in consultation response or websites
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Table 6: biofuel producers participating in the consultation 
I constructed the table below using data taken from a variety of sources. 
Unfortunately, official sources do not contain exhaustive and precise 
information. Sources: consultation responses; organisations’ websites; 
(BERR, 2003; NNFCC, 2006; BERR, 2007; NNFCC, 2008c; 2008a; DECC, 
2009b; NNFCC, 2009; 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
12 Biofuels Producers Nationality Biofuel Type Biofuels Plants Research 
submitted Number Biofuel Type Stage Capacity Location 2nd Gen
9 Biofuels-only  Producers to RTFO biofuels
biofuels prod. =core business
Argent UK BD 1 BD operational 44,000 TPA UK N/I
Convert2Green UK BD N/I BD N/I N/I UK N/I
Daka Biodiesel Denmark BD 1 BD operational 55 MPLY Denmark N/I
1 2nd Gen - BD under  construction 56 MPLY Denmark
Ensus UK BE 1 BE under  construction 315,000 TPA UK N/I
Vireol UK BE 1 BE planned 150,000 TPA UK N/I
1 BE planned 150,000 TPA UK
4 Producing other than
biodiesel or bioethanol
Verdant Fuels UK Pure Plant Oil N/I Pure Plant Oil N/I N/I N/I N/I
Helius Energy UK None 1 Electricity operational 65 Mwe UK N/I
1 Electricity planned 100 MW UK
Gasrec UK Biomethane N/I Biomethane N/I N/I UK N/I
Energexia UK None 1 2nd Gen - BD planned N/I N/I Yes
2 Biofuels Producers
biofuels prod.= NOT core business
British Sugar UK BE 1 BE operational 55,000 TPA UK N/I
1 BE planned 320,000 TPA UK
Neste Oil Finland None 1 BD - NExBTL operational 190,000 TPA Finland N/I
1 BD - NExBTL under  construction 190,000 TPA Finland
1 BD - NExBTL planned 800,000 TPA NL
1 BD - NExBTL planned 800,000 TPA Singapore
1 Biofuels Producers - Unknown - website and consultation response MISSING
Goldenfuels N/I BD N/I N/I N/I N/I N/I N/I
LEGEND:
BE - bioethanol TPA - tonnes per annum
BD - biodiesel MLPY - million litres per year
N/A - not applicable MW - megawatt
N/I - no information found either in consultation response or websites
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Glossary: 
 
AIC – Agricultural Industries Confederation 
APAG – European Oleo-chemical and Allied Products Group  
AUKOI – Association of United Kingdom Oil Independents (now Downstream 
Fuel Association) 
BACS – British Association for Chemical Specialities 
BBC – British Broadcasting Company 
BBSRC – Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council 
BERR – Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
BP – British Petroleum 
BRASS – ESRC Centre for Business Relationships Accountability Sustainability 
and Society 
BSBEC – BBSRC Supergen Biomass and Bioenergy Consortium 
CAFOD – Catholic Agency for Overseas Development 
CEN – European Committee of Standardisation 
CPT – Confederation of Passenger Transport 
DECC – Department of Energy and Climate Change 
Defra – Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs 
DETR – Department of Environment Transport and the Regions 
DfT – Department for Transport 
dLUC – Direct Land Use Changes 
DoT – Department of Transport 
DTI – Department of Trade and Industry 
DTLR – Department of Transport Local Government and Regions 
E.ON – Energy ON 
EA – Environment Agency 
EAC – Environmental Audit Committee 
EBB – European Biodiesel Board 
EC – European Commission 
EDF – Electricité de France 
EFPRA – European Association for the Animal Fats and Animal By–Products 
Processing Industry 
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EFRAC – Environment Food and Rural Affairs Committee 
EIC – Environment Industries Commission 
EPSRC – Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
ESRC – Economic Social Research Council 
EST – Energy Savings Trust 
EU – European Union 
FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations  
FBHVC – Federation of British Historic Vehicle Clubs 
FDF – Food and Drink Federation 
FoE – Friends of the Earth 
FPS – Federation of Petroleum Suppliers 
FQD – Fuel Quality Directive 
GHG – Green House Gasses 
GM – General Motors 
HIE – Highlands and Islands Enterprise 
HITRANS – Highlands and Islands Strategic Transport Partnership 
HoC IO – House of Commons Information Office 
HoC Library – House of Commons Library 
IEA – International Energy Agency 
IEEP – Institute for European Environmental Policy 
IFAD – International Fund for Agricultural Development 
IFPRI – International Food Policy Research Institute  
iLUC – Indirect Land Use Changes 
IMF – International Monetary Fund 
IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
LCA – Life Cycle Assessment  
MLP – Multi-Level Perspective 
NC – Nuffield Council 
NDPB – Non-Departmental Public Body 
NE – Natural England 
NEPIC – North East Process Industry Cluster 
NFU – National Farmers Union 
NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation 
NNFCC – National Non-Food Crops Centre 
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North East RSB – North East Regional Strategy Board for Transport Biofuels 
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PIU – Performance Innovation Unit of the Cabinet Office 
RAC Foundation – Royal Automobile Club Foundation 
RAE – Royal Academy of Engineering 
RCEP – Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
REA – Renewable Energy Association 
RED – Renewable Energy Directive 
RFA – Renewable Fuels Agency 
RS – Royal Society 
RSPB – Royal Society for the Protection of Birds  
RSSB – Rail Safety and Standards Board 
RTFO – Renewable Transport Fuels Obligation 
SCOPA – Seed Crushers and Oil Processors Association 
SEPA – Scottish Environment Protection Agency 
SMMT – The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders Ltd 
SNH – Scottish Natural Heritage 
STS – Science Technology and Society 
Supergen – Sustainable Power Generation and Supply 
TSO – The Stationary Office 
UCO – Used Cooking Oils 
UKCPI – United Kingdom Cleaning Products Industry Association  
UKERC – United Kingdom Energy Research Centre 
UKPIA – United Kingdom Petroleum Industry Association 
UKRA – United Kingdom Renderers Association 
ULSD – Ultra-Low Sulphur Diesel 
UN – United Nations 
UN HLTF – High Level Task Force of the United Nations 
UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNEP – United Nations Environment Programme 
UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
WEP – World Food Programme 
WTO – World Trade Organisation 
WWF – World Wide Fund for Nature 
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